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which have mushroomed since the 1990s, and considers their potential as a
tool for reducing inter- and intra-state conflict.
Exploring the links between trade, conflict and peace in different and vary-
ing contexts, this book maps the extant RTAs in the region, analyses the
factors that hinder or promote regional trade integration and considers their
economic and political impacts. Presenting a series of case studies in four
regions: South America; the southern African region; South Asia; and South
East Asia, the authors consider three key questions:
• What is the significance of the recent and rapid development of RTAs for
peace building both within and between countries?
• To what extent do RTAs engender inter- and intra-state conflict?
• To what extent are trade and RTAs hostage to conflict and is regional
political stability a precondition for economic integration?
Regional Trade Integration and Conflict Resolution will be of interest to
students and scholars of trade, international relations and conflict studies. It
will also be of interest to policy makers and non-governmental organisations
(NGOs).
Shaheen Rafi Khan is Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy
Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan.
Routledge Advances in International Political Economy
1 The Future of the Nation-State
Essays on cultural pluralism and
political integration





2 Classical Liberalism and
International Economic Order
Studies in theory and intellectual
history
Razeen Sally
3 Coping with Globalization
Jeffrey Hart and Aseem Prakash
4 Responding to Globalization
Jeffrey Hart and Aseem Prakash
5 Japanese Capitalism in Crisis
A regulationist interpretation
Edited by Robert Boyer and
Toshio Yamada
6 Globalization and Social Change
Edited by Johannes Dragsbaek
Schmidt and Jacques Hersh
7 Multilateralism and the World Trade
Organisation
The architecture and extension of
international trade recognition
Rorden Wilkinson
8 Foreign Direct Investment,
Democracy and Development





Deregulation and global goverance
Barbara Emadi-Coffin
10 Technology, Governance and Political
Conflict in International Industries
Tony Porter
11 America’s Trade Policy towards Japan
Demanding results
John Kunkel
12 Chinese Capitalism in a Global Era
Towards hybrid capitalism
Henry Wai-chung Yeung
13 The World Bank and Africa
The construction of governance
states
Graham Harrison
14 Welfare, Right and the State
A framework for thinking
David P. Levine
15 Regional Trade Integration and
Conflict Resolution
Edited by Shaheen Rafi Khan
Regional Trade Integration
and Conflict Resolution
Edited by Shaheen Rafi Khan
International Development Research Centre
Ottawa • Cairo • Dakar • Montevideo • Nairobi • New Delhi • Singapore
First published 2009
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Routledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group,
an informa business
Published in association with the
International Development Research Centre
PO Box 8500, Ottawa, ON K1G 3H9, Canada
www.idrc.ca info@idrc.ca
ISBN: 978–1–55250–414–7 (ebook)
© 2009 International Development Research Centre
Typeset in Times New Roman by
RefineCatch Limited, Bungay, Suffolk
Printed and bound in Great Britain by
TJ International Ltd, Padstow, Cornwall
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic,
mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any
information storage or retrieval system, without permission in
writing from the publishers.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Regional trade integration and conflict resolution / edited by Shaheen
Rafi Khan.
p. cm.—(Routledge advances in international political economy ; 14)
Trade blocs—Developing countries. 2. Developing countries—
Commercial treaties. 3. Developing countries—Foreign economic
relations. 4. Peace-building—Developing countries.
5. Regionalism—Developing countries. I. Khan, Shaheen Rafi.
HF1418.7.R443 2008
382′.911724—dc22 2008018392
ISBN 10: 0–415–47759–X (pbk)
ISBN 10: 0–203–88980–0 (ebk)
ISBN 13: 978–0–415–47759–8 (pbk)
ISBN 13: 978–0–203–88980–0 (ebk)
Contents
List of figures vii
List of tables viii




List of acronyms xviii
1 Introduction 1
OLI BROWN, SHAHEEN RAFI KHAN AND FAISAL HAQ SHAHEEN
2 Regional integration, trade and conflicts in
Latin America 15
ALEJANDRA RUIZ-DANA, PETER GOLDSCHAGG, EDMUNDO
CLARO AND HERNÁN BLANCO
3 Regional integration, trade and conflict in
southern Africa 45
MZUKISI QOBO
4 Regional trade agreements in South Asia: trade
and conflict linkages 69
SHAHEEN RAFI KHAN, MOEED YUSUF, FAISAL HAQ SHAHEEN
AND AZKA TANVEER
5 Regional trade agreements and conflict: the case
of Southeast Asia 102
HANK LIM
6 Managing conflict through trade: the case of
Pakistan and India 130
SHAHEEN RAFI KHAN, FAISAL HAQ SHAHEEN AND MOEED YUSUF
7 Outlines of intra-state conflict in Zimbabwe and
regional challenges 165
MZUKISI QOBO
8 Peru and Ecuador: a case study of Latin American
integration and conflict 181
ALEJANDRA RUIZ-DANA
9 Trading across the Straits: will a free trade
agreement between China and Taiwan promote peace? 207
HANK LIM
10 Conclusion: the role of regional trade integration
in conflict prevention 231




2.1 Map of South America 17
2.2 Trade agreements signed and under negotiations in
the Americas 23
2.3 Development of tariffs in Latin America and the
Caribbean (LAC) 24
4.1 Trade and conflict dynamics 70
4.2 Political stability 72
4.3 Comparison of South Asian tariffs with other regional
trading blocs 89
5.1 East Asia’s export shares using input–output table
calculations, 2003 115
6.1 The peace dividend 153
6.2 Pakistan’s defence, education and health expenditures 155
6.3 Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Pakistan
and India) 155
8.1 Peru–Ecuador: area of boundary dispute 184
8.2 Defence spending 189
8.3 Bilateral trade trends 194
8.4 Regional trade 197
8.5 Global trade 197
Tables
1.1 Acronyms for selected prominent RTAs 2
1.2 Good governance conditionality in south–south RTAs 8
2.1 LAC export structure 25
2.2 Intra-regional trade per sub-region 25
3.1 Bilateral complementarity indices in SADC 53
3.2 Overlapping membership 58
4.1 Chronology of major conflicts in South Asia 78
4.2 Trade and conflict language in RTAs 83
4.3 Intra-regional export shares: a comparison across
southern RTAs 87
4.4 SAARC intra-regional trade 88
4.5 India’s informal trade with South Asian countries 88
4.6 Non-tariff measures–coverage ratio of South Asian
countries 88
4.7 Chronology of key bilateral agreements 90
5.1 ASEAN-6 top ten export commodities by two-digit
HS codes in 2004 116
5.2 ASEAN-6 top ten import commodities by two-digit
HS codes in 2004 117
5.3 ASEAN-6 top ten major import and export markets
in 2001–2004 118
5.4 Other projects in the Mekong sub-region 124
6.1 Chronology of India–Pakistan conflicts 132
6.2 Gini coefficient and consumption shares by quintiles
in Pakistan 141
6.3 Pakistan trade with India 143
6.4 Source, destination and value of informal imports 145
6.5 Source, destination and value of informal exports 146
6.6 Combined trade, 2005 146
6.7 Export potential from Pakistan 150
6.8 Export potential from India 151
6.9 Costing conflict: Siachen 154
6.10 Pakistan and India defence expenditures 154
7.1 A chronology of bilateral trade agreements 170
7.2 Estimated Zimbabwean informal imports from
SADC countries 172
7.3 Estimated informal Zimbabwean exports to
SADC countries 172
8.1 Military spending as percentage of federal budget 188
8.2 Bilateral trade 196
8.3 Global trade partners 196
9.1 Mainland China foreign trade by country (area) 212
9.2 Sources of realised FDI in China 213
9.3 Number of Taiwanese visitors to mainland China 214
9.4 Taiwan’s major trade partners 218
9.5 Taiwan’s investment in mainland China 219
Tables ix
Contributors
Hernán Blanco is Executive Director and Founding Partner of RIDES, San-
tiago, Chile.
Oli Brown is a project manager and policy researcher for the International
Institute for Sustainable Development’s (IISD) Trade and Investment, and
Security programmes.
Edmundo Claro is Associate Researcher at RIDES, Santiago, Chile.
Peter Goldschagg is Associate Researcher at RIDES, Santiago, Chile.
Shaheen Rafi Khan is Research Fellow at the Sustainable Development Policy
Institute (SDPI), Islamabad, Pakistan.
Hank Lim is Director of Research at the Singapore Institute of International
Affairs (SIIA), Singapore.
Mzukisi Qobo is Research Fellow at the South African Institute of Inter-
national Affairs (SAIIA).
Alejandra Ruiz-Dana is a researcher at the Recursos e Investigación para el
Desarello Sustenable (RIDES), Santiago, Chile.
Faisal Haq Shaheen is Visiting Research Associate at the SDPI, Islama-
bad, Pakistan.
Azka Tanveer is Research Assistant at the SDPI, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Moeed Yusuf is a consultant on Economic Policy at the SDPI, Islama-
bad, Pakistan.
Foreword
Flat world or a world of regions?
While many have talked about globalisation and some suggest we live in a
‘flat’ world, regionalism has been a phenomenon that has been less remarked
upon and studied. Yet, even with the lower costs of travel and transport, and
the wonders of technology, there are still costs and constraints such as time
and culture that lead globalisation to be incomplete. Thus, in a less than fully
global world, there are many reasons that regionalism has continued and
indeed grown.
The European Union (EU) has provided the boldest and perhaps most
advanced example of regionalisation in the world. Yet we may equally note
different efforts to link and prefer regional ties in North and South America,
in Africa and across Asia.
Many of these are overlapping groups. For example, in Asia alone, there is
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), that brings together
the ten states of Southeast Asia; ASEAN+3, with the North East Asian
countries of China, Japan and South Korea; the East Asia Summit, with the
foregoing plus India, Australia and New Zealand; and the still wider Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) process.
For these reasons, there is evidence to suggest that we live not in a flat
world in which all points are equally accessible, but in a world of regions, with
differing circles of proximity and identification. Such thinking underscores
the current talk about the rise of Asia to a greater equality with North
America and the EU.
While this book deals with regionalism in different parts of the world,
allow me in this context to share some observations drawn from an
Asian perspective.
Asian regionalism and trade
More and more people predict the rise of Asia with economic, political and
other dimensions. However, this is not an assured and guaranteed outcome,
as the crisis of 1997 showed us. Much depends on the policies and choices
that Asians make in facing the challenges ahead and dealing with pot-
ential conflicts. In this context, trade and the avoidance of conflict are
key pillars.
Trade has been a central policy for many Asian states not only to drive its
rise, but also to address diverse attendant challenges such as education and
equity for the poor, and industrialisation and economic competitiveness in
the private sector.
Given the modern patterns of trade, Asians have traditionally traded
more with the developed economies than with each other. International
trade remains of key importance to Asia, and many have hoped for
progress in the Doha Development Round and the equitable representation
of their interests and perspectives in the World Trade Organization
(WTO).
Yet Asia has also witnessed a rising tide in regional trade agreements
(RTAs). While early efforts among Asian economies like the Japan–Singa-
pore Economic Partnership Agreement were doubted by both those within
and outside the region, regional free trade and economic agreements have
proliferated from the early 2000s. Today, there are few Asian states that are
not involved in one or more trade agreements, either bilaterally or as a
sub-regional group.
Some question these free trade agreements (FTAs) for their efficacy and
efficiency, suggesting that an unwieldy and incoherent ‘spaghetti bowl’ of
agreements has resulted. Notwithstanding this, we can see that these FTAs
serve as political signifiers of the growing ties and sense of regionalism
among Asians, and underline a real and underlying economic integration that
already exists in Asia.
This growing regional trade integration can be seen in the rise in the vol-
ume of intra-Asian trade. A large part of this trade is in intermediate goods,
with the final product meant for export to non-Asian markets, especially the
US and EU. This signifies the creation of a regional production base as
private sector actors rationally leverage on different competitive strengths in
different Asian states, rather than producing any product exclusively and less
efficiently in a single country.
Additionally, a growing part of the intra-Asian trade is not for export but
meant for consumers within Asia. For this reason, as the US faces economic
difficulties ahead, there is some talk of a decoupling of their economies such
that Asia can and will keep growing even if the US is adversely affected. My
own analysis is that such talk is perhaps premature. While Asian consump-
tion is growing with the rise of a middle class, there is still considerable
interdependence and exchange with non-Asian economies, especially the US
and EU. What may be truer is that the dynamics in these interregional rela-




Peace or at least the avoidance of conflicts is a second important pillar in the
rise of Asia. Differences over trade can and will be likely to arise. While the
importance of trade is almost universally recognised, particular groups and
sectors may well face losses, and drive political and social sensitivities to
liberalisation. There can and have been disagreements on other issues too,
such as the environmental impacts of trade in certain goods, or their impact
on human and labour rights. Or about standards of safety, technical require-
ments and other areas.
Such differences over trade arise at different levels and scales and can
lead to wider political differences and tensions between states. The resolu-
tion of such differences in the WTO has been developed and increasingly
strengthened.
Yet regional approaches to trade dispute resolution are also needed in Asia
and other regions. Efforts should be made so that trade relations can be dealt
with in a wider context of relations and the need to avoid increasing tension
and possible conflict between states.
Wider and more fundamental conflicts must also be managed and avoided
at the regional levels, between neighbours and near neighbours. These include
the political and security tensions that exist in Asia and other countries. Some
relate to historical differences, narrow nationalism, ethnic differences (or
indeed commonalities) and territorial claims. Others even more dangerously
perhaps relate to political hegemony presently or in the future, whereby secur-
ity, trade and other concerns are brought together in a heady and potentially
dangerous brew.
What is the role of regional trade integration in such conflicts? This is one
of the difficult questions that this volume makes an effort to address. This is
most welcome.
Many regional schemes for cooperation and integration have proceeded on
the faith that interdependence in the economic field can potentially soften
political tension and competition between states. This has been the rationale
in Asia and ASEAN, whether stated or implicit. Similarly, some see the
intra-Asian efforts such as the ASEAN+3 as an effort to engage China as an
emerging power, and the China–ASEAN FTA as, conversely, China’s effort
to reach out to its southern neighbours.
Bilaterally too, the high levels of investment and trade between neighbours
often belies a relationship that can be tense, in other dimensions. Relations
among the Indo-Chinese states and Thailand, between Singapore and Malay-
sia, and between these two triangulated with Indonesia, and perhaps most
famously between Japan and China show this pattern.
This volume is therefore to be welcomed for more closely and critic-
ally examining the relationship between regional economic integration and
conflict, not only in Asia but also across the world. For as economic and
other ties bring us closer together, there are both opportunities for closer
Foreword xiii
cooperation and greater understanding, as well as dangers for increased
frictions and envy between neighbouring states. The studies in this vol-
ume therefore bear close study for the observations they make and the
implications they draw out about the reality of the world we live in, that is
increasingly interconnected but not at peace.
Simon S.C. Tay
Chairman
Singapore Institute of International Affairs
xiv Foreword
Preface
Economic interdependence as a means to attain peace is becoming increas-
ingly important, as the evolving global security paradigm grows weary of
purely military solutions to inter- and intra-state tensions. A concrete articula-
tion of this is regional trade agreements (RTAs), which mushroomed globally
during the 1990s. The ‘rush to regionalism’ generated considerable debate.
While Jagdish Bhagwati dismisses these agreements as ‘spaghetti bowl situ-
ations’, at the other end of the spectrum, scholars and policy practitioners
view RTAs as World Trade Organization (WTO)-plus arrangements to spur
global trade. They also add potential value in inverting the historical dictum,
‘trade follows the flag’. In other words, RTAs have political relevance in
as much as they can promote regional peace. Inspired by the example of the
European Union (EU), aid donors and the international community
have been particularly keen to promote regional economic integration in the
developing world, anticipating both trade liberalisation and political stability.
This may be a reasonable expectation in the north given the enabling insti-
tutional environment. Southern dynamics are far more unstable, with the
possibility that RTAs can actually implode; they can either trigger conflict, or
they may not even be able to get off the ground in the absence of certain
political preconditions. The range of possibilities suggests the need for empiri-
cal research to shed light on these questions. However, most of the existing
literature is preoccupied with conducting a theoretical debate on the issue.
There are relatively few attempts to test the theoretical premises through
empirical studies. In an effort to address this deficiency, we have examined the
issues of regional and bilateral trade and peace building under varying con-
texts and in different regions. The volume provides useful insights for stu-
dents from a southern perspective, providing a counterweight in the debate,
which has thus far revolved largely around Eurocentric premises and insights.
For instance, the evidence suggests possible reverse causality, with prior
political conditions determining the scope for economic integration. Further,
even the best-designed RTA can abort in the absence of trade and economic
complementarities – the RTA can end up diverting rather than creating trade.
These are important distinctions as they differentiate between those RTAs
(mostly northern) that are politically and institutionally grounded, and those
(mostly southern) that lack an enabling environment. The message is that
the optimism generated by the ‘rush to regionalism’ needs to be tempered
with reality.
This volume explores the trade–peace–conflict linkage through a case
study approach. Four regions: South America; the southern African region;
South Asia; and South East Asia are the subjects of the case studies. The
three key questions addressed are:
• What is the significance of the recent and rapid development of RTAs for
peace building both within and between countries?
• To what extent do RTAs engender inter and intra-state conflict?
• Conversely, to what extent are trade and RTAs hostage to conflict?
In other words, is regional political stability a precondition for econo-
mic integration?
The contrasting theoretical premises provide an introduction and a context
for examining peace or conflict outcomes in disparate regions of the world.
The investigative part of the study includes a mapping of extant RTAs in the
region, an analysis of the factors that hinder or promote regional trade inte-
gration, and the consequent economic and political impacts. These aspects
are examined in more depth at the bilateral level, between two countries in
each region. The concluding section attempts to draw out synthesising as well
as differentiated messages.
This book is the result of a two-year research collaboration involving
four regional institutes and one northern institute. The International Devel-
opment Research Centre (IDRC) funded the initiative. The Sustainable
Development Policy Institute (SDPI), the Recursos e Investigación para el
Desarello Sustenable (RIDES), the South African Institute of International
Affairs (SAIIA) and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA),
Singapore and the International Institute for Sustainable Development
(IISD) engaged in the research. SDPI and the IISD coordinated the global
effort, in particular organising the consultative process from inception to
stakeholder workshop to peer reviews. The research partners presented their
initial findings at the WTO Ministerial in Hong Kong, followed by consulta-
tive workshops in Calgary, Canada and Johannesberg, South Africa. This






The book is a collective effort and it needs a collective acknowledgement. The
authors would like to extend warm thanks to the International Development
Research Centre (IDRC) for funding the initiative and for showing extra-
ordinary patience and support while the research was underway. In particu-
lar, they would like to thank Dr Gerd Schonwalder, Marie-France Guimond,
Mano Buckshi and Bill Carman from the Centre who guided and encouraged
us in their various capacities. In particular, we thank them for providing a
research environment that allowed articulation of Southern voices but in a
manner that was detached and objective.
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1 Introduction
Oli Brown, Shaheen Rafi Khan and
Faisal Haq Shaheen
Regional trade agreements: building peace or
promoting conflict?
Over the last 15 years regional trade agreements (RTAs) have become defin-
ing features of the modern economy and a powerful force for globalisation.
As of July 2007 more than 380 RTAs had been notified to the World Trade
Organization (WTO) of which nearly 205 were active (see Table 1.1 for a list
of selected RTAs).1 All but one WTO member, Mongolia, are engaged in an
RTA of one sort or another (Crawford and Fiorentino 2005: 1).
The example of the European Union (EU) as an economically success-
ful trade agreement and peaceful political arrangement has much to offer
the world. While the EU is the product of a unique political and econo-
mic landscape, other RTAs also have the potential to build peace and
prosperity.
However, RTAs can also be divisive and exclusive, and their terms can
embed regional tensions and power imbalances. Particularly when negotiated
between countries of differing economic power, trade agreements can exert
powerful leverage on the political stability of the economically weaker part-
ner. Poorly designed and implemented RTAs can lead to heightened tensions
between countries and increase the risk of inter-state conflict. At the same
time, the political and economic adjustment costs involved in pursuing
regional trade integration can undermine local livelihoods and create winners
and losers, spurring competition between groups and leading to intra-state
conflict.2
The repeated frustrations of multilateral trade negotiations have resulted
in renewed energy being directed towards regional trade integration as a more
flexible way of liberalising trade and pursuing other strategic goals. In the
13 months between January 2004 and February 2005, 43 RTAs were notified
to the WTO. In the words of Jo-Ann Crawford and Roberto Fiorentino of
the WTO, ‘this [is] the most prolific RTA period in history’.3 For some WTO
members preferential trade now represents over 90 per cent of their total
trade. While some agreements count as few as three member nations, the
majority have ten or more signatories.
Crawford and Fiorentino’s 2005 study argues that there are four main
emerging trends in regional trade integration:4
1 Countries are increasingly making RTAs a central objective of
their trade policy, which may take priority over multilateral trade
objectives.
2 RTAs are becoming more complex, in many cases establishing regulatory
regimes that go beyond multilaterally agreed trade regulations.
3 The emergence of trade agreements between key developing countries
may be evidence of strengthened ‘south–south’ trading patterns.
4 RTAs are generally expanding and consolidating. On the one hand there
are a growing number of cross-regional RTAs, which account for a large
proportion of the total increase in RTAs. On the other hand, regional
trading blocks that span continents are in the making.
Table 1.1 Acronyms for selected prominent RTAs
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Source: IISD–SDPI in-house, 2007.
2 Oli Brown, Shaheen Rafi Khan and Faisal Haq Shaheen
The debate on RTAs has tended to revolve around the somewhat narrow
topic of what the trend means for multilateral trade liberalisation; whether
RTAs are a ‘stumbling block’ or a ‘stepping stone’ to multilateralism.
However, as the EU shows, trade agreements can presage deep and profound
economic, social and political changes. Aid donors and the international
community have been particularly keen to promote regional integration in
the developing world as a stepping stone towards greater interdependence,
trade liberalisation and stability. Yet, while the process promises much in terms
of greater interdependence and stronger relationships between countries, it
also presents very real dangers.
In attempting to introduce the relationship between RTAs and violent
conflict we chart the development of RTAs around the world, and question
the extent to which the trend is an endogenously or exogenously driven pro-
cess. We investigate some of the non-trade concerns that are being bundled
into modern RTAs – particularly those that attempt to use trade agree-
ments as a vehicle for good governance and interdependence as mechanisms
to encourage peace. Finally, we attempt to assess the positive and negative
impacts of RTAs on peace and security around the world.
Acronym soup: a word on terminology
There are a number of different types of trade agreement and a variety
of ways to describe them. As these phrases are often interchangeable
and confusing it is worth briefly noting what we understand by them in
this chapter.
• A free trade agreement (FTA) is where each party to the agreement
reduces tariffs and other non-tariff barriers to trade but maintains
its own trade policy vis-à-vis third parties.
• A preferential trade agreement (PTA) is the same thing but the
term highlights the point that the lowered trade barriers between
partners are preferential to those offered to third parties.
• A customs union (CU) is more politically ambitious requiring as it
does a common external tariff and the harmonisation of external
trade policies.
• Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs) simply refer to any of the three
above when concluded within a regional group.
Understanding the growth of RTAs
RTAs are signed for a number of reasons. Increasing trade flows may be part
of the story, but there are often other geostrategic and political motives at
play. The socio-economic and political ‘drivers’ of regional trade integration
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can be divided into ‘internal factors’ (drivers that originate from within a
particular region) and ‘external factors’ (drivers that come from outside
a region or nation).
Internal factors
New markets and trade opportunities: Typically, by expanding access to
regional markets, RTA agreements promise increased and low cost intra-
regional trade. They can also help promote foreign direct investment (FDI),
improve economic growth, improve a country’s balance of payments pos-
ition and bring new skills and technology. MERCOSUR, the RTA concluded
between the countries of southern Latin America, is credited, for example,
with significantly increasing regional trade flows in the decade during 1990–
2000. Exports between MERCOSUR members rose from US$4.1 billion to
US$17.6 billion while imports grew from US$4.2 billion to US$17.9 billion.
During 1995–2000, exports of every MERCOSUR state to other members
showed an upward trend.
Geostrategic and political interests: While economic interests may be the
principal engines driving the growth of RTAs, such agreements are also
increasingly being guided by political, strategic and security concerns. The
fact that the negotiation and commitments of RTAs tends to be less transpar-
ent than multilateral trade negotiations makes such an approach easier. There
are several examples of south–south RTAs that reflect a combination of
economic and security goals. The Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN), for example, was initially created as a response to the perceived
spread of communism in the region in the 1960s.
Growing frustration with multilateral trade negotiations: There is mounting
scepticism in the ability of negotiations under the framework the WTO to
deliver sufficient progress towards trade liberalisation. The perception is that
negotiating trade agreements within smaller blocs is both more flexible and
quicker than attempting to bring the 152 members of the WTO to consensus.
In addition, RTAs can be more specific to the needs of a particular region
than the ‘lowest common denominator’ solution often offered at WTO
negotiations.
Counterbalancing the negotiating power of other blocs: Regional blocs are
a powerful tool to negotiate common interests both within and outside the
WTO. Increasingly, many developing countries are realising that their inter-
ests may best be served by integration with like-minded countries that have
similar economies. In the case of the Latin American countries, regional inte-
gration has been used to counterbalance the negotiating power of the US while
it sought to expand the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) to
the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas (FTAA). The formation of trad-
ing communities such as ASEAN, MERCOSUR and the Andean Community
(CAN) are clear examples of bloc building efforts to bolster a particular
region’s resilience against other regional and global trading blocs.
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Building on socio-cultural similarities: Sharing a common language and cul-
ture can encourage closer integration. While differing in terms of development
and prone to intra-regional conflicts, the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS), which emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union, was
brought together, at least in part, by socio-cultural similarities.5
Reducing illegal trade and smuggling: RTAs can establish the institutions for
shared information and action to reduce illegal trade in drugs and weapons.
Meanwhile, common tariffs for trade between members help to undermine
the economic incentive for smuggling. MERCOSUR, made up of Argentina,
Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay, was created with the explicit goal of providing
a platform for member states to discuss common security issues such as drug
trafficking.
External factors
‘Exporting’ the model of regional integration: EU delegations are actively
encouraged to help ‘export’ the EU’s model of regional integration. This
is backed up by EU funds to support regional organisations such as the
African Union and the Pacific Forum with the specific expectation of con-
tributing to the prevention, management and resolution of violent conflicts
(Council of the European Union 2004: 3). The same is true of the US.
According to Edward Mansfield of the University of Pennsylvania, both
the Clinton and Bush administrations have made spreading regional
economic agreements a foreign policy priority (Mansfield 2003: 14). In July
2005, for example, Louis Michel, the EU Commissioner for Development
and Humanitarian Aid, signed an agreement to provide 30 million to the
Common Market for Eastern and Southern African (COMESA) as part of
the EU’s five-year 223 million Regional Integration Support Programme
(RISP).6
Pursuing strategic bilateralism: In the case of India and Pakistan, the fear
that this region could continue to be unstable has motivated regional and
global players such as ASEAN and the US to try to encourage a more stable
(trading) relationship between the two countries.
RTAs and peace building – the visionary ideal
The links between international trade and security have been recognised for
centuries. As the French philosopher the Baron of Montesquieu said in 1748,
‘[peace is a] natural effect of commerce’ (Humphreys 2004: 8). The Italian
economist Vilfredo Pareto argued in 1889 that CUs could help to achieve
peace between countries.
At the most basic level, equitable trade promotes prosperity and reduces
poverty. But beyond that, free trade has also been seen as a vehicle to promote
internationalism and end war. ‘For the disbanding of great armies and the
promotion of peace’ wrote John Bright, one of the leaders of the Anti-Corn
Introduction 5
Law League in 1840s Britain, ‘I rely on the abolition of tariffs, on the
brotherhood of the nations resulting from free trade in the products of
industry’ (Sturgis 1969).
Recent empirical studies also seem to confirm the adage that countries
that trade with each other (on equitable terms) are less likely to fight
each other (Humphreys 2004: 8; Mansfield 2003: 222). Trade can be a
powerful driver of growth, reducing poverty and creating jobs. In theory at
least, there are a number of ways that regional trade integration can support
peace:
1 Given the relatively small size of many economies in the developing
world, and their dependency on a handful of primary commodities,
regional trade integration offers poorer countries mutual development
gains through pooled resources, expanded markets, increased regional
trade and investment, and greater economic diversification.
2 Economic integration makes conflicts more costly for individual states.
Attacking a neighbouring economy becomes just as damaging as attack-
ing one’s own.
3 Through interdependence, nations can use trade to access one another’s
resources, instead of using violence to capture them.
4 Regional groupings such as MERCOSUR and the South Asian Associ-
ation for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) can serve as aspirational clubs
and can play a stabilising role for countries on their borders.
5 RTAs provide non-military ways to resolve disputes and promote under-
standing and dialogue between countries. Many agreements have insti-
tuted dispute settlement mechanisms to mediate economic conflicts that
have also been used for managing political conflicts.
In practice several economic and trading arrangements have been established
with the explicit purpose of preventing conflict between or within states. For
instance:
• Concerns about the threat of the spread of fundamentalism motivated
the governments of Egypt, Morocco and Tunisia to negotiate regional
agreements with the EU.
• MERCOSUR was originally established to reduce tensions between
Argentina and Brazil. It also helped to avert a possible coup in Paraguay
following reaffirmation by the presidents of the MERCOSUR member
countries that democracy was a necessary condition for membership.7
• The Stability Pact for South-Eastern Europe was created in 2000 to
create a free trade area designed to promote economic recovery and
integration in the war-devastated Balkan region.8
• In December 2004 Israel and Egypt signed a trade protocol with the US
designed to accelerate the two countries’ rapprochement. The deal cre-
ates five special zones where Egyptian goods will have free access to US
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markets, as long as 35 per cent of the goods are the product of Israeli–
Egyptian cooperation.9
RTAs and good governance
Moreover RTAs can play a role in promoting elements of good governance
such as budget transparency, careful fiscal management and an independent
judiciary. A notable trend in north–south trade agreements is the increasing
inclusion of non-trade commitments as part of the agreement. The 2000
Cotonou agreement between the EU and countries of the African-
Caribbean-Pacific region is a case in point. It lists three so-called ‘essential
elements’: respect for human rights, democracy and the rule of law. If contra-
vened, these conditions can lead to suspension of cooperation – including the
cancellation of preferential access.10
Similar conditions are being currently attached to the trade agreements
that are to succeed the Cotonou agreement. Known as economic partner-
ship agreements (EPAs), the EU is negotiating these trade agreements with
blocs of African, Caribbean and Pacific countries. Former EU Trade Com-
missioner Pascal Lamy argued that trade agreements should contain even
more extensive conditionality. He suggested that the agreements should
allow the EU to ban any imports that do not meet the EU’s ‘collective
preferences’. The term is deliberately broad and vague but would likely
enable trade sanctions in cases of human rights abuse, poor governance or
rigged elections.
In short, rich countries are using trade agreements as an inducement
for largely unrelated governance concerns. That this is possible at all is
indicative of their negotiating power. South–south RTAs have not gone
as far down this path, perhaps because negotiations tend to be less one-
sided and are focused on extracting trade concessions rather than other
commitments.
Nevertheless several south–south RTAs do include such provisions.
The trend seems to be catching on. Table 1.2 lays out the governance and
security commitments in six current south–south RTAs. The majority of
RTAs establish some degree of dispute resolution between signatories.
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the
Southern African Development Community (SADC) go further; signatory
countries agreed to cooperate on specific security concerns and establish
ways of mitigating conflict between members. The agreements also
contained weak provisions on respect for democracy, human rights and
the rule of law. The links between good governance and peace are well
established. If south–south RTAs can encourage ‘good governance’ this
could add a new dimension to their role in building peace between and within
countries.
Introduction 7










































NORTH–SOUTH AGREEMENTS (MODEL AGREEMENTS)
Association Agreement
between EU and Chile
 •   • • • •   •    • •  
COTONOU Agreement  • • •  •  • • • •     • • 




















 • •  •             
Asia
South Asia Free Trade
Agreement (SAFTA)




             •  • 
• Mentioned in sufficient detail to be implemented under the agreement
 Mentioned in agreement but with minor detail; no implementation procedure provided
 Not mentioned in agreement
Source: SDPI in-house compilation, 2006.
RTAs and conflict – the occasional reality
Regional trade integration is progressing fast, propelled by a growing num-
ber of regional trade agreements and the encouragement of many Organisa-
tion for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. For
example, in December 2004, the members of MERCOSUR and the CAN
signed an agreement for closer economic and political integration, to be
called the Union of South American Nations, with an explicit nod to the trail
blazing role of the EU.11
But there is no compelling reason why south–south RTAs should follow
the same trajectory as the EU. The first thing to note is that an RTA may not
be much of a ‘brake’ on conflict. Even when war is costly and the option of
a negotiated bargain exists, rival states can nevertheless go to war, propelled
by incentives to misrepresent or keep information private, commitment prob-
lems after a settlement, or indivisibility of issues. Certainly, there are many
examples of conflict between members of RTAs:
• border clashes between Armenia and Azerbaijan, members of the CIS;
• the outbreak of war in the Great Lakes with foreign involvement in the
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) from Angola, Namibia, Rwanda,
Uganda and Zimbabwe, all members of COMESA; and
• the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and violent border clashes between Egypt
and Sudan, all members of the Council of Arab Economic Unity.
The EU’s genesis was a unique set of circumstances: the devastation of the
EU’s productive capacity after the Second World War and the determination
of its political leaders to banish any future prospect of war. Other regions
may not be willing, or able, to pursue certain aspects of integration, such as
opening labour markets and allowing the free movement of people across
borders.
Most important, and in contrast to many other regional agreements,
the EU and its predecessors have provided a means of redistributing income
from rich to poor countries. This has proved to be an effective compensa-
tion mechanism for the losers from trade liberalisation: facilitating economic
integration, promoting partnership between countries and preventing the
marginalisation of certain groups and countries. Following the fall of the
Iron Curtain, the EU concluded bilateral trade agreements with the Eastern
European countries that helped stabilise them and prepared them for eventual
inclusion as new member states.
So, while many liberal economists claim that RTAs build stability and
encourage peace, there is also a convincing case for the reverse: that RTAs
may even increase the chances for instability and conflict both between and
within countries.
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Instability and conflict between countries
There is no rule that says regional integration is an automatic force for miti-
gating tensions or conflict. Without careful negotiation and implementation,
regional integration between countries of widely differing size, wealth and
influence can cement inequalities, create tensions and trigger conflict. This is
perhaps particularly likely if there is a lack of transparency and accountability
in the negotiation of the agreement and its subsequent implementation.
Nor does membership of a trade institution automatically create bonds of
trust. Envy can result from trade imbalances and result in the creation
of social networks of memberships, resulting in social unrest. Trade ties can
actually provoke hostilities between states. Gains are rarely felt proportion-
ally and large inequalities in the relative distribution of gains can shift the
balance of inter-state power. There may also be tensions between members of
the RTA and non-members who may find that trade diversion within the
RTA results in lost markets. In a sense trade ‘gives people something to fight
about’.
Neither are trade institutions necessarily the best mechanism to mediate
disputes – especially if those disputes have wider social and political dimen-
sions. In conflict prone areas, international institutions built around trade
agreements can have adverse effects on conflicts among member states by
mismanaging crisis situations and worsening conflict intensity, or producing
rivalry among states due to their relative social positions (Hafner-Burton and
Montgomery 2005).
During the 1980s and 1990s the EU encouraged rapid regional integra-
tion and structural adjustment policies on Francophone West Africa, urging
the free movement of goods but not people and without providing for
a redistributive wealth mechanism that would have helped surmount the
adjustment costs of trade liberalisation and integration. Some analysts argue
that this uncompromising process, which drove up unemployment and under-
mined government social programmes, can explain much of the subsequent
instability in Francophone West Africa.12
Finally, there is also a concern, though one without much empirical
investigation, that trade integration may help to facilitate the illegal trade in
conflict resources such as blood diamonds and illegal timber. It may also
increase access to weapons. After all trade agreements are about reducing
barriers to trade: the increased trade that can result can be both legal and
illegal.
Instability and conflict within countries
RTAs typically involve concessions to greater liberalisation. Trade liberalisa-
tion can result in painful adjustment to new tariff barriers, new regulation
and the influx of fierce new competition. Over the short term trade liberalisa-
tion can lead to industrial contraction, unemployment and social unrest. If
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new market opportunities fail to materialise, this can set a trend of increased
poverty and economic instability over the long term.
In addition, trade liberalisation creates winners and losers. The resulting
increased wealth disparities can create tensions and lead to conflict. A reduced
tax base as well as reduced receipts from duties on exports and imports can
severely strain government revenues and undermine health and education
spending. The costs of integration itself can be a further burden. In the case
of the former East African Community the establishment and cost of suitable
organisations to oversee trade integration proved to be contentious both
within and between countries (Wu 2005: 476).
In general, economic integration can be socially destabilising and promote
processes of change that erode established identities, undermine established
ways of conducting national politics and reduce state capacities to provide
for poor and marginalised segments of the population. Such socio-cultural
challenges of integration are one element in the Zapatista rebellion in
Chiapas.
RTAs can help to reinforce both the perception and reality of trade domin-
ance by an external power. Public perceptions of trade dominance can be
a powerful force. Examples of such sentiment can be seen in the anti-
globalisation riots of Seattle and Genoa or in the way US headquartered
franchises based in developing nations are treated during times of protest
against US foreign policy. In extreme circumstances, such strong domestic
opinion can undermine peaceful relations between countries.
Finally, RTAs can generate high expectations of increased economic
growth, new job opportunities and reduced poverty. However, RTAs between
countries that are reliant on the export of primary resources and that have
relatively undiversified economies can fail to live up to their proponents’
rhetoric.
Countries tend to exclude key goods from liberalisation agreements.
When those countries trade in a similar, and narrow, basket of goods the net
economic impact of the RTA can be limited. For example, West Africa’s
reliance on cocoa and palm oil leaves little else to trade between countries.
Consequently, mismanaged expectations coupled with the adjustment costs
of joining an RTA can lead to the perception that governments have let their
citizens down.
Dissecting the rush to regionalism
The rise of the RTA is an important feature of the global economy, which is
altering the political chemistry of entire continents. RTAs are increasing both
in number and in ambition. We are now seeing a complex, overlapping web of
trade agreements stretching across the world.
The received wisdom is that regional trade integration can be a powerful
force for peace. Building interdependence between countries, creating eco-
nomic incentives for peace and developing non-military means for resolving
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disputes are all goals of the proponents of trade integration. Using trade as
the cement, RTAs help to bind countries’ interests to a common future.
However, in the light of recent experience, this assumption requires scru-
tiny. The many conflicts between member countries of RTAs imply that
regional trade integration is not an automatic brake on conflict. That said
isolationism is also a risky strategy. A study by the US State Failure task force
found that the likelihood of state failure is affected by international influ-
ences, particularly the openness to international trade and membership of
international organisations. Those countries outside regional integration
processes, or with no obvious regional ‘club’ to join, such as Myanmar,
Afghanistan or Turkmenistan, are arguably more likely to suffer state failure
and further isolation.13
This book is the result of an 18-month multi-regional study that investi-
gated the promise of regional trade integration for conflict prevention.
Research institutions in Chile, South Africa, Pakistan and Singapore investi-
gated the institutional, political and economic implications of south–south
RTAs and trade integration in each of their regions. The following questions
directed their analysis:
1 What is the significance of the recent and rapid development of RTAs
for violent conflict and peace building both within and between states?
2 How can RTAs be negotiated in a way that reduces inter- and intra-state
tensions and helps construct institutional barriers to violent conflict?
3 What range of non-trade provisions (such as on the rule of law, respect
for human rights) are being included in southern RTAs? And how effect-
ive are these provisions at improving domestic governance and reducing
the risk of future conflict?
4 What are the threats and opportunities when building trade links and
formalised trading relationships between countries previously at war or
risk of war?
The book is divided into two sections. The first section takes a regional focus
and looks at the institutional dimensions of trade integration, asking what it
means for regional conflict prevention.
The second section focuses on country case studies in each of the regions.
These case studies analyse in more detail the role of trade in conflict preven-
tion and confidence building between countries with a history of tension
and conflict: China and Taiwan; Peru and Ecuador; Pakistan and India;
Zimbabwe and its neighbours.
The concluding chapter attempts to weave together the key messages
from the regional analysis and country case studies. It addresses two funda-
mental questions: Is trade a cause or effect of peace? And how can the
international community best contribute to the process of developing peace-
ful trading links between countries emerging from or at risk of violent
conflict?
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Notes
1 http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/region_e.htm (accessed 3 June
2008).
2 Violent conflict is understood in this context as encompassing both violent conflict
and destabilising but non-violent disputes between and within states.
3 See Crawford and Fiorentino (2005).
4 Ibid.
5 The CIS was created in 1991 and closer economic union was signed in 1993. At
present the CIS consists of Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Ukraine. See
http://www.cisstat.com/eng/cis.htm (accessed 21st September 2005).
6 Europa press release, 20 July 2005 (accessed 19th September 2005). The RISP ran
between 2002 and 2007. See http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?
reference=IP/05/991&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
(accessed 11 June 2008).
7 See http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/1841.htm (accessed 11 June 2008).
8 Council on Hemispheric Affairs, press release ‘Argentina–Brazil relations: urgent
challenges come to the forefront’, 12 July 2005, http://www.coha.org (accessed
20 September 2005).
9 BBC ‘Egypt and Israel seal trade deal’, http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/
4095011.stm (accessed 11 June 2008).
10 ECDPM (2001).
11 Euractiv ‘First steps taken towards a south American EU’, 8 December 2004,
http://www.euractiv.com/Article?tcmuri=tcm:29-133262-16&type=News
(accessed 11 June 2008).
12 Interview by author in Brown (2005: 13).
13 Goldstein et al. ‘State failure task force: phase III findings’, 2000. See http://
www.cidcm.umd.edu/publications/papers/SFTF%20Phase%20III%20Report%20
Final.pdf (accessed 11 June 2008).
References
Brown, O. (2005) ‘EU Trade Policy and Conflict’, Geneva: International Institute of
Sustainable Development (IISD).
Council of the European Union (2004) ‘Council common position concerning conflict
prevention, management and resolution in Africa’, SN 1010/04. Brussels: Council
of Europe.
Crawford, J. and Fiorentino, R. (2005) ‘The changing landscape of regional trade
agreements’, Discussion Paper 8, Geneva: WTO.
ECDPM (European Centre for Development Policy Management) (2001) Cotonou
Infokit: Essential and fundamental Elements (20), Maastricht: ECDPM.
Hafner-Burton, E. and Montgomery, A. (2005) ‘War, trade and envy: why trade
agreements don’t always keep the peace’, presented at the International Studies
Association Annual Conference, Honolulu, Hawaii.
Humphreys, M. (2004) ‘Economics and violent conflict’, in D. Brack (ed.) Trade, Aid
and Security: Introduction, Background and Conceptual Framework, Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University, IISD/IUCN.
Mansfield, E.D. (2003) ‘Preferential peace: why preferential trading arrangements
inhibit interstate conflict’, in E.D. Mansfield and B.M. Pollins (eds) Economic
Interdependence and International Conflict: New Perspectives on an Enduring
Introduction 13
Debate, Ann Arbor: Michigan Studies in International Political Economy, Uni-
versity of Michigan pp. 222–236.
Sturgis, J.L. (1969) John Bright and the Empire, London: University of London.
Wu, J. (2005) ‘Trade agreements as self protection’, Review of International Economics,
13:3, 472–484, Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
14 Oli Brown, Shaheen Rafi Khan and Faisal Haq Shaheen
2 Regional integration, trade and
conflicts in Latin America
Alejandra Ruiz-Dana, Peter Goldschagg,
Edmundo Claro and Hernán Blanco
Introduction
Free trade often has conflict connotations. These connotations stem from
different takes on the subject. Different media, particularly newspapers, refer
constantly to the positive and negative ramifications of trade; they also tend
to polarise public opinion on the subject. In fact, free trade is part of an
intricate web of complexities that can yield more than the two sides of the
proverbial coin. In other words, the outcome is never black and white. Hence
studies, such as this one, which attempt to identify potential links between
trade and conflict, as well as the incidence of conflict resolution in the context
of increased interdependence, are important.
Views on conflicts and prevention
Conflicts often stem from disagreements between two or more parties. These
disagreements arise out of perceived threats to a party’s interests. In the
context of diplomatic relations, the tension brought forth by disagreements
can give way to international armed conflict, involving two or more states. We
refer to these tensions as externally driven confrontations.
Internal armed conflict (henceforth referred to as IAC), is defined by the
Geneva Convention as occurring in the territory of one of the parties. To
qualify as an IAC, a conflict must take place ‘between a [High Contracting
Party’s] armed forces and dissident armed forces or other armed groups
which, under responsible command, exercise such control over a part of its
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military
operations’.1 On the other hand, internal disturbance and tensions, such as
riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and other acts of a similar nature,
are not considered IACs.2
The term ‘internationalised armed conflict’ describes internal hostilities
that are rendered international. More specifically, the term includes ‘war
between two internal factions, both of which are backed by different states;
direct hostilities between two foreign states that militarily intervene in armed
conflict in support of opposing sides; and war involving foreign intervention
in support of an insurgent group fighting against an established government’
(Stewart 2003: 315). While distinguishing this type of conflict from an IAC
makes analytical sense, in practice, IACs are seldom free from foreign involve-
ment, although such involvement is not always immediately obvious (Stewart
2003: 316).
Confidence building measures (CBMs) constitute measures taken to reduce
military tensions between a set and sets of states, before, during or after
actual conflict. The European experience indicates that efficient CBMs draw
upon two elements: (1) ‘stability and predictability in the region’ and; (2)
‘the existence of a shared political culture amongst the states in question’
(Bromley and Perdomo 2005: 6). The first element is rarely found in Latin
America (see Figure 2.1); despite a shared political culture, distrust and
animosity characterise relations between neigbouring countries, such as Peru
and Ecuador, Chile and Bolivia, Argentina and Brazil. Most CBMs in Latin
American are reached at presidential reunions that imply personal commit-
ments understood as ‘governmental policies’, instead of ‘state policies’
(Bromley and Perdomo 2005). Presidential voluntarism does not translate
into an ability to fulfill commitments – much less where good governance is
relatively, if not wholly, absent.
In the virtual absence of successful CBMs in Latin America, some excep-
tions are worth mentioning. The Tlatelolco Treaty of Non-Proliferation
(1967) was sustained by the fear and concern that arose in the aftermath
of the Cuban Missile Crisis; it made the threat of nuclear war real. The
treaty was ratified by 11 states at the time of its inception, in 1969. Argentina
and Brazil chose not to be parties to the treaty since their mutual animosity
had embroiled them in an arms race. However, the treaty did pave the
way for a future CBM between the two countries. The Joint Declaration
of Nuclear Policy, signed in December 1986, opened communication channels
for consultation and the exchange of information on nuclear matters. The
precedent led to the eventual creation of the Brazilian–Argentine Agency for
Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).3
Future CBMs will need to take into account a wide range of threats to
security. The Organization of American States (OAS) took a step in the right
direction by adopting the Declaration on Security in the Americas in October
2003. The declaration states that different perspectives regarding security
threats and priorities are to be recognised. Its scope includes a wide array of
non-traditional threats to security, including transnational organised crime,
corruption, asset laundering, illicit trafficking in weapons, extreme poverty
and social exclusion, HIV/AIDS and other diseases and environmental deg-
radation. Trade also falls in the genre of ‘non-traditional’ threats to security.
Therefore regional trade agreements (RTAs) and regional integration initia-
tives constitute legitimate CBMs. In the following sections, we will explore
the extent to which selected RTAs have contributed to trade promotion and
conflict mitigation.
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Why have MERCOSUR and the Andean Community
(CAN) been selected?
This chapter focuses on MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) and the
CAN. Both represent the most important regional integration agreements in
Latin America. The agreements include countries with a long-standing history
of bilateral conflicts that have come together voluntarily under an institutional
arrangement that seeks to foster political and economic interdependence.
The MERCOSUR is the world’s fourth largest integrated economic block.
Representing 67 per cent of Latin America’s land area,4 47 per cent of its
Figure 2.1 Map of South America.
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population and more than half of Latin America’s gross domestic product
(GDP);5 it is the most progressive trade integration scheme in the develop-
ing world. MERCOSUR’s model of ‘open regionalism’6 aims to create a
common market in the mid-term future. International relations scholars
view the model as a crucial step to overcome the historic agenda of griev-
ances, mutual distrust and diverging interests within the region (notably by
linking the Southern Cone’s rival regional powers, Brazil and Argentina).
They compare it to the European Union (EU) – the most important example
of peace and regional political stability through economic integration
(O’Keefe 2005).
The CAN, endowed with supra-national organs, embodies institutional
depth. The hemispheric block – with 120 million people and a GDP of
US$260 billion in 2002 – is beset with various inter-state and intra-state
conflicts. The most prominent example of inter-state conflict is the persistent
border dispute between Peru and Ecuador. Examples of intra-state conflicts
are the guerrilla conflict in Colombia and the indigenous movement in
Bolivia. The analysis of these two regional blocs, with their distinct profiles
and contexts, will help us understand the relationship between integration,
trade and conflicts in the region.
The second section reviews the general conditions and trends in relation to
regional integration, trade, and conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean.
The third section analyses the specific cases of MERCOSUR and the CAN.
The fourth section concludes with recommendations.
Regional trade integration and conflict
In Latin America, trade integration initiatives are more likely to be based
on political rather than economic considerations. As Kacowicz puts it: ‘In
contrast to the common theoretical assumption, the order of causality has
been reversed in Latin America: economic interdependence became the con-
sequence, not the cause, of political cooperation and of economic integra-
tion’ (Kacowicz 1998: 28). The political component in the equation is what
determines the outcome. The situation is similar to South Asia in some ways.
Khan et al. (2007) argue that trade flows are contingent upon political
agreements; in fact, the regional integration process (culminating more often
than not in an RTA) follows the ebb and flow of regional politics.
Both historical and extant intra-regional trade flows in Latin America have
been low. A quick glance at regional trade statistics illustrates this point. In
2004, intra-regional commerce in the MERCOSUR and the CAN constituted
12.9 and 10.4 per cent of total trade respectively (CEPAL 2005: 106). This is
in contrast to what the two regions export to other Latin American nations
(15.4 and 16.8 per cent), the United States (18.3 and 46.6 per cent), and the
EU (23.0 and 11.0 per cent) (Kacowicz 1998). If economic integration were,
indeed, the salient motivation for MERCOSUR and the CAN, these numbers
would have been reversed.
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The level of intra-regional trade is also explained by the expected efficiency
gains from trade. These are very low as ‘[t]rade among similar Latin American
economies often heightens competition in primary goods, driving down
profits. It does little to increase technology or productivity, since competition
among manufacturing firms remains meager’ (Aggarwal and Espach 2003:
20–21). This situation also makes bilateral trade agreements between neigh-
bouring Latin American countries a rarity. Chile remains the lone exception.
It has opted for bilateral agreements with its neighbours instead of joining
their trade blocs. Both political and economic reasons motivate this stance.
On the one hand, Chile prefers the flexibility of choosing at will without
having to subject itself to supra-national rules. On the other, ‘Chile’s stable
and fast-growing economy and its increasing consumer market give it leverage
over its poorer Andean neighbors, while the competitiveness of its exports
and international corporations serves it well in the much larger Argentine and
Brazilian markets’ (Aggarwal and Espach 2003: 27). Such bilateral trade
remains low nevertheless. In 2005, only 11.3 per cent of Chile’s exports were
aimed at South American markets; Central America and the Caribbean
received 1.7 and 0.4 per cent, respectively.7 Chile’s predisposition to favour
partners outside of the region and its relative success has invited criticism and
retaliation by its neighbours. As a case in point, Bolivia refuses to sell natural
gas to Chile.
Historical background of conflict
Historically, wars in Latin America have taken place due to foreign interven-
tion (wars of independence) or internal struggles (revolutions). In addition,
recurring disputes – often associated with unresolved border issues, erupt
sporadically and continue to the present day. The 1995 clash between Peru
and Ecuador over a section of the Amazon River basin is an example. Most
tensions associated with geopolitical ambitions of certain regimes have
cooled down, but others have increased recently. Venezuela’s president, Hugo
Chávez, is promoting a Boliviarian project whose aim is to accelerate South
American integration and, in his own words, draw a ‘new geopolitical map
. . . to counterbalance the global dominance of the United States’ (Wagner
2005). Chávez has been stocking up on weapons, buying them from Russia
and Spain. Most observers express concern that such stockpiling goes beyond
a revamping of Venezuela’s military and that these purchases may affect the
balance of power in the Andean region.
However, the consensus is that the region ‘no longer represents a global
threat in terms of security’ (Narich 2003: 1). Indeed, Latin America is often
held up ‘as an example for the rest of the world when one deals with trad-
itional security issues’.8 There is both an historical and ethno-religious context
to the absence of violent conflict. In the first place, the continent enjoys
considerable religious and ethnic homogeneity. Simón Bolívar, leader of
the independence movements in South America, appealed to the region’s
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common cultural heritage to seek the union of American states in 1826. His
call sparked an inter-American cooperation process that eventually led to the
creation of the OAS in 1948, a predecessor to the United Nations (UN) (and,
according to some, much more effective than the latter).
Prior to the OAS, the Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) was estab-
lished in 1942 to coordinate security efforts in the region as a collective
response to the Second World War. The IADB is the oldest international
organisation of its kind in the world and is linked to the OAS through the
latter’s general secretariat. Other unprecedented diplomatic efforts include
the formation of the Tlatelolco Treaty. It set the standard for all nuclear
weapon free zone (NWFZ) agreements. Direct conflict mediation has also
achieved hallmark status. The Rio Protocol of 1942, for example, put an end
to the first war between Peru and Ecuador (c.1939–1941).
Although the 1960s and 1970s were particularly turbulent, ‘[t]he strength-
ening of democracies and the creation of trade blocks in the 1980s and 1990s
in Latin America contributed to an atmosphere of growing trust and cooper-
ation’ (Narich 2003: 6). Simultaneously, the military’s role diminished dra-
matically in the Latin America. The end of the Cold War in 1989 marked
the end of global bipolarity and the beginning of international and regional
approaches to issues of security and economic concern. Latin America ceased
to look up to the United States as the command and control centre for
regional security matters, mostly because the economic incentives to do so
were withdrawn and, as expected, the political justification no longer existed.
In the absence of a powerful benefactor, the challenges ahead seemed daunt-
ing for the individual Latin American states. Their reaction, prompted by
emerging globalisation, was manifested in the shape of integrated responses.
Current conflict trends
With the exception of the 1995 war between Peru and Ecuador, IACs have
been few in Latin America since the 1990s. As mentioned, the uniqueness of
the inter-American cooperation system deters an escalation into full-scale
war. Topographical and geographical restraints, weak military institutions
and socio-economic factors also limit the capacity to engage in open warfare
(Saavedra 2005). However, tensions and disputes continue to persist and
merit analysis. With this in mind, a distinction is made between traditional
and non-traditional disputes.
Traditional disputes are ancient in nature. They comprise border/frontier
disputes and other areas of historical tension between states. These disputes
‘have a higher probability of [leading states] to war than other kinds of
disputes’ (Dominguez et al. 2003: 14). Non-traditional disputes are due to
new or modern threats to security as a result of the weakening of the state
and the consequent rise in internal delinquency and violence. Examples
include terrorism and drug trafficking. Hence, these disputes are associated
with the spillover effects of an internal problem that has been unsuccessfully
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contained by the afflicted state. The problem, then, becomes internationalised
and, consequently, requires an international response.
‘Whereas interstate conflict has generally been limited in contemporary
Latin American history . . . intra-state violence has always been a great prob-
lem’ (Narich 2003: 7). Again, ideological and institutional factors are behind
this occurrence, which, in turn, also explains the relatively low levels of
defence spending in the region. Intra-state violence or turmoil is mostly
explained by persistent political and economic instability. The most visible
and damaging of these intra-state conflicts is Colombia’s civil war. The
intensity of the conflict there is such that some spillover effects are already
evident in the neighbouring countries (as discussed shortly).
According to a report by the US National Council on Intelligence (USNCI),
the main threat to security in the region is posed by the failure of govern-
ments to alleviate extreme poverty in spite of ‘the greater integration into the
global economy in the past decade’ (USNCI 2004: 78). Such failure sparks
populism and radical indigenous action. Recent estimates indicate that ‘vio-
lence has increased in Latin America as a result of poverty-induced criminal-
ity. In the year 2000, the crime rate in Latin America was twice the world
average (22.5 per 1000 versus 10.7 per 1000)’ (Narich 2003: 7). Addressing
this violence presents a formidable challenge for many Latin American
regimes.
The origin and evolution of RTAs in Latin America
Latin American countries have a long-standing, but erratic history of
regional integration. Prior to the Second World War, desultory attempts at
regional integration were motivated by the great freedom fighter, Simón
Bolívar. The focus later switched to more pragmatic development-oriented
economic goals. Inspired by the economist Raúl Prebisch, regional integra-
tion initiatives in the 1960s were conducted within the framework of ‘import
substitution industrialization’ (Ocampo 2001). The Latin American Free
Trade Association (LAFTA), established in 1960, aimed to overcome the
inherent scale limitations of the small domestic markets by allowing indus-
tries to become competitive on a regional level. The initial enthusiasm waned
when sensitive sectors (automobiles, textiles, agriculture) came up for discus-
sion; eventually, across the board industrial rationalisation was aborted. By
1980, the less ambitious Latin American Integration Association (LAIA,
in Spanish ALADI), which was largely structured around bilateral trade
preferences had replaced LAFTA (Hufbauer and Kotschwar 1998: 12).
Partly due to the limited progress on LAFTA’s economic front, six of
its original members (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Chile and later
Venezuela) established a sub-regional trade arrangement – the Andean Pact –
in 1969. Although very ambitious politically, it was supported by supra-
national arrangements and institutionally viable. However, the pact did not
achieve much by way of tariff reduction and trade promotion, collapsing
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shortly after Chile pulled out in 1976. The sub-region then fell into an
extended (ten-year long) recession. Subsequent sub-regional arrangements
also did not fare much better. The Central American Common Market
(CACM) proved to be a paper arrangement, neutralised by political and
military conflicts in the 1980s. The Caribbean Common Market (CARICOM)
never came close to being a common market due to its member states’
reluctance to reduce trade barriers. The oil price hike in 1973, followed by the
debt crisis and the global economic downturn, induced a deep recession and a
severe contraction of intra-regional trade.
The move towards a new wave of regionalism took place in the early 1990s.
The inward-looking policies had been largely discredited throughout the
1980s, to be replaced by the neo-liberal ‘Washington Consensus’. This was a
major paradigm shift that promoted ‘open regionalism’ as the most viable
option for developing states to integrate effectively within a global economy
marked by increasing interdependence, liberalisation and competition for
investments. A former exponent of the import substitution strategy, the
Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC)
now became the foremost proponent of the new regionalism. A spate of
market-oriented reforms followed in the shape of privatisation, deregulation
and budget consolidation. These reforms profoundly reshaped the political-
economic landscape of Latin America.
Except Cuba, all Latin American countries are now part of some regional
bloc, ranging from bilateral and plurilateral free trade areas to customs
unions (CUs) with ambitions of becoming a common market. Key among
these initiatives are the CACM, CARICOM (revived), and the Andean
Pact (now known as the CAN), as well as an increasing number of other
free trade agreements: Chile–Mexico (1991); Colombia–Venezuela (1992);
Mexico, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua
(1992); the Group of Three – Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela (1993); and
Chile–Venezuela (1993). Figure 2.2 shows the tangle of relationships resulting
from multiple and overlapping preferential trading arrangements, referred to
as a ‘spaghetti bowl’.
By far the most important arrangement in the ‘open regionalism’ context
is the MERCOSUR. MERCOSUR is embedded within a new policy frame-
work; prior to joining, the signing members (Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay
and Uruguay) were all democracies, with market-based economies. The
arrangement has worked well. Politically, it has diffused tensions between
Argentina and Brazil. Economically, it has stimulated intra-regional trade
and growth by dismantling tariff barriers, reflecting a region-wide tendency,
as evident in Figure 2.3.
However, removing non-tariff barriers has proved more difficult, as has
the forging of a common external trade policy. The common external tariffs
still include a broad range of exceptions to sensitive products, in spite of
MERCOSUR’s formal status as a CU since 1995.
MERCOSUR has rapidly acquired international legal status and a formal
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Figure 2.2 Trade agreements signed and under negotiations in the Americas.
Source: Adapted from Estevadeordal LAIA (2002: 5).
structure. However, in institutional terms, it is relatively less developed com-
pared to its Latin American counterpart, the CAN. Its rules are not well
harmonised and there is a relative absence of autonomous governing bodies;
in effect, MERCOSUR still remains an incomplete CU (Gratius 2005: 286).
Its decision-making process remains exclusively intergovernmental, based on
the principle of unanimity.9 We analyse the impacts on conflict resolution
processes in the third section.
Latin America’s basic regional trade profile
Overall, countries in Latin America exhibit similar patterns of inter- and
intra-regional trade flows, as indicated in Table 2.1. The exception is Mexico,
a North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) member. Over 90 per
cent of its exports go to the north (primarily to the US, but also to the EU
and Japan).10 In contrast, LAC exports are almost equally divided between
the north and the south. With regard to the latter, in 2004, 21.2 per cent of the
continent’s exports were directed to other developing countries while 27.3 per
cent stayed within the region. The recent increase in inter-regional trade
across the south has been triggered by the high Chinese growth rates and the
recovery staged by the Asian tigers after the 1997 crises.
In contrast, as evident in Table 2.2, Latin America’s intra-regional trade
flows have been erratic. During the 1990s, trade within the four customs
unions (CAN, MERCOSUR, CARICOM and CACM) was Latin America’s
Figure 2.3 Development of tariffs in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC).
Source: World Bank (2005: 68).
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primary growth engine, peaking in 1997 (IADB 2000: 3). With the onset of
the global financial crisis, intra-regional trade declined steadily until 2002.11
Subsequently, it picked up but remains low in relative terms – compared to
the EU and NAFTA.
The cases of MERCOSUR and the CAN
MERCOSUR and the CAN are the two main regional integration schemes in
South America. The review of both cases offers the opportunity to identify
similarities and differences. Whereas in the case of MERCOSUR the focus is
on trade and bilateral conflicts, in the CAN case the focus shifts to trade and
internal conflicts.
Table 2.1 LAC  (excluding Mexico): Export structure by major
destinations (in percentages of total exports)
Regions / World 1980 1990 2000 2004
LAC – North 56.8 63.8 57.8 51.5
North America 30.3 33.1 36.6 30.8
European Union 25.7 29.2 20.6 20.4
Japan 0.9 1.6 0.6 0.3
LAC – South 43.2 36.2 42.2 48.5
Intra-regional 26.4 18.2 31.0 27.3
Inter-regional 16.7 18.0 11.2 21.2
World 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: ECLAC (2005).
Table 2.2 Intra-regional trade per sub-region (exports of goods
as a proportion of GDP)
1980 1985 1990 1997 2003
LAC 16.4 10.6 14.4 21.1 16.0
CAN 3.7 3.2 4.1 12.1 9.0
MERCOSUR 11.6 5.5 8.9 24.9 11.9
CACM 23.1 14.4 14.1 13.3 20.7
CARICOM 8.3 11.3 12.4 16.7 21.3
NAFTA 33.6 43.9 41.4 49.1 55.0
FTAA (34) 33.6 43.9 41.4 49.1 60.1
ASEAN (10) 17.4 18.6 19.0 24.0 22.7*
EU (15) 55.6 59.9 64.9 62.9 62.7
Source: ECLAC, International Trade and Integration Division, based
on official data.
Note: * Coefficient corresponds to the year 2002.
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MERCOSUR
Current trade performance and integration outcomes
MERCOSUR was initially founded with the ambitious goal to ‘accelerate the
process of economic development in conjunction with social justice’ by
amplifying each member’s respective market through regional integration.12
Until 1998, MERCOSUR was one of the most successful integration projects
in the developing world, characterised by a remarkable commitment to
reciprocal trade liberalisation that resulted in a sixfold increase in intra-
regional trade. However, the integration process appears to have lost its early
momentum. More than a decade after the Treaty of Asunción came into
force, the Southern Cone’s initiative looks shaky. In particular, the economic
turmoil experienced in the 1999–2002 period demonstrated its vulnerability.
External shocks, such as the Asian crisis, led to severe macro-economic
disturbances and a drop in foreign direct investment (FDI) flows in the
Southern Cone. MERCOSUR’s rudimentary institutional structures were
unable to produce the economic and monetary cooperation required to with-
stand these shocks. In the absence of a mechanism to deal with trade
imbalances, unilateral moves, such as Brazil’s uncoordinated currency deval-
uation in 1999, created strong tensions among the regional trading partners,
endangered the integration process and the future of the customs unions
(Paiva and Gazel 2003: 119). As a result, intra-MERCOSUR trade plum-
meted to 12.9 per cent of the regions global exports in 2004, in contrast to the
25.3 per cent level registered in 1998 (CEPAL 2005: 106). Although a slight
improvement (12.9 per cent)13 occurred in the wake of Argentina’s economic
recovery, overall MERCOSUR’s intra-regional trade coefficient is consider-
ably lower than its global comparators (except the Andean community, see
Table 2.2).
Institutional factors are not the only reason for MERCOSUR’s poor trade
performance since 1999. Vaillant points to the unequal distribution of bene-
fits as a crucial obstacle to trade growth and full economic integration
(Vaillant 2005: 60). Thus far, only Brazil has profited from intra-regional
trade. The three smaller countries, Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay, have
been unable to access Brazil’s markets. Such inequities tend to make regional
integration efforts counterproductive. Non-tariff barriers (NTBs) and rules
of origin (RO) procedures act as an incentive to locate investment and
production in the dominant market while leading to deindustrialisation in the
peripheral ones. The constant disputes and conflicts between Brazil and
Argentina on the subject of asymmetries and inequalities have to be seen in
this context. To date, they have hindered the formulation of a common trade
policy as a precursor to the longer term goal of a common market.
Despite such asymmetries Paraguay and Uruguay, the two smallest play-
ers, continue to adhere to MERCOSUR since they see benefits in integra-
tion. However, the windows of opportunity are small. Uruguay, has taken
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advantage of the free access to the Brazilian and Argentine markets. It has
also extracted concessions from Argentina and Brazil by employing its veto
power. In an effort to address its regional partner’s concerns, Brazil has
channelled investment in their direction, particularly towards Argentina
during the 1990s. Its oil and gas company, Petrobras, is a leading investor.
Argentina has also invested in Brazil, especially in connection with various
industrial products. These cross-investment currents have also extended to
Paraguay and Uruguay.
Still, such strategies cannot offset asymmetrical economic power within the
region. Like Chile, Uruguay is contemplating a lone-player policy and has
entered into negotiations with the US, outside the MERCOSUR framework.
Paraguay has even less leverage within the framework and can only fulminate
against regional economic disparities.
MERCOSUR’s guiding lights and managers appear to have learned their
lessons from the recent turbulent years. An important advance in this
regard has been the response to the long-time demand of MERCOSUR’s
smaller states, Paraguay and Uruguay, to implement a cohesion fund and a
MERCOSUR Parliament (Parlasur). These actions aim to strengthen the
social dimensions of the integration process and to reduce inequalities. The
creation of a Permanent Court of Dispute Settlement in 2002 was another
step in the right direction. Last but not least, the block has re-emphasised its
commitment to macro-economic and monetary cooperation. As Espino and
Azar point out, ‘although, this progress is very slow and fragmented’, it
represents an important ‘chance of stepping forward to build a shared space
for sustainable development’ (Espino and Azar 2005: 4).
Trade and economic aspects
Despite the identified shortcomings in MERCOSUR’s institutional frame-
work and trade performance, its overall purpose of creating a common mar-
ket has been steadily reaffirmed. Indeed, MERCOSUR’s integrative common
market goal is by far the most ambitious of all Latin American economic
integration schemes.
In order to advance and institutionalise the process of economic and
monetary integration, the four member states have created two collegiate
and inter-governmental organs. The Common Market Council (CMC) –
comprising foreign ministers and the ministers of economic affairs – is
MERCOSUR’s highest policy-making body, responsible for compliance with
the strategic economic objectives of the Asunción Treaty and its subse-
quent protocols. The Common Market Group (CMG) – coordinated by the
Ministries of Foreign Affairs – represents its executive body, charged with
the implementation of CMC’s consensual decisions through the initiation of
practical measures for trade promotion, the coordination of macro-economic
policies, and negotiations with third parties. The CMG is assisted by ten
working groups in the areas of trade and customs issues; standards; trade
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related monetary and fiscal policies; infrastructure; energy policy; and the
coordination of macro-economic policies. A special Trade Commission was
established by the Ouro Preto Protocol (1994), to function under the ambit of
the CMG. This commission is responsible for the technical negotiations
required to design and enforce common trade policy instruments.
Non-trade aspects
Although MERCOSUR has evolved – in spite of its political roots – as a
predominantly commercial initiative, based on the successful implementation
of a trade liberalisation programme, it has gradually incorporated a variety of
non-trade issues in its agenda. Referring to the inherent ‘trade and cooper-
ation linkage’, which distinguishes its integration scheme from a purely free
trade agreement, such as NAFTA, the block seeks a broad cooperation pro-
cess in a wide range of socio-political areas (such as education, justice,
environment, energy, technology, health and foreign policy). Addressing these
areas is considered crucial for the establishment of a ‘community sense’ and a
regional identity, based on shared values and principles (Costa Vaz 2001).
LABOUR ISSUES
In order to mitigate the societal impact of greater economic integration,
MERCOSUR’s labour ministers proposed the creation of a Social Charter
for MERCOSUR two months after the signing of the Asunción Treaty
(1991). This charter addresses labour issues and improved working condi-
tions. Later, the Protocol of Ouro Preto created the Economic and Social
Consultative Forum. Made up of national representatives of the different
economic and social sectors, the forum serves as an advisory board to the
CMC. The creation of the MERCOSUR Socio-Labour Commission (1999),
through the proposal of the Working Group No. 10, has been a significant
advancement. Designed as a mandatory consultant of the CMG, the com-
mission established a Labour Market Observatory and which successfully led
to a CMC Resolution on Professional Qualifications.
DEVELOPMENT AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION
The CMC’s decision to establish a structural fund of US$100 million per
year, to address the problem of asymmetries and inequalities within the
block, was a momentous one. The main objective of this Fund for Structural
Convergence of MERCOSUR (FOCEM) is to develop competitiveness; to
encourage social cohesion, particularly in the smaller economies and least
developed regions; to support the functioning of the institutional structure;
and to strengthen the integration process. Presently, the fund is undercapital-
ised in view of the large number of people living below the poverty line in the
Southern Cone (approximately 95 million according to ECLAC 2003).
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ENVIRONMENT
Following upon the statement of intent in the Asunción Treaty, MERCO-
SUR’s member states expressed the need to complement the free movement
of goods and services with appropriate environmental measures. After a sig-
nificant delay, the block signed a ‘Framework Agreement on the Environment
in MERCOSUR’ in 2001. This framework aims to foster regional sustainable
development through the harmonisation of national environmental standards,
the sharing of information on environmental emergencies, and research
promotion for clean technology. Entering into force in June 2004, the agree-
ment focuses on the intra-regional elimination of environmental NTBs; the
implementation of a bloc-wide system of environmental information sharing;
the creation of guidelines for environmental emergencies, as well as for inter-
national environmental standards; and the introduction of a region-wide sys-
tem of eco-labelling. On 20 July 2006, the MERCOSUR Council, the highest
technical body within the block, issued Decision N 14/06: ‘Competitiveness
For Program Complementation – Directives for Environmental Management
and Cleaner Production’, evidence of a growing environmental awareness
within MERCOSUR as a whole.
Conflict resolution mechanism
As the regional integration process proceeds towards the integration of policy
disciplines, there is an increasing need to embed them in a strong and
supportive institutional framework, which is capable of resolving disputes
arising from treaty obligations. A key imperative, driven by MERCOSUR’s
distinctive intra-regional power asymmetries, is that the dispute settlement
mechanism serves not only to prevent the escalation of retaliation measures,
but also guarantees that the bloc’s weaker states can effectively push the
stronger ones to comply with their obligations.
In the early stages of the integration process, the governments were
reluctant to establish an independent judicial body, preferring a flexible and
cost-effective inter-governmental process based on political negotiations and
an ad hoc tribunal. The Protocol of Brasilia for the Solution of Controversies
(1991) provided two diplomatic measures (consultations and claims), but
only one arbitration procedure. While consultations are supposed to settle
minor disputes through direct negotiations, claims are designed to resolve
more awkward conflicts. Such claims need to be initiated by a national section
within the Mercosur Trade Commission. If the plenary session of the com-
mission does not resolve the case, it is sent to a technical committee, which
issues a non-binding recommendation to the Trade Commission. If there is
still no consensus, the claim may be forwarded to the CMG, which may, as a
last step, activate the arbitration mechanism. The arbitration proceedings
finally take part under an ad hoc tribunal composed of three members. After
a series of negotiations under the intervention of the CMG, mandatory and
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final determinations are issued. In the repeated event of non-compliance,
retaliation may be the ultimate response.
This minimalist jurisdictional architecture, based on consensus and
diplomatic cooperation, proved to be effective at the initial stages when
interdependence was relatively low and political commitment high. Its short-
comings became apparent in the aftermath of Brazil’s currency devaluation
in 1999: when Argentina imposed unilateral trade barriers in order to protect
its domestic market from the flood of Brazilian manufactures, the affected
private parties had no institutional bodies within MERCOSUR they could
revert to in order to redress their grievances (O’Keefe 2003). Other claims
were raised by the smaller states, lacking sufficient political leverage to ensure
their unrestricted market access. In a climate of retaliation, the absence of an
independent supra-national court with permanent arbitrators becomes a
serious hindrance to intra-regional trade.
In order to minimise such trade disruptions and its political ramifications,
the Protocol of Olivos (2002) introduced a number of innovations. Among
these, the establishment of a post-decision control mechanism and the cre-
ation of a permanent review court were the most noteworthy (Pena and
Rozenberg 2005: 9). The post-ruling control strengthens the obligatory nature
of the arbitration decisions by invoking possible compensation in case of a
member state’s non-compliance. The Permanent Review Court has a twofold
responsibility: reviewing the tribunal’s decision; and providing an alternative
to ad hoc arbitration, where the parties may submit their disputes directly to
the court without having to go through the arbitration process. In a recent
case, the tribunal met in Montevideo, Uruguay, to arbitrate the ongoing
dispute between Argentina and Uruguay over a water-contaminating pulp
mill plant to be installed close to the Uruguay River, a natural border between
both countries. The tribunal, assembled in early September 2006, included
legal representatives from both countries and a neutral arbitrator. The result-
ing ruling appears to have satisfied both parties (López-Dardaine 2006).
Admittedly these are preliminary initiatives, but they pave the way for
strengthening supra-national arbitration institutions in the Southern Cone.
Intra- and inter-state conflicts within the context of MERCOSUR
MERCOSUR came together in 1991 in almost ideal circumstances. Tensions
among member states had declined noticeably. In conjunction with their
neighbours, the member states had intensified efforts to settle territorial
disputes,14 and conflicts in the field of trade and investment were miti-
gated through enhanced political cooperation and the institutionalisation of
CBMs. As mentioned, the concept of ‘open regionalism’ underpinned the
integration process (emphasising external opening, privatisation, deregulation
and democratic governance). This approach reduced implicit and explicit
security threats. MERCOSUR’s firm diplomatic intervention in Paraguay’s
constitutional crisis (1996) earned it external credibility as a stable region
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(Strú́mberg 1998: 12). In fact, such intervention effectively put an end to the
persistent threat of military coups in the whole region (Vasconcelos 2001:
136). O’Keefe noted that the so-called ‘democracy clause’ in the Treaty of
Ushuaia (1998) provided ‘a way to strengthen weak democracies by requiring
liberal democracy and respect for human rights as a condition for entry and
continued access to the benefits of membership’ (O’Keefe 2005: 212).
However, notwithstanding MERCOSUR’s democracy clause, the diverse
CBMs and the changed political culture, new security issues emerged in the
wake of closer economic integration and open borders. Social and political
conflicts, induced by the trade in narcotics and international terrorism,
become more prevalent and produced spillover effects. The need for a
concerted regional response is clearly evident but not forthcoming. A major
obstruction is the combination of interdependency and inequality within the
region (Bodemer 2002: 415). Hafner-Burton and Montgomery’s condition
that ‘trade institutions can keep the peace . . . when they create ties among
states with relatively equal social positions within the international political
economy’ is far from being fulfilled in the Southern Cone (Hafner-Burton
and Montgomery 2005: 32). The lacunae in macro-economic and monetary
integration are a symptom of the glaring inter-state asymmetries, which
inhibit further progress towards conciliation and integration. Compounding
these asymmetries are the diverging foreign policy objectives, expressed inter
alia by Argentina’s efforts to counteract Brazil’s lobbying for a seat in the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) (Brown et al. 2005: 20). The
popular backlash against globalisation and free trade in Latin America has
stalled the politico-economic convergence process even further. There has
been a re-emergence of nationalistic rhetoric and a revival of old protectionist
import-substitution nostrums.
The MERCOSUR undoubtedly exemplifies the positive connection
between regional economic integration and security, yet the process is far
from being complete. Only by strengthening it with efficient conflict-solving
mechanisms and instituting a fair and equitable distribution of benefits for
all, will its members be able to secure peace in the long-term future.
CAN
The CAN comprises four member nations: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and
Peru.15 It has its roots in the Andean Pact, a trade bloc formed in 1969, within
the framework of the LAFTA:
Together with CARICOM, it formed part of the second wave of integra-
tion processes in Latin American and the Caribbean. Its goals were to
improve the conditions for participation of the less developed countries
encompassed by the LAFTA agreements, while simultaneously aiming at
the gradual formation of a Latin American Common Market.
(Malamud 2005: 9)
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As it stood, LAFTA left much to be desired. The Andean Pact attempted to
compensate for its inefficiencies by fostering further integration. The pact did
not make much headway either. Venezuela’s entrance in 1973 and Chile’s
withdrawal in 1976 created disarray among the members. They countered
through institutional initiatives such as the creation of the Court of Justice
and the Andean Parliament in 1979. However, these institutions lacked real
weight – in neofunctionalist terms, ‘form took precedence over substance’
(Malamud 2005: 10–11). Nonetheless, they set the institutional groundwork
for a viable regional bloc.
Currently, the affairs of the CAN are coordinated by the Andean Integra-
tion System (AIS). This constitutes a set of bodies and institutions ‘designed
to allow for an effective coordination between them in order to maximize
subregional Andean integration, promote their external projection and
strengthen the actions related to the integration process’.16 A total of six
ruling bodies including the Andean Presidential Council, and six community
institutions govern community affairs. ‘[T]he legal principle of direct effect
and the pre-eminence of community law evokes a level of formal insti-
tutionalization, only behind the European Union’ (Malamud 2005: 11). Still,
the CAN has not been uplifted by its network of institutions. Malamud
argues that the member countries are ‘naïve regarding their faith in supra-
nationality’ (Malamud 2005: 16).
The CAN has recently initiated a systemic approach to an Andean security
policy, formalised in the ‘Lima Declaration’ of November 2001 and comple-
mented with the Guidelines for the External Security Policy of the Andean
Community adopted in July 2004. This is in addition to efforts such as intelli-
gence sharing and ending arms trafficking. While these provide some regional
sense of security, they do little to forestall internal conflict. Indeed, a new
instability cycle has emerged in the central Andes. Michael Weinstein refers to
the ‘massive protest marches, roadblocks, the taking of official installations,
regional rebellions, government alienation and an attempt by governments to
extend their powers in an unconstitutional manner’ (Gonzalez and Luis 2005:
1–2). In all the member countries, with the exception of Venezuela, subversive
groups run riot, revealing the substantial capacity of the indigenous popula-
tion for mobilised action.
Similarly, treaties and declarations have done little to erase tensions
caused by border disputes. The case of Ecuador and Peru demonstrates that
‘[b]oundary-related conflict occurs even between partners to preferential
trade agreements’ (Dominguez et al. 2003: 18). Border disputes between these
two countries date back to 1840, ‘based on the imprecise borders drawn by
Spanish authorities during colonization’ (Cooper 2003). The 1939–41 war
was settled with a demarcation of the border by a third party (a Brazilian
mediator, Braz Dias de Aguiar) whom Ecuador did not accept. Subsequently,
despite a status quo agreement in 1992, war broke out between the two
countries again in 1995. International intermediaries, mostly from South
America, negotiated a resolution to the chagrin of some nationalist groups.
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Currently, there is insufficient evidence to link reduced tension and political
instability with CAN membership. Nor does it explain why, despite such
membership, intra-regional commerce is low, constituting only 10 per cent of
total trade. However, this figure was registered in 2004, after declining for two
consecutive years (CEPAL 2005: 109). While intra-regional trade flows fall
below what would be expected in a trading bloc, they are still significant
compared to those recorded prior to the establishment of the Andean Free
Trade Area (AFTA). The bloc’s overall trade performance does more to
justify its continuation. An extenuating factor is that political affinity (or
its absence thereof) does not explain trade preferences. Thus trade flows
between Colombia and Venezuela, the largest in the CAN (at 75 and 65
per cent respectively), belie the tension existing between the two countries
(Cooper 2003).
Colombia and the CAN
CONTEXT
Colombia is currently home to the most intense and complex IAC in the
region, with a history of conflicts dating back to the nineteenth century.
The recent conflict is associated with the guerrilla movement that emerged in
the 1960s, in the aftermath of ‘La Violencia’, a civil war that took place
between 1946 and 1959. Initially a political and ideological (Cooper 2003)
movement that sought an end to socio-economic injustice perpetuated by a
corrupt government, it has now become a full-fledged civil war pitching
the left-wing guerrillas, right-wing paramilitary groups and the Colombian
government against each other. Attempted peace negotiations have not been
fruitful. These tend to break down because of the ‘zero-sum mentality in
which only one victory is acceptable’ (Azcarate 1999: 31). Unfortunately, the
breakdown of negotiations does not signal a cool-down period, but a return
to business as usual.
ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES
Besides the loss of human lives (nearly 7,000 people died between July 2002
and June 2003), this IAC has serious economic consequences. The cost of
the conflict has been monetised at 1.34 per cent of GDP for the period of
1991–2001, rising to 1.91 per cent in 2001 (Caballero Argaez 2005: 28). Also,
starting in 1980, a drop in productivity has caused the rate of expansion of
the GDP to go down after registering a constant growth at 5 per cent for the
last 30 years. Clearly, violence heightens uncertainty and raises the costs of
doing business. According to one estimate, an increase of 1 per cent in
the homicide rate is enough to drop private investment by 0.66 per cent
(Echeverry et al. 2001). The attendant expected drop in long-term growth is
estimated at 8 per cent of GDP (Caballero Argaez 2005: 28). Also, the
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informal economy has expanded. This is mostly due to the conflict’s shift
from political and ideological objectives to pecuniary ones (Ballentine and
Nitzschke 2003: 6). This new paradigm redefines the conflict as a fight for the
control and influence of forest areas dedicated to growing and processing
cocaine (Azcarate 1999: 22–23). The combatant pool has also increased to
include drug dealers and farmers. Thus, the incentives to engage, rather than
disengage, make the web more intricate than it used to be 40 years ago. In
other words, the absence of causes and lowered social inhibition result in
‘criminal inertia’ (Echeverry et al. 2001).
IAC AND INTEGRATION
How does the conflict in Colombia fit in the CAN scenario? According to
Andrew Hurrell, ‘the liberalization of economic exchanges facilitates illicit
flows of all kinds, especially when this liberalization forms part of a more
general shift in power from the state to the market. Such illicit activities may
then spill over into inter-state relations’ (Hurell 1998: 540). For instance,
Ecuador has received about 6,000 refugees displaced by the conflict (Ramirez
2004: 3). A reported 1.3 million people were displaced in the 2001–2004
period. Venezuela, Brazil and Peru have also experienced negative repercus-
sions from the drug trade originating in Colombia.
A truly regional approach to solving the problem has been absent for two
reasons. First, Colombian heads of state refuse to recognise the international-
isation of the conflict; for fear that doing so has trans-territorial implications
and could, consequentially, lead others to challenge their sovereignty. Former
President Andrés Pastrana made an exception when he attempted to promote
peace diplomacy. ‘Faced with the “internationalization of the conflict”, that
is to say a situation that began to be understood as a threat to the peace and
security of the region and hemisphere, [Pastrana’s] government opted for
an “internationalization of the peace” ’ (Ramirez 2004: 3). The subsequent
peace negotiations took place in 1998 and 2002, but without much success.
During these negotiations, the Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces
(FARC) was severely criticised, prompting their withdrawal.
The second factor relates to external recrimination and lack of account-
ability. Ecuador and Peru ‘have blamed Colombia for not doing enough to
contain its armed conflict and prevent irregular armed groups and refugees
from crossing the border. In August 2002, Ecuador imposed travel restric-
tions on Colombians and stepped up security along its northern border (ICG
2004: 5). In January 2006, an alleged invasion of Ecuador’s aerial space by
Colombian military forces reignited tensions between the two countries.
Keeping in mind the backdrop of the Andean Plan of Cooperation against
Drug Trafficking and Criminal Activities (approved in June 2002), there is
little to be said in defence of Colombia’s neighbours. Much as they like to
complain about the situation in Colombia, Ecuador and Peru have done
little to halt the flows of arms trafficking originating in their territories.
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Venezuelan support for Colombia’s main rebel groups, FARC and ELN
(National Liberation Army) is not as farfetched as it sounds, given Chavez’s
apparent sympathy towards rebel groups. Overall, inter-Andean solidarity
has been marred by distrust and lack of cooperation.
Bolivia and the CAN
With a GDP of $10.06 billion (2005 estimate)17, Bolivia is the poorest country
in South America. An estimated two-thirds of its 9.2 million people live in
poverty.18 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) supported structural
adjustment programmes in the 1980s and 1990s. These programmes failed to
alleviate poverty despite a recorded economic growth of 3.8 per cent in the
last decade (CAFOD 2005). The income inequalities associated with such
growth fuelled mass resistance, particularly by indigenous groups, against
Bolivia’s ruling class. The political ramifications of such resistance were evi-
denced in the ousting of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada in November
2003 and the resignation of former President Carlos Mesa Gisbert in June 2005.
The latter witnessed over 800 protests during his term in office (Albro 2005: 1).
While political participation by those who have long been disenfranchised
by the system (i.e. indigenous groups) is an important step towards a repre-
sentative democracy, it also has had detrimental impacts. In economic terms,
it has deterred foreign investment (FDI flows have dropped from $US1,044
million in 2002 to $US160 million in 2003).19 Politically, the mass unrest has
triggered sharp internal divisions. These divisions pit the wealthy side of
the country, the lowlands or cambas, against the poor side, the collas or
western highlands.
Popular unrest has its roots in the ‘water war’. The war originated in the
city of Cochabamba, in April 2000, in response to the privatisation of
the water services (the consortium was led by International Water Ltd, a
subsidiary of a US-based corporation, and Edison SPA, Italy’s largest private
energy services provider). The steep rise in costs (for some users, the rates
went up by 300 per cent)20 angered the citizens of Cochabamba, who took to
the streets in protest. Initially, the Banzer administration sought to put
the protest down by force, which only increased its intensity. Eventually, the
Bolivian government cancelled the contract without compensating the inves-
tors. The success of the water war can be attributed to a broad coalition of
cocaleros, students, workers unions, and even middle-class professionals.
Contrary to popular belief this was not an ethnic war waged by poor,
indigenous Bolivians. Rather than un problema de indios (an Indian problem),
the war had a national and popular dimension.
The sale of natural gas, a newly discovered and vast resource, has fuelled
unrest on a similar scale. The gas is located in the lowlands, where an elite
minority has claimed it as its own. This sentiment is not shared by most
Bolivians, who believe that this resource is a national patrimony and, as such,
belongs to all Bolivians. They consider the sale of gas to foreigners as a threat
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to their sovereignty – a one-way deal. As evidence, multinational companies
have profited from the income generated by the sector, taking in as much as
58 per cent, while government revenues have dropped (CAFOD 2005). The
decision by President Sánchez de Lozada to approve the sale of liquefied gas
to Mexico and the United States provoked a popular and violent uprising,
resulting in the loss of 67 lives and considerably more injuries (CAFOD
2005). After reaching a referendum in July 2004 in favour of more state
control over the industry, the country was swept up in another political
crisis over the passing of a controversial hydrocarbons law. More than
three weeks of protests demanding the nationalisation of gas ended with
the resignation of President Mesa in June 2005 (CAFOD 2005). Most
Bolivians expect the newly elected president, Evo Morales, to uphold the
law despite these threats and dissenting opinions from the business groups
in Santa Cruz. The president himself prefers a middle ground: joint venture
partnerships.
INDIGENOUS UPRISING AND THE MORALES EXCEPTION
Indigenous communities, representing 70 per cent of the population, are
increasingly gaining political recognition (Gonzalez 2006). Their success
derives from an assertion of cultural practices combined with an openness
that allows these communities to cooperate with others with similar grievances
and aspirations.
The results of the 2005 presidential elections reflect their political achieve-
ments. For the first time in Bolivia’s electoral history, an indigenous person,
Evo Morales, won the presidential race. He beat out the candidate of the
Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario (MNR – Nationalist Revolution-
ary Party), the party whose political prominence dates back to 1952. As
president, Morales faces formidable challenges. He has to determine the fate
of Bolivia’s natural gas resources and oversee key legislative measures. These
measures relate to a referendum on departmental autonomy for the region of
Santa Cruz and Tarija, and a new constitution that fully takes into account
the rights of indigenous people. As expected, both measures have drawn
criticism from both sides of the political spectrum. On one hand, cruceños
argue that Bolivia’s population is predominantly mestizo (of mixed race) and
that the indigenous discourse is self-serving (ICG 2003: 16). On the other,
some indigenous activists believe that foreign oil companies are behind the
referendum and that their real intention is to generate ‘a violent reaction by
indigenous movements, in order to justify external military intervention’
(Gonzalez 2006). While the nature of these accusations is questionable, they
nonetheless illustrate the conflicting forces at play. Mediating these will
become a paramount task for the new president if he is to prevent any further
polarisation that could lead to civil unrest. For now, the risk of revived
violence and institutional destabilisation has come to a halt thanks, mostly, to
the same democratic processes that invested Morales with the presidency.
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IAC AND INTEGRATION
At first glance, the link between Bolivia’s internal problems and the trade and
integration processes it is currently engaged in is not clear. Within the CAN,
Bolivia was the first country to liberalise its trade in 1985. It also maintained
the lowest tariff schedules in the bloc.21 The country currently directs a
respectable 22 per cent of its free on board exports to the CAN.22
This profile is at odds with a grassroots movement demanding the national-
isation of natural resources, on the premise that the current exploitation
arrangements benefit foreigners and a Bolivian minority. According to a Pew
study, only 15 per cent of Bolivian respondents believed that growing trade
and business ties were very good for the country, in contrast with 62 per cent,
who thought it was beneficial to some extent.23 In another Pew study, 47 per
cent of respondents believed that anti-globalisation protests were a positive
influence.24 On the other hand, economic models on FDI, debt rating and
entrepreneurship, seem to indicate that a negative attitude towards globalisa-
tion is detrimental for the economy (Noland 2004: 14). One thing is clear; in
the absence of the political stability needed to safeguard their interests,
foreign players need to tread cautiously. Prior to the 2004 hydrocarbons
referendum, Brazil’s Lula travelled to Bolivia to defend the interests of
Petrobras, which controls two oil refineries (the only ones currently oper-
ational) and 25 per cent of Tarija’s natural gas reserves (Zibechi 2005: 2). If
Bolivia’s trade partners are to ensure a smooth flow of goods and services,
they will have to take measures to assist the country in its efforts to overcome
its political and economic difficulties. At the very least, Bolivia’s partners
should avoid arrangements that could do Bolivia’s cause a disservice by
further incensing its people.
Conclusions and recommendations
The following paragraphs recapitulate the content of our analysis. Conclu-
sions and recommendations are provided at the end of the section.
MERCOSUR
The MERCOSUR constitutes the region’s most important and successful
integration effort in the region. Its formation was motivated by the need
to strengthen diplomatic relations between member countries, particularly
Brazil and Argentina; second, the members aspired to enhance regional com-
petitiveness and, thereby, promote regional development. Since its inception
in 1991 to the mid-1990s, MERCOSUR achieved impressive growth in intra-
regional trade. The elimination of trade barriers was mainly responsible for
such growth. After the Asian crisis, the bloc’s performance has been somewhat
erratic. More recent setbacks, such as Brazil’s currency devaluation and
Argentine crisis, further stalled integration efforts.
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In general, MERCOSUR’s trade performance is negatively affected by
several factors. First, NTBs remain. Their removal is subject to individual
members’ perception of product sensitivity and their internal policies. These
factors hinder the formation of a CU and a common external policy. Second,
MERCOSUR’s member countries are not willing to defer to a supra-national
authority, preferring to manoeuvre the process at their own will. To compen-
sate for the resulting low level of institutionalism, several decision-making
bodies or committees, such as the CMC, have been created. There is only one
arbitration procedure and it is, at the same time, a last-resort mechanism that
is cumbersome to activate. Moreover, unilateral disregard for these resolution
mechanisms has been the rule, rather than the exception. An attempt to
overcome this systemic failure was made through the enactment of the Proto-
col of Olivos, but it is still behind in its efforts to develop a reliable system of
international commercial arbitration.
MERCOSUR was given an initial boost by Argentina and Brazil’s willing-
ness to leave their differences behind and put an end to their bilateral nuclear
arms race. Political conflicts are now suppressed by shared expectations/
confidence building measures. For instance, the democracy clause establishes
democratic governance as a precondition for enjoying membership rights and
benefits. However, the extant inter-state conflicts are rarely political in nature.
These tend to arise out of the unequal distribution of benefits and unilateral
economic policies. The level of integration achieved thus far has actually
caused deindustrialisation in Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay, due to
tariff-base liberalisation – with their manufactures being displaced by Brazil.
These are factors that deter full integration.
CAN
The Andean Pact was formed to fill the void that LAFTA left behind. Insti-
tutionally, the CAN has few peers in the developing world. Its supra-national
bodies take precedence over domestic law, effectively curtailing unilateral
digressions. The AFTA was recently completed with Peru’s accession. Intra-
regional export flows have been erratic since the formation of the bloc. His-
torically, the flows reached their highest level in the 1990s, after integration
efforts were reactivated following the sluggish trends of the 1980s. Currently,
intra-regional trade has been growing steadily and constitutes around 10 per
cent of total trade. Commerce has not been halted by tensions among neigh-
bours. Bilateral trade between Venezuela and Colombia continues despite
disagreements over how the guerrilla crisis is being handled. Ecuador and
Peru maintained trade links throughout their territorial dispute, although the
flows experienced a significant upsurge after the dispute was settled.
The Andean bloc has experienced relative peace since the last inter-state
conflict in the region, between Ecuador and Peru, was resolved in 1998.
However, latent threats to security continue to persist, reflecting the high
military spending in the region, non-traditional security concerns and the
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high incidence of intra-state conflict. If unresolved, intra-state dynamics
have the potential to spill over borders. In this regards, CAN members are
grappling with the problems of migration and arms trafficking.
Recent disagreements arose in the context of the bilateral trade agreements
some of the CAN members are negotiating with the US. According to Hugo
Chávez, the president of Venezuela, these agreements nullify the authority of
the CAN, as its conditions seek to override the community’s law. He, sub-
sequently, withdrew from CAN, causing the bloc to experience a major
internal crisis.
In order to identify the links between trade and conflict in Latin America,
there needs to be a systematic tracking and analysis of related events. This
study attempts to fill the void, but also leads us to question its usefulness.
That is, how practical is the attempt to correlate RTAs with conflict given that
we do not know what the life-span of an RTA is? When Venezuela withdrew
from the CAN, it shook the bloc’s core and some observers feared its eventual
demise. Although members of the CAN and MERCOSUR hope to eventually
merge into a single bloc, the fact that both regions are mired in their own
difficulties and tug of wars could have a negative effect on the formation of a
South American Free Trade Area. Each country participates in the regional
and global markets according to expected gains; proximity is less relevant
today thanks to globalisation and advances in technology. For this reason,
Chile has remained unengaged in the regional processes surrounding it.
Hence, we suggest that putting too much emphasis on RTAs as precursors to
regional peace and economic development might tempt us to overlook other,
more promising possibilities.
With the above in mind, we make the following recommendations:
• To enhance the integration process, the existing conflict/dispute resolution
mechanisms must be redesigned. They must have supra-national author-
ity so as to ensure independent judgement. In theory, some of the existing
mechanisms were designed to fulfil this criterion, but the practice reflects
another reality. A serious overhaul is needed, one that is based on renewed
commitments, rather than an old model that has already demonstrated
its futility.
• Trust is present in a relationship only when the interested parties con-
tinuously work towards its consolidation. An action taken unilaterally
will easily break the trust that takes years to build. A country with such
inclinations should not sign an RTA in the first place, as its actions will
affect regional morale and give way to tensions between members. More-
over, trust is essential to induce transparency and ensure compliance.
With this in mind, member countries should demonstrate a willingness to
subject themselves to third-party verification and oversight. The more
harmonised policies and cooperation are, the less the potential for regu-
latory interference.
• No foolproof way of avoiding conflicts exists, particularly in the face of
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power disparities. In the 1980s, the EU accepted countries that were
considered ‘backwards’ in relation to the majority of its members (Spain,
Portugal and Greece). These countries were not left to their own devices
because the EU understood that improving their situation was in its
best interest. Regional aid was, therefore, provided to help bring these
countries closer to the northern European average. A similar approach
could be taken, especially in the case of the MERCOSUR, to address
asymmetries.
• As in the case of the EU, asymmetries tend to be subsumed as inter-
dependence increases. The greater the interdependence, the less likely that
a conflict will escalate. However, the reality is that both the MERCOSUR
and the CAN direct most of their exports to external markets, the
US and the EU in particular, which reduces the level of interdependence
among member countries. It is, therefore, necessary to strengthen
regional institutions so as to augment the competitiveness of member
countries. A country or regional bloc cannot effectively compete in the
absence of reliable institutions, for it is these same institutions that serve
as guarantors and reduce the cost of doing business.
• Today’s security concerns are often related to organised crime. No
regional approach to these issues has been adopted yet. Blame games,
sovereignty discourses, and well-intentioned rhetoric must be set aside
in order to coordinate an effective strategy to address new security chal-
lenges. This is of utmost importance given that the spillover effects
transcend boundaries and their cumulative effects can be devastating.
Moreover, an effective strategy requires continuous cooperation and
reviews to remain so; it is never static. The fact that even a well-designed
security machine, such as that of the US, can fail should serve as a
reminder of the need to be meticulous in this regard.
• Both the MERCOSUR and the CAN could benefit greatly from each
other’s experience. The CAN has lessons to share in terms of insti-
tutionalisation, whereas the MERCOSUR has greater commercial lever-
age and could help pinpoint competitive strategies for Andean countries
to adopt. Such complementarity suggests the possibility of creating a
South American Free Trade Area.
Notes
1 See Protocol II to the Geneva Convention, Article 1(1), (1977).
2 Ibid.
3 See http://www.abacc.org/engl/abacc/abacc_history.htm ABACC (n.d.).
4 MERCOSUR is comprised of Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay as full
members. Chile, Bolivia, Venezuela, Peru and Ecuador participate as associate
members.
5 Without Mexico.
6 Regional economic integration that is not discriminatory against outside countries;
typically, a group of countries that agrees to reduce trade barriers on a most
favoured nation (MFN) basis.
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7 See ‘Chile trade facts and figures’, http://www.chileinfo.com/index.php?accion=
info_comercial (accessed November 2005).
8 Narich further elaborates on this point by stating: ‘Indeed, Latin Americans were
key worldwide pioneers of ideas and institutions that have succeeded in reducing
the incidence of warfare and also in strengthening the expectation that neighbor-
ing countries will not go to war with each other.’
9 Marques-Pereira (2002/2003: 45) notes the absence of supra-national institutions
in the MERCOSUR and points out the lack of clarity regarding the precedent of
community law over domestic law; only the constitutions of Argentina and
Paraguay recognise such precedence.
10 See ECLAC (2005).
11 Ibid.
12 ‘Antecedentes del MERCOSUR’, http://www.mercosur.int/msweb/portal%20
intermediario/es/index.htm (accessed December 2005).
13 ECLAC (2005).
14 Such as in the case of Argentina and Chile.
15 Chile was among the original five signatories, but it later withdrew.
16 See ‘The Andean integration system’, http://www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/
sai/que.html (accessed December 2005).
17 See ‘The World Fact Book: Bolivia’, http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/
geos/bl.html (accessed January 2006).
18 See ‘Country profile: Bolivia’, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35751.htm
(accessed February 2006).
19 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) http://
www.unctad.org/Templates/Page.asp?intItemID=2921&lang=1 (accessed January
2006).
20 See Shultz (2000).
21 Tariff barriers to internal trade have been phased out.
22 See ‘Estadísticas: Indicadores económicos de la Comunidad Andina’, http://
wwww.comunidadandina.org/estadisticas/documentos_indicadores.htm (accessed
November 2005).
23 See ‘Support for free trade: Miami protests do not reflect popular views’, http://
pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?AnalysisID=74 (accessed December
2005).
24 See ‘World publics approve increased international trade, but concern for prob-
lems of global economy’, http://pewglobal.org/commentary/display.php?Analysis
ID=68 (accessed February 2006).
References
ABACC (Brazilian–Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear
Materials) (n.d.) ‘History of the ABACC’. Available from http://www.abacc.org/
engl/abacc/abacc_history.htm. Accessed 28 February 2006.
Aggarwal, V.K. and Espach, R. (2003) ‘Diverging trade strategies in Latin America:
an analytical framework’, The Strategic Dynamics of Latin American Trade,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Available from http://ist-
socrates.berkeley.edu/~basc/pdf/articles/. Accessed 18 November 2005.
Albro, R. (2005) ‘The future of culture and rights for Bolivia’s indigenous movements’,
New York: Carnegie Council on Ethics and International Affairs. Available
from http://www.cceia.org/media/fellowPaper_albro2.pdf. Accessed 22 February
2006.
Azcarate, C.A. (1999) ‘Psychosocial dynamics of the armed conflict in Colombia’,
Regional integration, trade and conflicts in Latin America 41
Journal of Peace and Conflict Resolution 2:1. Available from http://
www.trinstitute.org/ojpcr/2_1colombia.htm. Accessed 31 October 2005.
Ballentine, K. and Nitschke, H. (2003) ‘Beyond greed and grievance: policy lesson
from studies in the political economy of armed conflict’, New York: International
Peace Academy. Available from http://www.ipacademy.org. Accessed 23 October
2005.
Bodemer, K. (2002) ‘The Mercosur on the way to a cooperative security community?’,
in P. Giordano (ed.) An Integrated Approach to the European Union – Mercosur
Association, Paris: Editions de la Chaire Mercosur, 403–417.
Bromley, M. and Perdomo, C. (2005) ‘CBM en América Latina y el Efecto de la
Adquisición de Armas por parte de Venezuela’, Real Instituto Elcano. Available
from http://www.realinstitutoelcano.org. Accessed on 10 and 11 November 2005.
Brown, O. et al. (2005) ‘Regional trade integration, violent conflict and peace building’,
working paper for the IDRC Research Initiative. Winnipeg, Canada: IISD.
Caballero Argaez, C. (2005) ‘La estrategia de seguridad democrática y la economía
Colombiana: un ensayo sobre la macroeconomía de la seguridad’, Banco de
la República (Colombia). Available from http://www.banrep.gov.co/docum/ftp/
borra234.pdf. Accessed on 11 November 2005.
CAFOD (Catholic Agency for Overseas Development) (2005) ‘Why focus on Bolivia?’
Available from http://www.cafod.org.uk/news_and_events/features/focus_on_
bolivia/why_focus_on_bolivia. Accessed 25 February 2006.
CEPAL (Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe) (2005) Panorama
de la Inserción Internacional de América Latina y el Caribe: Tendencias 2005,
Santiago: UN/CEPAL.
Cooper, T. (2003) ‘Peru vs. Ecuador: Alto-Cenepa war, 1995’, ACIG Central and Latin
American Database. Available from http://www.acig.org. Accessed 11 November
2005.
Costa Vaz, A. (2001) ‘Forging a social agenda within regionalism: the case of Mercosur
and the FTAA in a comparative approach’, unpublished working paper.
Dominguez, J.I. et al. (2003) Boundary Disputes in Latin America, Washington,
DC: United States Peace Institute. Available from http://www.usip.org. Accessed
20 November 2005.
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (2003)
Economic Indicators 2003. Available from http://www.eclac.cl/publicaciones/xml/8/
13618/EconomicIndicators2003.pdf. Accessed 2 February 2006.
ECLAC (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) (2005) ‘Latin
America and the Caribbean in the world economy: trends 2005’, Bulletin FAL, 230.
Espino, A. and Azar, P. (2005) ‘Mercosur: are we there yet? From cooperation
to integration’, working paper. Montevido: Latin America Gender and Trade
Network Interdisciplinary Centre for Development Studies, Uruguay.
Estevadeordal, A. (2002) Traditional Market Access Issues in RTAs: An Unfinished
Agenda in the Americas?, preliminary draft presented at the seminar Regionalism
and the WTO, Ginebra, 26 April, Washington, DC: Integration, Trade and Issues
Division, Integration and Regional Programs Department, Banco Interamerican.
de Desarrollo.
Gonzalez, G. (2006) ‘War on terror has indigenous people in its sights’, Inter Press
Service News Agency. Available from http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=28960.
Accessed 18 February 2006.
Gonzalez, M. and Luis, E. (2005) ‘El “Etnonacionalismo”: Las nuevas tensiones
42 Alejandra Ruiz-Dana et al.
interétnicas en América Latina’, Real Instituto Elcano. Available from http://
www.realinstitutoelcano.org. Accessed 10 November 2005.
Gratius, S. (2005) ‘EU–Mercosur relations as a learning experience for bioregionalism’,
in R. Seidelmann and W. Grabendorff and (eds) Relations between the European
Union and Latin America; Bioregionalism in a Changing Global System. Berlin:
Stiftung Wissenchaft und Politik, pp. 279–318.
Hafner-Burton, E. and Montgomery, A. (2005) ‘War, trade and envy: why trade
agreements don’t always keep the peace’, working paper presented at the Inter-
national Studies Association Annual Conference, Honolulu.
Hufbauer, G. and Kotschwar, B. (1998) ‘The future of regional trading arrangements
in the Western Hemisphere’, working paper. Washington, DC: Peterson Institute
for International Economics.
Hurell, A. (1998) ‘Security in Latin America’, International Affairs, 74:3.
IADB (Inter-American Development Bank) (2000) ‘Periodic note on integration and
trade in the Americas’. Available from http://2005.sice.oas.org/geograph/westernh/
idb2000.pdf
ICG (International Crisis Group) (2003) ‘Colombia and its neighbors: the tentacles of
instability’, IGC Latin America Report, 3. Available from http://www.crisisweb.org.
Accessed on 22 November 2005.
ICG (International Crisis Group – Las Divisiones en Bolivia) (2004) ‘Demasiado
hondas para superarlas’, Informe Sobre América Latina, 7. Available from http://
www.crisisweb.org. Accessed 22 November 2005.
Kacowicz, A.M. (1998) ‘Regionalization, globalization, and nationalism: Convergent,
divergent, or overlapping?’ working paper 262, Notre Dame, IN: The Helen
Kellogg Institute for International Studies. Available from http://www.nd.edu/~
kellogg/wps/262.pdf. Accessed 18 November 2005.
Khan, S.R. et al. (2007) ‘Regional integration, trade and conflict in South Asia’,
Winnipeg, Canada: Sustainable Development Policy Institute. Available from
http://www.iisd.org/pdf/2007/tas_rta_south_asia.pdf. Accessed 11 June 2008.
López-Dardaine, M. (2006) Personal communication.
Malamud, A. (2005) ‘Spill over in European and South American integration: an
assessment’, LASA 2001 meeting paper, Lisboa, Portugal: Centre for Research and
Studies in Sociology (CIES-ISCTE). Available from http://136.142.158.105/
Lasa2001/MalamudAndres.pdf. Accessed 18 November 2005.
Marques-Pereira, B. (2002/2003) ‘Processus de développement régional en Amérique
Latine’, Syllabus DEVL 013, Brussels: ULB Presses Universitaires de Bruxelles.
Narich, R. (2003) ‘Traditional and non-traditional security issues in Latin America:
evolution and recent developments’, occasional paper series, 42, Geneva: Geneva
Centre for Security Policy (GCSP).
Noland, M. (2004) ‘Popular attitudes, globalization and risk’, working paper, 04-2,
Institute for International Economics. Available from http://www.iie.com/publica-
tions/wp/wp04-2.pdf. Accessed 3 March 2006.
Ocampo, J.A. (2001) ‘Raúl Prebisch and the development agenda at the dawn of the
twenty-first century’, ECLAC Review, 75, 23–37.
O’Keefe, T. (2003) ‘A resurgent Mercosur: confronting economic crises and negotiating
trade agreements’, North–South Agenda, papers no. 60, January. Florida: The
Dante B. Fascell North–South Center at the University of Miami.
O’Keefe, T. (2005) ‘Economic integration as a means for promoting regional political
Regional integration, trade and conflicts in Latin America 43
stability: lessons from the European Union and Mercosur’, Chicago-Kent Law
Review, 80, 187–213.
Paiva, P. and Gazel, R. (2003) ‘Mercosur: past, present and future’, Nova Economia,
13: 2, 115–136 IADB.
Pena, C. and Rozenberg, R. (2005) ‘Mercosur: A different approach to institutional
development’, federal policy paper, FPP–05–06, Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for
the Americas.
Ramirez, A. (2004) ‘The role of the international community in Colombia’, Accord:
An International Review of Peace Initiative, 14. Available from http://www.c-r.org/
accord/col/accord14/roleofinternational.html. Accessed 18 November 2005.
Saavedra, B. (2005) ‘Transnational security crime in Latin America: building up
cooperation in the Andean Ridge’, CSRC discussion paper. Available from http://
www.da.mod.uk / CSRC / documents / Special / csrc_mpf.2005-10-17.5799702381 / 05
(54).PDF. Accessed 18 January 2005.
Shultz, J. (2000) ‘My response to Bechtel’, letter in Weekly News Update on the
Americas, 556. Available from http://www.1worldcommunication.org/bolivia.
htm#TEXT%20OF%20STATEMENT. Accessed 16 January 2006.
Stewart, J.G. (2003) ‘Towards a single definition of armed conflict in humanitarian
law: a critique of internationalized armed conflict’, International Review of
the Red Cross, 85: 850, 313–350. Available from http://www.rcrc.org. Accessed
11 November 2005.
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3 Regional integration, trade and
conflict in southern Africa
Mzukisi Qobo
Introduction
Regional trade integration, in the strict sense of the concept, is a relatively
new development in southern Africa, although Africa’s post-colonial leaders
had, in the early 1960s, called for integration of Africa’s political and eco-
nomic structures. The story of regionalism in sub-Saharan Africa is marked
by failure, with lack of political will an oft-cited reason. The sub-continent
has had to contend with many challenges in the process of regional integra-
tion and cooperation. This chapter will examine these challenges, focusing on
the intersection of trade and security in the southern African context.
The southern African region became an institutional construct in the form
of the Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC)
in the late 1970s (this structure was later renamed Southern African Devel-
opment Community (SADC)), with the expressed purpose of providing a
counter to the hostile apartheid regime in South Africa. By this time a large
number of countries in the sub-region had obtained their independence from
colonial powers, and South Africa was seen as the last bastion of colonialism
in the continent, a situation that made the political environment in southern
Africa fraught with security tensions. The backdrop of apartheid South Africa
and heightened Cold War tensions that played themselves out in southern
Africa shaped the formation of the region.
This chapter discusses the nature of political and economic relations
amongst SADC country members, looking specifically at the intersection
between trade and security. The existing literature on southern Africa tends
to treat various dimensions of regional integration and cooperation separ-
ately. There is very little work done on the linkages between trade, security
and development. Yet southern Africa is a good example of a region that
captures the complex dynamics of trade and security. The security aspect, in
particular, has been salient both before democracy and after apartheid,
whereas the trade dimension is relatively new and took on prominence after
South Africa was integrated into the formal structures of the region.
The discussion of trade and security issues in this chapter draws both on
academic and policy research. It should be underlined from the outset that on
both fronts – trade and security – progress in the region has been tortuously
slow and much of this reflects the weak institutional capacity of SADC
member countries. The strengths and weaknesses of the organisation mirror
those of the individual member countries. There is, however, a considerable
scope for SADC’s institutions and policy architecture to improve.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The second section provides a
critical overview of the broader debate on trade and security, focusing mainly
on the implications for the study of regions. It feeds into the main theme this
chapter attempts to develop, namely that regional relations based on trade and
security cannot be understood in isolation from domestic level challenges,
including the nature of institutions, the political culture and the relationships
between various societal actors, especially the state–society nexus. The experi-
ence and expectations of state actors who facilitate political and economic
relations at regional and international level are shaped heavily by their domestic
political context, institutional experiences and the nature of social relations and
networks at the domestic level. Hence this chapter also considers the impact of
intra-state experiences on regional level interactions and conversely.
The third section highlights some of the tensions that exist within the
region, and the nature of regional organisations, including their overlapping
memberships in the wider southern African region.
The fourth section considers pertinent issues of trade integration and
security cooperation in SADC. The discussion centres on the two most critical
areas: the SADC Protocol on Trade, and the Organ for Politics, Security and
Defence (OPSD). Areas of tensions and cooperation in relation to trade and
security are discussed. Regarding the SADC Protocol on Trade, I consider
both the structure of trade complementarities and the nature of rules of
origin (RO) as examples of how trade can generate tensions within the region.
This questions the standard liberal-trade assumption that trade relations fos-
ter harmonious social relations that could automatically generate peace. On
the OPSD, I draw examples from the Great Lakes conflict to demonstrate
how institutional weaknesses at domestic and regional levels can create fertile
conditions for conflict.
Related to this point is the fact that even though trade relations existed
among all the countries that were part of the conflict, it did not stem the tide
of violent conflict, and perhaps even promoted it via resource competition. In
examining this case, the countries involved and the institutional mechanisms
that were in place, the question that I pose – and seek to answer – is what is
the appropriate institutional design that could help foster deeper trade rela-
tions and ensure sustained peace in regions that were previously mired in
violent (inter-state) conflict?
The last section draws summary conclusions from the study and points to
some of the policy considerations that could improve our understanding of
the relationship between trade and security and the institutional designs that
could be explored to create a strong positive association between trade and
security in a regional context.
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Trade and security: a critical review of theory
The benign trade–security nexus
The case for a positive relationship between trade and security gained strong
currency in the liberal-trade paradigm, propounded strongly by Mansfield
and Pevehouse (2000). These scholars have made a noteworthy contribution
in taking the trade–security debate away from generalities and broad con-
ceptualisation to the more specific context of preferential trading partners –
bilaterally and regionally. Their proposition is that the ‘conflict-inhibiting’
effect of preferential trade will grow larger and stronger as trade flows rise,
and that ‘heightened commerce will be more likely to dampen hostilities
between PTA [preferential trade agreement] members than between other
states’ (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2000: 781).
The assumption is that increased commercial relations create a climate
for peaceful co-existence or, simply put, the more countries trade, the more
peaceful towards one another they become. This is hardly a novel proposition.
Since the late seventeenth century, liberal philosophers such as Charles Louis
de Secondat Montesquieu, John Stuart Mill and Jean-François Melon drew
a close association between the expansion of commerce, the spread of gentle-
ness or civilisation and taming of violent passions.1 Montesquieu2 argued
that ‘the natural effect of commerce is to lead to peace. Two nations that
trade together become mutually dependent . . .’.
In further expounding this theoretical proposition, Albert Hirschman3
points out that ‘international commerce, being a transaction between nations,
could conceivably have also a direct impact on the likelihood of peace and
war: once again the interests might overcome the passions, especially the
passion for conquest’. Following this argument, peace can be regarded as an
outcome or dividend of good commercial behaviour. In this respect, today’s
proponents of the thesis that trade equals the absence of conflict draw a
conclusion that, with increasing interdependence among nations, bound
together by common commercial interests or a balance of interests, conflict is
levelled out.
This view is deeply rooted in the European intellectual tradition as it was
there that the rise of commerce and the formation of nation-states were co-
reinforcing. Ironically, this was also the region that gave rise to the most
destructive (global) conflicts in recent history. Indeed, the late nineteenth
century was a time of great optimism for liberal theorists but this gave way to
the carnage of the First and Second World Wars. Arguably a major contribut-
ing factor was the lack of formal institutional mechanisms for regulating
resource competition amongst industrialising nation-states – states built on
mercantilist notions of state-craft. It was not until after the Second World
War that such institutional mechanisms were put in place (the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT); the European Union (EU)), and
with relative success. This recent historical experience in institution-building
Regional integration, trade and conflict in southern Africa 47
lends substantial weight to the liberal proposition, at least from the standpoint
of Western history.
However, applied to other contexts, especially where the state was more
an external imposition than an organic development, this perspective is
unconvincing. For example, in most instances, states in sub-Saharan Africa
were forged through the crucible of conflict, according to Buzan and Weaver,
‘without exception based on inter-state rivalry, and many of them were born
into war’ (Buzan and Weaver 2003: 17). In contrast, during Europe’s transi-
tion from feudal societies to modern nation-states, the political elite used
taxation in the process of state-building and socio-political change. On the
other hand, most of sub-Saharan Africa’s elite did not use fiscal policy
instruments to build cohesion among citizens.
The liberal free-trade-peace thesis has been contested by some scholars,
who argue that interdependence can also increase the risk of militarised
disputes. They suggest that asymmetric dependence in trade relations can
create conditions that could give rise to conflict. Indeed, it is possible that
such unequal trade arrangements, where benefits are seen as accruing dis-
proportionately to one member or a select group of countries, without
compensatory mechanisms to assuage the sense of deprivation, can create
resentment and cause strains in regional relations. At the heart of Barbieri
and Schneider’s argument is that symmetric ties may promote peace while
asymmetric trade dependence could lead to conflict (Barbieri and Schneider
1999: 387–404). Conflict could be a function of skewed distribution of
material power in a regional context, which in turn could establish grounds
for the emergence of hostilities or lead to strained relations, especially if there
are no compensatory measures extended by the hegemon. If the regionalisa-
tion process is seen to proceed in a way that reduces gains for other countries
and creates a space for hegemonic assertion by a strong country, resentment
is likely to arise among countries that perceive themselves to be in a position
of disadvantage and vulnerability in relation to the dominant country.
Arguably, one of the key reasons for the failure of the East Africa com-
munity integration project in the late 1960s was Kenya’s perceived domineer-
ing role. Kenya was seen as benefiting disproportionately from the customs
union (CU) at the expense of the other two countries (Tanzania and Uganda).
Other political factors also came into play, including tensions between
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere and Uganda’s Idi Amin, which saw the former
engineer a coup that edged Amin out of power. The fact that commercial
relations existed between these countries did not restrain political actors from
engaging in violent conflict. It would however be facile to suggest that these
tensions resulted from trade-generated disparities but the telling point is that
economic relations are on their own insufficient for forging harmonious
relations.
Barbieri criticises the liberal view that ‘leaders are deterred from engaging
in conflict with important trading partners for fear of losing the welfare gains
associated with trade’. It is not always the case that the economic welfare
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trade generates outweighs the benefits of engaging in conflict. Such a linkage
assumes a universal or standard conceptualisation of benefits, and this fails
to take into account the composition of the state and the nature of the
relationship it has with civil society in different contexts. Similarly, Buzan and
Weaver (2003) suggest that the nature of the links between trade and security
are governed by internal institutional conditions. Regions made up of weak
states will be different from those made up of fairly strong states: weak and
strong states are defined based on the degree of internal cohesion of the state
and the degree of socio-political cohesion between the state and civil society
(Buzan and Weaver 2003: 22). While, as they suggest, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa
contains predominantly pre-modern states’, there is a degree of differentiation
and signs of ‘modern’ state construction in some cases in southern Africa.
Without doubt, most of the continent’s states conform to the image of
pre-modernity, with weak institutionalisation and relations with civil society
constituted in neo-patrimonial terms.
Regional political geography before 1994
Western European state-systems failed to take root in sub-Saharan Africa.4
As Chabal and Daloz argue, the state in sub-Saharan Africa has an edifice
that conforms to the Western template, yet its workings derive from patri-
monial dynamics, characterised by a lack of ‘emancipation’ of the state from
clientelistic social networks, informalisation of politics and personalisation
of public service (Chabal and Daloz 1999: 8).
Much of southern Africa mirrors the failure of nation-state building and
the lack of rules-based socio-political cohesion between the state and civil
society. The new political elite in the region, after achieving independence,
inherited state structures that were largely underdeveloped. Even the forma-
tion of a regional institutional entity (SADCC), which responded to the
security challenges posed by apartheid South Africa in the 1970s, acted fitfully
well into the 1980s.
The organisation was a politically directed effort aimed at dealing with
essentially non-economic challenges. As such, it was less demanding of its
members and accorded greater weight to the sovereignty of national govern-
ments, relative to supranational structures (Anglin 1983: 709). This sover-
eignty did not go far in defining the precise form the relationship between the
state and civil society would take and, because the Western bureaucratic
state model was relatively new, had the political elite as its primary security
reference point rather than the citizens. As Anglin noted, ‘national sover-
eignty was fundamental to SADCC’s modus operandi ’.5 This logic, especially
in its preoccupation with national interests and economic autonomy, is still
pervasive even though SADCC evolved into SADC in 1992.
It is this form of sovereignty – characterised by Jackson as ‘negative
sovereignty’ – where state elites in southern Africa are bent on safeguarding
their security. This form of sovereignty is deliberately limited to the legality
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of the state’s existence and does not confer responsibility or obligation upon
state elites towards their subjects; the ‘liberty’ possessed by the state is in
relation to the former colonial state and is especially articulated with respect
to independence from external interference (Lal 1994: 81).
Lal observes, ‘while paying lip service to the ideal of liberty in their rela-
tions with their subjects, their actions belied their commitment to this norm’.6
This point also features in Jackson’s observation of quasi-states when, para-
phrasing J.S. Mill, he suggests that ‘an independent government which is
responsible to other sovereigns can still harm its subjects either deliberately or
through negligence or incompetence’ (Jackson 1991: 11). In this spirit, supra-
national entities such as SADC do not deserve their designation since their
modus operandi does not protect individuals from the excesses of the state.
In more specific terms, SADCC’s core objectives were framed around polit-
ical initiatives designed to reduce dependence on South Africa and to achieve
collective self-reliance and balanced development among member countries.
But in reality the region was structured as a security complex in which states
were singularly concerned with their survival and sought to maximise their
aggregate power through regional cooperation.
Following the Realist perspective, security was considered a derivative of
power; the raison d’être of the state was seen in terms of maximisation of its
security vis-à-vis other states in the region. This political orientation blends
well with economic nationalism or – more narrowly, neo-mercantilism, where
each state is fixated with maximising its aggregate economic power in relation
to other states. These two dynamics are still very entrenched in southern
Africa’s political and economic thinking. In the realm of politics, they are
expressed in the form of a regional security complex.
Buzan defines a security complex as involving ‘a group of states whose
primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national
securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another’ (Buzan
1991: 190). This suggests both interdependence of rivalries and interdepend-
ence of interests. It is a form of containment of potential conflicts among
contiguous states, and this can be both positive and negative.7 Furthermore,
as Mohamed Ayoob notes: ‘The Third World state elites major concern –
indeed, obsession – is with security at the level of both state structures and
governing regimes’ (Ayoob 1995: 6).
The fact that SADCC members saw apartheid South Africa as a common
enemy and a threat to their political and economic well-being strengthened
the basis for cooperation and sustained the regional body for another decade,
until its transformation into the SADC. South Africa had since the 1970s
engaged in systematic destabilising campaigns using its military force against
neighbouring countries suspected of harbouring members of the African
National Congress (ANC) – then a liberation movement – and its military
wing. Evidently, the character of the security complex that existed in the
region at that time was negative and shaped the contours of future relations
between South Africa and regional partners post-apartheid.
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Post-apartheid relations in southern Africa
As the apartheid era ended in the early 1990s, it was widely expected that
regional relations would be reconstituted in ways that would accelerate polit-
ical modernisation and economic growth. In a fit of optimism, it was hoped
that post-apartheid South Africa would play the role of a pivotal or hege-
monic state, as well as an engine of growth for the entire region. However,
apartheid ended over ten years ago, and with its overtly adversarial relations
between South Africa and countries in the region, southern Africa remains
fraught with political (especially security) and economic challenges. In the
security context, latent tensions exist on many fronts within various coun-
tries, including those between the ruling elite and civil society, resulting from
the incomplete process of state-building, lack of socio-political cohesion
and the organisational weakness of state bureaucracy. Tensions also exist,
broadly, between other countries in the region and South Africa because
of its hegemonic image, as well as perceptions around the division of spoils
in trade relations. Another line of tension exists between different groups
and alliance structures in the region. This was evident in the military inter-
vention in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) by three SADC mem-
ber countries (Angola, Namibia and Zimbabwe), ostensibly to defend the
DRC from attacks by Rwanda and Uganda with the involvement of rebel
movements.
Two key factors explain the uneasy relationship between South Africa and
its regional partners. The first has to do with perceptions and envy; and the
second, which is discussed in detail below, concerns the character of its trad-
ing relationship with regional partners. It is here that questions bearing on
the relationship between trade and security may have relevance.
The lingering legacy of apartheid has cast regional relations in a negative
light. Some elites in the region also harbour deep resentment against South
Africa. Partly, the resentment is generated by a prospering South Africa
amidst an almost generalised state of regional poverty and underdevelop-
ment – a situation to which South Africa contributed during the apartheid
era. Between 1980 and 1988 the total cost to the region of apartheid is
estimated at US$60 billion, measured in terms of lost gross domestic product
(GDP), with about one million deaths and millions of people displaced
(Ostergaard 1990: 51). This purportedly amounted to three times the gross
external resource inflows in the form of grants, soft loans, export credits and
commercial loans over the nine-year period. These costs were unevenly dis-
tributed, with Angola and Mozambique shouldering a large proportion.
About 1.5 million people in these countries were displaced as refugees to
other countries.8
As Ahwireng-Obeng and McGowan have suggested, state elites in the
region had expectations that the new South Africa would feel a moral obliga-
tion to ‘engage southern Africa in a positive manner’ (Ahwireng-Obeng
and McGowan 1998: 12). Given the huge cost that South Africa’s apartheid
Regional integration, trade and conflict in southern Africa 51
policies inflicted on the region, the sense of entitlement that regional elites
have with respect to South Africa’s largesse is not entirely misplaced, espe-
cially since South Africa’s dominance of economic (trade) relations con-
tinued post-apartheid. As Table 3.1 shows, the trade complementarity within
the region is heavily weighted in favour of South Africa.
The indices reflected Table 3.1 reveal asymmetric complementarity
between South Africa and the majority of SADC countries, which South
Africa’s political elite put down to lack of supply capacity in neighbour-
ing countries. An International Monetary Fund (IMF) working paper by
Khandelwal on regional integration in Southern Africa also reveals that the
extent of product complementarity within SADC is very low. In its measure-
ment, the product complementarity index ranges from 0 (which signifies no
complementarity) to 100 (which express full complementarity). According
to Khandelwal’s calculation, using UN-COMTRADE database, ‘there is
complementarity between South Africa’s exports and the imports of the rest
of the region, but not vice versa’ (Khandelwal 2004: 16).
On reflection, this suggests two things. First, the structure of trade in the
region follows a mercantilist framework, where the gains of trade are seen
as generated solely through exports, and because South Africa is a structur-
ally dominant economy such an arrangement serves its interests. Second,
this could also mean that, in spite of the prevailing mercantilist manner
in which trade relations between two or more countries are structured,
South Africa is able to find markets for its products in the neighbouring
region, while the reverse is not the case as a result of supply-side constraints
(structural limitations) in other countries. Or it could be both.
Nevertheless, as Khandelwal suggests, the trade imbalance raises concerns
regarding polarisation as ‘investment may be attracted towards the larger and
more industrially diversified economies in the region’.9 This also clearly dem-
onstrates that the level of integration within the region is quite shallow and,
as such, extant trade integration is a weak basis for creating strong conditions
for sustained peace in the region. Indeed, trade relations understood as a
zero-sum game, as is the case in the region, do not augur well for harmonious
relations or sustained peace.
Alluding to the dangers of mercantilism, Douglas Irwin points out that
concern with zero-sum gains in the context of Anglo-Dutch rivalry for the
East India trade routes generated militarised disputes in Europe in the seven-
teenth century (Irwin 1991: 1296). The raison d’être of state during this
period, Irwin suggests, was to maximise its aggregate welfare and relative
power vis-à-vis other states.10 As we observed earlier, this nationalistic mind-
set and approach towards economic relations has persisted in southern Africa
well into the establishment of SADC in 1992 and beyond. In part this was
influenced by then prevailing pan-Africanism and the quest for political
independence and economic self-sufficiency in the colonial aftermath.
Nonetheless, the establishment of SADC in 1992 marked an important
phase for regionalism in southern Africa, and portended a gradual shift away
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Table 3.1 Bilateral complementarity indices in SADC
Exporting Importing country
country
Bots. Mal. Maur. Moz. Namib. SA Swaz. Tanz. Zamb. Zimb. Average
Botswana – 7.5 11.3 17.8 9.6 13.0 9.7 7.4 7.8 8.9 13.0
Malawi 13.7 – 9.3 18.4 11.6 11.6 13.0 9.3 8.1 6.6 11.3
Mauritius 16.8 11.3 – 21.3 14.6 15.3 15.8 12.0 10.3 8.9 14.0
Mozambique 23.2 21.8 26.7 – 23.9 24.6 26.2 20.8 19.5 19.1 22.9
Namibia 22.8 14.0 20.5 24.8 – 17.1 18.8 11.5 21.0 11.3 18.0
South Africa 53.9 48.5 54.1 59.4 54.1 – 55.1 51.3 51.0 49.9 53.0
Swaziland 27.9 20.4 23.5 30.0 29.9 22.0 – 20.6 19.0 17.6 23.4
Tanzania 16.4 13.1 20.2 20.2 13.4 13.2 13.3 – 8.9 7.1 14.0
Zambia 19.0 12.9 19.3 23.2 14.9 16.6 14.2 12.8 – 11.9 16.1
Zimbabwe 13.7 14.0 18.4 20.4 10.6 11.5 11.5 10.6 9.1 – 13.3
Source: From IMF Working Paper, WP/04/227; IMF Staff Calculations using UN-COMTRADE data.
Note: Angola, DRC and Lesotho were excluded due to lack of data. Seychelles, even though included here, left SADC towards the end of 2004; bold denoting a
fairly good measure of complementarities is as original table.
from old, exclusively politically driven regionalism, which had been defined
largely by excessive state interventionism, and the suffocation of markets
within the context of the Cold War and apartheid in South Africa. As by far
the largest economy in the region, with relatively well-developed institutions
and sophisticated productive forces, South Africa was initially welcomed as
a member of SADC by most regional governments. This prompted some
African scholars to predict the dawn of a new era for the region, character-
ised by political and economic modernisation. Asante observed that ‘Southern
Africa can look forward to the closer integration of the dominant economy
of the subcontinent into the economic and political structures of the region’
(Asante 1997: 12).
In his take, Azam suggested that South Africa’s regional role could propel
growth in southern Africa in pretty much the same way that the Asian tigers
(Hong Kong, South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan) led the way for Malaysia
and southern China (Azam 1995: 12). Azam further suggested that, because
of South Africa’s future role in southern Africa, the region ‘might become
the main pole of Africa’s development in the medium-term’.11 Similarly,
Western countries hailed South Africa’s enhanced participation in the regional
economy as an important development that would help stem the tide of
economic decline and poor governance and anchor regional economies on a
sustainable growth path.
South Africa’s reintegration into the region heralded the evolution of
regional ties from the minimalist project coordination type towards regional
economic integration, especially in trade. This was initially seen in a positive
light, and it was hoped that it would facilitate the development of neighbour-
ing economies – which the previous apartheid government stifled – through
developmental transfers and enhanced access to South Africa’s relatively
large market. The bilateral deficits that these countries had with South Africa
gave more force to such expectations.
Trade relations in southern Africa were formalised through the signing of
the SADC Protocol on Trade, which most countries in the region initially
expected to be an instrument that would equalise economic gains in the
region. In this respect, trade relations and the benefits associated with them
were not seen from the point of view of a fully liberalised trade regime in the
region, but through mercantilist lenses. As such there was reluctance amongst
most countries in taking major liberalisation obligations, and South Africa
was generally expected to make generous offers in its liberalisation schedule
in order to address the existing developmental asymmetries in the region,
which it later did, albeit under a generally protectionist and defensive climate.
In essence, there was not much reflection on what exactly countries were
committing to and what the implications of regional economic integration
would be in their national economies. The old SADCC structure (including
the Summit of Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers,
Sectoral Commissions, the Standing Committee of Officials and the Secre-
tariat) became the institutional edifice of the new SADC.12 It was an attempt
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to modernise SADC without having to re-think its purpose or take a long-term
view of its role in the region and in international relations.
There was also no substantial transformation of regional relations as they
existed pre-apartheid and during the Cold War era. It is therefore fair to
conclude that the security-complex milieu was not decisively shifted for the
region to conform to new global economic challenges, which required,
amongst other things, liberalisation of trade and close integration into global
markets. That the intended trade liberalisation process in the region was not
genuinely driven from below by private economic agents posed major difficul-
ties for the project. Indeed, political considerations overshadowed economic
exigencies.
The SADC Trade Protocol
The SADC Trade Protocol was thus signed in 1996 against the backdrop
of political changes in South Africa’s relations with its neighbouring region,
and as the basis on which the region would ensure its economic growth
and development as well as positive integration into the global economy.
The SADC Trade Protocol was aimed at liberalising intra-regional trade in
goods and services with the ultimate view of establishing a free trade area for
SADC through an asymmetric tariff phase-down process. The Protocol came
into force in September 2000, after the necessary number of signatories was
achieved. The DRC is the only country that has not acceded to the Trade
Protocol, and Angola has yet to put forward a tariff offer. Incidentally, these
are the countries that have had the most frequent incidence of conflict in the
region.
Since ratification, the implementation process has been slow. Apart from
the fact that neighbouring countries were far less prepared to engage in
deeper and meaningful liberalisation of their trade, at the heart of the hiatus
in the SADC trade protocol has been South Africa’s lack of positive leader-
ship in the early phase. It is believed by other SADC member countries as
having been preoccupied with its own short-term interests in the region and
demonstrating very limited sensitivity towards its neighbours, conceding,
however, that the tariff phase-down is asymmetric in favour of poor countries
in the region.
Some of the often cited examples of South Africa’s lack of leadership
include stringent RO, especially in textiles and clothing, the automotive sec-
tor and other manufacturing sub-sectors, which some studies have pointed to
as having created a gridlock in the liberalisation process; the existence of
other non-tariff barriers; high tariffs in certain product lines such as tobacco
and sugar; and tariff escalation in others, for example wood products. The
view that South Africa’s approach has been somewhat mercantilist is consist-
ent with the sense of grievance other countries in the region and beyond have
towards South Africa.
South Africa’s approach during the negotiations on the SADC Trade
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Protocol played strongly to domestic groups – and was motivated by its
domestic growth concerns and anxieties regarding the competitiveness of its
domestic industry. In this sense, instead of taking a lead in opening its bor-
ders, it fostered relations of rivalry by stringently insisting on protectionist
measures. This has, however, aggravated political sensitivities in the region,
with potentially corrosive effects on the political influence that South Africa
could hope to exert in future.
A climate charged with political insecurity and anxieties regarding the role
of the regional power could significantly weaken the platform for fostering
long-term peace and security. Although, conceptually, the linkage between
regional trade and security is not a solidly grounded one, it should not be an
impossible task to examine the prospects, or lack thereof, of peace dividends
in an integrating area based on empirical observation. In southern Africa,
such an examination should entail the extent to which the design of the
regional trade agreement (trade protocol) facilitates deeper integration
amongst various countries, fosters harmonious relations and contributes
positively in creating a general climate of peace on a sustained basis rather
than generating possibilities for reversal.
South Africa’s claim to the status of ‘security manager’ in southern Africa,
although not officially pronounced, is not uncontested, especially by coun-
tries such as Zimbabwe, which had previously enjoyed a status of a regional
hegemon before South Africa was re-integrated into SADC. While regional
power centres or pivotal states can give coherence to regional security, as
Ayoob suggests, they also have the potential to increase the conflict level if
their legitimacy is not accepted or their claims for primacy are under dispute
(Ayoob 1995: 59).
Some SADC countries have, as a way of countervailing South Africa’s dom-
inance, opted for an alternative centre through which to formalise their com-
mercial relations. Zambia, Zimbabwe, Mauritius and Malawi, all SADC
members, are simultaneously participating in the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern Africa (COMESA) free trade agreement (FTA) arrangement in
a move that is viewed as a snub to a South African-centred SADC (Lee 2003).
Furthermore, these countries are currently negotiating economic partner-
ship agreements (EPAs) with the EU under a different regional configuration,
which does not include any of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU)
members.13 In a study conducted among business actors in the region there
was a strong view that Tanzania, an SADC member country also active in
efforts to establish an East African Community Customs Union (EACCU)
and political federation, should integrate closely with COMESA.14 While
politically it may make sense for Tanzania to plug itself into SADC processes,
business actors in the country are conscious of the fact that greater benefits
could be realised elsewhere – COMESA specifically. It has not escaped pri-
vate economic agents that a regional trade integration scheme has to open
more opportunities for commerce – something that SADC is struggling to
achieve – rather than creating a gridlocked enclave.
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One of the crucial points in the SADC Trade Protocol concerns RO. For
example, the initial rule, which required a change of tariff heading, was
replaced by rules that required detailed technical processes, much higher
domestic value-added and lower permitted import content (World Bank
2005: 65). This was done without any evidence that existing rules were inef-
fective and needed to be tightened. There are two major reasons advanced by
South Africa in particular: the first is a barely veiled mercantilist one and
emphasises the need to curtail trans-shipment through customs loopholes;
and the second is ostensibly utilitarian, and views these as instruments to
force industrial development in the region. These have been heavily criticised
by trade practitioners and independent studies in the region.15
This exotic protectionist instrument did not only reveal the extent to which
South Africa has at times thrown around its weight in the region to benefit its
interests, but also the general lack of commitment to liberalisation. A recent
World Bank study on trade, regionalism and development, has noted that
‘specifying rules of origin on a product by product basis offers opportunities
for sectoral interests to influence the specification of the rules in a protectionist
way’ (World Bank 2005: 70).
The design of these RO creates variation along product lines. For example,
in some products, the requirement would be a simple change of tariff head-
ing; in others it would be a change of tariff chapter; and in others it would be
specification for a particular technical process or requirement for levels of
value addition in order to qualify for preferential treatment.16 This creates
confusion for already incapacitated customs officials, and also holds the
potential to slow down momentum in regional trade integration and give
rise to mistrust and tensions in the region. Given the political sensitivities
that already existed in the region, the design of the existing trade arrange-
ment in SADC is far from promoting harmonious relations and creates
unnecessary political strains in a region already racked by tensions.
Apart from these complex RO, there are other deeper problems in the
region, whose roots lie in the institutional domestic setting and structural
shape of the economies. Some of these problems include a lack of will by
political principals who are obsessed with short-term gains, poor support
given to technocrats, weak institutional instruments to implement agreed-
upon policies both at the national and regional levels, and overlapping mem-
bership and competition between various regional integration schemes with
geographical contiguity. Table 3.2 below shows the extent of overlapping
membership – a situation that represents a resource drain on poor countries
as they have to participate actively in various structures, pay membership
dues and implement agreements.
SADC Protocol mid-term review
The failure of regional trade integration has been a subject of interest
amongst African scholars and political economists since the early 1980s.
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From the outset, such efforts were directed through political means and
geared towards political objectives, namely creating Africa’s economic and
political union. The ideological focus was pan-Africanism. It was only late
in the 1990s that a serious effort to integrate into the global economy was
undertaken, and regional integration schemes began to take a more outward
shape. Even so, there are still strong shades of ideology in the integration
processes across the sub-Saharan sub-continent, with economic rationale
heavily subjected to political expediency. Regionalism in southern Africa is
still struggling to make a decisive shift from inward orientation to external
integration.
It is doubtful that Europe’s functionalist and linear model of integrat-
ion and security arrangements – epitomised in the EU – is appropriate for
Africa’s circumstances. Africa’s state forms and the shape of its institutions
do not provide propitious conditions for such complex systems. It should
not be supposed that these states can achieve at the regional level what they
have failed or been unwilling to achieve at the domestic setting, namely,
institutionalisation. As Lal observes, ‘it is unlikely that that third world nation-
states are going to give up their adherence to this principle [sovereignty]
and to the extant system of nation-states for some more cosmopolitan or
supranational form of international society’ (Lal 1994: 82).
In early 2004 SADC leaders adopted a Regional Indicative Strategic
Development Programme (RISDP) which, unrealistically, aims at achieving
an SADC CU by 2010, despite the generally slow pace of implementation of
the SADC Trade Protocol.
SADC’s RISDP views the attainment of an FTA in 2008 ‘as a step towards
achieving a Customs Union and subsequently a Common Market.’17 This
objective, as the RISDP points out, would be achieved on the basis of greater
commitment to the implementation of the SACU Protocol on Trade,
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appropriately designed RO and greater harmonisation of customs rules and
procedures, including standards. The RISDP sets out ambitious targets – very
much along the lines of the EU model – for achieving deeper integration.18
These are:
• completion of negotiations for the SADC CU: 2010;
• completion of negotiations for the SADC common market: 2015;
• diversification of industrial structure and exports with emphasis on
value-addition: 2015; and
• establishment of an SADC monetary union: 2016.
This strategy does not seem to have taken into account the ground realities:
for example, the existence of multiple integration schemes and overlapping
membership; the new SACU agreement finalised in 2002; and the continu-
ing EU EPA negotiations, the outcome of which could significantly alter
the nature of integration in southern Africa. Furthermore, there is no mooted
institutional mechanism to speed the integration process set out in the
RISDP.
The SADC Trade Protocol’s mid-term review took place during the latter
half of 2004 and was meant to infuse momentum in the liberalisation process.
This review was essentially designed to be a stock-taking exercise, focusing
mainly on market access, trade flows, tariff phase-down schedules, non-tariff
barriers and the pattern of trade flows since 2000. It was meant to look at the
progress made so far in these dimensions and propose ways of fast-tracking
liberalisation in the sub-region.
Without getting into fine detail on the outcomes of the review, a number of
concerns were raised by the report, including what the report calls a situation
where ‘a much larger degree of implementation existed’. Countries such as
Zimbabwe, Malawi and Zambia have substantially delayed implementation
of their tariff phase-down schedules; in some instances there have been dif-
ficulties with implementing revised, product-specific RO; and in some cases
there is poor communication with the private sector.
There are ongoing debates in the region as to the logic of deeper trade
integration in an area with so little in common with respect to economic
interests, and whether other forms of cooperation focusing on development
projects, political cooperation and harmonisation of regulatory systems
would not be more appropriate. For example, SADC has more than ten
other protocols to foster cooperation in other areas, including mining,
infrastructure, energy, environment, and on politics, security and defence.
Since there is a lack of both conceptual and institutional linkage between
various protocols – especially related to trade and economic integration on
the one hand, and politics and security on the other – it would be difficult to
test empirically the liberal-trade-peace assumption that increased trade could
generate peaceful outcomes. Even though the level of intra-regional trade is
much lower than what one would find in developed countries, still there are
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trade flows between different countries in southern Africa, both formally and
informally, and it does not appear that this has any direct bearing on the state
of politics or security.
As suggested in this chapter, more indirectly, trade relations that are fash-
ioned along neo-mercantilist lines have heightened political tensions, but this
has not led to actual conflict. This could also be attributed to the fact that
there is an institutional arrangement in place, to which politicians have given
more attention, to manage issues related to politics, security and defence
in the region.
The organ of politics, security and defence
The history of the southern African region is coloured by political tensions
that later took on a very strong security or military dimension. This was
evident from the early efforts in establishing SADCC, the same year that
apartheid South Africa announced its ‘Total Strategy’, designed primarily to
maintain white rule in South Africa, but also to: erode external support for
the liberation movements; secure recognition of South Africa’s hegemony in
the region; thwart attempts by SADCC countries to lessen their economic
dependence on South Africa; and destroy the image of non-racial states
in the SADCC region as a model for South Africa (Ostergaard 1990: 52).
To counter such efforts, the governing elite in the region’s countries that
had achieved political freedom from colonial powers – notably Tanzania,
Botswana, Zambia, Lesotho and Malawi – established themselves as front-
line states (FLS).
This collective show of unity was to later culminate in the establishment
of SADC with a strong security dimension. Apart from South Africa’s
destabilisation agenda, issuing from its ‘Total Strategy’, there were also Cold
War interplays that further moulded a particular security environment in the
region, forcing the elite to be singularly concerned with preservation of
territorial integrity and staying alert to external threats.
Even after the collapse of the Cold War and apartheid South Africa,
hostilities continued to run deep within the region. During the Cold War this
situation was made all the more septic by persisting internal conflicts in
Angola and Mozambique – both taking more than two decades to abate –
with apartheid South Africa playing a major role in fuelling these wars. How-
ever, in the post-apartheid and post-Cold War era, the region has, by and
large, remained frozen in time. The outbreak of conflict in the Great Lakes
in 1998 brought out sharply the complexities of inter-state security and dem-
onstrated quite emphatically that regional integration has a long way to go
before creating sustained peace in southern Africa.
As I noted earlier, the conception of security in SADC and in most of
Africa is generally informed by the traditional Realist view that regards state
survival as supreme, and in which the pursuit of power lies at the core of
defining relations between states. By implication, this de-emphasises, if not
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invalidates, the place of individuals or non-state actors as referent objects for
security (Van Schalkwyk and Cilliers 2004: 6–10). The political tensions in
Zimbabwe and SADC’s inability to play any meaningful role is one example
where conflict affecting individuals is trivialised compared to conflict between
different states. This is the mindset that still dominates SADC today. SADC
countries that participated in the Great Lakes conflict did so ostensibly to
defend a fellow SADC country facing external aggression, and using the
ambiguously constructed ‘Mutual Defence Pact’ as a justification.
The notion of ‘existential threat’ and what Buzan and Weaver characterise
as ‘the continued prominence of territoriality in the domain of security’
(Buzan and Weaver 2003: 11), has been the obsession of political actors in the
region for many years, and moving away from this narrow view remains an
important challenge in southern Africa. The thinking behind this approach
is still reminiscent of the Cold War milieu. State actors expend most of
their energies on security cooperation rather than economic integration.
The two most critical facets of SADC’s work are kept apart both conceptu-
ally and institutionally, with little effort to integrate the two or to treat them
symmetrically.
The main instrument for dealing with politics, security and defence in the
region (the OPSD) was established on the recommendations of an SADC
workshop on democracy, peace and security held in Windhoek on 11–16 July
1994. In this workshop SADC’s commitment to a greater role in areas of
security coordination, conflict mediation and military cooperation became
noticeably evident (Malan 1998: 267). It must be emphasised though, as
Hammerstad has pointed out, that the OPSD was established rather too
hastily, and lacked a solid basis for evolving common values and shared
understanding on the future of regional security, as well as the precise meaning
of security in the context of new regional relations.
The OPSD, as Van Nieuwkerk pointed out, was ‘characterised by inappro-
priate design, the suffocating arrogant state elites, and lack of resources’.19
The seeds of its failure were very much sown in its beginnings. Robert
Mugabe, the president of Zimbabwe, presided over the newly established
body in August 1996, in part as a way of repositioning himself vis-à-vis South
Africa’s entry into SADC. He insisted on the independence of this structure
from the SADC, which was chaired by Nelson Mandela, then president of
South Africa. This immediately brought to the surface tensions between
Zimbabwe and South Africa.
The existence of two potentially rival summits – both supreme decision-
making structures – in the SADC created a situation that was bound to
unravel the pretence of post-apartheid regional unity. This tension has also
played itself out on a number of occasions in other SADC processes, includ-
ing trade relations. This counter-tendency is also reflected in the overlapping
membership between two competing regional integration schemes – SADC
and COMESA.
In its first few years of existence, the OPSD lacked a clear direction, and its
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work was characterised by acrimony and discord. The first signs of fragility
were evident in 1996 when SADC refused to endorse Mandela’s criticism of
human rights violations in Nigeria (Leysons and Thompson 2001: 58). Given
the undemocratic nature of many SADC leaders, this was to be expected.
However, Mandela also protested at the manner in which the OPSD func-
tioned and the way Mugabe ran it as his prized power base in SADC, and
threatened to resign if it remained structurally de-linked from the SADC
body. The mutual acrimony generated by these sets of events continued to
shape political relations in the region and emphasised the limits South Africa
had in using its political clout to achieve certain outcomes.
Although the instruments of economic integration and political and secur-
ity cooperation existed separately, developments in one area could feed into
the other. However, the lack of institutional and policy coherence in dealing
with economic and security challenges render the potentially positive associ-
ation between the two weak. These are both important initiatives that suffer
from poor institutional design.
Although the idea of the OPSD was initially a laudable attempt at creating
a security regime, the complexity of regional power politics rapidly under-
mined its effectiveness. The rivalry between South Africa and Zimbabwe did
not help build sustainable foundations for a security framework and, in fact,
the OPSD’s agenda dominated SADC and over-shadowed other concerns
related to human security, collectively referred to as development security:
water, food, gender issues and health.
The OPSD and the Great Lakes conflict
The weaknesses of the OPSD’s operating modalities under Mugabe were
tested and exposed during the DRC conflict when Laurent Kabila, the
DRC’s president, faced internal and external threats to his rule. Having
joined SADC (something that SADC has since bitterly regretted), the DRC
issue soon rose to prominence and would for a considerable amount of
time dominate regional relations.
The war in the DRC started in 1998 when Uganda and Rwanda sent their
armies to help various rebel movements to topple Kabila’s government,
which they had helped put in power the previous year. In response to Kabila’s
call for aid, Angola, Zimbabwe and Namibia (the so-called ‘SADC allies’)
sent troops to the DRC, ostensibly to ‘protect’ an SADC member against
foreign invasion. There is no doubt that Mugabe also saw this as an oppor-
tunity to reinforce his regional authority, which was slowly evaporating
with South Africa increasingly gaining a leadership foothold in regional
affairs.
Yet, the DRC admittance was another South African creation in SADC; its
application for membership was sponsored by South Africa when Mandela
made a persuasive point about the space SADC would have in influencing
political developments in the DRC. This was despite the opposition from the
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majority of SADC countries who had argued that it would not be viable to
accept a new member when meaningful integration amongst existing mem-
bers had not been achieved. Having accepted the DRC into SADC, there was
a sense of obligation amongst some SADC countries to come to its defence.
South Africa was excluded from participating in a meeting hosted by
Mugabe at Lake Victoria in August 1998, where the decision to commit
troops to the Great Lakes was taken.20 This again exposed the cracks that lay
underneath the surface of unity in the SADC structure, as well as the weak-
nesses of the security arrangement, especially the fact that there were no
enduring common values that bound various actors together. Tensions
between the Zimbabwe-led group, including Namibia and Angola on the
one hand, and South Africa on the other were all too apparent. The Great
Lakes conflict lasted for over two years and was temporarily halted when
a diplomatic solution was explored, with Zambia initially assuming the role
of a neutral mediator. The process initiated by Zambia led to the signing of a
ceasefire agreement in Lusaka in 1999.
The ceasefire did not last for very long. It was followed by South Africa’s
initiative, supported by Botswana and the United Nations, to broker a
lasting peace accord known as the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, in Gaborone,
Botswana, in August 2001. As its name suggests, it was aimed at fostering a
dialogue and pulling together a framework that would lead into a power-
sharing arrangement. The shape of the power-sharing formula first emerged
on 30 July 2002 in Sun City, South Africa, with the final peace agreement –
effectively ending formal hostilities between the belligerents – signed in April
2003. This did not completely stem the conflict, as intermittent skirmishes
along the eastern parts of the DRC continue. It is here that informal trade
networks, linked to the looting of resources, including diamonds and other
commodities, flourish. Such networks expand on the back of pre-existing
informal and illegal trade processes that bypass, and sometimes involve, state
officials.
The weakness of regional integration and cooperation in southern Africa is
evident on two fronts: first with regards to low levels of formal trade amongst
neighbouring countries; and second with respect to the tenuous security
foundations in SADC, especially in view of the impending political and eco-
nomic crisis in Zimbabwe and the fragile situation in the Great Lakes. These
have clearly shown how weak the institutional architecture of the regional
organisation is and the lack of appropriate and enduring policy instruments
to deal with such security crises.
Institutional restructuring of security relations
On the security front, efforts were made between 2000 and 2004 to restructure
the institutional design and processes. The Strategic Indicative Plan for the
OPSD (SIPO) was signed in 2001 and this sought to overhaul the previous
security arrangement in the region by placing a strong emphasis on peace and
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security as a linchpin for socio-economic development. One of its key object-
ives is to encourage greater interdependence and shared interests in the
region. There is recognition that ‘the region still faces potential and actual
military threats that include inter-alia armed conflicts in some Member
States, unfinished demobilisation, disarmament, re-integration, monitoring
of former military personnel, and the prevalence of terrorism’.21 SIPO is
divided into two related policy instruments: the protocol on politics, security
and defence, and a mutual defence pact.
The language used in crafting this policy framework adopts the rhetoric of
democratisation, institution-building, human rights, political pluralism and
civil society quite liberally – something that is a far cry from observed
practices on the ground, especially in countries such as Zimbabwe, Angola,
Swaziland and the DRC. The SIPO framework defines security along four
sectors: the political sector; the defence sector; the state security sector; and
the public security sector. We will only look here at the political sector, which
also touches on the other dimensions.
The political sector objectives are structured along the theme of prevent-
ing, containing and resolving inter- and intra-state conflict through peaceful
means. More specifically this would entail standardisation of conflict indica-
tors; developing early warning systems in member countries; enhancing
capacity for conflict prevention, management and resolution; and a regular
assessment of factors that have a potential to lead to conflict, including
imbalances in welfare and poverty.
On the face of it, it would be difficult to contend with these lofty objectives,
but the reality sharply diverges from the rhetoric: SADC has limited capacity
– both financially and in terms of human capital – to undertake some of these
complex processes. The organisation draws much of its financial resources
from donor countries, without which it cannot exist as a viable structure.
The key objectives are: promotion of political cooperation among member
states; promotion of democratic institutions and practices; observation of
universal human rights; and the protection of civilians against instability
arising from the breakdown of law and order, intra- and inter-state conflict
and aggression. Again the recent practices in Zimbabwe, where the state has
trampled human rights with no positive intervention from SADC to help
affected citizens makes it difficult to take this formal policy process seriously.
It would be fair to observe that much of the language is framed for the
international (including donor) community who have historically played
a significant role in shoring up SADC financially. Interestingly, the outlines
of SADC’s strategic plan for security mirror those of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) charters, with similar wording in some respects.
SADC has sought to modernise its institutions when the constituents’
state foundations are quite shaky, and with shallow democratic ethos and
institutions.
There is little doubt that SADC is obsessed with its international image, as
its lifeline derives from international donors. Some of the ‘modern’ practices
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that SADC is promoting include those related to peace missions, humanitar-
ian efforts, disaster management and support for civilian authorities. In
this respect, it has established a peace-keeping centre in Zimbabwe – a coun-
try that has so far shown little respect for human rights and the rule of law.
Furthermore, there is also allusion to combating terrorism, exchanging intel-
ligence and confronting challenges related to organised crime, including drug
trafficking, money laundering and human trafficking.
A lack of trust and a strong consensual platform of shared interests, based
on values that are rooted in democratic practices, will continue to undermine
SADC and any processes towards building a sustainable peace and security
environment in the region. The institutionalisation of peace and security in
the region would derive weightier force from bottom-up processes, and this
would be possible when democratic ideals with appropriate institutions have
taken root at the domestic level.
Conclusion: some questions for policy consideration
Given the fact that SADC(C) was established in a climate fuelled by security
tensions, it would have been expected that there would be volumes of studies
examining the relationship between the security dimension and trade rela-
tions in a more specific context. At the policy level, there is an implicit linkage
between the two. For example, SADC’s OPSD has been an important leg
alongside the economic integration agenda, and has in fact dominated much
of the SADC’s agenda after 1996, notwithstanding its severe limitations, as
discussed earlier.
One of the arguments that this chapter has been making is that strong
institution building and consolidation, both at the domestic and regional
level, is a critical component in building a sustainable security community
in the region. This will not simply be a function of increased commercial
relations – as such relations already exist in an informal manner straddling
both legal and illegal lines – but, most fundamentally, it will be the outcome
of a maturing domestic polity.
Deepening democracy would entail, amongst other things, strong com-
mitment to building strong institutions, recasting of state–society nexus in
a manner that ensures institutional separation between the state and civil
society, and with social movements given space to exist independently, and to
participate meaningfully in political processes. Furthermore, rather than
dealing with trade integration or developmental cooperation and security
separately, it would be far more helpful, for policy coherence, to articulate
these in tandem. There is therefore an important policy imperative to examine
the intersection between trade and security in regional contexts.
One of the important questions that also needs further exploration deals
with the distribution of material gains: where there are asymmetries of power
and skewed distribution of gains, how can a ‘core’ or pivotal state within a
region use its position of advantage positively to equalise benefits or off-set
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losses arising from asymmetrical transactional arrangements? Is there a room
for making developmental transfers in order to incentivise greater commit-
ment to regional integration, especially for countries that are likely to lose in
the short term?
These questions are linked to questions related to the commitment of the
pivotal state in the region to play a greater role and give meaningful leader-
ship in integrating the region. There does not seem to be such a commitment
or urge to play a positive leadership role by South Africa, partly due to
resource limits imposed by its own domestic social challenges, as well as
awareness of hegemonic limits linked to the negative regional role that South
Africa has played in the past. Redeeming itself, and thus salvaging the region,
will either be a function of time or resource commitment.
In this regard, the SACU, which has a very long history of integration and
which is firmly anchored in South Africa’s trade and industrial structure,
emerges as one important vehicle to drive integration in the region in the
future. There is a possibility for SACU to expand in future. This would come
on the back of its success in consolidating itself as a trade liberalisation
project and an instrument to achieve regulatory reforms and harmonisation
in the integrating area.
Furthermore, as SACU grows in its stature as a global actor, first structur-
ing trade and developmental relations with the EU (under South Africa’s
leadership – a process that is currently underway), and second concluding
external trade linkages as a solid trade bloc, the epicentre of regional trade
integration will fundamentally shift away from SADC. This would also help
in overcoming the problems related to multiple and over-lapping membership
in regional integration schemes.
South African policy-makers have hinted that their attention will be turned
towards building SACU structures and consolidating its international iden-
tity, which could effectively mean SADC would cease to be an instrument of
trade integration, while retaining important developmental and security
functions. This should then make it less difficult for South Africa to enlarge
its developmental assistance to fewer SACU countries as it deepens its
hegemony in the immediate sub-region. Much of this assistance can come
from the EU itself. While it is not clear how the much-needed relationship
would be structured between SACU (as a trade liberalisation instrument) and
SADC (as a developmental and security structure), with greater clarity of
purpose in both structures defining the future of the region it should be less
difficult than it currently is.
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12 See TRALAC (2005).
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Introduction
As the number of regional trade agreements (RTAs) has grown, so has
the interest in the impact that RTAs tend to have within and outside the
region. Perhaps the most significant aspect is the link between RTAs and
political stability. In this chapter, we focus on the South Asian region and
examine the economic, political and strategic context in which the sub-
continental RTAs are embedded. South Asia is a strategically important
region with a history of both integration and conflict. While the Mughals
consolidated the Indian sub-continent, it remained internally divided. The
British colonial rulers unified India administratively and also integrated
it economically through the development of elaborate rail, road and canal
networks. The post-1947 colonial era saw India divide into two countries.
Subsequently Bangladesh broke away from Pakistan in 1971. These sub-
continental divisions weakened the integration process considerably and
the region has continued to experience long spells of intra and inter-state
tensions.
The region presents itself as an interesting case to examine the trade–
conflict linkage. For this study, we look at all three existing RTAs in the
region. The South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
is the overarching RTA with an economic and political mandate. Members
include Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal, Bangladesh and Bhutan.
Two South Asian agreements aiming at economic integration have been
constituted within the SAARC mandate, namely the South Asian Preferential
Trade Agreement (SAPTA) and the South Asian Free Trade Agreement
(SAFTA). Both agreements are primarily trade focused and were formu-
lated during the course of SAARC negotiations. While other sub-regional
and bilateral groupings exist, these are the only truly regional initiatives
that can be analysed to shed light on the RTA–conflict linkage in South
Asia.
In particular, we look at RTAs as part of a larger regional integration
process. We deconstruct the somewhat binary question, ‘Does trade promote
or mitigate conflict?’ In doing so, we attempt to determine whether conflict
mitigation precedes or follows trade. If the former, then can we view conflict
mitigation as an outcome of a broader integration process as represented in
Figure 4.1.
The analysis addresses two simple questions:
• Do RTAs promote trade?
• Does trade mitigate conflict?
The chapter has six sections. The second section provides a brief overview of
the theory of the trade–conflict linkage. The third section reviews the history
of conflict in South Asia and maps the RTAs while the fourth section exam-
ines the causal links between trade and conflict. The fifth section analyses
conflict mitigation within a broader regional integration process and the sixth
section concludes with a look into the future.
Theoretical underpinnings of the trade–conflict linkage
Literature on the relationship between RTAs and peace principally draws on
two theories, the classical theory of trade and international relations (IR)
theory. Classical trade theory is premised on the fact that trade is inherently
beneficial for countries as it brings efficiency gains for producers, consumers
and governments. More recent literature carries this argument forward with
regard to regional and preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (Robson 1998).
Proponents argue that regional trading blocs (through PTAs or RTAs) bring
about political stability by increasing interdependence.1 By increasing the
economic incentive for peace and by providing channels for the non-military
resolution of disputes, interdependence may bring amelioration of inter-
national or regional conflict, as a welcome political externality. With respect
to intra-state conflicts, trade theorists contend that increased trade spurs
Figure 4.1 Trade and conflict dynamics.
Source: SDPI in-house compilation
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domestic economic activity, thus generating employment and reducing unrest
within domestic populations.
IR theory presents the opposite thesis. It suggests that trade by itself is
not sufficient to ensure the absence of conflict. In fact, in certain cases, it can
exacerbate conflict. According to IR specialists, the decision to trade or go to
war depends on the potential returns from trade and the future expectations
of the level of trade. Moreover, a state’s choice between conflict and trade is
said to be based on relative trade benefits, and not absolute gains as classical
trade theory suggests. Hence, if a country perceives its neighbour to gain
much more from trading, it would deem it in its interest not to liberalise trade.
On the issue of intra-state conflict, IR theory is extended to suggest that
the gains from trade are likely to be asymmetrical within the trading coun-
tries, given distortions in domestic distribution mechanisms. This increases
the likelihood of intra-state strife reflecting the privileged elite’s control
over the entire resource pie.
The empirical evidence, provided in case studies, supports both views. The
liberal approach is substantiated by the cases of Europe and to a lesser extent,
Latin America, where economic inter-linkages have led to a significant decline
in conflict between states. On the other hand, in South Asia and in less
developed regions in Latin America and Africa where RTAs such as the
SAPTA and Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) have been
in place for some time, there has been little evidence of political stability.
Barbieri (2002) finds a consistent, positive relationship between trade ties and
conflict, specifically participation in militarised inter-state disputes. Hegre
(2000), on the other hand, demonstrates a clear negative relationship between
trade and conflict. Reuveny (2000) documents empirical evidence which points
in both directions. Rodrik (2000) demonstrates that the yardstick that matters
with respect to internal conflict mitigation is the construction of a high
quality institutional environment, rather than trade-openness or consistency
with World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. The divergence of views and
empirical results illustrates clearly that the scope for innovative research in
the trade–conflict linkage remains considerable.
Mapping RTAs and conflicts
Conflict in South Asia
South Asia is a conflict-prone region that has been subjected to continuous
political tensions. India, by far the largest country and centrally located geo-
graphically, has developed differences with most of its smaller neighbours.
Tensions have tended to recur periodically and have corroded trust between
South Asian countries. Reflecting these tensions, a recent European Union
(EU) report rates political risk in the context of trade and investment in
South Asia – as presented in Figure 4.2. The report indicates that only the
two smallest SAARC members, Maldives and Bhutan, are politically stable.
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All other states are considered fragile, with the average stability values falling
well below the global average (European Commission 2005).
Chronology of conflict in South Asia since 1980
A timeline of the region’s history of conflict since 1980 indicates a high
incidence of inter and intra-state conflict. Internal instability and external
tensions and conflict feed off each other to create a cycle of political and
economic instability. Relations between India and Pakistan have been par-
ticularly volatile, interspersed by short periods of peace. This was historically
true in Sri Lanka and India’s case, although the violence appears to
have developed an internal momentum and has become more sustained.
Intrinsically, the nexus of intra and inter-state conflicts between these two
dyads has delayed internal economic and political reforms, and stalled
regional economic integration and trade. We present an overview of conflict
in the region, focusing on the post-SAARC period when South Asian coun-
tries were making efforts to institute RTAs. It is important to note that all
bilateral conflicts during this period have been Indo-centric reflecting, to a
large extent, India’s hegemonic aspirations backed by its military supremacy
in the region.
Figure 4.2 Political stability.
Source: SDPI in-house compilation.
Note: Higher values imply better ratings. Figures shown are in percentage.
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Bilateral conflicts and tensions
India and Pakistan
Relations between India and Pakistan, the region’s two largest states, are
almost permanently unstable. The two states have been perpetually locked
in either overt or covert conflict, since they gained independence in 1947,
presenting the single largest constraint to regional economic integration.
The early part of the 1980s was marked by latent rather than active conflict.
Having lost a decisive war to India in 1971, which resulted in the separation
of Bangladesh from Pakistan, Pakistan took a more muted and realistic
stance on Kashmir, allowing the two countries to address economic and
trade issues. Discussions, eventually, led to the creation of SAARC in 1985.
However, the underlying intransigence, reflecting historical rifts, the religious
divide and military dynamics, led to a significant deterioration in relations
by the late 1980s; in particular, the Kashmiri separatist movement gained
momentum in Indian Kashmir. Soon after Pakistan started providing polit-
ical and military support to the insurgents. Such support kept the two sides at
loggerheads throughout the 1990s. India continuously blamed Pakistan for
the unrest in Kashmir, accusing its neighbour of training and sending cadres
to join the insurgency (Bose 2001).2
Security concerns between Pakistan and India peaked in 1998, when both
sides tested nuclear weapons, introducing a highly unstable dimension to the
security paradigm.3 In 1999, Pakistan and India were embroiled in an armed
confrontation in the Kargil region of Kashmir. Although the conflict ended
in a stalemate, Kargil marked the first conflict between two nuclear-armed
neighbours exposing the region to the danger of a nuclear catastrophe.
Tensions reached a new high in 2002 when India blamed Pakistan for having
engineered a terrorist attack on the Indian parliament. The two sides found
themselves in the midst of a ten-month-long stand-off, with a million troops
amassed on the Indo-Pakistan border, making this the largest military mobil-
isation in the region’s history. Fortunately, intense international pressure
achieved détente before the conflict could escalate further (Synnott 1999;
Khan et al. 2007).
Amidst continuing tensions, Pakistan and India made several efforts to
initiate a peace process. The two major initiatives preceding the Kargil War
in 1999, were the ‘Lahore Declaration’, and President Pervez Musharraf ’s
unsuccessful peace bid in 2001 (Bose 2001). Currently, a peace initiative is
underway aiming to seek rapprochement. While this effort has lasted longer
than preceding initiatives, by and large, Indo-Pakistan tensions still remain
high. Mutual suspicion remains deep-rooted and major outstanding issues
remain unresolved. Even if the current peace initiative were to remain on
track, it would take decades before Pakistan and India began to trust each
other.
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India and Sri Lanka
In the 1980s, Sri Lanka slowly slipped into the grip of ethnic conflict as the
majority Sinhalese witnessed the rising influence of minority Tamil separat-
ists seeking independence for northern Sri Lanka. With its sizable Tamil
population in the south, India had a natural interest in the issue. As early as
1983 it attempted to mediate Sri Lanka’s conflict, albeit unsuccessfully.
In time, ethnic violence in Sri Lanka led to Indo-Sri Lankan tensions as the
Indian government openly began to sympathise with the Sri Lankan Tamils.
The Indian state of Tamil Nadu reportedly funded the militant Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a fact tolerated by the central government in
New Delhi (Uyangoda 2003). Moreover, in 1987, India came to the rescue of
the Tamils when the Sri Lankan government attempted to regain control of
its northern territory through an economic blockade. In July 1987, India
decided to send the Indian Peace-Keeping Force (IPKF) to Tamil Nadu
under an agreement that sought to disarm the Tamils and achieve peace. The
agreement caused further resentment among Sri Lankan Sinhalese who
saw this as an Indian attempt to establish its hegemony over Sri Lanka.
Relations between India and Sri Lanka reached their nadir in 1989, when the
Sri Lankan government demanded the withdrawal of the IPKF (Bhasin 2001;
Kumar 2001).
Consequently, India boycotted the 1991 SAARC summit in Colombo,
causing its postponement. When the summit eventually took place, it was
an abrupt one-day affair, punctuated by the tensions between the hosts and
India (Uyangoda 2003).
Since the early 1990s, India has refrained from intervening directly while
maintaining its interest in the Tamil movement. It has also started to officially
support the Sri Lankan government’s position. Moreover, the two sides
have looked to enhance cooperation in other sectors leading to a significant
improvement in their relationship. While the Tamil separatist movement
does create minor irritants from time to time, India seems genuinely inter-
ested in a peaceful internal solution to the problem. On the whole, Sri Lankan
suspicions of India’s hegemonic designs have reduced substantially, allowing
relations between the two countries to become more cordial.
India and Bangladesh
Despite India’s support for East Pakistani separatists, who eventually gained
independence for what is now Bangladesh, relations between the two coun-
tries have see-sawed. Although the two sides penned economic agreements
and an annually renewable treaty on the contentious issue of water sharing, a
number of concerns remain unsettled. A general concern, which Bangladesh
shares with other SAARC members, pertains to India’s efforts to increase its
direct influence on its neighbours.
Specifically, in the early 1990s, Indo-Bangladesh relations deteriorated over
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a dispute concerning the Farakka Barrage, where India has built a feeder
canal to divert water to its side of the river (MacGregor 2000). Tensions
surface intermittently as no permanent solution to major outstanding issues
has been found. In 2001, India and Bangladesh were involved in a minor
border confrontation. The conflict centred on the disputed border territory
near Pyrdiwah village but remained contained to the border forces on
both sides (CNN 2001). The two countries also claim the river island of
Muhurichar. However, this issue has remained dormant since 1985. In the
late 1980s, India sought to build a fence on the Indo-Bangladesh inter-
national border to stop illegal immigrants from pouring into West Bengal.
This problem has assumed serious proportions in the recent past as the west-
bound influx has increased (Bowring 2003). Lately, India has also accused
Bangladesh of being sympathetic towards Pakistan and acting as a conduit
for anti-Indian terrorist operations. Bangladesh, on the other hand, blames
India for supporting anti-government, Chakma insurgents.
India and Nepal
The Indo-Nepal relationship has also been fraught with tension although
the two sides have not allowed their overall relationship to be held hostage
to their differences. The Indo-Nepal equation is a classic example of big
power–small power political manoeuvring with the smaller power, Nepal,
trying its utmost to retain an independent posture, despite being economic-
ally dependent on India. The majority of the problems between the two sides
are grounded in economic concerns.
Indo-Nepal relations were quite strained when SAARC was originally
formed. India had denied Nepal’s bid to be declared an international security
zone (Murthy 1999). Nepal’s acquisition of Chinese weaponry elicited a
strong official protest from the Indian government, worried about losing its
influence in Katmandu. In 1988, Nepal refused to accommodate Indian
demands on the long-standing transit treaty between the two countries.
Nepal took a hard-line approach, and after the expiration of the treaty in
1989, faced an economic blockade from India, a development that led to
further escalation in Indo-Nepal tensions (Murthy 1999).
More recently, a conciliatory strain in bilateral relations has emerged.
Although India and Nepal have an outstanding territorial dispute on a 75
square kilometre area, the issue has not impacted Indo-Nepal relations to any
significant degree (International Boundary Monitor 1998). Since the early
1990s, Nepal’s worsening economic and political situation has forced it to
seek rapprochement with India. In 1990, the special security relationship
between the two countries was restored and in the mid-1990s, fresh trade and
transit treaties were signed along with other economic agreements (Murthy
1999). India has also supported the Nepalese government in its fight against
the ongoing Maoist rebellion in the country, a fact that has further improved
relations between the two countries.
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Relations between other SAARC members
By and large, relations between other SAARC members have remained ten-
sion free, a direct product of their tension fraught relations with India. By the
same token, India has been wary of the designs of smaller states to ‘gang up’
in order to neutralise its influence. This has added to mutual suspicions
between smaller members and India, leading to alliances between non-Indian
member states. In 1999, Sri Lanka acquired military assistance from Pakistan
to defend itself against possible aggression from the Tamil rebels at a time
when New Delhi refused to come forward with such assistance (Uyangoda
2003). India also blamed Bangladesh for allowing Pakistani intelligence to
operate from its territory, and for acting as a base for terrorist attacks inside
India, an allegation it levies against Pakistan as well. Nepal–Bangladesh rela-
tions have been cordial, as Kathmandu has attempted to neutralise some of
New Delhi’s influence by entering into various agreements with Dhaka.
Intra-state strife in South Asia
In addition to the inter-state tensions that have plagued South Asia, countries
in the region have also experienced extended periods of intra-state strife. As
mentioned earlier, the two should be viewed in conjunction, feeding off each
other in dampening or expanding cycles of violence. With the exception of
the Maldives and Bhutan, intra-state conflict has been almost endemic to
SAARC member states. India has long battled the insurgency in Kashmir
that was initiated by Kashmiri Muslims opposing New Delhi’s rule. In
addition, during the 1980s, India experienced the rise of the ‘Khalistan’
separatist movement, fighting for an independent Indian state of Punjab.
Resistance to Delhi’s rule also exists in pockets of Nagaland in the country’s
north-east (Sahadevan 1999). Of these, the Kashmiri struggle is by far the
most threatening in the region.
Pakistan has also had its share of internal conflicts. Since SAARC’s incep-
tion, Pakistan has struggled with sectarian violence. Sunni–Shia violence
peaked following the Afghan jihad in the early 1990s;4 while conditions have
improved ever since, sectarian violence continues to erupt periodically. More
recently, the inflexible centrist policies of an army-dominated government
have reignited the dormant nationalist movement in Balochistan (Hussaini
2005). The ‘Talibanisation’ of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA), a large swathe of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), also
reflects converging resentment against central government neglect and its
pro-US stance. The most recent evidence of creeping Talibanisation has been
the Jamia Hafsa incident. Vigilantes consisting of armed Islamic militants
(male and female) terrorised Islamabad and drew widespread media attention
by proclaiming their intention to establish Sharia (religious) law. Their provo-
cations led to a bloody confrontation with the government. While the mili-
tants were wiped out in a subsequent army operation, the country braced for
76 Shaheen Rafi Khan et al.
a bloody backlash that was not long in coming. Despite tight security precau-
tions the Al Qaeda/Taliban combination continues to strike at will, at any
time and at any place of its own choosing.
The Sri Lankan ethnic conflict between the Sinhalese and Tamil separatists
has already been discussed. The conflict continues and despite numerous
attempts at peace talks, including third-party mediation, most notably by the
Norwegian government, no breakthrough has been achieved. While violence
is intermittent, it escalates periodically.
Since 1996, Nepal has been threatened by a well-organised Maoist rebel-
lion that is challenging the country’s monarchy (Thapa and Sijapati 2003).
The rebellion is one of the major factors responsible for the decline of the
Nepalese economy. While initiatives to accommodate Maoist demands have
been undertaken, none have satisfied the rebels. Consequently, the rebellion
remains active and continues to threaten the centre through constant targeting
of state functionaries.
Bangladesh has mobilised counter-insurgency operations against the
Chakma insurgents in the Chittagong hill tracts. The area has been quite
turbulent in the past, with the insurgents demanding regional autonomy from
the centre. Despite intermittent tensions, the government has managed to
keep the insurgents under control. In 1999, a peace accord was signed by the
Awami League government that promised increased autonomy to the insur-
gents. However, the accord has not been implemented fuelling resentment
among the Chakmas and the goal of finding a permanent solution remains
elusive (Chowdhury 2002).
The Maldives government foiled a coup attempt in 1988 with assistance
from Indian paratroopers and naval forces. More recently, it has seen consti-
tutional differences emerging among political actors (European Commission
2005). However, neither event was significant enough to destabilise the state.
Bhutan has remained free of internal strife. A chronology of major conflicts
in South Asia is presented in Table 4.1.
Mapping South Asian RTAs
Cooperation despite conflict
The idea of regional cooperation in South Asia had come under discussion at
three conferences: the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in April 1947,
the Baguio Conference in the Philippines in May 1950, and the Colombo
Powers Conference in April 1954. However, the idea did not take root with the
leadership of the region, until President Zia ur-Rehman of Bangladesh shared
his ‘Working paper on regional cooperation in South Asia’ with the heads of
states of South Asia in November 1980. A variety of reasons contributed to
the success of the president’s initiative.
The new regimes in the region displayed more accommodative diplomacy
than their predecessors. However, a renewed, more open stance towards
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Table 4.1 Chronology of major conflicts in South Asia
Inter-state conflict
Year India–Bangladesh India–Sri Lanka India–Nepal India–Pakistan
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foreign relations was not the only impetus for cooperation. The North–
South dialogue seemed to be failing, resulting in the North adopting more
protectionist attitudes. The 1979 oil crisis put pressure on South Asian econ-
omies, which were already suffering from balance of payments difficulties.
The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan put the security of South Asia at
risk and provided the leaders with another reason to have closer ties in order
to foster understanding of common problems and conflicts before they
spun out of control. At this critical juncture, a report by the Committee on
Studies for Cooperation in Development in South Asia (CSCD) identified
many feasible areas of cooperation between the countries of South Asia
(Dash 1996).
Despite these commonalities, the adversarial Indo-Pakistan relations, a
fear of Indian hegemony and India’s fear of a hostile small-country coalition
presented hurdles to integration. In view of this lack of trust, the CSCD
proposal showed remarkable foresight in ensuring its acceptability. Avoiding
all political and controversial matters, the report identified specific areas
of cooperation that were truly regional in nature. Moreover, it adopted
an incremental approach to integration. As a result, between 1980 and
1983, four meetings at the foreign secretary levels took place to establish the
1988 Attempted
coup thwarted
























Source: SDPI in-house compilation, August 2006.
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principles of organisation and narrow down areas of cooperation. Three
years of preparatory discussions at the official level culminated in the first
South Asian foreign ministers’ conference, held in New Delhi in August 1983.
The meeting concluded by launching the Integrated Programme of Action
(IPA) on mutually agreed areas of cooperation, constituting the first step
towards establishing SAARC.5
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SAARC aimed to bring stability to South Asia by enhancing regional
cooperation, with a view to improving the welfare and quality of life of its
people through economic growth, social progress and cultural development in
the region. SAARC also promoted the cooperation of member countries with
other developing countries on matters of common interests in international
and regional fora and with organisations with similar aims and purposes.6
While SAARC’s charter promotes active collaboration and mutual assistance
in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields, the main
thrust of regional efforts has been directed towards economic integration.
South Asian leaders recognised that opening their economies to trade and
investment, especially with neighbouring countries, could lay the groundwork
for peace in their conflict-ridden region.
All activities to be undertaken within the SAARC framework are governed
by the overarching principles of ‘sovereign equality, territorial integrity, polit-
ical independence and non-interference in the internal affairs of other States.’
On the one hand, mutual benefit is a primary consideration; the sovereign
equality condition weighs in against powerful countries leveraging their power
against weaker countries. On the other hand, member states cannot involve
themselves in bilateral conflicts within the region. The clauses on territorial
integrity and non-interference in member countries’ internal affairs rules out
SAARC’s role as a peace-keeper. Its charter states explicitly that ‘bilateral
and contentious issues shall be excluded from the deliberations of SAARC’.
This clause effectively keeps inter-state conflict off the table in all member-to-
member interactions.
South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement
The SAPTA signed in 1993 expired on 31 December 2003. The agreement
dealt exclusively with trade in goods and constituted the first step in establish-
ing an economic union. Under SAPTA, member countries extended conces-
sions to each other on tariff, para-tariff and non-tariff measures in successive
stages. They were free to liberalise trade at their own pace and to decide upon
which items to offer on concessional terms. The agreement made provisions
for establishing a Committee of Participants (COP), consisting of representa-
tives of all contracting states as the monitoring body of SAPTA. Its objective
was to review the progress made by SAPTA and ensure that the gains from
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trade were shared by all contracting states. The COP also acted as the dispute
resolution body for SAPTA.
The agreement also included several provisions extending special treatment
to least developed countries (LDCs). Support to LDCs involved the identifi-
cation, preparation and establishment of industrial and agricultural projects
in their territories, with the aim of creating an export base. SAPTA also
contained anti-dumping clauses which suspended concessions to member
states involved in dumping. The intent behind such measures was to ensure
fair trade for all member states, and eliminate the possibility for potential
conflicts/tensions between member states as a result of skewed economic
power relations. Similarly, SAPTA allowed countries to withdraw from the
agreement in the event they faced balance of payments difficulties, with the
aim to minimise intra-state economic disruptions. Also, SAPTA deferred to
other bilateral, multilateral and plurilateral agreements that contracting
countries were signatory to. In doing so it sought to harmonise itself with
other agreements.
Despite the inclusion of these measures, SAPTA proved unable to handle
trade-related disputes. The more powerful member states were unwilling to
accept embedded rules-based institutional and legal mechanisms for dispute
settlement. They preferred to resolve such disputes bilaterally. When the
matter could not be resolved, it was deferred to the COP, which issued
decisions that were neither time-bound nor legally binding. Essentially, the
COP developed its own procedures for dealing with contentious issues on a
case-by-case basis.
South Asian Free Trade Agreement
SAFTA came into force on 1 January 2006 and has proved to be the most
comprehensive mechanism to date that strives to achieve intra-regional eco-
nomic cooperation. Unlike SAPTA, SAFTA has a well-defined approach to
trade liberalisation. It specifies time-staggered tariff reductions for each
member country. India and Pakistan have committed to reduce tariffs from
existing levels to 20 per cent within two years effective from January 2006.
Subsequently, they are to come down to 0–5 per cent from 2008 to 2013. For
LDC members, a more flexible schedule allows them to reduce their tariffs to
30 per cent in the first two years of the agreement. The time period for the
second stage of reductions, at the end of which tariff levels are to be reduced
to 0–5 per cent, is eight years i.e. achieved by 2016. SAFTA concedes more
than SAPTA on trade-related dispute resolution. It stipulates that the anti-
dumping and safeguard provision cannot be invoked against a product ori-
ginating in a LDC, if its exports do not exceed 5 per cent of its total imports.7
The more comprehensive SAFTA also addresses a broader range of trade-
related issues, such as the harmonisation of standards and certification,
customs clearance procedures and classification, transit and transport facili-
tation as well as rules for fair competition and foreign exchange liberalisation.
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In the light of its fair trade provisions and the broadening of its economic
agenda, SAFTA offers better prospects than its predecessor for improving
relations between the member countries. Member countries are allowed to
maintain higher tariffs for sensitive lists of commodities (industry protection)
and pull back from the agreement if they face balance of payments difficul-
ties, underscoring that SAFTA is sensitive to national economic concerns and
a country’s political stability.
SAFTA’s dispute settlement mechanism is substantively similar to SAPTA
– if anything there are more tiers of consultations, involving a Committee
of Experts (COE) and the SAFTA Ministerial Council (SMC). However,
much as in the case of SAPTA, no institutional or legal mechanisms for
dispute settlement exist and both the COE and the SMC continue to devise
procedures on a case-by-case basis.
In an intra-state security context, the agreement includes a clause on
national security where states are not to be forced to take any measures
that compromise their national interests. This effort to allay domestic politi-
cal sensitivities can also assure buy-in to the agreement. In addition, the
General Exceptions clause deals with animal and plant life and health, and
articles of artistic, historic and archaeological value. Such confidence building
clauses demonstrate that SAFTA does not threaten but safeguards quality
of life.
Table 4.2 presents the broad scope of trade, conflict and conflict-related
(governance) language across the RTAs, bilateral, sub-regional and extra-
regional agreements in South Asia.
During SAARC’s inception, South Asian leaders realised that introducing
political conditions in the incipient regional integration process
could stall regional economic cooperation. Consequently, as indicated earlier,
bilateral issues were kept out of SAARC’s purview. Today, the absence of
recourse to deliberate upon bilateral political relations has become a major
concern for member states. Realising the negative impact of political tensions
on trade arrangements in the region, some analysts have called for a regional
institutional mechanism to contain conflict among members. Others have
even suggested the need to amend the SAARC charter to allow it to deliber-
ate upon bilateral issues. As early as 1990, Ariyasinghe had proposed a ‘stra-
tegic regional security framework’ designed to ensure regional security in
South Asia. No progress has been made on this front, and realistically such a
development is not on the cards any time soon. Member states, particularly
Pakistan and India, must find means outside the SAARC arrangement to
resolve their differences.
Two key points emerge. First, the incidence of inter and intra-state conflict
in South Asia is high and shows no signs of abating. Second, RTAs have not
been designed explicitly to mitigate inter and intra-state conflicts and tensions.
As the mapping shows, these RTAs focus primarily on economic cooperation.
Having said that the progressively extended economic mandate of the agree-
ments, the concessions built into the agreements for LDCs, sensitive lists and
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Table 4.2 Trade and conflict language in RTAs
Trade and conflict language












SAARC  – –
SAPTA • • – • – – –
SAFTA • • – • – • –
Bilateral agreements
India–Sri Lanka • • –  – • –
India–Nepal  • – – –  –
India–Maldives   – – –  –
India–Bhutan • • – – –  –
Pakistan–Nepal   – – – • –
Sri Lanka–Nepal  – –  – – –
Nepal–Bangladesh •  – – – • –
Sub/extra-regional agreements





RTAs Rule of law Transparency Property rights Democracy Human rights and gender
issues
SAARC – – – – 
SAPTA – – – – –
SAFTA – – – – –
Bilateral agreements
India–Sri Lanka  – – – –
India–Nepal  – – – –
India–Maldives – –
India–Bhutan – – – – –
Pakistan–Nepal – – – – –
Sri Lanka–Nepal – – – – –
Nepal–Bangladesh 
Sub/extra-regional agreements
BIMSTEC – – – – –
SAGQ
Key
• Mentioned in sufficient detail to be implemented under the agreement
 Mentioned in agreement but with minor detail; no implementation procedure provided
– Not mentioned in agreement
* A general exception security clause allows the contracting parties to violate the agreement in case of threat to national security.
national security clauses, which are at odds with the liberalisation mandate,
and dispute settlement mechanisms have both inter and intra-state security
implications, even though these are not formally articulated.
In the following section, we explore causal links between the RTAs, trade
and conflict looking for answers to the following questions: Have RTAs an
economic/trade rationale? Have RTAs fulfilled their mandate in generating
intra-regional trade? Conversely, are RTAs a mirror image of regional polit-
ical developments, and RTA negotiations hostage to what happens on the
political front? Alternatively, what has been the role of RTAs in conflict
mitigation?
RTAs, trade and conflict
Existence of trade complementarities in South Asia: the basis for trade
Recent literature (Wickramasinghe 2001; Burki 2004) on South Asian trade
indicates significant trade and service sector complementarities across the
region. The literature also suggests that increased trade flows are likely to
engender technical efficiency, improve resource allocation and allow countries
to create niches by specialising in different products within a given industry. A
number of studies have predicted gains from regional trade. One estimate
projects the long-term trade increase ensuing from SAFTA at US$14 billion
(FPCCI 2003). A 1993 World Bank study suggested that a free trade arrange-
ment (FTA) between Pakistan and India could have increased their trade
flows ninefold within a ten-year period (Burki 2004).
Mukherji (2002) identified as many as 113 potentially tradable items
within the SAARC region. These include tea and coffee, cotton and textiles,
garments, rubber, light engineering goods, iron and steel, cement, edibles
(dry fruits, spices and vegetables), medical equipment, pharmaceuticals and
agro-chemicals, among others. Owing to existing trade barriers a number
of these items are currently imported into the region. Specifically, in the
Pakistan–India context, Pakistan could import from India pharmaceuti-
cals, textile machinery, light engineering industry items, refrigerators, irons,
air-conditioners, washing machines, televisions, sugar, cement, organic and
inorganic chemicals, and paper and pulp, which it currently does from else-
where at much higher cost. Reciprocally, Pakistan could export to India
cotton, surgical and sports goods, leather products and dry and fresh fruits.
Zones of comparative advantage embrace countries making trade feasible
across these zones. Thus, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and India all export tea,
while Pakistan imports it. India and Bangladesh export jute and jute prod-
ucts to the rest of the SAARC member countries. Pakistan and India produce
cotton, which its neighbours require. Similarly, India and, to a lesser
degree, Pakistan, export manufactured goods within the region.
Informal trade (smuggling) in South Asia also is a good index of trade
complementarity. Under free trade, a substantial proportion of informal
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trade is likely to switch to formal channels. The major items currently being
traded informally in the region include cloth of different varieties, cos-
metics, jewelry, bicycles, medicines, cattle, sugar, spices, raw cotton, garments,
machinery, cement, aluminum, petroleum products, automobiles, tyres and
tubes, electrical goods, unprocessed food, rice and flour.8
Bilateral FTAs in South Asia are proof that trade is capturing comple-
mentarities between countries. The Indo-Sri Lanka FTA – fears of industry
contraction in both countries notwithstanding – has led to a threefold
increase in bilateral trade flows (Thakurta 2006).
Potential investment collaboration
The services sector is potentially a major driver of economic integration.
India’s dominance in information technology can be a trigger for profitable
affiliations with reputed institutions in India. These can be joint ventures or
strategic alliances that can utilise skilled professionals from neighbouring
countries, especially Pakistan (FPCCI 2003; Taneja 2004a). Mutually bene-
ficial joint ventures between India and Pakistan in the agro sector, especially
in processing and packaging, could generate 0.4 million jobs in both countries
(FPCCI 2003).
Energy is another area of possible collaboration. India, the most energy
deficient country in the region, stands to gain from investment partnerships
with countries with hydropower surpluses, such as Pakistan, Nepal and
Bhutan. Pakistan is on line as a conduit for Iranian natural gas to India.
Bangladesh’s considerable gas reserves have yet to be tapped. Ultimately,
over a long-term planning horizon, one could envisage connectivity through
a network of energy, gas and oil grids to help lower energy costs (Burki
2004).
India’s comparative advantage in technical education, the new cornerstone
of economic development, can be deployed to the advantage of its South
Asian neighbours. Pakistan can mobilise its potential in the areas of irriga-
tion, food preparation and textiles, for a similar purpose (Burki 2004). Other
service sectors with promise for regional cooperation are water, tourism and
health. In the tourism sector, joint marketing and management strategies
could bring collective gains to the region.
RTAs and trade growth: evidence from South Asia
Formal and informal trade trends in South Asia
Despite the indicated complementarities, trade between SAARC countries
has remained low. Intra-regional trade in South Asia accounts for a mere 4–5
per cent of the SAARC countries’ total exports (FPCCI 2003). In contrast to
the global trend, intra-regional trade in South Asia has declined dramatically
over the past five decades, and has remained stagnant at approximately
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2 per cent during 1980–2002, a figure lower than most other regional trading
blocs, as is evident in Table 4.3.
Formal trade statistics in South Asia, however, do not reflect the true mag-
nitude of intra-regional trade. A substantial volume of trade flows through
illegal channels, either smuggled across borders or transiting through third
countries. The total value of informal trade in South Asia is estimated at
US$1.5 billion. While informal trade volumes are substantial, even the add-
ition of these to formal trade flows does not accurately reflect the true trade
potential of the region. It is the persistence of tariff and non-tariff barriers
that have both choked intra-regional trade and diverted it into illegal channels.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present comparative formal and informal intra-regional
trade trends.
RTAs and trade promotion
The explicit linkages between RTAs and trade promotion are to be found
through SAPTA and SAFTA which were, as noted, established under the
SAARC mandate, but whose primary fiat is trade promotion. The combined
value of trade (exports and imports) increased from US$1.24 billion in 1980
to US$6.5 billion in 2001, as shown in Table 4.6. The bulk of this increase
occurred during the SAPTA period. As a percentage of total SAARC trade,
intra-regional trade increased from 2 to 4.6 per cent over the same period.
However, this increase should be seen against the backdrop of extremely low
absolutes.
TARIFF AND NON-TARIFF BARRIERS
South Asian economists argue that for significant trade to ensue, all quantita-
tive restrictions and non-tariff barriers should be removed (Mukherji 2002;
Upreti 2000). Second, they point out while many items have been brought
Table 4.3 Intra-regional export shares: a comparison
across southern RTAs
1990 2001 Year in force
Latin America
CAN 4.2 11.2 1988
MERCOSUR 8.9 20.8 1991
Africa
COMESA 6.3 5.2 1994
SADC 3.1 10.9 1992
UEMOA 12.1 13.5 2000
Asia
ASEAN/AFTA 19.0 22.4 1992
SAARC 2.4 4.6 1985
Source: UNCTAD (2002); WTO (2002).
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Table 4.4 SAARC intra-regional trade (US$ millions)
Year Intra-SAARC trade SAARC world trade Percentage
Pre-SAPTA period
1986 1,055 44,042 2.4
1987 1,146 49,480 2.3
1988 1,732 52,669 3.3
1989 1,723 58,595 2.9
1990 1,590 65,490 2.4
1991 1,914 63,435 3.0
1992 2,488 71,149 3.5
1993 2,458 72,211 3.4
Post-SAPTA period
1994 2,937 82,839 3.5
1995 4,263 103,878 4.1
1996 4,928 110,962 4.4
1997 4,447 115,370 3.9
1998 6,001 123,144 4.9
1999 5,511 131,152 4.2
2000 5,884 146,924 4.0
2001 6,537 143,443 4.6
Source: International Monetary Fund (1997, 2002).
Table 4.5 India’s informal trade with South Asian countries (US$ millions)
Exports Imports Total trade
Bangladesh 299.0 14.0 313.0
Sri Lanka 185.5 21.8 207.3
Pakistan 10.3 534.5 544.8
Nepal 180.0 228.0 408.0
Bhutan 31.3 1.2 32.6
Total 1,505.7
Sources: Taneja (2004a) for Sri Lanka and Nepal; Khan et al. (2007) for Pakistan.
Table 4.6 Non-tariff measures–coverage ratio of South
Asian countries





Sri Lanka 3 4
Nepal 1 1
Source: Khan et al. (2007).
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under preferential trade, only a handful is actively traded items (Mukherji
2000). Third, the fears of economic dominance by more powerful partners
should be allayed.
As mentioned, tariff and non-tariff barriers are a key constraint to trade
growth in South Asia. In fact, South Asia is debited with the highest inter-state
barriers to trade in the world. In the early 1990s, Bangladesh’s unweighted
average tariff was as high as 79 per cent, followed by Pakistan at 59 per cent
and India at 51 per cent (Taneja 2004b). While the averages have come
down significantly and currently stand at around 20 per cent, they are still
higher than the average in other regional trading blocs. India has consistently
had the highest tariffs among all South Asian countries, as indicated in
Figure 4.3.
Pursell and Sattar (2004) found India and Bangladesh to be in the top
10 per cent out of the 139 sampled countries on the basis of unweighted
tariffs. In another study that researched all types of border barriers, Kee
et al. (2006) found India to be the most protected economy in the world and
Bangladesh the fifth most protected. Moreover, Bangladesh uses ‘supplemen-
tary duties’ that often end up doubling the effective tariff. Bangladesh and
Pakistan also maintain a substantial negative list specific to India, thus
restricting or banning the import of potentially tradable items.
Non-tariff barriers are equally high among South Asian countries, and
continue to pose major hurdles to intra-regional trade. In the early 1990s,
India and Bangladesh had the highest non-tariff barrier coverage ratio for
primary and manufactured goods, as is evident in Table 4.7. For primary
Figure 4.3 Comparison of South Asian tariffs with other regional trading blocs.
Source: World Bank, WTO, IMF (statistics from various years).
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products, India’s ratio stood at 72 per cent and Bangladesh’s at 59 per cent
(Taneja 1999). Moreover, India has employed anti-dumping measures most
frequently in recent times, even surpassing the US (Khan et al. 2007).
Pakistan accuses Indian customs authorities of biased treatment towards
Pakistani consignments, as a way of neutralising the formal most favoured
nation (MFN) status India has granted to Pakistan.9
Further, all South Asian countries are lax in implementing trade facilita-
tion measures. A key aspect of trade facilitation is improving the efficiency
of customs authorities. Customs clearance procedures are time-consuming.
For example, as many as 38 signatures are required to clear a consignment
imported into Pakistan (Khan et al. 2007). In India, an export consignment
needs 258 signatures and key punching can take up to 22 hours (Roy 2004).
The average time required to clear Indian and Bangladeshi customs is about
three times that found in the customs agencies of the developed world (Khan
et al. 2007). In short, the high tariff and non-tariff barriers in South Asia
have stunted trade growth significantly and have led to trade leakages to
extra-regional sources.
While SAPTA has contributed to lowering these barriers, the low trade
response suggests that more drastic measures are required. It is hoped that
Table 4.7 Chronology of key bilateral agreements
Nations Nature of agreement and date
India–Pakistan Peace (Place of Worship) – 1953, 1955
Border – 1948, 1952, 1955, 1958, 1959, 1960, Indus Water Treaty
(1960), 1965, 1965, 1966, 1972, 1974, 1991, 1999
Conflict – 1965, 1966, 1971, 1972, 1973, 1974(2), 1975, 1988
Trade – 1947, 1957, 1960, 1961, 1963, 1974, India extending
MFN, Pakistan declines
India–Bangladesh Border – 1972(2), 1974, 1976,
Resource – Farakka 1977, 1982, 1983, 1984, Ganga Water
Sharing (1996)
Trade – 1972, 1973, 1974, 1980, 1981, 1982, 1988
FTA India interested, Bangladesh wary of protectionism
India–Bhutan Peace – 1949
Trade – Trade and Commerce (1995)
India–Maldives Border – 1976(2)
Trade – 1975, 1981
India–Nepal Peace – 1950, 1953, 1954
Resource – 1958, 1987, Mahakali Treaty (1996)
Trade – 1950, 1954, 1958, 1959, 1960, 1964, 1966, 1971, 1973,
1976, 1978(3), 1985, 1987, 1990, 1991(3), 1996, 1999, 2001
India–Sri Lanka Peace – 1954, 1986, 1987, 1989
Border – 1964, 1974, 1986
Trade – FTA (1998), Credit Agreement (2001)
Source: South Asia Foundation www.southasiafoundation.org; Bilaterals www.bilaterals.org.
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SAFTA, with its broader trade facilitation mandate will be able to reduce
trade barriers substantively. In a dynamic context, trade liberalisation needs
to be undertaken in conjunction with investment liberalisation, as it will foster
structural changes in industry. For example, allowing regional competitive
advantages and specialisation to flourish will build the horizontal and vertical
capacities of rising firms, enabling them to compete globally (FPCCI 2003).
This will then sustain the thrust towards diversification. Also, joint ventures
between firms within the region will present a viable way of circumventing
trade barriers. Thus far however, South Asian RTAs have failed to make a
lasting impact on intra-regional trade.
A related concern specific to RTAs is whether they actually contribute to
the creation of new trade or simply divert extra-regional to relatively high
cost intra-regional trade. In the latter case, the cost for the importing country
would increase and it would end up foregoing tariff revenues (Khan et al.
2007). High existing tariffs pre-SAFTA has implications for trade diversion.
A large proportion of South Asian imports from outside the region cost
less due to high intra-regional trade barriers (high transport costs notwith-
standing). For example, Sri Lanka currently imports railway coaches from
Romania foregoing the much cheaper alternative available in southern India.
In cement and ship building Sri Lanka trades with South Korea instead of
tapping the cheaper options in Pakistan and India (Dash 1996). Pakistan
imports iron ore and textile machinery at a higher cost than are available from
India. Existing tariff barriers also drive up local input costs, thus making
South Asian exports more expensive in relation to sources outside the region.
An initial reduction from these high levels would probably lead to such diver-
sion because inefficient local producers would now have a cost advantage
(lower transport costs) over exporters to the region. However, over the long
run, when tariffs fall to zero and industries become more competitive, trade
creation is likely to kick in.
Global and multilateral institutions: trade leakages outside the region
The SAARC member countries have continued reforms within the ambit
of World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionalities.
They have, to various degrees, introduced trade, industrial and investment
policy reforms. The reforms include reductions in tariff slabs, tariff rates,
quantitative restrictions, establishing export processing zones for foreign
direct investment (FDI), joint venture arrangements, fiscal and financial
incentives to industry and currency convertibility. These reforms have con-
tributed in large measure to the growth of trade with the North.
Although trade has increased between some member states (growth
increases have been dramatic between Bangladesh–India and Sri Lanka–
India), trade within the region has been increasingly dwarfed by trade
with outside nations. The largest trading partners are North America and the
EU followed by East Asia and Australasia (in the case of Bangladesh). As
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mentioned, only 4–5 per cent of the region’s total trade is within the SAARC
region.
In order to counter these leakages and restore parity in intra-regional
trade, the Research and Information System for the Non-aligned and Other
Developing Countries (RISNODEC 2001) proposes equivalent measures
within the region, such as pushing regional economic integration more
holistically via the creation of a customs union, as envisaged under SAFTA.
It also proposes to diversify extra-regional trade to countries such as China
in order to obtain better terms of trade for South Asian products.
On balance, while trade volumes have increased in the region, they are low
in absolute terms – the lowered trade barriers associated with the global push
towards liberalisation are diverting a substantial portion of the trade outside
the region and towards the North. This trend, as we mentioned earlier, is
exacerbated by the persistence of intra-regional trade barriers.
Exploring the causality between trade and conflict
From conflict to trade
Existing literature is reticent in exploring the causal links from conflict to
trade. The South Asian paradigm seems to be that conflict hinders trade and
economic integration. In common with other developing nations in Latin
America, Africa and the Middle East, South Asia illustrates that economic
liberalisation cannot serve as the sole driver of peace within the region (Ades
and Chua 1997). In fact, political stability is a prerequisite for instituting and
locking in economic liberalisation measures, an environment that South Asia
has not been able to develop.
Inter-state conflicts in the region have slowed trade growth. While it is
more difficult to establish a direct link between intra-state strife and stunted
trade growth, there is little disagreement that almost all major intra-state
tensions in South Asia have had spill-over effects on inter-state relations.
Ethnic violence in Sri Lanka caused disruption of the Indo-Sri Lankan rela-
tionship, the Kashmir struggle has put Pakistan and India at odds and the
Bangladesh insurgency has strained relations between Bangladesh and India.
Intra-state strife has exacerbated inter-state tensions and thus, indirectly,
played a role in curtailing trade flows within the region.
An analysis along a timeline explains the link between inter-state conflicts
and trade relations within South Asia. SAPTA’s sub-par performance can be
attributed to the fact that in the early 1990s, intra-regional tensions had escal-
ated. SAPTA only made modest headway, with member countries imposing
stringent limitations on the number of potentially tradable items. Political
tensions between member states also delayed the finalisation of the SAFTA
agreement. The agreement, initially planned to be finalised in 2001, was signed
with a three-year lag in 2004 (Bandara 2001). Just as SAARC was formally
established when the Pakistan–India conflict was dormant and no other major
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conflict was active in the region, SAFTA was also finalised utilising the rare
window when no SAARC member state was embroiled in conflict.
Further, political tensions and mutual suspicions between SAARC mem-
bers have prevented the delegation of SAARC’s negotiation procedures. In
the prevailing mistrust between member states, regional cooperation remains
the fiat of foreign affairs ministries, where perceptions of national security
normally dominate political decision-making. No country has allowed the
institutional framework to be widened to include line ministries, such as
finance, labor and transport, which would make SAARC processes more
relevant to domestic agendas. Clearly political stability and mutual trust are
prerequisites for such delegation.
Bilateral agreements: a mixed bag
Formal trade agreements have materialised between countries in an effort to
bypass the political logjam that has stalled movement on the RTAs. Part
of this momentum has been generated by India’s desire to leverage its eco-
nomic size and influence over its neighbours. While smaller countries, such
as Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, have complied in an effort to circum-
vent the Indo-Pakistan induced SAARC stalemate, increased trade with their
larger neighbour has also contributed to fears of Indian economic and cultural
domination. The outcomes are ambiguous. In some cases, there is evidence
that the ensuing trade has improved bilateral relations; in other cases, polit-
ical obstacles continue to hinder both bilateral agreements – and bilateral
trade, once these agreements are in force.
India signed an FTA with Sri Lanka in 1998 (European Commission 2005)
and a new trade and transit treaty with Nepal in the mid-1990s. India also
entered into an FTA with Bhutan, one of the only two SAARC members
which have not had any substantial disputes with India (European Commis-
sion 2005). The only two major SAARC members that have not concluded
any trade pact with India are Pakistan and Bangladesh. While the ongoing
peace process has engendered improved trade ties between the two countries,
Pakistan is still reluctant to grant India MFN status. Pakistan continues to
view trade relations as secondary to settlement of outstanding disputes, spe-
cifically Kashmir.10 The Indo-Pakistan case is a clear illustration of bilateral
trade being held hostage to conflict. Also, despite India and Bangladesh
having signed an MFN trade arrangement as early as 1980, political tensions
have limited trade flows. Bangladesh continues to maintain a restrictive trade
regime vis-à-vis India and, in defiance of trade logic, has refused to trade
even in commodities in which it possesses a comparative advantage (Bowring
2003). Even in the Indo-Sri Lankan and Indo-Nepalese cases the enhanced
trade ties have not led to a permanent settlement of historical political dis-
putes. In fact, trade has hardly impacted political relations. Even today, the
long-standing points of contention cause temporary disruption in trade
relations from time to time.
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Regional integration processes
As RTAs have been unable to develop momentum due to persisting regional
tensions, their ability to proactively mitigate conflict has also been limited.
However, concurrent processes are in evidence that aim to promote political
stability. These processes encompass intra-regional non-trade, non-economic
arrangements. Alternatively, they reflect pressure by external powers with
political stakes in the region. In particular, informal political dialogue and
processes from beyond the region are playing an increasing role in conflict
mitigation. These processes can impact intra-state conditions and, in turn, be
impacted by them.
Internal /regional processes
India has signed a series of agreements over the years with its neighbours,
with whom it shares a history of conflict and tension, shown in Table 4.7. A
characteristic of the more successful bilateral agreements is that they cover a
range of issues that are independent of one another. In the case of Bangladesh
and Sri Lanka, addressing ‘foundational’ issues of peace building and border
issues early on has been key to relationship building. While earlier agreements
cover border treaty, water sharing, religious harmony and peace building
issues, more recent agreements involve credit, and economic development
(commitments to research and infrastructure cooperation followed by credit
agreements and tariff reductions). The Indus Water Treaty between Pakistan
and India is an example of one of the intra-regional agreements (Iyer 1999)
that exemplifies successful conflict resolution between two countries bedevilled
by tensions and unresolved issues (Iyer 2002).
External processes
Interestingly, most of the processes that have achieved some success in miti-
gating conflict in South Asia have been externally driven. While intra-regional
dialogues are part of normal diplomacy, there have been few internally gen-
erated movements geared towards sustained mitigation efforts. We indicated
earlier that bilateral political issues have been kept out of SAARC’s purview
to accommodate the sensitivities of member countries. In view of the nega-
tive fallout of political tensions on trade arrangements in the region, some
analysts have called for a regional institutional mechanism to address conflict
among members; Ariyasinghe (1990) proposed a ‘strategic regional security
framework’ designed to ensure regional security in South Asia. Others have
suggested amending the SAARC charter to allow it to deliberate upon
bilateral issues.
SAARC’s ineptness has allowed extra-regional forces to step into the polit-
ical vacuum in South Asia. Norway initiated the peace process between the
Tamil and the Sinhalese factions in Sri Lanka. The World Bank and the Asian
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Development Bank (ADB) among other financial institutions backed its
efforts (Uyangoda 2003). Scandinavian countries have played a significant
role in moving the Sri Lankan–LTTE peace process forward, through, for
instance, the 2002 Memorandum of Understanding. Also international pres-
sure from the US, consequent upon the LTTE being listed as a terrorist
organisation, has led to a clamp down on financial flows from the Tamil
diaspora. In the case of India and Pakistan, US pressure has impelled the
peace process towards settling and resolving bilateral disputes between the
two countries. With two nuclear states and a conflict-prone geo-political situ-
ation, the international community has every interest in diffusing violent
conflict in South Asia. At the same time however, Western involvement can
create contradictions. The recent US–India rapprochement has alienated
Pakistan and threatened a fragile peace, which the US wished to engineer in
the first place. Similarly, the Iran–Pakistan–India gas pipeline is a classic
example of a promising regional initiative being undermined by external
pressure. While all regional parties are interested in the project, which analysts
believe could provide the much-needed framework for energy cooperation in
South Asia, US influence on India has forced it to remain non-committal on
the issue. That said however, third party mediation by Western countries has,
for the most part, mediated violent inter-state conflict in the region.
China, along with Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
countries is likely to be a key player in future South Asian geo-politics. Beijing
maintains a military interest in the region due to Sino-Indian territorial dis-
putes and has hosted regular visits by leaders from Nepal, Bangladesh and
Sri Lanka to ensure that improved Sino-Indian relations would not be to
their detriment. Beijing remains critical of India’s coercive diplomacy and
maintains diplomatic and military relations with Pakistan. As an SAARC
observer, China may become a more formal player in terms of maintaining
peace in the region (Malik 2001).
Impact on intra-state conflict
The impact of external political processes on intra-state conflict in South
Asia has been negative. Such influences, particularly in the case of Pakistan,
illustrate how external involvement can increase divisive tendencies within a
country. On the one hand, the secular elite have welcomed US intervention,
while those within the lower classes sway towards more conservative rhetoric
from religious quarters. As a result, an already weakened state risks further
destabilisation due to an increase in intra-state extremist activities. Similarly,
United Nations (UN) involvement in the Nepalese crisis has driven a wedge
between the government of Nepal, the mainstream political parties and the
Nepali citizens (Pradhan 2005). Electing for arbitration from a third party
rather than looking inwards for a solution prevents the region from evolving
into a politically mature and self-sufficient political entity. In this man-
ner, SAARC countries settle for short-term conflict mitigation rather than
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developing a lasting internal solution that eliminates the cause of the conflict.
The efficacy of external processes has its limits, as dispute resolution through
mediation or under third-party pressure can only prevent conflict, not resolve
it. For conflict to be resolved permanently, and for long-term peace to be
achieved, dispute resolution measures have to be built and institutionalised
by the SAARC countries themselves.
Looking to the future
In looking forward, it is difficult to prescribe a set of proven remedies that
will cure the region’s myriad problems that constrain peace, stability and
sustainable development. Peace remains an elusive goal despite SAARC’s
emergence as a regional entity in the international political system.
Antagonistic relations between countries with outstanding political issues,
low levels of intra-SAARC trade and joint economic ventures and inadequate
communication and infrastructure links present a bleak future. However, the
fact that formal cooperation has survived recurrent setbacks is testimony to
the resilience of the organisation. On the other hand, militarisation, elitism
and fundamentalism as competing forms of governance, present a worrisome
political paradigm that will continue to challenge SAARC.
International players can contribute to peaceful relations within the region
by mitigating the impacts that economic globalisation and market failures
are having on the region’s marginalised communities. More important, they
should engage with all stakeholders in South Asia in a manner that elevates
development to include not just economic needs but also social, cultural and
religious values intrinsic to the region.
While lessons from the EU and ASEAN prove the benefits of regional inte-
gration, there is still a need to shape institutions that, as commentators indi-
cate, are asked to compete and yet cooperate in a neo-liberal political economy
(Mukherjee-Reed 1997). Economic integration will depend on how indi-
vidual nations deal with contentious issues and remain committed to regional
cooperation. Durable peace must therefore include the resolution of domestic
and long-standing differences, including of the Kashmir issue, border disputes,
inequitable distribution of natural resources, and of the corrosive politics
that divides Hindu, Muslim, Sikh and Buddhist communities.
Political analysts have proposed the creation of an SAARC parliament as a
new interactive mechanism to increase transactions, linkages and coalitions
beyond the divisive politics that exacerbate antagonism. This might go beyond
the bureaucratic-technical parameters of SAARC and introduce political,
religious, moral, cultural and civilisational dimensions of regionalism. Such
a parliament could address conflict in the region, take advantage of civil
society, incorporate the principal of ‘unity in diversity’ and incorporate a
two-stage development process, where government has high influence, to
a level where popular participation begins to weigh in. Conflict could be
managed through three stages, input (source, latent and manifestation of
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identified conflict) to management (understanding, containing and negotiat-
ing problems) and finally to output (consequences defined and outputs gen-
erated and drafted) (Paranjpe 2002).
Shared management of renewable resources such as water can leverage
peace building efforts within the region (India–Pakistan and India–Nepal–
Bhutan), especially as there is a precedence for doing so. There are clear
linkages between environmental factors and security, namely trans-boundary
water issues in conflict settings. The environment in the context of conflict
can be most effectively defined as resources at risk of depletion, as well
as damage that can result from human impact. Such was the case between
India and Pakistan during partition with the separation of the Indus river
tributaries which Pakistan relied upon heavily (Carius et al. 2004). The World
Bank mediated agreement can inform a sub-regional grouping to address
the water and energy dependency between Nepal, Bhutan and India, and
between India and Bangladesh. SAARC could and should serve as a regional
vehicle for extending resource management across the region. Other threats
to South Asia’s environmental security include acid precipitation, deforest-
ation, degradation of agricultural land, over use and pollution of water sup-
plies and depletion of fish stocks (Homer-Dixon 2001). As international
cooperation within Asia is required to address such issues, relevant negoti-
ation must extend beyond South Asia. Cross-boundary conservation efforts
to jointly manage resources and conserve natural ecosystems that benefit the
South Asian biome are feasible. For example, the South Asian Seas Action
Plan has been developed and, following adoption in March 1995, has been
agreed to by the governments of Bangladesh, Maldives, Sri Lanka, Pakistan
and India. Data collection between India and Pakistan also exists through
the Global Environment Measurement System (GEMS) and the Global
Resource Information database (Rajen 2003). While such agreements do
enhance people-to-people contact, they have not been capable in and of
themselves, in mitigating conflict and easing tensions.
Beneath the political colourations of South Asia, reside the socio-economic
aspirations of its middle class. Some argue that in order for the region to
prosper, a new idea of South Asia will have to emerge and the primary driver
will have to be the aspirations of the middle class for something more than
private affluence in the midst of public squalor. Hence, social capital building
that challenges all of the region’s societies and effective collective action
within and then across will be the test of whether or not this society emerges
(Singh 2005). Other informal political dialogues need to include citizen-to-
citizen contact, which addresses displaced persons following partition (East
Bangladesh and West Bengal, the two Punjabs) and the social and religious
values of being able to visit one’s homeland, place of birth and ancestral grave
sites. Education and cultural exchange should allow students, writers, intel-
lectuals and artists to be able to mix and exchange ideas on a new South Asia
(Ahmed 2003).
Summing up, SAARC security discourses must be expanded to include
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political, social and environmental perspectives in order to achieve sustain-
ability (Thakur and Newman 2004). Joint law enforcement, intelligence and
linkages with international organisations could suppress violence if linked
with broader development objectives that take into account the root causes
of violence and the injustices that fan the flames of conflict.
The international community can take measures through bilateral agree-
ments and trade by encouraging equitable development within agreements,
fair trade and better understanding of the socio-economic and political real-
ity of poorer segments of society. While their current understanding is
framed within an economic paradigm that seeks to modernise South Asia
at the expense of sustainable and pro-poor development, a shift towards all
encompassing development would address concerns and issues within the
marginalised classes, which is where intra-state conflict manifests itself.
Notes
1 For a discussion on PTAs, see C. Parr Rosson et al. ‘Preferential trading
arrangements: gainers and losers from regional trading blocs’, http://
www.ces.ncsu.edu/depts/agecon/trade/eight.html (accessed 26 March 2007).
2 Bose provides a detailed account of the problem in Kashmir.
3 Some, albeit pro-establishment analysts, argue differently claiming that nuclear
capability creates a deterrent.
4 In the province of Punjab, official figures indicate 776 deaths from 1990–2001.
The News, 18 May 2002.
5 The areas of cooperation were agriculture, rural development, telecommunica-
tions, meteorology, health and population control, transport, sports, arts and
culture, postal services and scientific and technical cooperation.
6 SAARC Secretariat.
7 See http://www.saarc-sec.org/main.php?id=12&t=2.1 (accessed 26 March 2007).
8 This list has been compiled from Taneja (1999) and Khan et al. (2007).
9 We found this during primary research for Khan et al. (2007).
10 Trade between the two countries went up sixfold in the current fiscal year, compared
to the previous year.
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5 Regional trade agreements
and conflict
The case of Southeast Asia
Hank Lim
Introduction
Southeast Asia has witnessed a relative subsidence in conventional security
threats such as territorial disputes, arms races and inter-state warfare over
the last decade or so.1 Instead, non-traditional security threats and intra-state
conflict have taken greater precedence in recent years.2 These non-traditional
security threats in the region have manifested themselves as social unrest
(including forced displacement) and political instability associated with
environmental crises, energy shortfalls, terrorist attacks, pandemic diseases,
religious differences and economic recession. Such threats have risen sharply
since the Asian financial crisis in 1997.
The region is one of the most ecologically and ethnically diverse in the
world with divergent development paths and non-inclusive economic strat-
egies that some Southeast Asian nations adopted, particularly before 1997.
The strategies generated rapid growth in income and output but they also
engendered widespread unemployment and poverty. Differentiated benefits
along the lines of religion, ethnicity and resource use have precipitated intra-
state conflicts, such as in Myanmar (with the Karen group over issues of
regional autonomy, land rights and discrimination), Laos and Cambodia
(instigated by remnants of the Khmer Rouge until 1997), Indonesia (the
secession of East Timor and Aceh), Thailand (over its southern provinces)
and the Philippines (over discrimination of the Muslims Moros, in the south).
The following sub-sections provide an overview of inter and intra-state
conflicts in the region.
Overview of inter-state conflicts in Southeast Asia
Sovereignty-related disputes remain a flashpoint in the region with different
colonial histories. Indonesia annexed East Timor in 1975 after the latter
declared independence from the Portuguese. Initially, the invasion and the
subsequent violation of human rights by the occupying military forces
were tolerated. In 1999, following a referendum, East Timor secured its
independence as the Democratic Republic of Timor Leste. This victory for
independence triggered a massive and violent response from disaffected
groups in East Timor (and Indonesia), who did not want independence from
Indonesia. The ensuing violence resulted in extensive damage to infrastructure
and loss of human lives.
The Philippines and Malaysia have competing claims over Sabah. The
Philippines claim eastern Sabah as part of its territory. This claim is based
upon the Sultanate of Brunei’s cession of its north-east territories to the
Sultanate of Sulu in 1703, as recompense for military assistance by the latter.
Malaysia, on the other hand, has claimed sovereign rights over Sabah on the
basis of the leasing agreements secured by Baron von Overbeck and Alfred
Dent with the Brunei Sultanate on 29 December 1877, and the Sulu Sultanate
on 22 January 1878. The British Crown renewed the lease on 15 July 1946, but
finally ceded Sabah to Malaysia on 16 September 1963. Currently, Malaysia
continues to reject Philippine calls to bring the matter of Sabah’s jurisdiction
to the International Court of Justice.
On 24 July 2003, Malaysia and Singapore jointly approached the Inter-
national Court of Justice regarding a dispute concerning sovereignty over the
island of Pedra Branca (Pulau Batu Puteh), Middle Rocks and South Ledge.
Malaysia first claimed the island in 1979 after publishing new official maps.
Singapore, on the other hand, states that it has managed Horsburgh Light-
house and exercised full sovereignty over the island since the 1840s without
any protest from Malaysia. However, Malaysia insists that when Johor ceded
Singapore to the British in 1824, the island was not part of the secession and
that the Sultan of Johor only allowed the British to construct a lighthouse on
the island in 1844. The International Court of Justice in The Hague has ruled
on 23 May 2008 that Pedra Branca belongs to Singapore and Middle Rocks
to Malaysia. It cannot make a decision on South Ledge because it does not
have the mandate to do so. It further stated that South Ledge should belong
to a country that has jurisdiction over it.
Elsewhere, Indonesia and Malaysia also went to the International Court
of Justice with competing claims over the islands of Ligitan and Sepadan.
Indonesia’s claim to sovereignty over the islands is based primarily on a
conventional title, the 1891 Convention between Great Britain and the
Netherlands. However, the Court found that the Convention, when read
in context and in the light of its object and purpose, cannot be interpreted
as establishing an allocation line determining sovereignty over the islands.
The Court ruled in favour of Malaysia on 17 December 2002 on the basis
of ‘effectivities’, that is, ‘based on activities evidencing an actual, continued
exercise of authority over the islands, i.e., the intention and will to act as
sovereign’.3
Sovereignty-related disputes are also sourced in energy security concerns.
The South China Sea is a disputed site; specifically, some of the islands on
the key shipping routes are oil and natural gas repositories. The resource-
rich islands have evoked competing claims from claimants such as Brunei,
China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam. On several
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occasions armed open conflict has erupted, involving naval vessels. Chinese
and Vietnamese vessels clashed 1974, 1988 and 2002. In 1996, China and
the Philippines faced off against each other. In 2002, the country claimants
agreed to resolve the issue of the islands peacefully and signed the ‘Declaration
on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea’.4 There now appears to be
a greater commitment to negotiate rather than resorting to force, and a
recent interest in cooperation via joint exploration initiatives. In March 2005,
Chinese, Vietnamese and Philippine oil companies signed an agreement to
conduct a joint marine seismic survey of oil potential in the South China Sea,
signifying ‘a historic contribution to peace, stability and development in
the region’.5
Elsewhere, refugee inflows due to political unrest in the country of origin
have threatened state security. Relations between Thailand and Malaysia
became strained in 2005, when 130 Muslim Thais sought refuge in Malaysia.
Subsequently, the Thai interior minister, Kongsak Wantana, insinuated that
the bombs that exploded in southern Thailand were made in Malaysia. Thai
security and intelligence officials claimed that the insurgent and separatist
leaders were based in northern Malaysia and that Kuala Lumpur adamantly
refused to hand them over to the Thai government. During the military
coup launched in Thailand on 19 September 2006, Malaysia tightened its
border security to prevent refugee movements and smuggling activities from
Thailand.6
Overview of intra-state conflicts in Southeast Asia
With the exception of Singapore, Brunei and Malaysia, separatist and other
forms of intra-state violent conflict are prevalent in Southeast Asia. The
shift of Myanmar’s administrative capital from colonial Rangoon to remote
Pyinmana in April 2006 signifies a new wave of political insularism, inviting
sharp criticism from the international community. The move represents an
attempt to consolidate power, and to use repressive tactics to wipe out the
opposition. The military junta has announced new plans to step up the pres-
sure on Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy, and to launch
an offensive against the Karen National Union (KNU) which is agitating
over issues of regional autonomy, land rights and discrimination. An attempt
to diffuse criticism by organising a local and foreign press trip to a remote
part of the Karen area (in eastern Burma) affected by the fighting backfired.
It only aggravated the international outcry over alleged reports of murder,
rape and mutilation, marking the junta’s most brutal offensive since 1997.
Laos gained its independence from the French in 1954. The US bombed
the country in retaliation for its support to the Vietcong during the war,
which extended through the 1960s and 1970s. In 1975 the Communist Pathet
Lao, backed by the Soviet Union and Vietnam, overthrew the royalist gov-
ernment. Presently, minority groups such as the Hmong and disaffected mili-
tary personnel continue to mount sporadic resistance against the Communist
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regime. The US trained the ethnic Hmongs to fight against the Communists
during the Vietnam War; after the US withdrew, the Communist Laotian
government drove the Hmongs out of Cambodia and massacred those who
remained. Amnesty International is active in highlighting the human rights
abuses against them.7
Cambodia has only recently emerged from extended inter- and intra-state
conflict. The country invited retaliatory bombing from the US in 1969, after
it supported the Vietcong. In 1970, General Lon Nol deposed King Sihanouk,
who had ruled the country since independence in 1953. In turn, the Khmer
Rouge removed General Lon Nol in 1975. Although the Vietnamese drove
the Khmer Rouge out of Phnom Penh in 1979, it continued to resist the
government in the provinces until 1996, when a large number of soldiers left
the organisation.
Indonesia faced domestic insurgency by the separatist Free Aceh Move-
ment (or Gerakan Aceh Merdeka (GAM)), and sectarian violence between
Christians and Muslims in Central Sulawesi. GAM has sought independence
for the Aceh region of Sumatra from Indonesia since 1976, particularly
during Suharto’s reign. The main flashpoints were a dilution of Acehnese
religion and culture, especially with the influx of Javanese migrants and the
uneven income allocation from Aceh’s rich oil reserves. Initial GAM guerrilla
resistance was put down by government forces in the late 1970s. But renewed
efforts by the group, sponsored by Libya and Iran during the 1980s, led
to more violent repression and human rights abuses. GAM declared a cease-
fire during the December 2004 tsunami, and the government temporarily
removed restrictions for aid relief. A peace deal was forged on 16 July 2005 to
end the 30-year insurgency through the negotiation efforts, brokered in
part by the Swedish government. On 27 December 2005, the GAM leaders
disbanded their military wing.
Indonesia experienced one of the bloodiest religious conflicts between
Christians and Muslims in Central Sulawesi from 1998 to 2002, where more
than 1,000 antagonists from both communities were killed and tens of thou-
sands rendered homeless. Fresh violence broke out in a May 2000 attack on
the Muslims in Poso district. As the world’s most populous Muslim state
practising a moderate form of Islam, its porous maritime borders and a weak
central government have made Indonesia victim to the Al Qaeda-linked
terror group, Jemaah Islamiya (JI). The October 2002 Bali bombing took
202 lives (including 88 Australians). Subsequent years witnessed the Marriott
Hotel blast and Australian Embassy attack in Jakarta. The most recent
attack took place in October last year in Bali, which was bombed for the
second time.
The Philippines has seen a long ongoing struggle by secessionist Muslim
groups in Mindanao to break free from Manila. These movements include
the Abu Sayyaf, JI and the more nationalistic Moro Islamic Liberation Front
(MILF). A truce between the Philippines government and the MILF has
been sustained since 2003. This has allowed the military to concentrate its
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fighting with Abu Sayyaf rebels on the remote southern island of Jolo. Fresh
violence broke out in September 2006 between security forces and Muslim
militants, and some 6,000 Marine and Army troops sealed off Jolo Island.8
In the case of Thailand, separatist movements are concentrated in its
southern provinces. These provinces are predominantly Muslim, unlike the
rest of Thailand which has a Buddhist majority. The ongoing violence since
January 2004 has resulted in the deaths of more than 1,400 people.
Non-traditional threats to peace
As related in the sections above, threats and opportunities abound when
building trade links and formalising trading relationships between states pre-
viously at war, or at risk of war. Such relationships become especially difficult
in the presence of development gaps and uneven resource allocation. Eco-
nomic development has assigned priority to non-inclusive growth over income
distribution and employment creation in some Association of South East
Asian Nations (ASEAN) countries. This has resulted in income disparities
and poverty existing side by side with economic prosperity. Priorities such
as social welfare and reducing the poverty gap have also been neglected as
Southeast Asia marches towards economic development and integration
into the global economy. Many fault lines define relations between the state
and non-governmental stakeholders, including religion, ethnicity, resource
use, pandemic outbreaks and environmental degradation.
Growing interdependence between states in the region has exposed unprece-
dented vulnerabilities. At the tenth ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) meeting,
held in Kuala Lumpur on 5 September 2006, Malaysia Deputy Prime
Minister Datuk Seri Najib noted that ‘the Asia-Pacific is not free from
conflicts . . . There are on-going sensitive security issues around us such as
overlapping claims on the Spratlys, nuclear proliferation and transnational
security issues.’
Najib’s caution points in part towards the conflation of energy resource
conflicts in the region, spurred to a large degree by China and India’s rapidly
expanding economies, with their corresponding energy demands. The devel-
opment presages a threat to the region with politically charged bilateral energy
trading and new interest in developing nuclear energy.
Environmental woes also plague Southeast Asia, as a result of short-term
economic goals. The region continues to be gripped by trans-boundary haze
pollution annually from July to September since 1997. Indonesia’s problem
with unchecked slash-and-burn practices is further exacerbated with recent
news of the country’s fast vanishing mangrove trees, with 6.6 million hectares
destroyed over the past seven years, constituting around 70 per cent of
mangrove areas damaged. The problem has similarly afflicted several other
Southeast Asian countries such as Myanmar, Thailand, Malaysia, Vietnam,
Brunei Darussalam and the Philippines. Indonesia has just experienced
another tsunami, albeit on a smaller scale than the one in 2004. Earlier in
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May 2005, an earthquake in Central Java killed more than 57,000 people
and left tens of thousands homeless. Almost exactly one year later, the
Yogyakarta quake took over 3,000 lives.9
Southeast Asia also holds the unenviable record of avian flu fatalities,
especially in Indonesia, Vietnam and Thailand. May 2005 saw the world’s
first lab-confirmed human-to-human transmission of bird flu in Indonesia,
raising the spectre of a flu pandemic. The country has recorded 49 deaths as
of 13 September 2006, the highest in the world.
One of the greatest threats facing the region is terrorism, as demonstrated
by the Bali bombing in 2002. While greater cooperation and more concerted
efforts to address the dangers of terrorism have been undertaken, the record
remains mixed. The Southeast Asian strategy has been to tackle poverty and
social ostracism from mainstream secular society. However, a sustainable
long-term solution is needed which addresses the genesis of terrorism –
namely, what triggered the movement in the first place in Southeast Asia. The
Israel–Hizbollah war has further deepened the Islam–West chasm in South-
east Asia, home to an estimated 230 million Muslims and which may spark a
new wave of Islamic radicalisation in the region.10
On the upside, efforts by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore to combat
piracy and terrorism in the Strait of Malacca have paid off. In August 2006
London’s insurance market, Lloyd’s Market Association (LMA), dropped
the war-risk rating on the strategic waterway, which links Asia with the
Middle East and Europe and carries some 50,000 vessels a year (or some
40 per cent of the world’s trade and 80 per cent of the energy supplies of
Japan and China). LMA had classed the Malacca Strait a ‘war risk’ zone
earlier and added it to a list of 21 other areas deemed high risk and vulnerable
to war, strikes and terrorism.
While the security threats are very real and remain a concern for Southeast
Asia’s future political and economic fate, the opportunities that exist through
forging RTAs outweigh the threats. By creating regional stability through the
ASEAN process and mechanism, Southeast Asia has been able to attract
foreign direct investment (FDI) and to create a policy environment for good
and effective macroeconomic management through regional demonstration
effects. In turn, rapid economic development, especially before the Asian
economic crisis in 1997, contributed to reducing inter-state conflicts in
Southeast Asia. For one thing, regional resources were directed to productive
economic activities rather than destructive inter-state conflicts.
Problem statement and aims
The regions representative groupings have considerably mitigated the risk of
intra-state conflicts from developing into inter-state strife. These groupings
include ASEAN and its associated RTAs, namely, the ASEAN Free Trade
Area (AFTA) and the ASEAN Community. The groupings act as political
and economic security buffers to promote peace and prosperity in the region.
Regional trade agreements and conflict 107
Southeast Asia’s experience with regional integration is closer to Latin
America and South Asia than to the European Union (EU), whose genesis
lay in demonstrated economic synergies. Thus, in ASEAN’s case, it was only
when conflicts and tensions in the region abated that the RTAs were con-
ceived and formulated. Subsequently, these RTAs have played a key role in
maintaining peace and security in Southeast Asia. The RTAs were forged to
promote economic cooperation and intra-regional growth, and to direct the
region’s resources towards productive economic activities. The AFTA pushed
towards lower tariffs under the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT)
scheme. This raised the level of intra-regional trade, creating more inter-
dependence and linkages and cementing ties within ASEAN. With closer
economic integration, the cost of conflict becomes higher. Further, AFTA’s
non-enforcing nature is geared to diffusing tension between partner coun-
tries. Finally, AFTA’s non-trade provisions, such as the rule of law and
respect for human rights and socio-cultural values could potentially yield
additional peace dividends. Admittedly, while there are many intervening
variables, a convincing case can be made for AFTA’s impact in terms of
increased intra-regional trade, better economic coordination and improved
regional ties.
In the following section, we describe how the formation of ASEAN created
the impetus for regional economic and political integration. We follow with a
review of AFTA, which ASEAN established in 1992 and which represents an
attempt to give more formal shape to its objectives. Subsequently we examine
intra-ASEAN trade trends and assess the impact of trade on regional peace
and security. We then look at the evolution of ASEAN from an association into
an institution-building community, comprising the ASEAN Economic Com-
munity (AEC), ASEAN Security Community (ASC), and ASEAN Socio-
Cultural Community (ASCC), which strengthened ASEAN’s peace-building
role in the wider Asia-Pacific region. We focus on AFTA’s role and functional
expansion into the AEC, ASC and ASCC. We then conclude with a recap.
Association of South East Asian Nations
The part of the Southeast Asian region that ASEAN embraces occupies
a total area of 4.5 million square kilometres with a population of about 500
million, a combined gross domestic product (GDP) of almost US$700 billion
and total trade amounting to about US$850 billion. ASEAN was the out-
come of a politically motivated agenda. Inspired by the EU and North
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), its initial objective was to pro-
mote regional political harmony, especially as the region was gripped by a
critical security threat. In subsequent years, when the security threat had
subsided, primacy was given to efforts to achieve regional economic integra-
tion. ASEAN’s transition from political to economic status can be classified
into four distinct periods. These periods fall between the years 1967 to 1982,




Southeast Asian countries came together in Bangkok on 8 August 1967, in
an attempt to meet the diverse challenges confronting a region recognised as
one of the most ecologically and ethnically diverse in the world. The Bangkok
Declaration to establish ASEAN was signed by Indonesia, Malaysia,
Philippines, Singapore and Thailand.11 The initial impulse came out of stra-
tegic and security concerns, even though the stated aims and purposes of the
Declaration were comparatively more eclectic, namely: (1) to accelerate eco-
nomic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region; and (2)
to promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice
and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and
adherence to the principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter.
The political orientation of ASEAN has its roots in Malaysia’s confronta-
tion with Indonesia, which had ended a year earlier. In addition, non-
Communist countries felt the need to develop a more concerted response to
the Vietnam War. This need became more pressing with the withdrawal of the
US following the end of the war in April 1975, and the corresponding spread
of Communism in the region. In order to stem the Communist tide, ASEAN’s
five founding nations established the Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality
(ZOPFAN) – signing the declaration in November 1971, with the aim of
securing international recognition for its political stance. The declaration
built upon the principles of peace, freedom, sovereignty, territorial integrity
and the non-use of force advocated in the Bangkok Declaration and by the
UN. The emphasis on peaceful dispute settlements and abstinence from
threats of force sets the framework for subsequent ASEAN approaches
towards the maintenance of regional and international security. ZOPFAN’s
significance also lies in strengthening the political will of ASEAN to reduce
external influences in the region; to avoid becoming a proxy war theatre for
superpower rivalries. Subsequently, US and Russian bases in the region were
closed (Ruland 2005).12
Until 1976, a loose and highly decentralised structure dominated by
state-to-state cooperation and involving mostly foreign ministers character-
ised ASEAN. Consequently, member countries felt the need to ratchet up
ASEAN as the defining regional community. The first ASEAN summit
in Bali in February 1976 formalised the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation
(TAC). The treaty specifically and legally binds all its ASEAN signatories
to peaceful co-existence and respect for the principles of sovereignty, terri-
torial integrity, non-interference in internal affairs and non-use of force
(the ASEAN way), that have been enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration.13
Its amity clause emphasises increased contact and interaction among ASE-
AN’s peoples to ensure closer understanding. Its cooperation clauses oblige
active efforts at consultation on international and regional matters with a
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view to coordinating policy and action. The clauses also restrict individual
signatory states from participating in activities that constitute a threat to
the political and economic stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity of
another signatory state.
In its operations, the TAC attempts to balance the principles of sovereignty
and non-interference, with the regulatory provisions for transnational action
and coordination towards peaceful dispute settlement. The High Council,
also established in 1976, is entrusted with recommending appropriate modes
of settlement. The Council consists of a representative (at ministerial level)
from each of the ASEAN members as well as dialogue partners involved in a
particular dispute. The TAC is accompanied by two amending protocols
which: (1) permit its extension to non-Southeast Asian states with qualifying
clauses and; (2) acknowledge the inclusion of new members, namely, Brunei,
Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam.
The inaugural Bali summit also issued the Declaration of ASEAN Con-
cord I (Bali Concord I), with the collective objectives of regional resilience,
promoting social justice and national development, peaceful settlement of
disputes and the creation of an ASEAN community and identity. The Bali
Concord I adopted a framework of cooperation in six areas: political, eco-
nomic, social, cultural and information, security and the improvement of
ASEAN machinery.
In time, member states also began to see the role of economic cooperation
in helping ASEAN to develop into a stronger political entity. The foreseen
cooperation entailed both market-sharing and resource-pooling strategies.
Member states experimented with preferential trading arrangements (PTAs)
to allow access to ASEAN markets, and embarked upon large-scale projects
such as the ASEAN Industrial Projects and the ASEAN Industrial Joint
Ventures to benefit from economies of scale. In reality, reflecting the mutual
distrust among member states, businesses in the region continue to adopt
protectionist strategies in both tariff and non-tariff forms.14
1983–1990
This period is marked by the fallout from the second oil crisis of 1979–1980,
which led to a dramatic drop in commodity prices and a weakened global
economy. ASEAN leaders created a task force to formulate a regional response
aimed at reviving their economies; the crisis spurred member countries to use
economic cooperation as a revival tool. However, the recovery was fast as a
result of the Plaza Accord of September 1985, which led to the depreciation
of the US dollar vis-à-vis other major currencies, particularly the Japanese
yen. Exchange rates turned in favour of ASEAN as most of the currencies in




Trade liberalisation emerged as the new mantra, with the imminent conclu-
sion of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay
Round leading to the formation of the World Trade Organization (WTO). As
a result, ASEAN member states began to seriously consider the need for an
economic safeguard. The CEPT and the AFTA were mooted in 1992 with
a view towards regional economic integration. ASEAN also joined the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum to promote trade, investment
and economic and technical cooperation among the member states.
1994–1999
In 1994, Indochina and Myanmar began to express interest in joining
ASEAN. By 1999, the ASEAN-10 vision was a reality with membership
extending to all Southeast Asian countries. However ASEAN continued to
grapple with the political uncertainties of Cambodia, and the compar-
atively lower economic status of the state-led economies of the ASEAN-4
(Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam).
Member states launched the ARF in 1994 as a regional security forum
which included the ASEAN member states, the observers and consultative
and dialogue partners of ASEAN.15 The ARF is responsible for the analysis
and identification of key regional challenges, and for resolving differences and
diffusing tensions among stakeholders. The approach is incremental, as
reflected in its three-stage development plan: Promotion of Confidence-
Building Measures (Stage I); Development of Preventive Diplomacy Mechan-
isms (Stage II); and Development of Conflict Resolution Mechanisms (Stage
III). The ten ASEAN member states also signed the Treaty of the Southeast
Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone in December 1995. Three years later, at the
third ASEAN informal summit in Manila in 1998, the ASEAN heads of
government agreed to the Thai prime minister, Chuan Leekpai’s proposal for
an ASEAN Troika to be constituted as an ad-hoc body at the ministerial level
for the leaders to cooperate more closely and mitigate conflict.
The Asian financial crisis of 1997 was a watershed moment that under-
mined the structural integrity of ASEAN. Massive domestic imbalances
destabilised the region’s economies, reversing the growth trends of the 1980s.
Many ASEAN countries abandoned economic liberalisation (the outward,
export-oriented newly industrialised economy (NIE) model) and reverted to
protectionist and insular economic policies. For instance, Malaysia began
experimenting with controls over capital flows and currency rates. The timing
of ASEAN’s expansion during the financial crisis was regarded by many as
inopportune. The crisis drove a wedge in the integration process; among
other things, it widened the gap between the ASEAN-4 and ASEAN-6
countries. The upside is that it increased perceptions of the need to accelerate
economic integration if ASEAN was to enhance itself.16 In the ASEAN
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Vision 2020 issued in December 1997, ASEAN leaders resolved to: (1) main-
tain regional macroeconomic and financial stability by promoting closer
consultations on macroeconomic and financial policies; and (2) continue to
liberalise the financial services sector and closely cooperate in money and
capital market, tax, insurance and customs matters.
To carry out the mandate, officials have drawn up an ASEAN Finance
Work Programme, outlining measures to establish sound international finan-
cial practices and standards, deepen capital markets and improve corporate
governance. ASEAN countries also worked towards the proper sequencing
of the liberalisation of capital accounts to allow freer capital flows, while
cushioning the impact of sudden shifts in these flows. In October 1998,
the ASEAN finance ministers formalised the ASEAN Surveillance Process
(ASP), which served as a framework for closer consultations on economic
policies. The first element of the ASP involves monitoring of global as well
as regional and national economic and financial developments as an ‘early
warning system’: to keep track of the recovery process and to detect any
sign of recurring vulnerability in the ASEAN financial systems and econ-
omies. The second element of the ASP takes the form of a peer review where
ASEAN finance ministers exchange views and information on developments
in their domestic economies, including policy measures carried out and the
progress of structural reforms. The review also provides an opportunity for
the consideration of jointly unilateral or collective action to counter potential
threats to any member economy. The foundation of the ASP process later led
to the adoption of the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) in May 2000, as the
ASEAN+3 (China, Japan and the Republic of Korea) finance ministers
came together to establish a regional financing arrangement. The CMI con-
sists of two components: an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement and a
network of bilateral swap arrangements among ASEAN+3 members.
ASEAN Free Trade Area
As we indicated earlier, ASEAN established AFTA in 1992 to bolster itself as
both a credible political and economic entity. Subsequently AFTA evolved
into the AEC. This section addresses the following questions:
• the constraining environment for RTAs;
• the significance of the recent development of RTAs for global and
intra-regional competitiveness;
• the contribution of RTAs to trade promotion;
• the role of RTAs in conflict mitigation.
Impetus for AFTA
A move towards economic cooperation became evident after the end of the
Cold War and with the resolution of the Cambodian conflict. In 1991, the
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Thai prime minister, Anand Panyarachun, proposed the formation of a
free trade agreement (FTA) within ASEAN in 1991, a suggestion that
Singapore and then Malaysia endorsed enthusiastically. The European Eco-
nomic Union and negotiations towards a North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) had engendered fears of a possible loss of markets to other
regions, due to regional protectionism. In particular, the ASEAN was con-
cerned about Mexico gaining free access to US markets (the largest consumer
of its exports) through NAFTA. Second, the ‘socialist economies of China
and Vietnam, with their low-cost labour and land, [had] become attractive,
both as production locations for export and for the domestic market’
(Lee 2003: 195). ASEAN felt threatened by the potential diversion of
investments away from the region.
To maintain its economic competitiveness and its US, European and
Japanese markets, ASEAN adopted the CEPT under the umbrella of AFTA.
The non-binding and non-punitive nature of these tariffs ensured they were
implemented swiftly. The understanding was that existing tariffs on inclusion
list (IL) goods would be reduced to 5 per cent within 15 years.17 Subsequently,
some of the ASEAN-6 countries added an amendment to the CEPT in 1995
to shorten the timeline by five years to 2002. By 2002, the target had been
largely met: tariffs on IL goods had been lowered among the ASEAN-6
countries from an average 12.76 per cent in 1993, to 1.96 per cent in 2003.
Almost all the lines on the IL (98.62 per cent) are below the 5 per cent
CEPT target. The ASEAN-6 countries also shifted more products from their
temporary exclusion lists (TEL) and general exception lists (GEL) to the IL.
The GEL, which makes an exception for products on the basis of national
security, health or cultural reasons, contains 292 lines, or about 0.65 per cent
of all tariff lines in ASEAN. The TEL, which makes a temporary exception
for products at the request of member states, contains 218 lines, or about
0.49 per cent of all tariff lines.
The ASEAN-4 countries, on the other hand, had agreed to the following
timelines to reduce tariffs on their IL goods to 5 per cent or less: Vietnam by
2006, Myanmar and Laos by 2008 and Cambodia by 2010. They have put
60.89 per cent of their total tariff lines on the IL. Their TEL lines account for
25.09 per cent of their total lines. The success of ASEAN’s member states in
reducing their tariffs lends credibility to the zero-tariff goal. In the 2003
CEPT package, ASEAN-6 countries agreed to have zero tariffs on 60 per cent
of their IL goods by 2003, a target they slightly surpassed (60.89 per cent). By
2010, all goods on their IL lists will have zero tariffs. Cambodia, Myanmar,
Laos and Vietnam (CMLV) are to follow suit in 2015.
The constraining environment: threats to AFTA
The linkage of RTAs and conflict assumes a complex and unique relationship
in Southeast Asia. AFTA’s initial implementation in the early 1990s was not
a smooth one; inter and intra-state conflict threats almost derailed the entire
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agenda. At the time, the region’s rapid economic success was threatened by
the global economic transition that saw the emergence of trading blocs and
protectionist sentiments.
Domestic turmoil in the form of leadership change also occurred during
the year AFTA was mooted.18 Thailand was shaken by a series of elections
and public revolt that year. Chuan Leekpai took office after ousting Anand
Panyarachun, who had initiated AFTA a year before. The Leekpai adminis-
tration’s postponed the scheduled AFTA Ministerial Council meeting. Eco-
nomic nationalism also fuelled the reversal with the pro-business government
responding to the demands of local business. Thailand’s petrochemical
industry sought exclusion from AFTA, accusing Singapore of unfair com-
petition. Other sectors, namely, electronics and plastics products – both on
the ‘fast track’ – soon followed suit.
Similarly, in Malaysia, the bureaucracy–business nexus stalled liberalisa-
tion efforts. According to then Malaysian minister for international trade and
industry, Rafidah Aziz, the bureaucracy (with more than 45,000 different
tariff lines at their disposal) had plenty of room to manoeuvre and obstruct
the AFTA implementation process. Malaysia was also protective over its
car, the Proton Saga, and pushed for its automobile industry to be exempted
from AFTA. The government also sought a similar dispensation for its
petrochemical industry.
With only 23.4 per cent of popular vote, Fidel Ramos’ election victory over
Aquino in 1992, raised concerns that the weak political leadership would
not commit to AFTA. In the Philippines, the business community, repre-
sented by the textiles, apparel, footwear, and iron and steel industries, pro-
tested the implementation of AFTA. It went into dispute with Singapore, by
refusing to reduce tariffs on 11 petrochemical products. While the Philippines
had formerly undertaken to lower tariffs under CEPT, the government
subsequently gave its petrochemical industry special interest status to defer its
earlier CEPT commitments.
Similarly, the Indonesian government continued to protect its powerful
indigenous corporations.
AFTA’s impact on intra-ASEAN trade trends
Many ASEAN countries have opted for export-led growth. These countries
share similar resource inputs and are engaged in producing high-tech and
labour-intensive exports. Thus, the intra-regional competition for developed
country markets is high. For instance, electronics and computer products
account for 50 per cent of all ASEAN trade, but are ranked fortieth in terms
of intra-ASEAN trade. In addition, the total lines on the IL account for as
little as 5 per cent of ASEAN’s total trade by some estimates, despite having
drastically lower tariffs. Intra-regional competition in commonly produced
goods has slowed integration, as member countries fear losing out to each
other if they cooperate too closely. Generically, the export-oriented regimes
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are limited in terms of the intra-regional trade they can generate. Figure 5.1
refers to East Asia’s export shares in 2003 based on input–output table calcula-
tions. The figure indicates that there is a limit to the amount of intra-regional
trade that can take place in East Asia (and similarly in ASEAN).
Despite such competition, intra-regional trade among ASEAN members
does exist, in complimentary items, taking the form of intra-industry trade in
electrical items. Tables 5.1 and 5.2 show the dominant share of trade in these
items.
In addition, Table 5.3 shows that intra-ASEAN trade exceeds trade with
other individual countries by a substantial margin. From the data in these
tables we can infer that a large proportion of intra-regional trade comprises
intra-industry trade.
As a first step in economic integration, AFTA achieved a moderate degree
of success. Total intra-ASEAN trade increased from US$44.2 billion in 1993
to US$174.39 billion in 2003. Figure 5.1 shows a steady increase in intra-
ASEAN exports every year post-AFTA with a temporary dip in 1998 due to
the financial crisis.
Forging consensus is particularly important given that ASEAN does not
operate on a voting system. Instead, it has traditionally worked on the
principle of consensus. As reported by former Indonesian president, Mega-
wati Soekarnoputri, at the AFTA 2002 Symposium – ten years after the
Figure 5.1 East Asia’s export shares using input–output table calculations, 2003.
Source: Economic Policy Department (2003: 64).
Note: Export shares are the Export Promotion Department’s internal estimates based on the
1995 Asian input–output tables. Adjustments have also been made using 2001 data for East
Asia’s exports within and without the region; domestic demand refers to private consumption,
government consumption, gross and domestic fixed capital formation and increase in stock.
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implementation of AFTA – intra-regional trade had increased approximately
11.6 per cent per annum, and appeared promising for AFTA’s eventual
materialisation. Through AFTA, President Megawati argued, ‘there will also
be an improvement of income of its members individually or collectively . . .
regional demanding and bargaining powers would increase which, in turn,
[would] also increase the intra-ASEAN trading volumes’.
However, the results look less promising. We observe that intra-ASEAN
trade as a percentage of total trade rose less than 1 per cent, from 21.7
percent in 1993 to 22.08 per cent in 2003. Stronger economies from ASEAN-
6 countries such as Singapore and Malaysia represented a disproportionately
Table 5.1 ASEAN-6 top ten export commodities by two-digit HS codes in 2004
HS Commodities Value (US$ millions) Share (%)
85 Electrical machinery, equipment
parts, sound equipment, TV
equipment
163,220.3 31.4
84 Nuclear reactors, broilers, machinery
and mechanical appliances, parts
88,665.9 17.1
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and
products of their distillation,
bituminous substances, mineral waxes
58,987.9 11.4
29 Organic chemicals 16,877.1 3.3
39 Plastics and articles thereof 14,498.5 2.8
40 Rubber and articles thereof 12,417.3 2.4
15 Animal or vegetable fats and oils and
their cleavage products, prepared




checking, precision, medical or
surgical instruments and apparatus,
and parts and accessories thereof
10,946.2 2.1
87 Vehicles others than railway or
tramway rolling-stock, and parts and
accessories thereof
10,820.2 2.1
44 Vehicles others than railway or
tramway rolling-stock, and parts and
accessories thereof
8,283.1 1.6
Ten major commodities 396,812.0 76.4
Others 122,413.0 23.6
Total 519,225.0 100.0
Source: ASEAN (2005: 83, Table V13).
Note: HS refers to Harmonized System of Tariffs any slight discrepancies in numbers are due to
rounding.
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large share most of total intra-regional trade. Yet, this situation might have
been different today had it not been for the 1997 Asian financial crisis.
Nonetheless, intra-regional trade is heavily concentrated on bilateral trade
relations between Singapore–Malaysia and Singapore–Indonesia.
Dispute settlement mechanisms
According to a study conducted by Nesadurai (2003), there has been a ‘pro-
gressive institutionalisation of AFTA since 1992 as far as the nature of con-
stitutional documents is concerned’. Nesadurai observes that with AFTA’s
Table 5.2 ASEAN-6 top ten import commodities by two-digit HS codes in 2004
HS Commodities Value (US$ millions) Share (%)
85 Electrical machinery and equipment and
parts thereof, sound recorders and
reproducers, television image and sound
recorders and reproducers, and parts and
accessories of such articles
140,991.1 30.9
84 Nuclear reactors, boilers, machinery and
mechanical appliances, and parts thereof
73,372.3 16.1
27 Mineral fuels, mineral oils and products
of their distillation, bituminous
substances, mineral waxes
60,995.2 13.4
72 Iron and steel 15,765.0 3.5
87 Vehicles others than railway or tramway
rolling-stock, and parts and accessories
thereof
13,615.9 3.0
39 Plastics and articles thereof 12,756.3 2.8
90 Optical, photographic, cinematographic,
measuring, checking, precision, medical
or surgical instruments and apparatus,
and parts and accessories thereof
12,454.5 2.7
29 Organic chemicals 12,258.0 2.7
71 Natural or cultured pearls, precious or
semi-precious stones, precious metals,
metals clad with precious metal and
articles thereof, imitation jewellery, coins
6,905.0 1.5
73 Articles of iron or steel 6,769.0 1.5
Ten major commodities 355,882.3 78.1
Others 100,124.8 22.0
Total 456,007.1 100.0
Source: ASEAN (2005: 83, Table V14).
Note: HS refers to Harmonized System of Tariffs; any slight discrepancies in numbers are due to
rounding.
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Table 5.3 ASEAN-6 top ten major import and export markets in 2001–2004 (US$
thousands)
Exports 2001 2002 2003 2004
Country Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
ASEAN 81,302.1 22.2 85,0774.4 22.4 97,157.1 22.9 117,090.1 22.6
US 61,594.4 16.8 60,317.4 15.9 60,146.6 14.2 73,960.5 14.2
EU 56,148.0 15.3 53,828.9 14.2 56,381.9 13.3 68,666.0 13.2
Japan 48,152.7 13.1 44,411.0 11.7 50,086.5 11.8 63,613.2 12.3
Hong
Kong
20,061.8 5.5 21,861.4 5.8 28,583.7 6.7 29,668.9 5.7
South
Korea
14,710.6 4.0 15,676.9 4.1 16,890.6 4.0 19,770.6 3.8
China 14,454.9 3.9 19,486.1 5.1 26,974.6 6.4 38,554.1 7.4
Taiwan 8,693.5 2.4 18,556.1 4.9 13,823.0 3.3 17,537.5 3.4
Australia 8,495.5 2.3 9,567.4 2.5 11,531.8 2.7 16,170.9 3.1
India 5,861.3 1.6 8,099.0 2.1 7,773.0 1.8 10,609.6 2.0
Top ten
countries
319,474.8 87.1 336,881.5 88.8 369,348.8 87.0 455,641.4 87.8
Others 47,167.5 12.9 42,604.3 11.2 55,105.1 13.0 63,583.6 12.2
Total 366,642.3 100.0 379,485.9 100.0 424,453.9 100.0 519,255.0 100.0
Source: ASEAN (2005: 78–79, Table V.11).
Imports 2001 2002 2003 2004
Country Value Share Value Share Value Share Value Share
ASEAN 64,423.0 20.6 70,534.8 21.7 73,216.0 20.6 100,172.0 22.0
Japan 52,861.4 16.9 52,789.5 16.3 57,788.9 16.3 72,192.2 15.8
US 45,565.8 14.6 49,814.8 14.0 49,814.8 14.0 54,526.3 12.0
EU 39,561.2 12.6 39,903.2 12.3 42,711.4 12.0 51,674.3 11.3
China 17,009.7 5.4 22,803.2 7.0 27,783.7 7.8 42,522.0 9.3
South
Korea
13,057.1 4.2 14,586.8 4.5 14,857.2 4.2 20,530.2 4.5
Australia 9,481.0 3.0 7,215.1 2.2 7,555.2 2.1 9,116.4 2.0
Hong
Kong
7,049.5 2.3 7,804.6 2.4 7,532.9 2.1 8,576.2 1.9
Taiwan 6,792.9 2.2 12,477.6 3.8 15,589.5 4.4 19,509.4 4.3
India 3,589.9 1.1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Saudi
Arabia
N/A N/A 6,252.1 1.9 7,095.1 2.0 9,757.4 2.1
Top ten
countries
259,391.5 82.9 277,721.9 85.6 303,944.6 85.6 388,576.6 85.2
Others 53,423.8 17.1 46,607.9 14.4 51,195.8 14.4 67,430.6 14.8
Total 312,815.2 100.0 324,329.8 100.0 355,140.4 100.0 456,007.1 100.0
Source: ASEAN (2005: 78–79, Table V.12).
Note: The table above only shows the share of the top ten markets. India was not among the top
ten import markets for ASEAN in 2002–2004, hence its figures are not reflected in the table.
Saudi Arabia was not one of the top ten import markets of ASEAN in 2001, hence its figures are
not reflected in the table; any slight discrepancies in numbers are due to rounding.
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inception, progressive improvements were made on the initial general guide-
lines such as implementation details for the CEPT (Operational Procedures
for CEPT, Rules of Origin for CEPT and Interpretative Notes to the Agree-
ment on the CEPT Scheme for AFTA). After 1995 in particular, ‘the consti-
tutional documents pertaining to AFTA [also] became formal and binding on
signatories’.
While the 1992 CEPT agreement did not include any dispute settlement
mechanisms (DSM), with the exception of Article 8 stating that member
states should try to amicably settle any disputes arising from implementation
of AFTA through consultations, ASEAN member states adopted a protocol
on DSM in November 1996. Five stages in the dispute settlement process
were detailed for guiding governments in the event of a dispute: consultation,
elevation of dispute to the senior economic officials meeting (SEOM), appeal
of SEOM ruling to the ASEAN economic ministers (AEM), implementation
of decision of the SEOM or AEM, and compensation or suspension of
concessions.
There is also a DSM in place to address private sector complaints on non-
tariff barrier (NTB) issues, which are to be channelled directly to member
countries and to the ASEAN Secretariat. The complaints will undergo a
process of clarification and verification by the member countries concerned,
and if found to be valid, efforts will be made to remove them.
Thus far, ASEAN member countries have yet to invoke the DSM process,
even as disputes have arisen in the course of implementing AFTA, in the
areas of agriculture, automobiles and petrochemicals. Affected countries
such as Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and the Philippines have preferred to
settle their disputes via diplomatic consultations and bargaining. Nesadurai’s
(2003) interviews with senior officials from Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand
and Malaysia revealed that invoking the DSM could jeopardise political
relationships in ASEAN.
With the inter-governmental mechanisms in place, AFTA’s implementa-
tion could be pursued against an institutionalised backdrop, which helps
to advance the AFTA process. While Nesadurai (2003) noted that ‘these
institutionalised mechanisms have served as the arena in which compromises
resulting in a lower level of compliance were worked out . . . it is [nevertheless]
unlikely that AFTA could have advanced as far as it has done without these
compromises’. AFTA is generally recognised as an initial step in pushing
ASEAN towards realising Vision 2020’s goal of ‘a concert of Southeast
Asian Nations, outward-looking, living in peace, stability and prosperity,
bonded together in partnership in dynamic development and in a community
of caring societies’. The new AEC will build upon AFTA by increasing eco-
nomic integration, bridging the divide between the ASEAN-6 and CMLV,
and bringing greater economic benefits to the region as a whole.
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Potential impact of AFTA on regional peace and security
ASEAN’s political economy is characterised by entrenched interests and
economic nationalism, especially during its early founding years. AFTA’s
structure attempts to neutralise these insular tendencies by allowing for
exceptions without penalty. Also, CEPT is based on the lowest common
denominator to harmonise effective tariffs, and is designed to diffuse tensions
if the reductions progress too quickly.
AFTA is not restricted to tariff reductions. The CEPT Agreement for
AFTA also provides for the immediate elimination of quantitative restric-
tions for products included in the CEPT Scheme. The scheme also eliminates
other NTBs within a period of five years upon enjoyment of the CEPT
concession, through efforts such as the harmonisation of product standards
and mutual recognition of conformity assessment requirements, simplifica-
tion of customs clearance procedures and harmonisation of sanitary and
phytosanitary standards.
AFTA’s non-binding and non-punitive nature arguably promotes the miti-
gation of potential conflict, while at the same time pushing towards lower
tariffs to raise the level of intra-regional trade, thereby creating more inter-
dependence and linkages as a way to cement better ties within ASEAN. With
closer economic integration, the cost of conflict becomes higher. While there
are many intervening variables, a case can be made for AFTA’s impact – espe-
cially with its expansion in scope and function in ensuing years – on increased
intra-regional trade and better economic coordination and regional ties.
Towards an ASEAN Community
Since its inception in 1967, ASEAN is seen to be moving from an association
into an institution-building community. Apart from promoting peace and
security in Southeast Asia, ASEAN also seeks to strengthen its peace-building
role in the wider Asia-Pacific region.
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, forged in October 2003, addresses
new challenges that accompany both ASEAN’s evolving place in the inter-
national context, as well as ASEAN’s expansion to ten countries in Southeast
Asia. Through this Declaration, ASEAN affirms its political will to forge
a sustainable future for the region, based on political solidarity, economic
cooperation and mutually derived benefits, as embodied by the adoption
of ‘Prosper Thy Neighbour’ policies. These aims, which give a coherent
structure and organisation to the ASEAN Vision 2020, are to be attained
through the realisation of the proposed ASEAN Community – comprising
the ASC, the AEC and the ASCC.
This section will attempt to address the following questions:
• What range of non-trade provisions such as the rule of law and respect
for human rights are included in RTAs?
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• How effective are these provisions at improving domestic governance and
reducing the risk of future conflict?
Expanding the role and functions of AFTA
The extension of AFTA membership to CMLV has diversified the ASEAN
grouping in terms of political regimes and economic priorities. This has also
made the decision-making process more time-consuming, which has in turn
slowed down the progress of economic integration. Another obstacle for
AFTA is the proliferation of bilateral FTAs, which could minimise its
effectiveness as a PTA.
ASEAN’s weakness in not having a mechanism for redistributing resources,
and the lack of an independent regional authority to ensure compliance with
the ASEAN agreement, limits its ability to move new members in lock-step
with the agreement. It also makes them unable to reap the full benefits of
regional integration which, potentially, could reduce their interest in ASEAN.
This is particularly true of Myanmar, which seems to be tilting towards a
strategy of playing India and China against each other, instead of relying on
ASEAN for its diplomatic support.
ASEAN therefore needs to move rapidly and boldly in creating competitive
production clusters and greater regional domestic demand to increase growth
within the region. The expansion of AFTA’s role and functions also recog-
nises the close link between economics and security, and the openness to non-
trade provisions, such as the rule of law and respect for human rights and
socio-cultural values.
From AFTA to AEC: consolidating economic integration
ASEAN leaders finalised the details of the AEC at the tenth ASEAN summit
in Vientiane in November 2004. The new AEC will build upon AFTA by
increasing economic integration, bridging the divide between the ASEAN-6
countries and CMLV, and bringing greater economic benefits to the region as
a whole.
The AEC vision, proposed during the Bali Concord II, envisages a free
flow of goods, investment and services, and a freer flow of capital and labour
by 2020. Unlike a common market, the AEC restricts the flow of labour to
skilled labourers and business persons, and does not plan to impose a uni-
form tariff rate on non-members. For this reason, some proponents of the
AEC have called it an ‘AFTA-plus’. Others, who would like to see a fully
economically integrated ASEAN, have suggested that ASEAN adopts a
‘common market-minus’ framework. This would act like an FTA-plus at
the beginning, but would delay the deep integration measures needed for a
common market until after 2020. It might be more agreeable to newer
members, as it would grant them greater flexibility as they begin reforming
their economies and integrating them into ASEAN.
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The purpose of the AEC, as explained in the Bali Concord II, is to make
ASEAN into a single market and production base that would be more
economically competitive and attractive to investors. It would incorporate
all the existing trade and investment agreements, fast-track the integration
of priority sectors and make the AEC into a rules-bound body. While the
Bali Concord II does not provide much detail, the declaration reveals that
ASEAN would adopt the recommendations of the High Level Task Force on
ASEAN Economic Integration; its report identifies 11 priority sectors slated
for trade and investment liberalisation.
The Task Force’s report provides a comprehensive strategy to accelerate
economic integration, and also recommends several new features, includ-
ing an independent panel to solve trade disputes. It names 11 sectors as
priority sectors for integration, assigning responsibility for each to various
ASEAN members: wood, automotives, rubber, textiles, agriculture, fisheries,
electronics, e-ASEAN, healthcare, air transport and tourism. The integration
clause would be advanced by moving quickly on these sectors. The report
recommends the following steps:
• zero tariffs;
• the immediate elimination of trade barriers;
• faster and simplified customs;
• faster harmonisation of mutually recognised agreements;
• standards and regulations.
Services relating to these sectors should be liberalised by 2010. For tourism,
the report recommends an intra-ASEAN travel visa by 2005, and urges mem-
bers to draw up an agreement on skilled labour mobility by the same year.
These steps should be combined with an outreach and promotional pro-
gramme to establish pan-ASEAN companies, with divisions located accord-
ing to the comparative advantages of countries. This includes outsourcing,
more intra-ASEAN investing and an eventual ‘ASEAN brand’ for goods and
services.
At the thirty-sixth ASEAN economic ministers meeting in September
2004, ministers endorsed the framework agreement for the integration of
the 11 priority sectors and the roadmaps for integration of the priority
sectors. Both were ratified at the tenth ASEAN summit in Vientiane in
November 2004.
During the thirty-ninth ASEAN ministerial meeting on 24–25 July 2006,
ASEAN officials revealed plans to craft a charter by 2007 (ASEAN’s fortieth
founding anniversary), to substantively complete the integration process
by 2015, instead of 2020, albeit without a single currency system.19 The rise
of India and China prompted the move to accelerate the process. Singapore,
Thailand and Brunei strongly supported the move, with the rest of the
member states ‘not averse’ to the initiative, according to Singaporean Foreign
Minister George Yeo.
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From AFTA to ASCC: social development
The ASCC, in consonance with the goal set by ASEAN Vision 2020, envis-
ages a Southeast Asia bonded together in partnership as a community of
caring societies and founded on a common regional identity. Members of the
ASCC are committed to cooperation in social development, aimed at raising
the standard of living of disadvantaged groups and the rural population, and
to seek the active involvement of all sectors of society, in particular women,
youth and local communities. Additionally, ASEAN member states are to
ensure that their individual work forces are prepared for and benefit from
economic integration, by investing more resources for basic and higher edu-
cation, training, science and technology development, job creation and social
protection. The area of public health, including the prevention and control
of infectious and communicable diseases, will also see intensified cooper-
ation. Human resource development takes precedence and represents a key
strategy for employment generation, alleviating poverty and socio-economic
disparities, and ensuring economic growth with equity.
Addressing non-traditional security threats
In order to address development gaps and uneven resource allocation within
ASEAN, there also exist alternative RTAs which take the shape of market-
oriented sub-regionalism, also known as the Greater Mekong Sub-region
(GMS). The difference between the GMS project and other formal economic
regional integration is that the former is a sub-regional grouping that is
more concerned about environmental security, infrastructural networking
and sustainable development than trade or economic issues per se. This focus
on infrastructure includes not only physical infrastructure (e.g. roads, rail
and water transportation) but also complementary ‘software’ issues, such as
improving procedures for customs clearance and enhancing skills for regula-
tory systems. Most notably, there has not been an official trade liberalisation
programme under the GMS project (Than 2005: 94).
The GMS is currently focusing on constructing, upgrading and rehabilitat-
ing critical sections of road and the East–West, North–South and Southern
economic corridors (see Table 5.4 for other projects). The East–West economic
corridor is the most advanced and will link the India Ocean to the South
China Sea via a 1,500-km road network. By 2007, this will allow all-weather
travel between Da Nang port in Vietnam and the Mawlamyine port in
Myanmar, via Laos and Thailand. By 2012, all three economic corridors
should be established.
In November 2001, the six members agreed to a Ten-Year Strategic
Framework that consists of 11 flagship programmes to physically and com-
mercially link the GMS countries. The members have also agreed to focus on
five strategic developmental thrusts:
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• strengthen infrastructure linkages through a multi-sectoral approach;
• facilitate cross-border trade and investment;
• enhance private sector participation in development and improve its
competitiveness;
• develop human resources and skill competencies; and
• protect the environment and promote sustainable use of the sub-region’s
shared natural resources.20
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The success of the GMS project would enable both Myanmar and Laos to
benefit much more quickly than from AFTA and ASEAN’s external FTAs.
This is because the improved infrastructure would make the transportation of
goods more efficient, facilitating trade along the Mekong sub-region. Facili-
tating border movement will also help to reduce the costs of transaction and
increase trade. In a study done by the Asian Development Bank, Menon
(2005) found that the GMS would help its members be more ‘effective mem-
bers of ASEAN’ and that the ‘GMS program is assisting its members to
integrate more closely with the ASEAN region and through this, with the rest
of the world’.
ASC: consolidating the institutional environment for
conflict mitigation
The ASC builds on efforts made by ASEAN to prevent major inter-state
conflict over the past four decades or so. The ASC’s aim is to ensure that
countries in the region live at peace with one another and with the world
in a just, democratic and harmonious environment. ASC members are
committed to relying exclusively on peaceful processes for the settlement
of intra-regional differences, and regard their security as fundamentally
linked to one another and bound by geographic location, common vision
and objectives.
The ASC comprises the following components: political development;
shaping and sharing of norms; conflict prevention; conflict resolution; post-
conflict peace building; and implementing mechanisms. It will be built on the
strong foundation of ASEAN processes, principles, agreements and struc-
tures, which evolved over the years and are contained in the following major
political agreements:
• ASEAN Declaration, Bangkok, 8 August 1967;
• ZOPFAN Declaration, Kuala Lumpur, 27 November 1971;
• Declaration of ASEAN Concord I, Bali, 24 February 1976;
• Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia, Bali, 24 February
1976;
• ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, 22 July 1992;
• Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, Bangkok,
15 December 1995;
• ASEAN Vision 2020, Kuala Lumpur, 15 December 1997; and
• Declaration of ASEAN Concord II, Bali, 7 October 2003.
The essence of the ASC in particular, is the principle of comprehensive
security, in line with the strong interconnections among contemporary
political, economic and social realities. It does not connote a defence pact,
military alliance or joint foreign policy. The High Council of the TAC and the
ASEAN-steered ARF are also singled out as important pillars of the ASC.
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The procedures for the High Council were further clarified in 2001.
However, members tend to ignore the High Council, preferring international
arbitration over intra-regional intermediation.
ASEAN established the ARF in 1994. Its agenda will unfold in three stages,
namely: the promotion of confidence building; development of preventive
diplomacy; and the elaboration of approaches to conflicts for major regional
security issues in the region, such as non-proliferation, counter-terrorism,
transnational crime.
Critics have pointed out the ARF’s slow progress in developing its
confidence-building and preventive diplomacy agenda, overall institutional
growth and problem-solving mechanisms to engage the US and other key
members. China in particular, resisted the development of preventive diplo-
macy measures within the ARF, as compared to confidence-building meas-
ures. There is also the concern that ASEAN may dominate the ARF core,
which prevents the resolution of more intractable security problems in
Northeast Asia.21
The ARF has also posted achievements. At its tenth meeting on 18
June 2003, it provided a venue for multilateral and bilateral dialogue, and
established effective principles of dialogue and cooperation amongst its
26 members. The meeting also included the networking and exchange of
information relating to defence policy and the publication of defence white
papers.22 The ARF also recently attempted to play a role in addressing the
North Korean missile crisis via an appeal to a return to the six-party talks but
North Korea rejected the move.23
The ARF has recently developed some modest structures and capacities
towards preventive diplomacy. It has also focused on non-traditional security
threats such as terrorism, maritime security and disaster management. The
forum has also taken institutional measures, such as strengthening the ARF
chair, developing a Register of Eminent and Expert Persons and establishing
an ARF unit within the ASEAN Secretariat.
The last ARF meeting on 28 July 2006 ended on a positive note with
ASEAN seemingly regaining its previous prominence in regional affairs,
especially with the renewed US focus on the region, to counter China’s increas-
ing influence. In a promising development, France agreed to be signatory to
the TAC with the EU indicating interest as well.24
The Declaration of ASEAN Concord II reveals how ASEAN has matured
since its inception. It has demonstrated a new-found receptiveness and
assurance with regard to the establishment and implementation of rules,
institutional mechanisms and planned strategic initiatives. Part of this con-
fidence stems from the international endorsement given to ASEAN-driven
mechanisms, such as the TAC and the ARF. ASEAN is also coming to terms
with its capacity to shape its own future, with constructive initiatives taking
precedence over response and reaction.
Other security measures include the Treaty of the Southeast Asia Nuclear
Weapon-Free Zone and the ASEAN Troika. Established in December 1995,
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the Treaty of the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone plans progres-
sive, concrete action by ASEAN towards general and complete disarmament,
and upholds the international non-proliferation system. The treaty also pro-
motes the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes – particularly eco-
nomic development and social progress while conforming to International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) guidelines and standards. These measures
underscore the emphasis placed on shared norms among ASEAN states, not
merely common action. A number of mechanisms have been put in place to
enforce the implementation of the treaty, including information exchange,
clarification and fact-finding missions, as well as a system of controls and
safeguards. Cooperation with international organisations is encouraged to
facilitate the enforcement of the treaty. The treaty is to remain in force
indefinitely, and any breach of it will give other states the right to withdraw.
All ten ASEAN countries have signed the Convention on the Prohibition of
the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological)
and Toxic Weapons and their Destruction, as well as the Convention on
Chemical Weapons.
On 25 August 2006, the Cambodian parliament launched the ‘The
Cambodia Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar’ in Phnom Penh, which rep-
resented an unprecedented move to condemn Myanmar’s military junta for
its lack of reform and flagrant rights abuses. Other initiatives include the
draft charter circulated by the ASEAN Institute of Strategic and Inter-
national Studies (ASEAN-ISIS) at the Track Two diplomacy level in April
2006, aimed at mitigating potential conflict within ASEAN. An ASEAN
Court of Justice was mooted to address the emerging trend of agreements
that involve legally binding rules, beyond political commitments. Its draft
charter proposes to establish an ASEAN Peace and Reconciliation Council
to play a stronger role in conflict prevention and resolution.
Such proposals have the potential to ameliorate inter and intra-state con-
flicts, upholding the principle of non-intervention embodied in the ‘ASEAN
Way’, and building more confidence in the ASEAN mechanism. Issues that
have regional implications, such as maritime security, terrorism, transbound-
ary haze pollution and pandemic diseases can be better dealt with through
more open consultation and communication between member states.
Conclusion
ASEAN as a regional grouping has been successful in reducing and minimising
regional conflicts, particularly inter-state conflicts among ASEAN members.
This chapter has argued further that AFTA’s non-binding and non-punitive
nature arguably promotes the mitigation of potential conflict, while at the
same time pushing towards lower tariffs to raise the level of intra-regional
trade, thereby creating more interdependence and linkages as a way to cement
better ties within ASEAN.
With closer economic integration, the cost of conflict becomes higher,
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as AFTA serves as a ‘passive’ indirect link between trade/investments and
conflict/peace building, with non-pure tariff reductions under the CEPT
scheme playing the role of enhancing security.
While there are many intervening variables, this chapter has put forward
the case that AFTA – with its expansion in scope and function in ensuing
years into an ASEAN Community vision – has increased intra-regional trade
and better economic coordination and regional ties. AFTA’s development
into an ASEAN Community is indicative of the realisation amongst the
ASEAN member states of the close nexus between economics and security,
and openness to non-trade provisions such as the rule of law and respect for
human rights and socio-cultural values as a necessary adjunct to the RTA’s
economic impetus.
The viability of RTAs to promote the region’s economy and security is not
in question. Yet, the relationship between RTAs and conflict in the future
remains tied to the political will of the ASEAN member states to set up
the requisite regional institutions and mechanisms to implement economics,
security, social-cultural agreements towards fulfilling the vision of enhanced
regionalism under the ASEAN Community framework.
Notes
1 See Ruland (2005).
2 See Yeo et al. (2005).
3 See http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ipresscom/ipress2002/ipresscom200239_inma_
20021217.htm (accessed 13 September 2006).
4 The agreement is available from http://www.aseansec.org/13163.htm (accessed
28 March 2006).
5 See ‘South China Sea cooperation hailed: FM’, Xinhua, 16 March 2005.
6 See ‘Malaysia increases border security’, Bangkok Post, 23 September 2006.
7 Annual reports available from Amnesty International website http://www.
amnesty.org (accessed 11 June 2008).
8 See ‘New violence in south Philippines’, BBC News, 4 September 2006.
9 This one was 6.2 on the Richter scale.
10 Constituting 20 per cent of the world’s total.
11 Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Lao
People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on
30 April 1999.
12 However, the ensuing years of financial crisis and international terrorism renewed
the need for external influence to achieve regional security.
13 The ASEAN Way emphasises the norm of non-interference in other states’ affairs,
prefers consensus and non-binding plans to treaties and legalistic rules, and
relies on national institutions and actions, rather than creating a strong central
bureaucracy.
14 Singapore was the exception.
15 They are: Australia, Bangladesh, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Canada, China,
EU, India, Indonesia, Japan, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Republic of
Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Mongolia, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua
New Guinea, Philippines, Russian Federation, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste,
United States and Vietnam.
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16 See http://www.aseansec.org/7660.htm (accessed 11 June 2008).
17 Lim and Walls (2005).
18 See Stubbs (2003).
19 See ‘Officials discuss timeline to realize ASEAN Economic Community’, Bernama,
16 August 2006.
20 See http://www.adb.org/GMS/Projects/default.asp (accessed 11 June 2008).
21 See Choi (2004).
22 See https://www.aseanregionalforum.org/Default.aspx?tabid=49 (accessed 10
September 2006).
23 See ‘Asean forum to condemn N. Korea missile tests’, Chosun Ilbo, 20 July 2006.
24 See ‘EU likely to accede to ASEAN Treaty of Amity’, Business Times, 29 July
2006.
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6 Managing conflict
through trade
The case of Pakistan and India
Shaheen Rafi Khan, Faisal Haq Shaheen and
Moeed Yusuf
Introduction
Histories of recurrent inter and intra-state tensions have constrained progress
on regional trade agreements (RTAs) within South Asia. While India tends to
see itself as an omnipresent Lord Buddha, with surrounding smaller states
taking on the persona of clinging acolytes, this is not a shared vision. Relations
between India and its neighbours have been historically volatile, epitomised
in particular by India and Pakistan. In fact, bilateral differences between the
two have spilled over and stalled the South Asian regional integration process.
While both countries share common historical, ethnic, linguistic, cultural and
religious roots, their potential to synergise constructive bilateral relations
have been subverted by a number of ‘push factors’, most importantly the
collapse of democracy in Pakistan, and growing sectarian and religious
militancy in both countries. Inter and intra-state conflict have fuelled each
other, stifling trade and economic relations and, in the extreme, evoking the
spectre of a nuclear conflict.
The share of regional trade and foreign investment between both nations
has historically hovered around 1 per cent of their total global trade. Open
conflict and latent tensions between the two states have restricted trade vol-
umes to levels that are low in relation to their gross national product (GNP),
population, proximity and cultural ties. The high level of unofficial trade
between the two countries further demonstrates this trade potential. Conflict
induces economic protectionism. Pakistan maintains a narrowly defined posi-
tive list of products that may be legally imported from India. In turn, despite
granting of most favoured nation (MFN) status to Pakistan, India maintains
a ban on most imports. South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) efforts
towards tariff reductions, originally seen as promising, are being deflected by
the emphasis on composite dialogue, which links trade concessions to resolv-
ing the impasse on Kashmir, along with lesser bilateral issues. Consequently,
India has begun to build on a ‘look East’ policy, which entails an economic
interface between eastern South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) nations, a surging China and Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN).
Since 1947, both nations have fought three wars and engaged in several
localised skirmishes. Conflict has institutionalised an accelerating arms race
and growing nuclear capability. Kashmir is the most prominent and enduring
flashpoint between the two countries – the source of two wars and several
skirmishes. Differences also linger over Siachen, Sir Creek and, more recently,
the threat of freshwater retention by India has invited international arbitra-
tion. Politicians invoke cross-border issues to divert attention from domestic
misgovernance. The concentration of wealth, urban–rural and inter-provincial
disparities, deficient social services and infrastructure and the loss of liveli-
hoods contribute to economic and social insecurity. Impoverished and dis-
enfranchised groups and ethnic minorities find refuge in militancy, which
feeds internal discord and cross-border provocations, to which the state is
often privy.
The geo-strategic importance of the region sustains western involvement in
Pakistan and India, and has produced an assortment of alliances with both
religious zealots and modernists. Despite the pendulum swing, the military
remains the common denominator attesting to the reactive nature of the
engagement. Economic and military support to Afghanistan and Pakistan
emanates from security concerns; it has been historically unsustainable and
has come at great cost to Pakistan’s political development. In contrast,
western involvement in India is premised on political and economic synergies;
even the defence relationship focuses as much on building India’s military
capabilities as on arms deliveries.
This chapter seeks to understand the trade conflict links in a bilateral
context. It addresses the question whether economic interdependence
between Pakistan and India is possible, and if such interdependence is likely
to engender peaceful coexistence between the two. The second section out-
lines the history and causes of conflict between India and Pakistan. The third
section compares existing levels of bilateral trade with the assessed potential
and identifies the barriers that constrain this trade. The fourth section argues
that these barriers have a political genesis and that, in fact, trade is being
held hostage to conflict between the two countries. The fifth section is the
concluding section.
The politics of conflict
A chronology of conflict
The adversarial relations between Pakistan and India have embroiled them in
several crises and three full-scale conventional wars in the past. The first
active conflict was initiated in Kashmir just a year after the two countries
gained independence. In 1965, they clashed again, and in 1971 yet another
conventional war led to the dismemberment of Pakistan and to the creation
of the new state of Bangladesh.
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Apart from overt conflict, there have been four major crises, which have
brought India and Pakistan perilously close to war. The first of these crises
occurred in 1987 when India conducted an aggressive military exercise
on the Pakistani border. Three years later, in 1990, Pakistan responded
with Zarb-e-Momin, another military exercise. Tensions escalated as India
linked the exercise to surging violence in Kashmir. In 1999, Pakistan and
India were involved in a limited conflict in the Kargil sector of Indian
Kashmir, where Pakistan’s Northern Light Infantry, infiltrating across
the line of control (LOC), captured Indian posts. Subsequently, India
retaliated militarily. In 2001–2002, the two sides were on the brink of war
again as Indian mobilised its forces on the international border, provoking
a Pakistani response and leading to a ten-month-long eyeball-to-eyeball
confrontation.
Internal instability can lead to cross-border spillovers and exacerbate
threats of conflict. Both India and Pakistan have suffered separatist move-
ments in the brief span since they became independent states – Khalistan,
Assam, Kashmir, Balochistan, Sindh and the North West Frontier Province
(NWFP) tribal areas, to name but a few. Intelligence agencies in both countries
have interfered across borders, seeking to exploit these movements to their
own advantage (see Table 6.1). India’s Research and Intelligence Wing
(RAW) has supported insurrections in the former East Pakistan and, more
recently, in Balochistan. Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has used
the diffuse but more explosive force of religion to fight a proxy war in
Kashmir. In general, sectarian and ethnic divides have become increasingly
pronounced over time, generating a nexus of internal and external instability,
and fuelling insecurity between two nuclear-armed states.
Table 6.1 Chronology of India–Pakistan conflicts




























Source: SDPI in-house compilation.
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Open conflict
Pakistan and India have gone to war three times over the course of their
58-year history. The two triggers for these conflicts were the territorial
dispute over Kashmir, which continues to fester, and the unrest in Pakistan’s
exploited eastern wing, which invited Indian intervention.
The first armed conflict between the two sides occurred over Kashmir.
Following the partition of Pakistan from British India in 1947, the reigning
Hindu Maharaja requested military assistance from the Indian government
and as a pre-condition acceded the state to India.1 In a reflex response,
Muslim rebels supported by Pakistani infiltrators, captured Muzaffarabad,
now the capital of the Pakistan-affiliated Azad Kashmir. The conflict ended
with both sides agreeing to a United Nations (UN) brokered ceasefire on
1 January 1949, and to the establishment of an LOC to serve as the common
border. Over time the LOC came to be recognised as the de facto border,
which separates Pakistani and Indian Kashmir today.
Tensions remained high between the two sides despite a number of UN
proposals to resolve the Kashmir issue. In September 1965, both countries
went to war; Kashmir, again, was the casus belli. The ‘17-day War’ ended in a
stalemate and subsequently the Soviet Union effected a face-saving ceasefire.
While India opened the war on the international border, the aggression was
preceded by Pakistan’s ‘Operation Gibraltar’ through which the mujahedeen
launched a limited offensive in Indian Kashmir (Mohan et al. 2005).
Six years later the two countries were locked in conflict again. This was the
most shameful event in Pakistan’s history, marked by the atrocities the army
committed in its eastern wing. An extended period of economic and political
excesses culminated in open rebellion in 1970, when the West Pakistan
establishment denied the Awami League office after its electoral victory
(Sisson and Rose 1990). The Indian military, allied with Bengali insurgents,
launched a full-scale attack on Dhaka. The offensive lasted 12 days. Dhaka
fell on 16 December 1971, to the allied forces, which annihilated the Pakistani
army in East Pakistan and established complete supremacy.
Crises
Four crises, as opposed to open conflict, are of note. In 1986–1987, India
conducted ‘Operation Brass Tacks’, and Pakistan counter-mobilised, both
sides amassing a quarter of a million troops along the border. Opinions vary
as to the motives. Some researchers are of the view that it was an attempt to
discourage Pakistan’s support to Sikh separatists (Khalistanis) in eastern
Punjab. Others contend that the Indian mobilisation aimed at a war designed
to split Pakistani territory (Cheema 2004; Chengappa 2000).
Tensions between the two countries mounted again in 1990, following
an upsurge in violence in Indian Kashmir and subsequent Indian allega-
tions of Pakistani support to the insurgents. Pakistan conducted Operation
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Zarb-e-Momin, a large-scale military exercise to which India retaliated with
its own ‘precautionary’ reinforcements (Chari 2003). Both armies were placed
on high alert and the crisis seemed set to escalate into open conflict. Some
reports indicated movement of nuclear arsenals during the crisis.
The third crisis, in effect a localised conflict, occurred in the spring of 1999,
a year after both countries had conducted nuclear tests. A large contingent of
Pakistani soldiers from the Northern Light Infantry crossed the LOC and
captured Indian army posts in the Kargil–Drass area of Kashmir (Synnott
1990). Indian forces counter-attacked in an attempt to regain the posts and
made slow headway. The conflict remained confined as the Indian forces were
under strict orders not to retaliate across the LOC (Chari 2003). In July 1999,
Pakistan withdrew its troops under US pressure.2
The latest crisis was spurred by a terrorist attack on the Indian parlia-
ment on 13 December 2001. New Delhi blamed the terrorist attack on two
Pakistan-based militant outfits (Thies and Hellmuth 2004). On 14 May 2002,
Islamic extremists struck again in Indian Kashmir, attacking a passenger bus
and then an Indian army camp in Kaluchak, just outside Jammu in Indian
Kashmir. The attack reignited tensions between the two countries. Shortly,
thereafter, a million soldiers amassed on the international border, making it
the largest mobilisation in the two countries’ history (Chaudhury 2004).
Tensions remained high for a while but then cooled off, and the troops
demobilised in late 2002. Although war was averted, the standoff is con-
sidered the worst ‘nuclear’ crisis in South Asian history.
Intra-state conflict
Internal tensions within both countries fuelled by sectarian and ethnic strife
and growing religious militancy have created space for covert operations,
which further inflame these tensions. They have also brought both countries
to the brink of war several times, as indicated above. While the two mistrusting
neighbours tend to see a ‘foreign hand’ in every episode, there are instances
where such intervention has been clearly established.
Indian intra-state conflict
Perhaps the most serious intrusion in what India considers an internal affair
is the ongoing insurgency in Indian Kashmir. The insurgency is sourced in a
local uprising by disgruntled Kashmiri Muslim youth.3 India alleges active
Pakistani involvement in training and arming the insurgents. Pakistan, on the
other hand, denies the accusation, attributing it to indigenous unrest and
focusing on human rights abuses by the Indian security forces (Suri 2003).4
While such abuses are clearly in evidence, Pakistan has exploited the situation
to its advantage.5 The evidence is out that the ISI was training, funding and
infiltrating freedom fighters (mujahedeen) into Indian Kashmir, as a low-cost
option aimed at ‘bleeding India to death’ (Cohen 2003). Regardless, the
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insurgency has proved to be extremely costly for India to manage. More than
600,000 troops have been committed by New Delhi to quash the insurgency,
which has led to a loss of over 60,000 lives since 1989.
India also alleges Pakistani ISI involvement in the Khalistan movement, a
Sikh drive for independence in the East Punjab province during the 1980s
(Kozicki 2002).6 In fact, the alleged link tracks back to support for its precur-
sor, the ‘Sikh Home Rule Movement’, being run out of London in the late
1960s, and later transformed into the Khalistan movement.
Finally, Pakistan has always been vocal about the plight of Indian Muslims
victimised by communal violence. Perhaps the two most traumatic instances
of communal violence were the demolition of the Babri Mosque, and the
2002 Gujarat massacre. In the numerous Babri-related riots that took place
from 1986–1992, thousands of Muslim deaths were recorded (Allen 1992).
The Gujarat massacre in 2002 was even more violent. Communal violence
radiated from an attack by a Muslim mob on a passenger train in Godhra,
Gujarat, in February 2002. The state-sponsored retaliation led to the death of
over 2,000 people, the majority of whom were Muslims. The violence was
allegedly authorised from the highest tiers of the government. During 2002,
communal riots also took place in Harayana, Kerala, Rajasthan and a number
of other states (Engineer 2003). Pakistan wasted no opportunity to point to
the Gujarat incident as a proof of India’s maltreatment of Indian Muslims.
Both incidents have tarnished India’s international image considerably.
Pakistani intra-state conflict
Pakistan too has had its share of intra-state strife and, reciprocally, has
blamed India for inciting and fanning it. Indian involvement was central to
the dismemberment of East Pakistan in 1971. As indicated, this was a direct
outcome of extended political and economic excesses committed by West
Pakistan. The Indian role in accelerating what, perhaps, was inevitable has
left a permanent scar on Indo-Pak relations.
Pakistan also blamed India for supporting acts of sectarian and ethnic
violence across the country in the 1990s, especially in the troubled city of
Karachi. Islamabad alleged Indian support to Altaf Hussein, leader of the
Muhajir Qaumi Mahaz (Mutahidda Qaumi Movement, MQM) who was
aiming to destabilise Karachi in a bid to acquire greater powers for Urdu-
speaking Muhajirs (Mazari 1999). The Indian role in Karachi’s sectarian
violence was even officially hinted at when Pakistan ordered the closing down
of the Indian consulate in Karachi, although the act was portrayed as retali-
ation to the Babri Mosque incident in 1992. The Supreme Court of Pakistan
recently handed the death sentence to an RAW agent for having engineered
bombings in various Pakistan cities in 1990, a crime he confessed to have
masterminded.
Pakistan also accuses India of supporting Baloch insurgents involved in
anti-state violence. Recently, India was alleged to have trained as well as
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funded insurgents in the volatile and impoverished Pakistani province. While
India continues to deny any involvement, India’s increasing clout in Kabul
and its access to Balochistan via Afghanistan has provided it with an opportu-
nity to destabilise Balochistan, an option confidential Pakistani intelligence
reports suggest it has opted to embrace.
Drivers of conflict
The democracy deficit
A paradigm presents itself, based on a chronological interpretation of events.
The period from 1958 to 1971 exposed Pakistan to its first cycle of military
rule. The pattern repeated itself three times, with martial law in the early
stages, followed by a semblance of democratic governance, in an effort to
impart legitimacy to army rule. It was during this first cycle that two major
conflicts occurred, namely, the 1965 war with India over Kashmir and,
following another war in 1971, the creation of independent Bangladesh.
Subsequently, to date, no major wars have occurred although, as observed
above, both countries have come close to the brink.
The clue to this may lie in the two alternating systems of governance,
post-1971. Thus, the democratically elected governments of Zulfiqar Ali
Bhutto (1971–1977) and of Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif (1988–1999)
preceded two cycles of military rule, namely, 1977–1988, and 1999 to the
present. One possible conjecture is that elected governments imparted stability
in bilateral relations. In other words, negotiators were able to talk on the same
wavelength; the formal and informal channels of dialogue and communication
established were able to diffuse tensions before they reached the point of no
return. It goes to the credit of these governments – and to various civil society
initiatives – that, despite their subservience to the army and the intelligence
agencies on strategic issues, they found enough wriggle room to improve
political relations with India.7 Subsequently, when they were dislodged, the
communication modalities they established, and the residual goodwill they
garnered continued to dampen bilateral hostilities.
Admittedly, there is a linear dimension to this hypothesis, which ignores
the other influences affecting the ebb and flow of relations between the two
countries. However, an assessment of their antecedents and impacts appears
to support our thesis. Thus, pre-1971, the key source of internal strife was the
tensions between the two wings of the country, which eventually led to
Pakistan splitting up. With respect to external relations, the army central
command opted for the western-dominated defence pacts, namely the Central
Treaty Organisation (CENTO) and South East Asia Treaty Organisation
(SEATO). In turn, external economic and military support extended the
army’s hold on power. The army overestimated its leverage with the United
States to launch an incursion into ‘occupied’ Kashmir in 1965, agreeing to a
negotiated peace in short order. Six years later, the growing tensions generated
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by army misrule instigated the Indian strike in East Pakistan. The point we
make is that internal strife had its roots in army rule; the army directed the
course of external relations and its subsequent miscalculations became a
basis for cross-border adventurism.
The internal political situation, post-1971, was comparatively far more
unstable – in fact, by many factors. Balochistan haemorrhaged steadily,
reflecting dissatisfaction with central government policies; the ‘Talibanisation’
of northern Balochistan and the NWFP tribal areas is threatening to fan
south; the tribal areas are also host to the Al Qaeda influx; inter-ethnic
discord has intensified with the creation of the MQM and the Sindhi card;
and sectarian strife (Shia–Sunni) has scaled new heights of violence across
the country. Adding to this explosive mix, Pakistan and India detonated
nuclear devices in 1998. Internal developments also fuelled cross-border
incursions by both countries as mentioned above. In particular, the ISI linked
up with jihadi groups to foment unrest in Indian Kashmir.
Yet, outright conflict was averted despite the repeated provocations. We
can attribute this partly to the periods of democratic governance, which
alternated with stints of army rule and hence, moderated its influence.
Equally important, the volatile mix of political instability, nuclear-armed
status and extremism invited forceful US restraint. Both countries remain
under tremendous pressure to ensure détente. However, a worrisome aspect is
that US intervention is becoming increasingly reactive, as opposed to the
more proactive relations it is developing with India; the US strategic relation-
ship with India is multi-pronged, while the relationship with Pakistan remains
narrowly focused on the ‘War on Terror’. Fissures may develop in Pak–US
relations with a continuance of the status quo – as long as the army’s
stranglehold on power remains and it continues to maintain uneasy alliances
with extremist elements.
The prognosis for sustained democratic rule (not the official version) is
bleak. The military, with its outright predominance in the strategic enclave
and heavy clout in the political sphere has stifled any voices that question the
logic of a highly conservative strategic outlook. With the entire discourse set
within the confines of the narrow-minded national security paradigm, and
the virtual subservience of political governments (in addition to periods of
direct military rule), the military has managed to implement its agenda
unopposed. Perhaps the more damaging affect of such a lopsided balance
of power has been on institution building within the country. In order to
maintain its institutional supremacy the military has, over the years, severely
undermined the civilian institutions of governance. While it argues that it is
the only organised institution in the country that does not suffer from
capacity constraints, this clouds the fact that it has suborned civilian political
institutions, stifled their growth and kept them from evolving into robust
functional units.
India has not lagged in leveraging the ‘democracy deficit’, using it as a
convenient excuse for lack of progress on the peace front. Whenever New
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Delhi raises this concern, the international community is quick to support
its contention, pointing fingers towards Pakistan for not having allowed
democracy to flourish. In essence, the ‘democracy deficit’ in Pakistan has
exacerbated the state of the other conflict drivers. It is within this paradigm
that the various drivers of conflict need to be assessed. Several leading
Pakistani analysts hold little hope for the future of Indo-Pakistan relations.
There are enormous stakes for vested interests on both sides to maintain
bilateral tensions; these are people who depend on the tense atmosphere
for their livelihoods.
(Zafar Nawaz Jaspal, Professor of International Relations,
Quaid-I-Azam University)
Securing and protecting economic, political and other benefits by sus-
taining the ‘enemy images’ seem to play well in the two countries because
of illiteracy, ignorance, poverty and religious intolerance.
(Moonis Ahmar, Professor of International Relations,
Karachi University)
Normalization in terms of absence of conflict suits the military’s inter-
ests but beyond mere normalization the military’s institutional inter-
ests and institutional memory impedes rapprochement. This implies
that friendly ties between Pakistan and India are likely to remain an
elusive goal.
(Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, Defense Analyst)
Bilateral disputes
Outstanding bilateral issues between Pakistan and India are arguably the
most important factors behind conflicts, crises, as well as the overall high
level of tensions between the two sides. Kashmir is undoubtedly the most
serious issue and more than just an international dispute. For Pakistan,
Kashmir has become a central pillar of national pride, national aspiration
and national identity. It is considered the litmus test of Pakistani nationalism
and even patriotism. It is thus political suicidal for any politician in Pakistan
to be seen to waffle on or be seen as weak on the Kashmir question (Yusuf
and Najam 2005). For India, the rhetoric of Kashmir being an ‘atoot ang’
(inseparable part) of India has been promulgated by all Indian governments.8
The highly intractable positions of both sides on the issue have not allowed
any substantial movement towards reconciliation. The issue has been the
major cause of at least two conflicts and three crises.
While idealism, whether of the secular or religious sort has its locus standi,
not atypically, it mingles with murkier motives. Thus Kashmir is integral to
India’s perception of itself as a global superpower (Siddiqa Agha 2004). In
Pakistan’s case, Kashmir represents a large part of the army’s raison d’être,
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justifying its size, its large defence appropriations, its political excesses and its
compromises with obscurantist elements. Without such motives, it becomes
difficult to reconcile the passion felt over Kashmir with the atrocities commit-
ted against fellow Muslims in former East Pakistan. These motives also make
it possible to understand the mindless nature of the Siachen dispute – a fracas
over a large chunk of ice with little strategic value but at great cost to human
lives. Similarly, the dispute over Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch seems facile.
Hence, while the two countries differ over which of the three imaginary lines
in the 60-mile-long estuary defines the international boundary, all of which
are difficult to patrol, the reality is that the boundaries themselves are not as
much the issue as the need to affirm either side’s stature relative to its
adversary.
Conversely, attributing the Indian threat to a construction of the Pakistani
establishment is also erroneous. India continues to exercise a policy of eco-
nomic dominance and interference in the internal affairs of other South
Asian countries (Khan and Haider 2004). Moreover, much of India’s defence
policies remain Pakistan specific. A large chunk of India’s military forma-
tions, certain political doctrines and its recent war doctrines maintain an
outright focus on Pakistan.9 Hindu nationalist parties and activist factions
use the anti-Pakistan rhetoric for political gains much as the army does in
Pakistan.
The cumulative environment of mistrust diminishes the leverage to be
gained from historical and cultural affinities and natural trade ties. It also
imparts unpredictability to the peace initiatives. As Zaidi (2004) puts it:
Discussing India–Pakistan relations is like walking on shifting sand: one
moment you are sure of your position, ready to make proclamations to
change the world, and the next the whole landscape has changed, become
unrecognizable, presenting a completely different scenario. . . . The
nature of India–Pakistan relations has become extremely variable and
fluctuating, often touching extremes at both ends, with great euphoria of
the prospects of peace followed within weeks by war.
The religious divide
A treasured belief is that Pakistan emerged as a separate homeland for
the Muslims of India who believed they would be targeted in a Hindu majority
in India – the much cited ‘two-nation theory’. The Pakistani state is quick to
exploit this religious divide. It continues to portray India as the ‘evil empire’ –
aiming to undermine the interests of the ‘Muslim’ Pakistan (Nizamani
2000).10 Often enough, hardcore inter-state problems are immersed in such
religious discourse, one which religious factions are quick to pick up and
perpetuate.
The story is not much different in India. India has seen a tremen-
dous increase in Hindu militancy over the past two decades. Although the
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government cannot afford to cast inter-state tensions in religious terms given
its substantial Muslim population, it has not hesitated to do so through party
politics and rhetoric. The Hindu Nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
and other activist factions such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)
and the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP) have openly appealed to domestic
constituencies. Often internal problems, especially those communal in nature,
have been blamed on Pakistan, thus automatically tying these with the
ideological discourse (Siddiqa Agha 2004).
In essence, while the divergent ideological perceptions are a reality and may
impact relations at some level, it is the political compulsions that have led
leaders on both sides to play up this divide. No Pakistan–India conflict or
crisis has ever been initiated on ideological grounds. The issues that spur
conflict have always been relevant to realpolitik, although ideology features
regularly in raising political temperatures during periods of high tension.
Stakeholders in both countries are quick to grasp such opportunities. Com-
munal tensions in Kashmir have given an impetus to the military–jihadi nexus
in Kashmir and have brought the two countries to the brink of war on several
occasions. The sectarian and ethnic strife in Pakistan has provided similar
opportunities to India, as evident in its support to Balochi insurgents and
Sindhi separatists in the 1990s. Analysts have been quick to see through
the ploy:
I don’t think ideology matters in Indo-Pak relations any more. It is
purely parochial interests held by the ruling establishments of the two
sides to maintain some sort of insecurity, tension and hostility in their
relations in order to secure their vested interests.
(Moonis Ahmar, Professor of International Relations,
Karachi University)
Under the current circumstances ideology is a barrier. Both countries
have systematically and deliberately redefined their national ideology,
with India pushing for the secular agenda and Pakistan considering itself
an Islamic state under siege.
(Ayesha Siddiqa Agha, Defense Analyst)
External actors
External actors have played a dual role in conflict. In hindsight, it is difficult
to tell whether the ill effects outweighed the good. Throughout the Cold
War years, Pakistan and India opted for opposite camps, with Pakistan
electing to become a western ally and India – while keeping an official
non-aligned stance – tilting towards the Soviet bloc.11 The Cold War rivals
contributed significantly to the military build up of their South Asian allies.
Pakistan received considerable military support from the US over the years.
As Sino–Indian tensions continued, Pakistan sought to establish a close
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relationship with China as well. Much of Pakistan’s military capability has
been built up on US and Chinese assistance. The Soviet Union assisted India,
which was adamant on finding a counter to the US–Pakistan and Pakistan–
China relationship. While India claims its military arsenal is indigenous,
much of it is based on Soviet military hardware and technology.
Externally assisted military build ups have both deterred and promoted
conflicts. As weapons capable states, India and Pakistan have gone to war on
three separate occasions and both the US and Russia have interceded to effect
a ceasefire. As nuclear capable states, the US stepped in on two occasions
before war broke out, first in 1999 and then again in 2002. An indictment of
US policy is that it has stalled democratic evolution in Pakistan by support-
ing military governments to further its own strategic interests – even when they
knowingly aligned with or condoned extremism – thus perpetuating a state of
tension between two heavily armed states. Another negative by-product was
the spill over effect of the millions of dollars worth of arms that poured
into Pakistan during the Afghan Jihad (Burki and Baxter 1991). Elements
supporting Pakistani policy as well as insurgents aiming to destabilise the
Pakistani state subsequently used much of the weaponry (Yusuf 2003).
Economic drivers
Pakistan and India remain poor countries with unenviable human develop-
ment indicators. Persisting with a macroeconomic model that has maintained
an outright focus on growth rates has excluded the poor from the benefits of
development. In the past seven years of the Musharraf regime, Pakistan’s
gross domestic product (GDP) growth rates have been impressive. Yet
poverty and income inequality has increased in tandem, leaving many of the
underprivileged disgruntled and creating a climate of social unrest (see Table
6.2). Further, the increasing disparity in terms of development and economic
Table 6.2 Gini coefficient and consumption shares by quintiles in Pakistan
2000–2001 2004–2005
Urban Rural Pakistan Urban Rural Pakistan
Gini coefficient 0.3227 0.2367 0.2752 0.3388 0.2519 0.2976
Consumption share by quintile
Quintile 1 5.3 12.8 10.1 4.8 12.6 9.5
Quintile 2 8.1 16.9 13.7 7.6 17.1 13.2
Quintile 3 12.1 19.5 16.8 11.6 19.7 16.4
Quintile 4 19.4 22.4 21.3 18.3 23.0 21.4
Quintile 5 55.1 28.4 38.0 57.7 27.6 39.4
Ratio of highest
to lowest
10.40 2.22 3.76 12.02 2.19 4.15
Source: Pakistan Economic Survey 2005–2006
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growth between Punjab and the three ‘lesser’ provinces is exacerbating the
fault lines between those already disillusioned by the ‘Punjabi military’.
Rising inequality has been exploited by radical madrassahs to further their
agendas. Findings of an ISI survey undertaken in the mid-1990s suggest that
as many as 70–80 per cent of madrassah students come from the impoverished
rural areas (Bokhari 2003). Finding little or no opportunities for social and
economic advancement, they embrace martyrdom. As mentioned, extremist
elements have contributed to both cross-border subversion and crises. The
2001–2002 crisis was triggered by the attack on the Indian parliament, an
episode India blamed on Pakistani militant outfits. In India, extreme poverty
levels have also led to growing militarism. However, there is a caveat here; the
centrality of economics to extremism and militarism is not clearly established.
There is enough evidence to the contrary that economic deprivation does not
necessarily lead to violent recourse.
The above discussion highlights the various factors that drive conflict
between the two countries. While each of these remains important in its own
right, the military presence is overarching. An ever-widening civil–military
divide has also meant that the national security paradigm continues to be
defined by the military. Apart from the impact on other ‘drivers’ of conflict,
one major negative spin-off of the fixation with security has been lack of any
real impetus to open economic ties between the two sides. Interestingly, while
India seems interested in moving along the economic front, its economic
posturing has been no less restrictive than Pakistan’s. This is despite that fact
that existing estimates suggest the presence of significant trade potential
between the two countries. We examine this aspect in the next section.
The rationale for trade
Improved economic and political relations in a globally interdependent
market place can further peace-building efforts between countries. The
assumption is that synergies from economic cooperation clearly exist and can
be leveraged to the benefit of domestic enterprises, reducing more costly
dependence on countries outside the region. This section attempts to estimate
the static and dynamic potential for trade.
Current state of bilateral trade
Since the mid-1990s, Pakistan’s exports to India have remained between 0.4
per cent and 2.5 per cent of its total exports while, in India’s case, the propor-
tion is less than 0.5 per cent. This does not say much for trade between the
two countries – barring last year’s increase, total annual trade over the past
seven years has never exceeded US$250 million. This is less than 1 per cent of
the combined value of total trade of the two countries averaged over the past
four years. Moreover, the balance of trade has remained consistently in
India’s favour (see Table 6.3).
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The major items of export from Pakistan include petroleum products,
yarn, organic chemicals and cotton. Major imports from India include organic
chemicals, rubber (and articles thereof), animal fodder, waste from food
industries, plastics, iron and steel, among others.12
Trade switching – the static potential for trade
The static potential for trade between India and Pakistan is quite consider-
able, reflecting production complementarities and geographical proximity.
Concrete evidence of this appeared immediately after 1947, when political
relations between the two countries were benign and, resultantly, trade flows
were significant. In the period 1948–1949, exports to India accounted for
56 per cent of Pakistan’s total exports while 32 per cent of its imports also
came from India (Nabi and Nasim 2001). However, in 1949, with the
intent of protecting import levels, Pakistan refused to devalue its currency
as a reciprocal gesture to India’s devaluation, causing trade between
the two countries to plummet sharply. Trade volumes remained low and
trade ties were suspended completely in 1971. Although economic
relations were resumed, subsequently, they continue to remain severely
depressed.
One could argue that, prior to 1949, the situation can be viewed as a variant
of trade diversion, in that inter-regional trade channels had not opened
up, and the two countries were compelled to trade with each other. Therefore,
the present situation could, conceivably, be viewed as a more normal and
competitive one. However, the counter to this argument is that informal
trade, which is quite substantial, is the real index of the static trade potential
that currently exists between the two countries in the presence of existing
trade barriers.
Table 6.3 Pakistan trade with India (US$ millions)







1996–1997 36.23 204.70 (168.47) 0.43 0.61
1997–1998 90.57 154.53 (63.98) 1.04 0.44
1998–1999 173.66 145.85 28.81 2.39 0.43
1999–2000 53.84 127.38 (73.74) 0.62 0.34
2000–2001 55.41 238.33 (182.92) 0.60 0.53
2001–2002 49.37 186.80 (137.44) 0.54 0.42
2002–2003 70.66 166.57 (95.91) 0.63 0.31
2004–2005 288.13 491.66 (205.53) 1.99 2.71
2005–2006 293.31 634.91 (341.60) 1.77 2.49
Source: Export Promotion Bureau, Pakistan; Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan; Karachi
Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Pakistan; Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India.
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A recent study by Khan et al. (2007) estimates the value of informal trade
between India and Pakistan at over US$0.5 billion. Informal trade is defined
as illicit and quasi-legal trade. While illicit trade is outright smuggling, quasi-
legal trade shows in official trade statistics as trade between Pakistan and a
country other than India – even though it is actually sourced in India. The
source, destination and value of informal trade for the two countries are
shown in Tables 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6.
Two aspects are of note: (1) informal trade is tilted greatly in India’s favour,
replicating formal trade between the two countries; and (2) informal trade
exceeds formal trade by over US$150 million. The combined value of trade is
close to US$1 billion. Clearly, trade-related barriers (tariffs and transactions
costs) have restricted formal trade and have forced a significant volume of
trade to switch to informal channels.
The process is driven by traditional connections with ethnicity playing a
major role. Particular tribes dominate the trade in each major location.
Consequently, communication and access to information is virtually uninter-
rupted. The financial arrangement is driven by trust, without any formal
guarantees and yet default in payments has never been recorded. Moreover,
informal trade sustains communities. It becomes the only viable recourse, a
source of enormous profit for the favoured few, and meagre livelihoods for a
multitude of dependent carriers and transporters working under brutally
harsh conditions.
In the static sense, if tariff barriers were to be removed completely, there
would be an immediate and significant re-routing from informal to formal
trade. In a comparative static sense, additional trade would be induced over
and above the amount switched. However, induced trade also depends on a
number of other enabling factors, which give it a dynamic aspect. The next
sub-section provides an overview of the barriers that constrain trade and of
the enabling factors that can give trade an additional boost if instituted in
tandem with trade liberalisation measures.
Trade barriers between Pakistan and India
Eliminating quota and tariff restrictions and trade facilitation are an integral
part of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) global mandate. Notwith-
standing, trade barriers between India and Pakistan take the form of both
formal and informal barriers.
Formal trade barriers are comprised of:
• tariff barriers;
• non-tariff barriers. These consist of:
– quota restrictions;
– trade bans, such as the denial of MFN status.
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Cloth 128,000 1,066 45,350 2,500 7,800 1,280 185,996
Livestock 33,340 33,340









20,000 40,280 2,600 960 63,840
Herbs and spices 6,250 1,300 800 8,350
Ispaghol (husk) 1,350 1,350
Big elachi 8,500 8,500










Indian razor blades 2,225 2,225
Biri (cigarettes) 8,572 8,572
Others 5,070 480 500 6,050
Total value 156,850 119,376 95,700 97,500 55,440 7,150 2,500
Sigma total 534,516
Source: SDPI survey, January–May, 2005.




• rent seeking – a euphemism for bribes.
Formal barriers
In terms of their global trade, both India and Pakistan have abolished quota
restrictions and reduced tariff rates steadily in conformance with their obliga-
tions under the WTO mandate. Bilaterally, tariffs in India remain much
higher, on average, than in Pakistan. Similarly, Pakistan has not given India
reciprocal MFN status.13 It maintains a positive list of over 800 importable
items from India. One would expect this one-sided arrangement to lead to a
positive trade balance for Pakistan. The reality is that relatively higher tariffs








Cloth 6,800 1,775 520 9,095
Cigarettes 100 100
Dry fruit 375 52 427
Video games, CDs 100 100
Footwear 52 52
Prayer mats 52 52
Bed sheets 135 135
Other items 375 30 405
Total value 6,800 2,525 1,041
Sigma total 10,366
Source: SDPI Survey, January–May, 2005.
Note: ‘Other items’ include surma, hardware used in drills (TIPS/VITS), Rexene and cigarettes.
Edible oil and wheat were once considered ‘hot ticket’ export items. However, the price differen-
tials for edible oil suggest that this should be entering Pakistan rather than the other way around.
Also, India has become self-sufficient in wheat. Furthermore, there are large outflows via the
African transit trade to Afghanistan under various aid/relief programmes.
Table 6.6 Combined trade, 2005 (US$ millions)
Total formal trade Total informal trade Combined trade
384,6567 544,882 929,54
Source: Khan et al. (2007).
Note: The formal trade figure is an average for nine years, as there is no
discernible trend over time.
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in India and an array of hidden barriers leave little wriggle room for Pakistani
exports to India. By and large, moves to facilitate trade by India have
remained cosmetic. The perception is that, despite the MFN status, official
tariff rates and transaction costs (especially hidden costs) remain higher in
India.14 Such perceptions are supported by multilateral studies – according to
an International Monetary Fund (IMF) study, India’s trade restrictiveness
measures eight (on a scale from one to ten), while Pakistan’s index stands at
six (IMF 2005).15
Social, environmental and quality standards are other forms of non-
tariff barriers. These will not be considered in our study as their impact
relates mostly to inter- rather than intra-regional trade (see Khan and Haider
2004).
Informal barriers
In the same way that formal barriers have restricted trade, informal barriers
in the shape of high transactions costs have forced much of the trade, even
in commodities that are legally tradable, to flow through informal channels.
These informal barriers, in effect, become a key factor in determining
whether informal trade is likely to flow through formal/legal channels. In
other words, if the formal sector’s transaction costs of importing exceed
those in the informal sector, and this difference is greater than the tariff rate,
then informal trade is unlikely to revert to formal trade channels.
In the broadest sense, transaction costs have three aspects: (1) procedural
costs; (2) transport related costs; and (3) rent seeking. Examples of transaction
costs include: port clearance times for cargo; extent of cargo movement
required in the port; sanitary standards; bribes; documentation requirements
for trade transactions (as well as the average amount of time spent in fulfilling
these requirements); procedural delays (such as absence of staff, administrative
inefficiencies, excessive department clearances and signatures); limited vehicle
access; inefficient rail links and transport through third ports. The cost of
trading is increased significantly by the existence of transaction costs, not
only financially but also in terms of added time spent in completing trade
transactions (Khan et al. 2007).
Enabling factors
Trade flows are induced not just by removing trade-related barriers. For
example, certain institutional pre-conditions at the regional level need to be
met; communication and transport links established and policy and regula-
tory frameworks for supporting investments need to be created before trade
between two countries can reach its full potential. Whether the push factors
are strong enough gets into a debate of the linkage between trade and the
broader notion of peace, a subject we will address in the next section. Here,
we simply discuss the various factors that could potentially push trade.
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Perhaps the most important pre-condition is that of the RTAs, which
provide an overarching framework for a broad spectrum of trade enabling
activities. We have dwelt upon the SAARC, SAFTA and SAPTA at some
length elsewhere in this book (see Chapter 4).
Logistics are another key trade driver. Currently, there are very few exam-
ples by both sides that indicate efforts to develop these arrangements. How-
ever, one welcome development in the shipping sector is the recent agreement
to sign a revised shipping protocol. This agreement will permit India’s use of
Karachi’s Port Qasim to facilitate transit trade to Afghanistan, as well as
Pakistan’s access to Indian ports. The key benefit of utilising nearby ports is
the substantial mutual reductions in freight bills. Currently, Pakistan’s freight
bill stands at US$1.3 billion a year and India’s is at least four times as high
(Ansar and Vohra 2003). Similarly, despite having inherited an integrated rail
network from the British colonial era, neither side has maintained active
communication channels. There has been some progress on opening previ-
ously abandoned rail routes, although road connectivity between the two
nations still does not exist (Burki 2004).
Business people on both sides suffer from a dearth of information and
restrictions in their mobility and interaction. They find it difficult to obtain
timely, reliable and inexpensive information on trade-related matters, such
as product specifications, technologies, prices, exportable surpluses, manu-
facturers and distributors of goods, domestic production and consumption
patterns, market structures, industrial trends, changes to tariffs and non-
tariff barriers, trade regulations, list of banned items and various other tech-
nical requirements. Stringent travel restrictions between India and Pakistan
have prevented the development of business contacts and have hindered the
exchange of information among the business communities in the region (Jain
1999). Khan et al. (2007) found that business people often meet in a mutually
agreeable third country location, most frequently Dubai, to finalise deals. The
only existing institutions for trade are the near perfect market-based instru-
ments used to conduct informal trade. Deals are financed through ‘hundi’ or
‘hawala’, basically a chit system based on trust and relationships involving
no cash transfers, uninterrupted communication flows and boasting a very
low incidence of disputes and defaults (Khan et al. 2007).
A welcome sign has been the willingness by the two sides to discuss the
potential for joint ventures and investment projects across borders. Many
experts have begun to argue that it is joint investment projects that actually
hold the key to Pakistan–India trade growth, as trade by itself would not be
able to provide the necessary integration in the way that manageable, long-
term investment projects could. The India–Pakistan–Iran (IPI) gas pipeline
project is one example of such potential interdependence:
The attraction of mutual trading between the two sides is linked to
low freight costs that translate into cheaper prices, given the contiguous
borders between these two countries. The other conducive conditions
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are cultural affinity, common language, similar economic and social
systems that provide an ideal foundation for broader India–Pakistan
trade ties.
(Benazir Bhutto, Former Prime Minister of Pakistan)
Joint projects, whether joint investment ventures on mega-projects are key
to enhancing trade ties and interdependence. The IPI gas pipeline could
become a major driver of such interdependence between the two sides.
(Akbar Zaidi, Economic Consultant)
Inducing trade: the dynamic trade potential
In this sub-section we try and quantify the trade potential between the two
countries, assuming some give in the variables that restrict trade. We use two
approaches as the figures are conjectural, and for such purposes a range of
estimates is more useful than a single point estimate. In the first approach, we
denote Pakistan’s and India’s trade with the rest of the world (ROW) as the
outer limit for intra-country trade. The second approach draws on Baroncel-
li’s (2005) use of a gravity model – essentially an econometric approach to
estimating the potential for trade between the two countries.
A global comparison approach
This first approach is simple and compiles both Pakistan and India’s global
trade with the ROW in identical commodities traded between the two coun-
tries. It must be noted, however, that these are outer limits as they consider-
ably overstate the trade absorption potential in both countries.
The potential outer limits for both countries’ exports are calculated by
taking the maximum traded volumes for each commodity. For instance, if the
commodity exported by Pakistan to the ROW is less than the value imported
by India from the ROW, the latter value represents Pakistan’s export poten-
tial to India in that commodity. If it exceeds it, the former value represents
the outer limit for export. The potential outer limits for Indian exports to
Pakistan are calculated similarly. Tables 6.7 and 6.8 present both estimates by
commodities.
The combined potential outer limit of trade is valued at almost US$12
billion. Not surprisingly, the balance of potential trade continues to remain
in India’s favour (by a factor of almost three).
An econometric approach
Baroncelli uses a gravity model to generate hypothetical estimates of trade
flows. These estimates are based on certain macro variables, such as GDP,
population and geographic distance as well as cultural variables. The
technique introduces three variables attributing the gap between real and
hypothetical trade to them. The impact of two of these variables is positive,
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namely: (1) granting of MFN status to India by Pakistan and mutual tariff
relaxations and; (2) the institution of RTAs (using a dummy). The third
variable, conflict (again introduced via a dummy) captures the trade reducing
impact. Baroncelli tests her model on a larger aggregate panel dataset, cover-
ing the period from post-Second World War up to 2003. The model also
shows in real time an inverse correlation between trade and conflict, demon-
strating that conflict does stifle trade.
Based on annual data for the period 1987–2003, the hypothetical trade
flows for the year 2002 are estimated to be US$2.62 billion. This number is
composed of US$1.24 billion in exports from India to Pakistan and US$1.38
billion in exports from Pakistan to India. Counter intuitively, the hypo-
thetical trade balance is in Pakistan’s favour. Thus, the estimates for overall
trade generated by the two approaches range from US$2.62 billion to almost
US$12 billion. Despite the wide range, the trade potential is considerable.
Baroncelli selects a few product groups and demonstrates trade gains in
these groups consequent upon tariff reductions. She does a similar exercise
for institutional arrangements (RTAs) over a longer time span and demon-
strates that the hypothetical benefits are completely offset by hypothetical
losses thanks to conflict. We introduce this in more detail in the next section
as a quantitative lead-in to the discussion that follows.
















96.87 825.65 20,500 825.65
Yarn 80.53 1,382.87 438.09 438.09
Organic chemicals 36.48 432.83 5,144.21 432.83
Cotton 28.12 2,108.48 438.09 438.09
Edible fruits, nuts 27.88 229.41 787.09 229.41
Leather and
articles thereof
20.22 945.63 332.73 332.73
Synthetic textiles 13.83 200.30 127.33 127.33
Edible vegetables
and roots
11.78 42.79 637.64 42.79
Fish and fish
preparations
0.43 194.15 24.20 24.20
Informal trade
Footwear 0.07 142.22 92.61 92.61
Bed linen, sheets 1.67 2,038.06 107.06 107.06
Total 317.88 8,542.39 28,629.05 3,090.79
Sources: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan; Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India;
Export Promotion Bureau, Pakistan; State Bank of Pakistan.
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Trade and conflict linkages
The peace dividend: estimating the trade potential
Considerable potential for trade between Pakistan and India does exist, as
demonstrated in the previous section. Similarly, the scope for cross-border











1 2 3 4 5
Formal trade
Organic chemicals 205.66 4,857.09 1,224.97 1,224.97
Rubber and
articles thereof




54.01 1,122.88 49.65 49.65
Plastics and
articles
44.89 2,160.51 1,792.90 1,792.90
Iron and steel 32.63 3,813.47 320.06 320.06
Sugars 30.48 168.53 87.87 87.87
Edible vegetables,
roots
30.47 567.87 142.57 142.57
Tanning and
dyeing extracts
20.55 846.94 187.05 187.05




13.63 421.35 1091.14 421.35
Tea, coffee mate,
spices




75.00 2000.55 2601.00 2000.55
Cosmetics and
jewellery
63.84 764.93 123.98 123.98
Buffaloes 33.34 6.00 – 6.00
Pharmaceuticals 32.75 2444.18 292.15 292.15
Chemicals (apart
from organic)
15.00 1079.06 1365.80 1079.06
Auto parts 5.25 252.92 N/A 252.92
Blankets 5.00 87.56 N/A 87.56
Value-added
textiles, silk
– 11,399.75 320.79 320.79
Total: 810.3 38,386.27 10,091.94 8,881.44
Sources: Federal Bureau of Statistics, Pakistan; Directorate General of Foreign Trade, India;
Export Promotion Bureau, Pakistan; State Bank of Pakistan.
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investment in manufacturing, energy, information technology and other
ventures is considerable. Further, infrastructure links (transport and com-
munication) have increased over time to catalyse economic and trade activ-
ities. There is also potentially a vast market for each other’s products; one
tangible manifestation being a large and growing middle class in both grow-
ing countries. Finally, the enabling institutional frameworks, in the shape of
regional trade and economic agreements are in place, and both countries have
entered into bilateral trade agreements with other countries in the region.
While all the indicators underscore the scope for meaningful economic and
trade integration, the reality is very different. Trade between the two coun-
tries is infinitesimal, thanks to tariff and non-tariff barriers. Unlike other
bilateral economic initiatives within the region (see Chapter 4), cross-border
investment ventures between the two countries virtually do not exist. Similarly,
while transport and communication links have improved, they suffer frequent
disruption. This brings us to our central thesis, derived from the first section
of the chapter, namely, that conflict deters trade specifically, and economic
integration in a broader sense. Baroncelli (2005) estimates this peace dividend
in the two graphs presented (Figure 6.1).
The dividend, presented in nominal and real terms, is denoted by the con-
flict variable in the econometric analysis. It reduces the divergence between
potential and real trade, with the points of convergence coinciding with
periods of conflict. In fact, as mentioned, the dividend almost exactly offsets
the trade creating impact of RTAs. As we indicated, Baroncelli’s estimate is
derived from a lower base of potential trade of US$2.62 billion. The upper
base, encompassing a more dynamic scenario, is in the region of US$12
billion, implying an even higher peace dividend.
Why has this dividend stalled?
Sustained conflict between the two countries has transformed Pakistan into a
war economy and stalled its democratic evolution. India’s defence expend-
itures have escalated to higher than normal levels. The benign links between
internal growth and expanding trade have given way to a malign nexus, where
defence appropriations and arms procurement feed off each other through
the budgetary decisions and funding allocations. The consequence is social
sector neglect.
Indian social sector indicators are not much better than the ones presented
for Pakistan. Such neglect fuels internal discord, which obscurantist elements
prey upon. In turn, this feeds xenophobia and encourages cross-border
adventurism. The global superpower agenda, originally anti-communist, but
driven now by the terrorist threat has, ironically, nurtured military govern-
ments in Pakistan that remain locked in conflict with India. Recently, these
governments have been prone to develop murky relations with terrorist elem-
ents, and strategic alliances with global powers are increasingly underpinned
by mercenary considerations.
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Conflict entrenched relations have hampered the sanction of transit rights
and pipeline projects; more fundamentally, they have arrested economic
diversification and given way to large investments in military hardware.
The costs of the Siachen Glacier conflict (Table 6.9) and annual defence
expenditures (Table 6.10) illustrate the strain that military investment and
costs place on both nations in economic and social terms. Figures 6.2 and 6.3
present some comparative numbers.
Figure 6.1 The peace dividend.
Source: Baroncelli (2005).
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The high military expenditures are the financial counterpart to the con-
frontations between the two countries, and are the minimum considered by
both countries to keep them in a state of war readiness. The magnitude of
these expenditures, both for a single event and sustained over time, under-
score the fragility of trade initiatives by subsuming them.
Table 6.9 Costing conflict: Siachen
Criteria
India 8,733 Total casualties from four
wars
13,896 Pakistan
$1.8 billion 2002 Siachen conflict $1.2 billion
0.38 percent of
GDP
Mobilisation cost 1.79 percent
of GDP
Costs of continuation
100,000 people Internal displacement 50,000 people
$1.6 billion Localised costs of Siachen $0.3 billion
900 lives Conflict over five years 450 lives
40 million Rs.
per day






73 billion Rs. 2003–2007 economic costs 18 billion Rs.
0.07 Annual % of GDP 0.09
Sources: Table compiled from Sahni (2001); Rao (1999).





















Source: Compiled from various SIPRI Year Books.
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Figure 6.2 Pakistan’s defence, education and health expenditures.
Source: Compiled from various budget documents from Pakistan and India
Figure 6.3 Defence expenditures as a percentage of GDP (Pakistan and India).
Source: Compiled from various budget documents from Pakistan and India
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Zaidi (2004) points out that: ‘The constraints to better regional cooper-
ation and free trade are more political than economic, and there are no real
economic arguments for not trading with each other.’ He claims less
convincingly: ‘Moreover the gains that can accrue to both countries are
disproportionately tilted in Pakistan’s favor.’
Trade hostage to conflict
We demonstrate this relationship chronologically, highlighting the large
number of trade/economic agreements and investments/communications
protocols that the two countries have signed. However, as noted, such agree-
ments and protocols have not made much headway in terms of increased
trade and investment flows and transit rights. While political rapprochement
has paved the way for such agreements and protocols, recurring political
tensions have undermined their implementation; as a result, both countries
have ‘returned to square one’.
AGREEMENT FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE TAXATION OF INCOME
BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE DOMINION OF INDIA AND PAKISTAN
(DECEMBER 1947)
Pakistan and India were major trading partners at the time of independence
in 1947. A conciliatory spirit prompted the agreement to avoid double tax-
ation. However, just months after independence, the two countries found
themselves embroiled in conflict over Kashmir. Political tensions stalled trade
when, in 1949, Pakistan’s refusal to devalue reciprocally led to trade ties
being curtailed.
INDO-PAKISTAN TRADE AGREEMENT (JANUARY 1957)
The 1957 trade agreement was the first, following a decade of silence between
the two countries. A thaw in relations made the agreement possible. How-
ever, the agreement was limited in scope and only valid for a period of three
years, reflecting a cautious ‘wait-and-see’ approach on both sides. Failing any
major breakthroughs on Kashmir, the 1957 agreement was extended but only
for another three years. Following yet another three-year extension, Pakistan
and India went to war in 1965. The result was a virtual stalling of trade ties
and the de facto expiry of the agreement.
AGREEMENT ON BILATERAL RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
SIGNED AT SIMLA (JULY 1972)
Relations between Pakistan and India reached their nadir after the 1971
Indo-Pak war and the dismemberment of East Pakistan. All trade relations,
that is the little that continued in the wake of the 1965 war, ceased. Left with
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little choice but to accept the final outcome as permanent, Pakistan and
India signed the 1972 Simla Agreement. The agreement was holistic in
nature; while it stressed the need to reinitiate trade ties a number of political
qualifiers were attached as well. However, as political relations remained
cold, the two neighbours did not make much headway in terms of trade.
Following the Simla Agreement, Pakistan and India signed an accord on
Kashmir in 1975.
PROTOCOL ON THE RESUMPTION OF TRADE BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
(NOVEMBER 1974); PROTOCOL ON THE RESUMPTION OF SHIPPING SERVICES
BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN (JANUARY 1975); TRADE AGREEMENT WITH
PAKISTAN (JANUARY 1975)
Pakistan and India officially signed a new trade protocol in 1974, and a
shipping protocol and a fresh trade agreement a year later. Both sides agreed
to reinitiate trade ties, and by virtue of these protocols were able to generate
increased trade flows. Existing political tensions were pushed to the back-
burner. Surprisingly, the increase in economic activity was not affected by a
1977 military coup in Pakistan.
CREATION OF THE SAARC (1985)
The potential loss of staying out of a South Asian regional forum led to both
countries agreeing to be included in SAARC, which was created in 1985.
However, the two sides found themselves in the midst of a crisis in 1987,
which led to relations cooling again. Towards the end of the military rule in
1987, and especially with the return of democracy to Pakistan in 1988, the
two countries began to negotiate again on linked political and economic
concessions.
AGREEMENT BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN FOR THE AVOIDANCE OF DOUBLE
TAXATION OF INCOME DERIVED FROM INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT
(DECEMBER 1988)
The agreement celebrated the return of democracy to Pakistan in 1988 and
was the result of rapprochement efforts by Prime Ministers Benazir Bhutto
and Rajiv Gandhi.
THE LAHORE DECLARATION (FEBRUARY 1999)
During the 1990s, when Indo-Pak relations remained tense, not a single
trade agreement was signed. Although elected governments were in power
throughout the 1990s, frequent military interventions behind the scenes
and persistent political turmoil did not allow progress on the trade/econo-
mic front. The Lahore Declaration signed in 1999 was largely the result
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of efforts to resolve political differences and suggested that cooperation
in all spheres would be achieved. For the first time in a decade, the region
was euphoric about the possibility of open relations. However, the effort
was stymied before it could generate momentum by the 1999 crisis in
Indian Kashmir and the resultant mini-war between Pakistan and India.
Another crisis followed two years later when the military staged yet another
coup d’état.
THE COMPOSITE DIALOGUE
Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee’s ‘Hand of Friendship’ speech in
April 2003 led to the initiation of a fresh peace bid.16 Trade ties formed an
important pillar of the resulting dialogue. The dialogue has for the first time
taken a parallel approach to discussing all issues of mutual interest. Pakistan
has finally agreed to move away from its ‘Kashmir first’ stance and discuss
issues such as commercial ties concurrently. This has come to be defined in
official jargon as ‘composite dialogue’. As part of the dialogue, Pakistan and
India now regularly exchange commissions and hold meetings on various
aspects of trade and trade facilitation. Some of the important exchanges are
listed below:
• A meeting of foreign ministers of both countries at the ASEAN
Regional Forum (ARF) where Pakistan is formally accepted as a mem-
ber of the ARF after India drops its objections (June–July 2004).
• A meeting of commerce secretaries in Islamabad to discuss economic
and commercial cooperation (August 2004).
• Pakistan accepts 25 tons of food, medicine, tents, blankets, plastic sheets
from India after the earthquake (October–November 2005).
• Pakistan–India resume train services after 40 years (February 2006).
• An agreement to revive trade in Kashmir (May 2006). This represented
an attempt to redress the ravages of the recent earthquake. Subsequent to
this agreement the two sides agreed to trade food and raw materials
between divided regions of Jammu and Kashmir. No manufactured
(value added) items, which would signal confidence in trade building
efforts, have been allowed thus far.
• Both countries agreed to sign a Revised Shipping Protocol (October
2006). The accord, when signed, will be the first revision of the original
protocol signed in 1975.
However, while encouraging in intent, the progression of events clearly sug-
gests that the dialogue has reverted to more historical patterns, as detailed
in Box 6.1.
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Box 6.1 The composite dialogue: old wine in new bottles?
The composite dialogue represents a breakthrough in that it has
allowed both sides to interact more freely than was possible previously.
As mentioned, regular commissions are being exchanged. Moreover,
such developments are not restricted to trade. However, the optimism
that the dialogue has generated has tended to obscure a key structural
deficiency in the dialogue framework; in other words, parallel move-
ment on political and trade issues without removing the linkages
between the two. While Pakistan has agreed to experiment with a paral-
lel approach, it has been categorical in maintaining that the progress on
Kashmir must be linked with progress in other spheres for the process
to continue. India on the other hand, is more interested in using the
parallel approach to move forward on ‘non-contentious’ issues while
leaving the contentious ones on the backburner. The linkage represents
a ‘spanner in the works’, as it is virtually impossible to move simul-
taneously in the political and non-political spheres.
Such an approach is likely to yield dividends in the initial stages,
when both sides are willing – albeit cautiously – to push the envelope.
Indeed, bilateral trade volumes have increased substantially. However,
the more important structural impediments and institutional barriers
to trade have not been addressed at all. In that sense, the gains have
deliberately been kept narrow. Moreover, there is little movement on
the political front, as was to be expected given the virtually irreconcil-
able positions on Kashmir (despite some flexibility shown by Pakistan).
Increasingly then, one is beginning to witness tensions resurface and
experts have observed that the process might be dying a natural death.
Certainly, if progress is not made on political issues, which in all likeli-
hood seems to be the case, progress on trade might also be reversed.
This reaffirms our point that unless political differences are resolved, it
is unrealistic to expect permanent and meaningful trade ties between
India and Pakistan.
SAFTA SIGNED (JANUARY 2004)
A positive spin-off of the composite dialogue was that SAFTA was finally
signed in January 2004. The agreement, which had been agreed in principal a
decade ago and was supposed to be implemented by 2001, continued to be
delayed in the wake of Indo-Pak tensions. The thaw in relations finally gave
the opportunity to the regional members to ink the deal. The timing of the
SAFTA accord, in relation to the state of Indo-Pak relations, also under-
scores the geo-political weight the two countries carry in the region.
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However, progress on SAFTA remains limited. Pakistan continues to refuse
MFN status to India and the concessions it has allowed are in the South
Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) mode, namely enhancing the
positive list, which contravenes SAFTA’s free trade spirit. A combination of
factors inhibit substantive economic and trade breakthroughs. First, militant
voices within Pakistan’s government, fearing the Kashmir issue would be
skirted should trade volumes and reliance upon India increase, have lobbied
the government to refuse to grant India MFN status. Second, a strong sense
of nationalism coloured by religious discourse has created an inward-looking
mindset vis-à-vis India. Both sentiments drive national policy on trade.
Third, the Pakistani business community rightly points out that invisible
barriers have diluted the MFN concession and that, in fact, India is no less
protectionist. Fourth, there is evidence to support the concern that Indian
products would flood local markets and destroy local industry or, conversely,
their supply cannot be assured. Thus, Pakistan was heavily dependent on
Indian coal and iron steel in the mid-1960s, until the 1965 war disrupted
shipments. Similarly, cotton exports to India (constituting 30 per cent of
Pakistan’s global export) risked disruption following the hijacking of an
Indian Airlines passenger jet in 1999. Shortly thereafter, India banned
Pakistani cotton, finding it contaminated. However, as indicated, trade com-
plementarities do exist, as does informal trade between the two countries.
This suggests that a thaw on the political front could dampen concerns about
market domination and supply unpredictability. The political complexity
associated with each trade agreement has forced both India and Pakistan to
turn to markets and suppliers elsewhere. As mentioned, India is increasingly
favouring a ‘look East’ trade policy and is pursuing regional energy projects
with Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh.
The discussion presents a clear trend in the linkage between political
and trade-related events between the two sides. Without exception, each trade
agreement between Pakistan and India can be traced back to positive move-
ments on the political front. In fact, the scope of trade agreements in part has
been a gauge of the temperature of the political climate prevailing at the time.
This was clear from the narrow scope and periodic short-term extensions of
the 1957 trade agreement. By the same token, the Indo-Pak history shows
that political tensions emanating at a time when a trade arrangement was
in place invariably ended up stalling trade and commercial exchanges.
Such a cyclical relationship has continued unabated. While the composite
dialogue attempts to break the cycle by pursuing a parallel approach, it is
unlikely to deliver lasting results, unless progress on political tensions is sub-
stantial and precedes complete liberalisation of trade.
Conclusion: is there hope for the future?
Both India and Pakistan confront political challenges in moving forward. In
recent years, experts have pointed to a realisation among Indian policy
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makers that concessions on Kashmir are a confidence building measure,
which will legitimise its global power status and appease its Muslim elector-
ate. Similarly, Pakistan’s recent moves towards rapprochement – albeit under
a military regime – are indicative of a need for respite, after years of conflict
and deterioration in its own security environment, thanks to growing mili-
tancy. There is also a perception that the Pakistan economy may plummet
irreversibly, if defence allocations are not curbed. Further, the rattled nerves
of international players during the 1998 nuclear tests and the confrontation
of 2001–2002 have provided a spur to international mediation.
In the aftermath of September 11, a potential for bilateral collabora-
tion has emerged in the global fight against terrorism. Both India and
Pakistan need to reorient their external policies to address this threat. The
large amounts of economic and military aid being invested in countries that
are key to the new security order are likely to energise mutual collabora-
tion. Almost certainly the United States will continue to engage India and
Pakistan in the foreseeable future with a view to developing peaceful relations
between them.17 Although hedged in with the usual caveats about a history of
prolonged conflict and turmoil, it is in the mutual interest of both countries
to look beyond Kashmir. The bilateral issues need to be faced squarely. As
the last election in Kashmir has shown, the populace has emphatically opted
for democratic rule, which, to an extent, has delegitimised the conflict
between the Indian and the Pakistani governments.
If India and Pakistan were able to agree on a resolution to the conflict,
tensions in the South Asian region would decrease significantly, and the
resulting political and economic rewards for both countries would be con-
siderable. Aside from the obvious reduction in military tensions, a resolution
of the India–Pakistan rivalry would translate into decreases in military
spending, increased trade and economic benefits and increased spending on
infrastructure, social and educational programmes. Furthermore, it could
allow for increased trade, investment, energy cooperation, tourism benefits
and a likely increase in the standard of living in both countries.
Finally, SAARC must be reactivated. SAARC’s most important collective
role must lie in resisting the ‘Columbus’ model of export-led growth being
advocated by multilateral institutions, such as the IMF, the World Bank and
the WTO. Enamoured with the theory of comparative advantage, these
international institutions are encouraging trade in natural products and
keeping developing countries from engaging in the trade of value added
products.18 A holistic, cooperative trading relationship between India
and Pakistan that benefits all socio-economic segments of their societies will
be a cornerstone to anchoring such a vision of SAARC. In that sense, it is
probably more useful to draw lessons from the European Commission or
North American Free Trade Agreement, regional arrangements that have
grown ‘organically’ out of the changed context.
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Notes
1 Pakistan argued that the Maharaja’s decision to accede to India was against the
spirit of independence according to which geographically contiguous Muslim
majority areas should have acceded to Pakistan. For a detailed discussion of the
rebellion and its role in the Maharaja’s decision to accede, see Victoria Schofield
(2003: 41–60).
2 Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif flew to Washington to secure an agree-
ment with US President Bill Clinton. Troop withdrawal took place shortly
afterwards. See ‘U.S.-Pakistan deal calls for withdrawal of Kashmir fighters’,
CNN, 5 July 1999, http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/asiapcf/9907/05/kashmir.01/
(accessed 16 March 2007).
3 Although India officially contends that the insurgency was spurred by Pakistan
to begin with, neutral observers and even Indian experts confess that the reasons
for the insurgency were domestic. George Fernandez, former Indian minister for
Kashmir, has aptly summarised the major causes: (1) excessive corruption; (2)
failure of the government to address economic problems; and (3) an engineered
election process. See Fernandez (1992: 288).
4 Both sides have maintained this stance throughout the insurgency. India has
raised the issue of cross-border support for the insurgency countless number of
times in international fora.
5 Amnesty International has also regularly documented human rights abuses in
Indian Kashmir. See for example, Amnesty International Report on India, 2001,
www.amnesty.org (accessed 16 March 2007).
6 Also see Bhatt (2002).
7 The ‘Two Track Diplomacy Initiative’, and the ‘Indo-Pak Forum for Peace and
Democracy’.
8 In recent times, the BJP has rallied the cry of Kashmir as ‘atoot ang’. India’s
unequivocal right over the entire Jammu and Kashmir is even stated in the party’s
official manifesto.
9 India latest war doctrine, ‘Cold Start’ is highly Pakistan specific. Moreover, much
of India’s western active missile deployment is also directed towards Pakistan.
10 This argument was most often used to defend Pakistan’s nuclear programme
pre-overt nuclearisation.
11 Pakistan signed a defence pact with the US in 1954. The Indo-Soviet ‘Treaty of
Peace, Friendship and Cooperation’ was concluded in 1971.
12 Source: Directorate General of Foreign Trade (2006), India, http://dgft.delhi.
nic.in (accessed 16 March 2007); Export Promotion Bureau, Pakistan (2006).
13 India granted MFN status to Pakistan in 1995.
14 A detailed analysis of these hidden costs is in Pakistan–India CEO’s Business
Forum (2005), www.statpak.gov.pk/depts/index.html (accessed 16 March 2007).
15 The non-tariff barriers generally quoted by exporters in Pakistan include require-
ment of political/security clearance, sampling/customs inspection, requirement of
technical/standard certification, labeling and marking rules and packaging specifi-
cations. In addition, India maintains tariff rate quotas in the agricultural sector
and the efficiency of customs operations also act as a de facto barrier to trade.
16 The speech delivered from the capital of the state of Jammu and Kashmir was well
received in Pakistan as a genuine effort by India to come to terms with its
nuclear-armed neighbour.
17 See Lloyd and Nankivell (2002).
18 See Mukherjee-Reed (1997: 235–251).
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7 Outlines of intra-state




The political and economic contours of present-day Zimbabwe present a
country at war with itself. The political elite are arrayed against its people,
civil–military relations are at a nadir, and militarism, intimidation, paranoia
and fear engulf Zimbabwean society. The political leadership has lost legit-
imacy and lacks the confidence to govern. The prevailing crisis has raised
questions about the effectiveness and relevance of regional institutions such
as the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in defending
human rights abuses and ensuring the rule of law among member countries.
In other words, the ‘intra-state’ crisis in Zimbabwe has reduced the ability
of regional integration processes to guarantee peace and security, both within
states and between neighbouring states. Internal instability in Zimbabwe has
generated regional insecurities, although not in a strictly militaristic sense.
Contrast this with the 1980s, when Zimbabwe was a pivotal actor against
apartheid and Mugabe earned international respect as a chair of the Non-
Aligned Movement (NAM) in 1989, and for his role as part of the front-line
states (FLS) in Southern Africa.1 The volte-face, therefore, is all the more
worrying. The genesis of Zimbabwe’s crisis is multifaceted. Much has been
written about some of its aspects, especially the land redistribution process
and the narrowing of democratic space.
I posit that the crisis in Zimbabwe is a limited form of ‘intra-state conflict’
in the making, and that the deepening crisis in that country has revealed the
ineffectiveness of regional structures, such as the SADC to mitigate this con-
flict. Underscoring its flawed design, the regional integration mechanism has
also failed to achieve trade integration.
I contend that only when a pact is founded on shared values can regional
institutions play a role as agents of restraint and promoters of regional
peace and stability. Zimbabwe’s case clearly demonstrates that the absence of
deeply ingrained and shared political values such as accountability, democracy
and human rights have rendered regional integration processes ineffectual
and limited their ability to curb intra-state conflict. Despite the existence of
regional trade integration mechanisms – the Common Market for Eastern
and Southern African countries (COMESA) and the SADC Protocol on
Trade – Zimbabwe’s social and economic regression continues to deepen.
This is a testament to the inadequacy of formal trade structures in creating
conditions for peace and stability in sub-Saharan Africa.
This chapter adds a new dimension to the perspective introduced by the
other studies in that I examine trade–conflict linkages in an intra-state rather
than an inter-state context.
An anatomy of the political and economic crisis in Zimbabwe:
an overview
Zimbabwe attained its liberation from the administration of Ian Smith in
1979, following protracted hostilities between Smith’s Rhodesian Front and
the Zimbabwe liberation movements – comprising mainly the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU) and the Zimbabwean African People’s
Union (ZAPU). Previous attempts at a détente, brokered mainly by Zambia,
proved fruitless reflecting the mistrust between the liberation movements and
the Rhodesian Front. The history of the liberation struggle in Zimbabwe is
covered extensively in the literature and I will not repeat here. I focus primar-
ily on the potential for intra-state conflict in Zimbabwe, and the challenges
that this presents for the SADC region. The backdrop is the SADC trade and
security cooperation and integration process.
The post-independence settlement in Zimbabwe was negotiated through
the Lancaster House Agreement. The liberation movements, Ian Smith’s
Rhodesian Front, Muzorewa’s United African National Congress (UANC),
Britain and, to a lesser extent, South Africa were all represented in these
deliberations and became party to the agreement.2 The manner in which
Zimbabwe’s political transition was managed contained some of the seeds
that led to the contemporary crisis in the country.
The pre-independence Rhodesian state was in essence a security state,
which the post-independence settlement failed to transform. The nationalistic
tendencies of the new political elite combined with a strong element of
militarism defined the security edifice of the new state. The militarisation of
the state that began with Ian Smith’s unilateral declaration of independence
in 1965 permeated every societal institution. The Zimbabwean African
National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) simply continued on a path that
was already charted, and sought to militarise the nascent post-liberation
society in Zimbabwe.3 Parallels – and indeed continuities – between the
Smith era and the emergence of ZANU-PF in government are striking. Vari-
ous state agencies, including marketing boards and parastatals set up at
independence were regarded as strategic sectors in which the military was to
play a central role in future.
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Early signs of militarism in the ZANU-PF: Matabeleland purges
The political repression evident in Zimbabwe today has its roots in the period
between 1982 to 1985. On Mugabe’s instructions, the Zimbabwean army’s
Fifth Brigade (trained by the North Koreans) massacred or tortured thou-
sands of civilians in Matabeleland – mostly believed to be Ndebele and
Zimbabwean African People’s Union-Patriotic Front (ZAPU-PF) supporters.
Supporting the Fifth Brigade were ZANU-PF youth who, like today’s
youth militias in Zimbabwe, were also trained in military tactics. The acts
of violence carried out by ZAPU dissidents against ZANU-PF officials
and innocent civilians provoked the purging (Kriger 2005: 1–34). Although
ignored by the international community, the systematic massacre bordered
on ethnic cleansing of the Ndebeles. The Fifth Brigade army units, as Meredith
observed, were ‘drawn almost entirely from Shona-speaking ex-Zanla forces
loyal to Mugabe’ (Meredith 2002: 65).
The dissidents in the entire Matabeleland were said to number no more
than 400, comprising ex-Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA)
soldiers and ordinary criminals. The reprisal did not warrant the level of
ferocity that Mugabe unleashed. Troops were deployed in 1983 and began
systematic attacks against civilians, which included beatings, arson and
mass murder. The blood-letting in Matabeleland – dubbed Gukurahundi4 –
represents a grim period whose scars still lie buried in the nation’s psyche.
I argue that the army’s recourse to violence sowed the seeds of a latent
‘intra-state’ conflict waiting to surface. The deep-rooted hatred between the
Ndebeles and the ZANU-PF go way beyond the healthy disagreements found
in democracies.
Emerging signs of crisis
The 1990s represented a difficult period for Zimbabwe, characterised by eco-
nomic duress in the form of drought, unsustainable fiscal deficits, declining
productivity and falling tax revenues (Bracking 2005: 341–357). The govern-
ment’s interventionist measures to halt structural decline did not work.
Rising unemployment reached the unprecedented mark of one million –
almost half the total number of workers employed in the formal economy at
the time. From 10 per cent in 1980, unemployment surged to 40 per cent in
1990 (Hawkins 2004: 63).
The state came under pressure to undertake structural reforms in order to
reverse the downward spiral. Introduced as the Economic Structural Adjust-
ment Programme (ESAP) the reforms aimed to stimulate economic growth,
cut the budget deficit, encourage private sector and foreign direct investment
and embark on trade liberalisation. The reform objectives never materialised
(Bond and Manyanya 2002: 31–32). The crisis did not abate; rather it was
exacerbated by wage cuts, reduced subsidies and curbed social spending
(Chattopadhyay 2000: 307–316). Health and education – Zimbabwe’s flagship
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developmental projects – became casualties of these retrenchment programs.
Critics are divided between those who blame the stabilisation programme
itself for imposing economic hardship, and those who feel poor management
and misgovernance by the elite did more harm.
Adding to Zimbabwe’s economic difficulties, South Africa refused to renew
the preferential trade agreement that had existed since 1964. According to
Bond and Manyanya, the refusal to renew was in response to pressure by
South Africa’s domestic textile interests.5 The reasons for Zimbabwe’s eco-
nomic decline in the period leading to the reforms of the early 1990s are
varied.
The droughts of 1992 and 1995 further aggravated the situation.6 Also,
despite the economic security guarantees offered to whites at independence,
there continued to be outflows of critical white skills, leaving the country with
insufficient human capital. Even five years before independence, Zimbabwe’s
economy had begun to experience a significant loss of critical professional
and technological skills as a result of emigration (Giliomee 1980: 8–9).
The crisis in the early 1990s triggered popular discontent, which the liber-
ation war veterans were quick to seize for their parochial financial interests.
These veterans had a close association with the former Zimbabwean African
National Liberation Army (ZANLA) commander, Josiah Tongogara, and
considered themselves the midwives of Zimbabwe’s independence.7 They
publicly challenged Mugabe, demanding massive pension pay outs. The issue
of these pensions was a sore point. The veterans felt short-changed by the
negotiated settlement that had entrenched rights and privileges for former
Rhodesian forces and the white minority and leaving nothing materially sub-
stantive for them (Alexander et al. 2000: 182–183). In an attempt to stave-off
a potential revolt that could damage the little legitimacy that the ZANU-PF
had, Mugabe, in 1997, authorised an upfront payment of Z$50,000 each
(then about US$6,000), with an additional Z$2,000 every month.8 The pay-
ment, not backed by budgetary resources, would have far-reaching macro-
economic implications, especially with the economy going through turbulent
times.
Zimbabwe and regional conflict: regionalising a domestic
crisis in the Great Lakes
The two incidents that forced Zimbabwe’s economy to the brink of collapse
were the pension payments to the war veterans and Mugabe’s involvement
in what became a regional conflict – the Great Lakes conflict. Both actions
were misguided and reduced the confidence of international financial institu-
tions in Zimbabwe. The involvement of SADC countries, especially Zimbabwe
(as chair of the SADC Organ for Politics, Security and Defence (OPSD)) in
the conflict, did much to damage intra-regional political relations. In turn,
this engendered adverse trade relations.
Under Zimbabwe’s influence, two other countries in the region, namely
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Angola and Namibia (dubbed ‘SADC Allies’) also entered the Great Lakes
conflict. Having come under military shelling from Rwanda and Uganda in
1998, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) sought help from the SADC
OPSD. Zimbabwe took the lead in involving SADC and, as would later be
evident, material considerations were a driving factor. First, in the distressed
economic environment, Mugabe saw the war as a means to enhance economic
dividends for the elite, including top military personnel. Second, Ngoma
notes the material interests underlying the Great Lakes intervention. Zimb-
abwe had invested US$200 million in the country and, together with Angola
and Namibia, was part owner of a commercial bank in the country. Firms in
these countries also held a number of mineral contracts in the DRC.
The Great Lakes conflict proved to be one of the testing points for SADC,
as agreement could not be reached on the deployment of troops to the DRC.
A fundamental weakness in the SADC was exposed when Mugabe flouted
all proper decision-making channels to use the cover of SADC in engaging
in the conflict. He excluded South Africa, a strong opponent of military
involvement, from the meeting he hosted at Lake Victoria in August 1998,
where the decision to commit troops to the Great Lakes was taken (Barber
2004: 194). This sheds light on the cracks that lay underneath the surface
of unity in the SADC; in fact, there were no enduring common values that
bound various actors together.
Zimbabwe committed an initial contingent of 6,000 soldiers to the war, the
number increasing eventually to about 13,000, approximately one-third of
Zimbabwe’s army (Taylor and Williams 2002: 551). The war casualties were
not without consequence at home. Zimbabwe lost over 600 soldiers and
the war proved to be a financial drain. Rene Lemarchand points out that
‘political and economic costs of military involvement (estimated at US$1
million dollars a day) have come home to roost, causing violent anti-war
protests in the capital city’ (Lemarchand 2000: 346–347).
Economic effects of Zimbabwe’s collapse on neighbouring
countries: trade linkages and the informal economy
Zimbabwe and regional relations
As one of the founding members of the Southern African Development
Coordinating Community (SADCC) – a precursor to SADC – Zimbabwe has
always enjoyed a special status. Mugabe, the region’s eldest statesman in
the region wields considerable influence. This was apparent in the muted
response of other neighbouring countries during the land seizures in early
2000. In general, SADC members have never been forthright in condemning
Zimbabwe’s human rights excesses, even though this has had a deleterious
impact on the process of regional integration. Going a step further, SADC
has been complicit in Zimbabwe’s political collapse. Its members continue to
overlook the economic meltdown in the country. Pivotal countries such as
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South Africa have also demonstrated indifference to Zimbabwe’s political
and economic plight, electing to characterise the situation as an internal crisis
that Zimbabweans should themselves deal with.
Internal contradictions, in turn, have generated adverse political and
economic impacts on neighbouring counties. Although Zimbabwe is meant
to implement the SADC Protocol on Trade, it has also signed a number of
bilateral trade deals with other SADC members (see Table 7.1).
Admittedly, other countries in the region have also entered into bilateral
agreements. The multiplicity of trade arrangements, regional and bilateral,
has led to problems related to rules of origin that continue to fester as there is
no dispute settlement mechanism. Confusion prevails on which agreement
takes pre-eminence, bilateral or regional. Essentially the bilateral trade deals
outside the regional trade integration framework have compounded imple-
mentation challenges in the SADC Protocol on Trade. Indeed, tensions arising
between countries at the bilateral level strain relations at the regional level and
act to inhibit progress. Since early 2000, Zimbabwe substantially delayed its
trade protocol implementation schedule. It is unlikely that it will meet the
deadline of 2008. Economists Daniel Ndlela and Moses Tekere noted that
Zimbabwe would complete 75 per cent of its tariff phase-down schedule by
Table 7.1 A chronology of bilateral trade agreements
Country Nature of the agreement Year
Botswana Reciprocal duty-free trade agreement on
wholly produced products subject to 25
per cent local content
1988
Namibia Reciprocal duty-free agreement
Has rules of origin requiring 25 per cent
domestic value added for manufactured
1992
Malawi Reciprocal duty-free trade agreement
subject to 25 per cent domestic value
added
Rules of origin problems exist
1995
South Africa Duty-free regime on preferential tariff
quota: dairy products, potatoes, birds
and eggs
Woven fabric is subject to concessional
tariff rates when meeting 75 per cent
local (Zimbabwean) content
Initially signed in 1964;
the recent version was
signed in 1996
Mozambique Aimed at eliminating tariff and non-
tariff barriers
Customs admin cooperation and trade
promotion




Source: SAIIA in-house compilation.
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2008.9 There are 26 per cent of lines that Zimbabwe still needs to remove tariffs
on. The combination of domestic crises and weak regional enforcement has
reduced Zimbabwe’s commitment to trade integration. Given its centrality in
the process, the adverse ripple effects have radiated rapidly within the region.
Informalisation of the economy
The economy has not only shrunk, but large segments have receded into an
informal mode. At the outset, the informal economy was always a feature of
the country since colonial times and Smith’s era. For instance, temporary
migration from Zimbabwe to South Africa was triggered by pull factors such
as employment. As Ndlela notes, ‘men flocked to South Africa in search of
employment and returned home with bicycles, watches, clothing and other
goods’ (Ndlela 2006: 7). Post-independence, informalisation of the economy
has also been driven by internal migration from rural to urban centres.
However, the present rapid growth of Zimbabwe’s informal economy
coincides with its economic slide and internal political conflict. The effects
manifested themselves as a shrinking of the formal productive sector of
the economy, a rise in unemployment and the growth of informal economic
activities. The urban informal sector includes micro-enterprises (largely sur-
vivalists and predominantly women), and cross-border traders.10 Nyatanga,
Mpofu and Tekere, note in their study that much of this trade passes through
unofficial routes and is therefore unrecorded (Nyatanga et al. 2000: 1).
The sector derives no significant resource or policy benefits from the gov-
ernment. Informal cross-border trade is not documented. In his study,
which focuses on product markets, Ndlela plots cross-border trade between
Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia. Interviews that I conducted in
Harare reveal informal to formal linkages in the services sector, especially in
the auto services in South Africa. These linkages are characterised by the
procurement of services by taxi operators in Zimbabwe from informal auto
parts and spares businesses in South Africa.11 Indeed, the emerging lines of
integration in SADC are along informal trade (see Tables 7.2 and 7.3).
Despite the inherent risks in informal cross-border trade, traders prefer to
work through parallel exchange markets for foreign currency as they are
perceived to be more reliable than banks.12 For traders the most important
factor is the availability of foreign exchange and obtaining this from the bank
requires complicated bureaucratic procedures, as the country has exchange
controls owing to insufficient foreign currency. Traders cite harassment by
corrupt customs officials at border posts, including extraction of bribes for
travel documents.13
The informal economy and the black market have become the de facto
institutions that people, including the elite, trust and through which almost
all economic transactions take place. This includes, inter alia, transactions in
currency, fuels and other basic commodities.14 The size of the informal sector
is symptomatic of the underlying economic, political and administrative
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collapse of the country. The social costs are yet to be quantified. However, it
is apparent that the informal sector drives the economy and this creates an
unenviable climate for administrative malpractice, tax evasion, corruption
and flouting of health and safety standards. While the government ignores
the scale of informal sector activities, non-state actors such as trade unions
have acknowledged the pivotal economic role of this sector. The Zimbabwean
Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU) – an influential civil society organ – has
investigated the circumstances and scale of the informal economy. This
has led to the formation of the Zimbabwe Chamber of Informal Economy
Association (ZCIA).15
Table 7.2 Estimated Zimbabwean informal imports from SADC countries
Country Goods
South Africa Electrical household items, motor vehicles and parts, industrial
equipment and machinery spares, printers, industrial chemicals,
cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, clothing, shoes, furniture, tyres,
bicycles, eggs and cooking oil
Zambia African design clothing materials, cosmetics, toilet soaps, sandals
and footwear, second-hand clothing, masks and wooden/stone
curios, suitcases, jackets and bags
Botswana Electrical household items, cosmetics, pharmaceuticals, kitchen
utensils
Mozambique Prawns, fish, kapentra, coconuts, soap, second-hand clothing,
sandals and footwear
Malawi African design clothing materials, wooden carvings, rice, sandals
and footwear, second-hand clothing
Source: Nyatanga et al. (2000); Ndlela (2006); and author’s own observations.
Table 7.3 Estimated informal Zimbabwean exports to SADC countries
Country Goods
South Africa Crafts, cane furniture, baskets, clothing, tie dye, bed and seat covers,
reed mats, brooms, mops, agricultural goods, whole and ground nuts
Zambia Clothing, bed and seat covers, jerseys, crochet, artefacts, wooden
curios
Botswana Crafts, crochet, tie dye, bed and seat covers, agricultural goods, sugar
cane, fruits, greeneries, dried vegetables, millet, whole and ground
nuts
Mozambique Plastic utensils, seat and bed covers, tie dye, plastic grain bags, wines
and spirits
Malawi Clothing, dresses, jerseys, bed and seat covers, crochet, plastic
utensils, cups, buckets, dishes, plastic grain bags
Source: Ndlela (2006).
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By the same token, the SADC Protocol on Trade also does not acknow-
ledge informal cross-border trade, even though it affects the entire region.
Ndlela notes in his study that the items traded across the border are quite
significant. In Zimbabwe’s case they comprise wooden carvings, curios and
other artefacts, which are an important mainstay of South Africa’s tourism
industry.16 Possibly such trade is not only limited to South Africa, but extends
to other neighbouring countries, such as Zambia. Given the salience of such
trade, one would expect that inter-governmental structures such as SADC
and related protocols would give due recognition to this phenomenon and
allow representation by informal cross-border traders’ associations in its
meetings. As Ndlela notes: ‘The SADC Trade Protocol is silent on the devel-
opment and facilitation of SMEs [small and medium enterprises] in general,
and the informal sector and cross-border trade in particular.’17
Recapping, regionalism in countries in sub-Saharan Africa, with collaps-
ing economies and weak institutions, is driven largely by non-state actors
and in its economic expression is highly informalised. This fact should not be
ignored in region-level governance and economic policy-making. It is no
longer sufficient to merely study formal-level processes; informal processes
driven by non-state actors are powerful drivers of regionalism. This reality
will need to be factored in when conceptualising solutions for conflict and
building mechanisms for sustainable peace.
The security dimension for spill-over effects
On the face of it, Zimbabwe is not an obvious candidate for studying intra-
state conflict. There is no evidence of overt militarised tensions between
groups in society, and neither are there visible signs of emergent counter-
insurgency or civil war along ethnic lines – a classical expression of intra-state
conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa. Therefore, to suggest that Zimbabwe is
staring at an intra-state conflict in the classical sense does not reflect reality.
However, often-times reality is not what it appears to be.
This chapter has elected to frame the current crisis in Zimbabwe as an
intra-state conflict, albeit a subtly militarised one. The ruling elite regard
the country as in a ‘state of war’, a war with the Western world and its proxy
– the opposition Movement for Democratic Change (MDC). This mindset
echoes Smith’s Rhodesian Front’s siege mentality when it saw itself as
‘beleaguered, attacked by the international community led by the British
government, and by all African countries led by the Organisation of African
Unity’ (Chung 2006: 62). A closer look at the civil–military relations suggests
that the real tension is between the political elite, using the army and other
security forces as its instruments, and the citizens. Zimbabwe is engulfed
in a cloud of tension, fear and anxiety. Trust between the political elite – and
by indirect implication the military – and the citizens has been severed.
Various pronouncements by senior security officers point to the symbiotic
linkages between the political and the military elite. Threats to elite power
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(i.e. ZANU-PF rule) are increasingly equated with threats to the security
of the country, and this is where the military sees itself playing a role as
the guardian of independence for which ZANU-PF is seen as the sole
proprietor.
Consequently, the potential for intra-state conflict cannot be ignored in the
ongoing crisis, especially in view of the fact that post-2000 the military has
been significantly politicised and society militarised.18 When ZANU-PF’s
authority began to ebb away during parliamentary elections in June 2000,
the government created more space for the military in civilian affairs. Tendai
Biti suggests, however, that this practice goes back to the 1980s (and continues
from Smith’s era) when the ZANU was intent on using the military to project
its authority.19 However, done more subtly in the past, militarisation has
now become overt. The military overshadows the cabinet as ‘the country’s
primary policy-making body, with the National Security Council, which
Mugabe chairs, effectively managing macro-economic policy’ (International
Crisis Group 2006: 10). Reminiscent of the Smith era’s ‘youth conscription
service’, ZANU-PF is also using young people as pawns in its securitisation
of the state. The National Youth Service (NYS), ostensibly designed to
impart economic skills among young people, has been perversely used to
indoctrinate the youth in militia tactics. These young people are often
deployed to deal with the ‘enemies of the state’ – a designation applied to the
MDC opposition and anyone who criticises ZANU-PF policies.20
ZANU-PF has taken to brazenly invoking metaphors of war and views
itself as under siege. The state has become ‘commandist’, reflecting the inter-
ests of the elite, with its writ extended large over every sphere of society:
production, food distribution, judiciary and the media. Indeed, it resembles a
Stalinist ‘plan-ideological state’. Parastals are used as a means to dispense
patronage, often to retired army generals who still wield huge influence in
the army. For example, critical economic agencies such as the Grain Market-
ing Board and electricity supply parastatals are headed by retired military
officers. The state of the economy alone resembles a war zone; Zimbabwe is
the only country in the world outside a war zone to have inflation that runs up
to 100,000 per cent, and an extremely weak currency.21
Spill-over to South Africa
The situation has not been without ramifications for neighbouring countries,
especially South Africa. South African intelligence claims that a number
of armed robberies in South Africa since 2002 ‘could be traced to former
Zimbabwean soldiers’.22 A steady flow of immigrants continues to pour into
South Africa as the political and economic situation worsens daily in
Zimbabwe. While most of these are economic immigrants, a number of them
get caught in the web of criminal networks in South Africa. In 2002 an
airport heist led to the theft of more than R115 million with four of the
culprits being apprehended in a hotel in Bulawayo, Zimbabwe. In March
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2006, gunmen stole more than R70 million in cash from a South African
Airways flight and suspects were arrested en route to Zimbabwe. In 2004,
police arrested six members of a notorious gang that was said to be respon-
sible for robbing several banks and foreign exchange agencies – four of
these were Zimbabwean. The criminal gangs involved in various crimes,
including cash-in-transit heists, that have been apprehended by police have
exhibited military skills believed to be honed in the Zimbabwean army, and
are working with South African locals in their criminal activities.23 In July
2006, a military-style shoot-out took place in Johannesburg between the
South African police force and a criminal gang that included former security
personnel from the Zimbabwe Defence Force.
Regional institutions
SADC has been wholly ineffectual in stemming the crisis in Zimbabwe. The
organisation seems to have split into various alliances and lacks common
values that bind member states together. Similarly, the African Union (AU)
has prevaricated in dealing with the situation in Zimbabwe, despite the fact
that it has a commission dedicated to the protection of human rights – the
AU Commission on Human and People’s Rights (ACPHR). A resolution
moved by the commission in December 2005 to condemn excessive use of
force in Zimbabwe was defeated at the January 2006 AU meeting.
International organisations such as the European Union (EU) and the
Commonwealth and countries such as the United States and Britain have not
shied away from criticising Mugabe’s policies and imposing economic sanc-
tions. However, the sanctions have not deflected the government from its
errant path; if anything, Mugabe has become more defiant. The crucial point
is that efforts by African countries could have produced more tangible results,
but these countries elected to confine themselves to hollow statements about
solidarity. Good governance and human rights have been sacrificed at the
altar of political expedience and regional solidarity. It could thus be argued
that to a certain degree Zimbabwe’s failure is a collective failure of regional
institutions since Zimbabwe is a member of these regional structures and
their failure to intervene have tacitly encouraged political mismanagement.
Mugabe is a member of the supposed ‘concert of Africa’, and it is his peers in
regional bodies who should have demanded greater political accountability
and economic stewardship from him.
These organisations, including the regional power-house, South Africa,
have also failed to show ‘enlightened leadership’ despite the fact that the crisis
in Zimbabwe has had spill-over effects in neighbouring countries. One is then
left to ask: What is the purpose of regional institutions when they cannot act
where it matters? And why have they set lofty goals for themselves? The need
to gain international credibility, play the aid game with the West and cultivate
a deeper understanding of what it means to be part of a collective regional
regime lies at the heart of the explanation. The conclusion that I can draw
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from the failure of these institutions is that they have lost their sense of
conviction resulting in a loss of credibility. In the following sub-section, I
look at the specific role that South Africa has played in the crisis.
South Africa’s involvement in Zimbabwe
Relationships between South Africa and Zimbabwe go back a long way.
Apartheid South Africa and Smith’s Rhodesian Front shared broadly similar
racist ideologies and repressive practices, even though there were intermittent
tensions between the two. With both countries facing security threats from
liberation movements and hostility from FLS, they became natural, although
uneasy, allies.
South Africa has always had some involvement in Zimbabwe’s political
affairs, including its role in détente attempts by FSL, facilitated mainly by
Zambia, in the early 1970s. Again, South Africa was part of the processes
leading to independence in 1979, and witnessed the signing of the ceasefire
agreement under the Lancaster House negotiations.24
Although regional perceptions about South Africa changed somewhat in
the post-apartheid dispensation, there has always been wariness of the coun-
try’s big brother image in regional affairs. This has acted to constrain any
decisive leadership role the country could play in the future. To use Joseph
Nye’s phraseology, South Africa has been unable to ensure ‘power conver-
sion’25 that would be essential in influencing events in its neighbourhood
(Nye 2004: 54). For example, South Africa cannot simply threaten Zimbabwe
with military strikes, nor can it impose economic sanctions or cut sources of
electricity supply, without risking isolation by other leaders in the region, or
serious damage to its own business interests in Zimbabwe.
The political elite is more worried about South Africa’s image with its
neighbours, and cultivating good relations is seen as of supreme importance.
As such South Africa has defined its role in the region as that of a ‘develop-
mental partner’ however ambiguous such a designation may be. Nye argues
that ‘if a state can make its power legitimate in the eyes of others, it will
encounter less resistance to its wishes. If its culture and ideology are attractive,
others will more willingly follow.’26
Because of its perceived gravitas, Western countries expect South Africa
to play a role of a stabiliser or hegemon in its immediate region. This is
partly because South Africa’s normative orientation broadly conforms to
the West and the country could be a perfect conduit for such values in its
regional ‘backyard’. However, while South Africa’s hard-power dimension is
unquestioned, the country faces severe strictures in exporting its (democratic
and human rights) values or creating stability in its neighbouring region.
Its soft-power image is not readily received by its neighbours, despite its
projection through instruments such as the New Economic Partnership for
Africa’s Development (NEPAD) – Africa’s economic development framework
initiated by South Africa.
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This scepticism towards South Africa’s soft-power leadership is partly due
to diverging political values and cultures. The majority of African states are
steeped in neo-patrimonial practices. In contrast South Africa portrays itself
as a modern democratic state in Africa, with an economy that is globally
integrated. Moreover, there is a sense of grievance harboured by a number of
African countries regarding South Africa’s destabilising role in these coun-
tries in the past. South Africa is well aware of these perceptions and has been
reluctant to condemn Mugabe’s excesses in Zimbabwe.
There are other explanations for South Africa’s ‘soft’ diplomatic approach
towards Zimbabwe. The International Crisis Group (ICG) report on Zimb-
abwe highlighted three. First, Mbeki does not wish to be seen to be acting
in concert with external Western powers. As the ICG suggests, ‘the more
President Mbeki is perceived to be carrying an external agenda, the more
isolated he will become in a regional context, making South Africa’s leader-
ship all the more difficult’ (International Crisis Group 2002: 12). In this
respect, working closely with other African leaders could prove to be a more
credible strategy. Second, the African National Congress (ANC) is more con-
cerned with weaning ZANU-PF away from its socialist past, and is providing
silent support for a more technocratic leader in the mould of Simba Makoni,
the former finance minister and head of SADC Secretariat. Third, the
ANC and, indeed, ex-liberation movements in the region fear challenges
by labour-based movements, such as the MDC, to entrenched leadership in
sub-Saharan African countries.27
Conclusion and recommendations
With a view to a synthesis, it is important to restate a number of observations
on Zimbabwe’s crisis and the role of regional agencies. I argue that the crisis
in Zimbabwe represents militarised conflict at an early stage of development.
Since it is difficult to predict the future, any sign of the deepening politicisa-
tion of the military and its extension to civilian arenas should be a great cause
for concern. The risk that such politicisation may mutate into a classical
security state is very real. Zimbabwe’s crisis and the relationship between the
political elite and the military, especially reflected in the management of
various parastatals and in the succession tussle within the ZANU-PF, have
the markings of intra-state conflict.
To understand the crisis one needs to follow the history of the country.
First the ZANU-PF has acquired a distinct militaristic culture and shown a
strong inclination towards one-party rule. This inclination has its roots in the
past. Quite clearly, there was never a meaningful attempt at transforming
the fundamental architecture of the state from its strong militaristic orienta-
tion towards democratisation. There was simply a change of elite – a process
facilitated through the Lancaster House Agreement.
Rather than obsessing with the defence of sovereignty – since there is no
likely external threat to Zimbabwe – regional institutions such as SADC need
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to focus on human rights and the promotion of democratisation in member
states. A new contract established on common normative assumptions about
governance and economic management is required in regional institutions.
Furthermore, given the ubiquity of cross-border informal trade processes
and region-wide linkages driven by non-state actors it would make sense
that informal regionalism be given more attention in academic and policy
research. This reflects empirical realities in most of sub-Saharan Africa and,
as this chapter illustrated, countries going through political and economic
crisis such as Zimbabwe are drifting towards such informalisation.
Notes
1 The FLS organisation was an inter-governmental initiative amongst post-colonial
states in southern Africa that sought to buffer South Africa’s military encroach-
ment in the sub-region and oppose South Africa’s apartheid government. At its
beginning in the early 1970s countries that were active included Botswana under
Seretse Khama, Zambia under Kenneth Kaunda, Mozambique under Samora
Machel and Tanzania under Julius Nyerere. After the independence of Zimbabwe
Mugabe also played an important role in this structure.
2 Abel Muzorewa, a Methodist bishop, was accorded the position of prime minister
by Ian Smith in May 1979, in response to international pressure for change.
Substantially, power remained in the hands of Smith’s party and Muzorewa
became a token leader of the country until independence in 1980.
3 This section draws on an interview with Tendai Biti, secretary-general of the
MDC-Tsvingarai, 16 August 2006, Harare, Zimbabwe.
4 In Shona language this refers to the rain that washes away the chaff before the
spring rains. Gurukundani was the name given to the Fifth Brigade that was
trained by North Koreans after an agreement signed in October 1980 between
Mugabe and Kim Il Sung of North Korea. This brigade completed its training
around September 1982 and it was answerable to Mugabe. See Catholic Commis-
sion for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe (n.d.).
5 Bond and Manyanya (2002: 33).
6 Ibid.: 27.
7 Tongogara was an ambitious and popular top ZANLA commander during the
liberation struggle and Mugabe’s nemesis. His mysterious car accident in 1979 is
widely believed to have been engineered by Mugabe’s close associates. This draws
from various interviews in Zimbabwe, 13–22 August 2006. See also Fay Chung
(2006: 124–139).
8 Bond and Manyanya (2002: 39).
9 See Tekere and Ndlela (2003).
10 Ndlela (2006: 7).
11 This draws on informal interviews the author conducted with taxi drivers and
individuals in Zimbabwe, 13–22 August 2006.
12 Ndlela (2006: 32).
13 Ibid.: 33.
14 This draws on the field-research the author undertook and from various (confiden-
tial) interviews in Zimbabwe, 14–22 August 2006.
15 Nyatanga et al. (2000: 22).
16 Ibid.: 33.
17 Ibid.: 37.
18 See a detailed analysis of the politicisation of the military by Rupiya (2004).
178 Mzukisi Qobo
Rupiya is a retired lieutenant colonel from the Zimbabwe Defence Force. He notes
that prior to 2000 civil–military relations were stable.
19 Interview with Tendai Biti, secretary-general of the MDC-Tsvingarai, 16 August
2006.
20 This section mainly draws from an interview with the MDC-Youth National
Executive Committee members, 17 August 2006, Harare. Accounts by non-
partisan youth in Zimbabwe as well as various media reports confirm that the
NYS is used as a partisan instrument by ZANU-PF.
21 See Muleya (2006).
22 See Sunday Times (2006).
23 Ibid.
24 Campbell (2003: 23–24).
25 Joseph Nye (2004: 54) defines power conversion as ‘the capacity to convert
potential power, as measured by resources, to realised power, as measured by the
changed behaviour of others’.
26 Ibid.: 57.
27 International Crisis Group (2002: 5).
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Both economic and political variables affect trade. In economic terms, trade
partners seek material gains associated with the exchange of goods. Politics
may impede such transactions, depending on the tradeoffs or costs. If the
economic gains are significant, bilateral conflicts or tensions tend to be over-
looked. For example, Venezuela and Colombia continue to trade despite the
existing tension between the two countries.1 Conversely, trade can be conflict
inducing. The outcome of the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Doha
ministerial meeting produced more discord than cooperation. Perceptions
that the terms favoured one party over the other fuelled this discord. The
offending article was the European Union (EU) and United States refusal
to give up farm subsidies and provide fairer terms of trade for developing
country farmers.
Security threats, transaction costs and concerns about relative gains make
free trade less likely among adversaries (Gowa 1989). Any or all of these
factors can kick in when a dispute becomes active, its presumed effects exag-
gerated by negative propaganda. In particular, close proximity between two
countries throws the trade–conflict dynamic into sharp relief. This is particu-
larly true when the borders separating them are porous and not well defined.
The situation can give way to disagreements over jurisdictional rights and
responsibilities. Also, tensions at the border might affect the flow of goods.
‘But the broader reason for stagnant trade will have to do with the general
uncertainty surrounding property rights (broadly conceived) when two coun-
tries’ governments dispute territorial jurisdiction’ (Simmons 2005). This
uncertainty raises the cost of doing business in the area. It is, therefore, not
surprising to find that border zones lag behind the rest of the country in
terms of development.
Bilateral trade flows do take place in the presence of conflict, although they
are potentially lower than would be expected in a conflict-free scenario. A
trade freeze normally occurs when a dispute provokes armed hostilities. Even
if a boundary dispute does not escalate into an armed conflict, its irresolution
fuels nationalistic sentiment and generates bilateral mistrust. This mistrust
tends to feed fears of an eventual attack and, consequently, leads to an
arms race. Hence countries in a state of outright or incipient conflict end up
vying with each other militarily while more pressing problems such as poverty
go unattended. Overcoming this vicious cycle is essential for trade and
integration to flourish.
In Latin America, open armed conflict has often been associated with terri-
torial disputes. Having said that their incidence has been infrequent, charac-
terising the region as relatively peaceful and stable. This does not, however,
prevent attempts to identify links between conflict and trade. For this pur-
pose, I have elected to study Ecuador and Peru, two countries engaged in the
longest-running territorial dispute in the region. I examine the potential for
trade to mitigate conflict, as well as the implications that such conflict has on
trade.
The chapter is divided into three further sections. The second section
details the chronology and consequences of bilateral conflict. The third sec-
tion analyses trade patterns between the two countries over the duration of
the conflict, and predicts future trends in its aftermath. It also attempts to
determine whether regional integration schemes emerge spontaneously or are
the outcome of cause and effect relations. The fourth section presents my vision
of how future relations will be shaped by past and present events, and assesses
the feasibility of using trade concessions to mediate or resolve future conflicts.
History of conflicts
Origin and evolution
The conflict between Peru and Ecuador can be traced to the independence
era. It is the only territorial dispute in the region that has resulted in armed
clashes since World War II (Simmons 1999). The principle of uti possidetis
was applied at the time Peru and Ecuador attained their independence, which
granted each country sovereignty over the territory it occupied during the
colonial period. Both countries interpreted the concessions differently. Peru
defined its limits according to those established by the Royal Seal of 1802,
which gave it administrative control over an area once part of the Viceroyalty
of New Granada. Other sources indicate that this decree granted military
jurisdiction to the Viceroyalty of Lima and administrative control to the
Audiencia of Quito2 (Ruiz 2006). Ecuador, on the other hand, defined its
boundaries according to those demarcated by the Audiencia of Quito (Sethi
2000).
The colonial administrators did not attempt to define precise borders since
all the lands they governed belonged to the Crown. Land divisions were
carried out primarily for administrative convenience. In the same vein, several
factors negated the need to define borders, post-independence. These were uti
possidetis (as mentioned); the borders were isolated3 and did not bisect popu-
lated areas; nor were they considered valuable in economic terms; finally, the
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focus was on post-independence consolidation. Only the territorial water-
ways constituted a valuable asset. Since Peru and Lima were the colonial
capitals furthest from Spain, the Amazon River becomes strategically
important as it allows quicker access to the Atlantic Ocean. The alternative is
for commercial fleets to round the Cape of Horn to reach Europe.
Differences over riparian claims on the Amazon drove the two countries to
war. The first wars took place in the nineteenth century, in 18294 and 1859. By
1936, 13 attempts to settle the border had failed (Palmer 1997), including one
by the king of Spain. To avoid a potential confrontation at an inter-American
conference in Buenos Aires,5 Peru agreed to discuss the boundary issue with
Ecuador, with the United States acting as arbitrator. Both parties agreed to
maintain the status quo line6 pending a final resolution. Good will did not
move forward beyond this point, though. After a series of tense negotiations,
Peru withdrew from the talks in 1938.
Nearly two years later, Peru invaded Ecuador, supposedly in response to
Ecuadorian incursions into Peruvian territory. The 1941 war, known as the
Zarumilla War, resulted in more than 500 combatant casualties. Peru’s army
of 13,000 soldiers quickly overwhelmed Ecuador’s 1,800 troops.7 Its weap-
onry and aircraft were far superior. Indeed, Peru was one of the best
equipped military forces in the region at the time. Ecuador, on the other
hand, had no warplanes. Because of its military superiority, Peru quickly
secured its hold over 40 per cent of the territory in dispute, as well as
undisputed Ecuadorian territory (Mares 2001: 34). This was Peru’s first mili-
tary victory since its independence in 1821.
Upon cessation of hostilities, a final attempt to resolve the dispute was
made with the signing of the Rio Protocol of Peace, Friendship and Bound-
aries in 1942. The Rio Protocol granted Ecuador unsovereign access to the
Amazon and established a new boundary, closely based on the status quo
line, dividing the disputed area in half (see Figure 8.1, the map of the disputed
area). Out of 15 existing arguments, ten were resolved in favour of Ecuador
and the remaining five in favour of Peru (Leonard 2006). The solution was
defective in that the demarcation skipped difficult terrain (Economist 1995).
In doing so, it overlooked 78 kilometres of mountain range, in an area known
as Cordillera del Cóndor (the Condor Range), east of the Andes Mountains.
The boundary commission was put to work almost immediately after the
signing of the Protocol. Ecuador questioned its work when an aerial survey
by the US Air Force in 1946 revealed the existence of a river where a water-
shed was believed to exist. Indeed, Article VIII of the Rio Protocol stipulates
that, in this particular area, the boundary line is to arise ‘from the Quebrada
de San Francisco, the watershed between the Zamora and Santiago Rivers, to
the confluence of the Santiago River with the Yaupi’.8 The discovery of ‘a 120
mile (190 km) fluvial system’ (St John et al. 1999: 23), the Cenepa River, put a
dent in the Protocol’s validity and prompted Ecuador to halt the demarcation
process in 1948.9
The unmarked territory became the depository of Ecuador’s dream of
Peru and Ecuador 183
sovereign access to the Amazon River. That dream could easily be achieved
by extending the border line into the Marañón River, the river the Cenepa
flows into. According to some sources, Ecuador knew of the existence of the
Cenepa River before its ‘discovery’ by the US Air Force. Its officials delayed
the work of the commission on purpose, playing for time in order to find a
way to improve Ecuador’s prospects of gaining access to the Amazon River
(St John et al. 1999: 26; Palmer 1997). By halting the demarcation, Ecuador
hoped to coerce a border renegotiation.
Geographic discrepancies were not the sole basis of Ecuador’s argu-
ment against the Protocol’s validity. It also claimed signing under duress, in
Figure 8.1 Peru–Ecuador: area of boundary dispute.
Source: http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/americas/peru_ecuador_81.jpg
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deference to the US wish to resolve the dispute before the Second World War
began. Peruvian occupation of Ecuadorian territory at the time also made
the Protocol contrary to international law, since conquest was no longer
considered an accepted form of territorial acquisition.10
The Protocol’s four guarantors (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United
States) attempted to resolve the outstanding issues through arbitration. The
Protocol was, after all, a legally binding agreement. Notwithstanding,
Ecuador withdrew its commitment to the Protocol entirely, in refusal of any
solution that did not recognise it as an Amazon country. One of its
presidents, Jose Maria Velasco, went so far as to declare it null in 1960. This
action suspended the Protocol’s application for 35 years, during which
further militarisation of the border zone and sporadic encounters between
both forces took place, usually around the anniversary of the Protocol.
Meanwhile, Ecuador proposed other solutions. Peru remained inflexible;
it was unwilling to give up any of the rights conceded by the Protocol.
Both countries did attempt to establish ‘cooperative agreements on the use
of bi-national river basins, and the passage of individuals and vehicles in the
1960s and 1970s’ (Simmons 1999). However, the efforts did little to allay
the existing tension, which finally flared in 1981, at Paquisha. Peru repulsed
the Ecuadorian army infiltrators in less than a week (Bonilla 1996: 4).
Ecuador requested mediation from the Organization of American States
(OAS), whereas Peru sought the intervention of the Protocol guarantors
(Palmer 1997). Both helped the conflicting parties reach a settlement.
In early 1991, hostilities broke out once again. The provocation this time
was the presence of Peruvian troops in the disputed zone. Ecuadorian author-
ities became aware of their presence in 1987, but did not request their
withdrawal until January 1991, when the threat could no longer be ignored
(Bonilla 1996: 11). The subsequent conflict ended with a ‘gentlemen’s agree-
ment’ negotiated by the presidents of both countries (Palmer 1997). Besides
putting an end to the tension, the agreement established a military protocol
for a designated common security zone. Although the security zone never
materialised, other events did much to calm the atmosphere, including Presi-
dent Alberto Fujimori’s visit to Ecuador in 1992 – the first ever by a Peruvian
president.
A few skirmishes between soldiers stationed on both sides of the disputed
border erupted into a localised war in early 1995. Conflicting accounts make
it hard to identify the perpetrator. More likely, both sides played an import-
ant part in the unfolding events. The conflict lasted five weeks and involved
more than 3,000 Ecuadorian troops and 2,000 Peruvian troops (Marcella
1995; Homza 2004). Ecuador quickly established air and ground superiority
through a combination of efficient military planning, commanding position-
ing and advanced equipment, such global positioning systems (GPSs) and
satellites to locate targets. The encounter, the most serious since 1941, marked
the first Peruvian setback since the Battle of Tarqui in 1829 and resulted
in hundreds of casualties. The Ecuadorian president, Sixto Durán Ballén,
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attributed this victory to 14 years of arduous preparation (Marcella 1995).
Peru lost nine warplanes and sought retribution, even after President Fujimori
declared a victory and ordered a unilateral ceasefire on 16 February 1995
(Cooper 2003). Ecuador lost no aircraft.11
The four guarantors of the Rio Protocol negotiated a second ceasefire and
a peace agreement, the Itamaraty Peace Accord, on February 17. It marked
the first time in almost 50 years that Ecuador submitted to the Protocol
(although it still disputed its validity).12 In addition to setting the stage for
bilateral negotiations, the Peace Accord assigned a military observer mission
to Ecuador–Peru (MOMEP) to oversee the separation of forces and the
demilitarisation of the disputed area. This mission, made up of military
personnel from the guarantor countries, was financed by Ecuador and Peru.
MOMEP managed to evacuate most soldiers within five weeks (Weidner
1996). This is noteworthy given the original programme’s six-week duration.
This was complemented with aerial surveillance.13 Once the conflict zone
was cleared, MOMEP was able to propose a 528 square kilometre demilitar-
ised zone (DMZ),14 which was accepted by the Peruvian and Ecuadorian
representatives on 24–25 July 1995.15
Confrontations continued at the border, forcing MOMEP to extend the
DMZ by 10 kilometres on either side. Tension heightened in August 1998,16
and it was necessary to reaffirm the parties’ commitment to a common
solution. Many apparently intractable issues needed to be discussed while
each country dealt with problems of their own. Ecuador was in the midst
of a political crisis soon after President Abdalá Bucaram’s impeachment in
February 1997,17 and Peru had to deal with the Shining Path (the infamous
guerrilla group), as well as its severe economic problems.
The Peru–Ecuador territorial dispute officially came to an end on 26
October 1998. Both countries signed a peace treaty, the Presidential Act of
Brasilia, which not only settled the remaining border issues, but also paved
the way for further trade and development. The treaty favoured Peru by
mandating the Rio Protocol’s demarcation. Further, the disputed zone was to
be demilitarised and converted into an ecological park. Thus, Ecuador did
not get free and sovereign access to the Amazon River (the main concession
it sought). As compensation, it received a block of private property in the
area where it could fly its flag and erect a monument to its fallen soldiers. The
area measures 1 square kilometre at Tiwinza, the site of the most violent
confrontation between Ecuadorian and Peruvian troops. The conflict timeline
is summarised in the list below (Palmer 2007):
1822 Independence of Ecuador
1824 Independence of Peru
1829 Battle of Tarqui (over Guayaquil). Gran Colombia18 defeats Peru
1830 Ecuador separates from Gran Colombia
1859 War leads to Peru’s temporary occupation of Guayaquil
1941 Peru–Ecuador war (July–September). Peru defeats Ecuador
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1981 Border clashes end with intervention of OAS and the guarantors
1991 Tension flares in the disputed area and leads presidents to formu-
late a ‘gentlemen’s agreement’
1995 Renewed hostilities quickly escalate, leading President Fujimori
to unilaterally call for a ceasefire
Main actors involved
The duration and intensity of the dispute between Ecuador and Peru involved
many actors. The international scope of the dispute brought in foreign
entities and individuals. Understanding their motivation is key to unlocking
the succession of events.
National actors
Since the post-colonial era, the governments of Peru and Ecuador main-
tained ‘contrary historical claims on many chunks of their common border,
according to different interpretations of treaties and agreements that they
had entered into over the last two centuries’ (COHA 1998). Schoolbooks
articulated these claims, fuelling popular sentiment against any territorial
concession. Both countries, for example, still bicker over whether a Spanish
expedition in 1542 that ‘discovered the Amazon River, set out from Cuzco,
Peru, merely stopping in Quito for supplies (the Peruvian version), or whether
the expedition was in fact organized and led from Quito’ (COHA 1998).
While the waterway was a genuine concern, nationalistic politics also
fuelled the disagreement over the border’s real location. They led each state
to refuse to make any related concession. Historical discourse not only made
it difficult to pinpoint facts, but it also tied the disputed territory to national
identity. Ecuadorian textbooks, for instance, portrayed this discovery as a
transcendental event in the nation’s history (Carreras 2007: 6). The slogan
‘Ecuador has been, is, and will be an Amazonian country’ had a special
resonance after the Protocol was declared null (Carreras 2007: 7). Hence,
national pride got in the way of negotiations, often to the detriment of the
national interests.
According to Dominguez et al. (2003):
[P]olitical leaders are likely to have a strong base of domestic political
support for continuing to pursue territorial claims by a combination
of confrontational diplomatic or military policies whenever there is a
long-term history of past conflict (the Venezuela – Guyana case). All
these findings point to a key insight: disputes are path dependent.
Politicians often resort to nationalistic rhetoric and militarise a dispute in
order to exploit the issue for their own political benefit. Spatial control
becomes a means to attain political control.
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As indicated in the previous section, Ecuador judged the Rio Protocol
unfair and non-executable. This stance contravened international law since
Ecuador had signed and ratified the treaty; it could not ‘unilaterally with-
draw from being subject to its provisions’ (Palmer 1997). Peru claimed that
Ecuador had already gained an unfair land concession through the Protocol.
A revision would thus be unacceptable; Peru wanted the Protocol to be
upheld. Both countries did not waver in their positions, which became more
intractable with the passage of time as they were further ingrained into each
country’s collective consciousness.
The military’s prominent role in the dispute as well as in the internal affairs
of both countries19 also made it difficult to retract. The military had resources
to continue the conflict largely due to the substantial budget allocations.20
Table 8.1 shows Ecuador and Peru’s military spending as a percentage of
their respective annual budgets and time trends for these expenditures. For
developing countries, the expenditures are extremely high and represent
some important tradeoffs. For instance, in 1990, Peru had an inflation rate of





























Source: Ruiz (2006: 66–67).
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2 million per cent, US$10 billion in damages caused by the ongoing guerrilla
war, and a bankrupt government (Palmer 1997). Diverting scarce funds to the
military in this context certainly seemed reckless.
Overall, Ecuador’s military spending was half that of Peru’s in the 1970s
and 1980s. Peru actually engaged in an arms race in the 1980s. It became
the region’s largest importer of arms, spending US$1 billion a year until
1998 (Sethi 2000). The Peruvian air force is one of the most powerful in the
region, possessing a significant inventory of high-tech warplanes (Cooper
2003).
Ecuador’s military spending was reactive. Perceived threats, such as Peru’s
arms race, would prompt its increase. To keep Peru from consolidating its
military position during the negotiations after the 1995 war, Ecuador
increased its military spending from US$447 million in 1995 to US$640 mil-
lion in 1998 (Ruiz 2006: 67). It purchased four refurbished Kfir fighter-
bombers from Israel right in the midst of the negotiations (Economist 1996;
Sims 1996). Figure 8.2 shows defence spending trends over 1973 to 1999.
In absolute terms Peru spent substantially larger amounts on defence
(US$2.3 billion in 1986, compared to Uruguay’s US$244.4 million 1981).
However, in relation to the total budget, the percentage amounts converged;
after 1996 these amounts were almost the same (see Table 8.1). Peru’s armed
forces are two times larger than Ecuador’s, but the latter’s army is pro-
portional to the country’s size and its population (Ruiz 2006: 68). Addition-
ally, Table 8.1 shows peaks in military spending in the aftermath of armed
conflicts. Clearly, as the threat increased, military spending rose in order to
achieve higher levels of deterrence.
The outcome of the 1995 border war helped pave the way to a resolution
of the conflict. As Simmons (1999) correctly observes, Ecuador’s military
victory allowed it to make a dignified submission to the Protocol. Peru, on
the other hand, was in the midst of a serious economic crisis and, therefore,
could no longer sustain its military expenditures. The Peace Accord allowed
funds to be redirected for development purposes and also permitted each
country to focus on regional trade and integration efforts.
Figure 8.2 Defence spending.
Source: Ruiz (2006: 66–67).
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Consolidation of democracy in the region also heralded the demise of
military regimes. The peace process itself was indicative of an increase in
civilian leverage; popular opinion was in favour of a resolution. The results
of a 1995 poll indicated that 58 per cent of Peru’s and 71 per cent of the
Ecuador’s population were keen on seeing the dispute reach a final resolution
(Simmons 1999).
External actors
There have been 22 cases of legally binding third-party rulings on contested
territorial sovereignty in Latin America, the largest number for any geographic
region in the world (Simmons 1999). Given the military balance in the region,
resolving border disputes through a third party is the preferred method.
The Ecuador–Peru border dispute itself was resolved through extensive
third-party involvement, made possible by the Rio Protocol.
The Rio Protocol is a unique third-party dispute settlement mechanism
that exemplifies the power of international law through the mediators’ obser-
vance of treaty obligations. These obligations were meant to assure the
engagement of the guarantor states (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and the United
States). They were legally mandated to oversee the treaty’s provisions, includ-
ing the mediation and arbitration of the dispute. Further, the guarantors
were obligated, under Article 5, to mediate the conflict until it reached its
final resolution.
Since an ongoing dispute meant continuous engagement, the guarantors
reacted immediately to flare-ups for fear that an escalation could potentially
complicate their attempts to find a resolution. By 1995, the protracted nature
of the conflict allowed the guarantors to build strong intra-group relations,
as well as good rapport with the disputing parties. These diplomatic dyna-
mics allowed greater agility in the guarantors’ efforts when the antagonists,
Ecuador in particular, expressed willingness to settle the border dispute for
good.
After the 1995 ceasefire, Ecuador and Peru initiated a series of encounters
that paved the way for the conclusion of negotiations in 1998. These negoti-
ations included an agreement to resolve pending matters through four com-
missions.21 A deadline for the submission of all proposals was set for 30 May
1998. The only commission unable to meet the deadline was the one respon-
sible for border demarcation. In order to overcome this drawback and put an
end to military tensions for good, the presidents of both countries requested
that the guarantors determine the boundary. The guarantors’ condition was
that Peru and Ecuador’s legislatures had to approve the proposal in advance
to avoid interminable negotiations. This made a ‘fast track peace agreement
possible, and was an elegant way for [Presidents] Mahuad and Fujimori to
politically survive the consequences of this potentially explosive issue in their
own countries’ (COHA 1998).
Reliance on an observer mission, MOMEP, was essential to lend continuum
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to the negotiations. Although it was not required to enforce the peace,
MOMEP gradually became a confidence building measure (CBM) as it
increased the scope of its operations from observation and demilitarisation,
to actual prevention of conflict.22 The then US Secretary of State Madeleine
Albright observed that, ‘what was truly unique about this observer mission
was that its expenses were paid for by the two antagonists, who realized it was
cheaper to pay the price of peace than the costs of war’.23 MOMEP was
successful because it operated on the principle of shared responsibility,24 with
participating nations providing units that, due to their small size,25 were easier
to manage and did not pose a threat to the antagonists’ sovereignty. With
time, Peruvian and Ecuadorian officers were integrated into MOMEP to give
each country a stake in the process, rather than keeping them on the sideline
altogether.
The international context also favoured the guarantors’ efforts. Both coun-
tries’ leaders were quite aware that this border dispute was the last ‘active’
dispute in the region, which not only affected the risk perception associated
with the antagonist countries, but precluded them from enjoying the benefits
of regional integration (Carreras 2007: 10).
All in all, the Rio Protocol kept the guarantors engaged for more than
55 years – until the last boundary marker was set in place in May 1999.
Consequences
The outcome of the negotiations was well accepted in Ecuador. Ecuadorians
were eager to settle the dispute and move on. Not so in Peru, where the
settlement sparked riots and protests. The difference in public reaction was, in
part, due to the way in which each government approached the negotiations.
The government of Ecuador kept the public informed and allowed some
input into the process, whereas the Peruvian government did not (Palmer
1997). Also, Ecuador’s military was stronger and more unified than Peru’s;
they were consulted throughout the process and were, therefore, content with
the result.
The Ecuador–Peru dispute illustrates how conflict can provoke a costly
arms race. Each country has spent over US$500 million (Palmer 1997). In
real terms, this exceeds 1 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively, of Peru and
Ecuador’s gross domestic product (GDP) at the time (Ryser 1995). Now that
the dispute is settled, much-needed development projects can get underway.
Due to the continued conflict, the border area remained the least developed in
both countries. In Peru, the area’s per capita income is US$1,301 compared
to the national average of US$2,182 (López 2004).
As both countries have expressed their desire to work together in order
uplift the border zone, foreign assistance has started to flow in, in support of
such an effort. The post-conflict assistance offered by the United States
Agency for International Development (USAID), aims to foster develop-
ment in the region and economic integration at the border. This entails the
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improvement of infrastructure to improve producers’ access to markets, and
of overall conditions to foster the stability necessary for business to flourish.
Projected contribution is set at US$20 million, to be invested over the course
of two phases.26
The Bilateral Development Plan of the Ecuador–Peru Border Region,
which is expected to be in operation through 2000 to 2014,27 has provided
additional development assistance. The plan objective is to improve the lives
of the residents of the border area and to foster integration and cooperation
efforts between both countries.28 Over the course of its duration, the Bilateral
Fund will receive a total of US$3 billion from each government, donor
countries and participating international organisations.
In addition to rampant poverty in the border zone, Peru and Ecuador face
other challenges that could be potentially divisive. One of these is the pres-
ence of uncleared land mines in the former conflict zone. Increased cross-
border migration could result in the accidental detonation of these mines.
In order to diffuse such threats, the Andean Community’s (CAN) member
countries established the Andean Charter for Peace and Security and for the
Limitation and Control of Foreign Defense Spending (Lima Commitment)
in 17 June 2002.29 The CAN members reaffirmed their obligation to peace
and security by establishing a peace zone that covered the territory of all
member countries, including airspace and waters. The threat or use of force
was prohibited, defence spending cutbacks were encouraged, as well as open-
ness and exchange of information regarding the purchase of arms. The Lima
Commitment also undertook to clear the land mines.
However, neither Peru nor Ecuador made significant strides in terms of
reduced defence spending. The motivation, ostensibly, no longer remained
inter-state rivalry. Peru’s current Minister of Defense Allan Wagner
announced a US$650 million investment to revamp the country’s inefficient
and corrupt armed forces (Brousek 2006). Although he acknowledged that
there were no security threats from neighbouring countries, the armed forces
needed to be fully capable of tackling international organised crime, espe-
cially smuggling. As justification for its military spending, Ecuador cited
guerrilla incursions from Colombia as its main security concern. Still,
Ecuador’s current military spending is considered excessive by some obser-
vers. More than 20 per cent of the federal budget, amounting to US$1.2
billion, goes to the armed forces.30
Notwithstanding these defence allocations, both countries remain on good
terms and have not lost sight of the bigger goal, which is to proceed with
integration efforts. In a recent meeting, the ministers of foreign relations
signed a joint declaration, stating their intention to uphold bilateral integra-
tion commitments and push ahead with common border projects (La Oferta
2005). Ecuador also demonstrated willingness to regularise illegal Peruvian
immigrants who had been lured by the dollar-based Ecuadorian economy
(El Universo 2006). Most importantly, both countries showed interest in




Despite the border dispute, Peru and Ecuador remained trade partners. While
commercial channels remained open, the low levels of bilateral trade during
the conflict did not suggest mutual interdependence. Peruvian exports to
Ecuador in 1992 constituted only 1 per cent of its total exports (Bonilla 1996:
13). Neither country had qualms about closing their common border after
war broke out in the Condor Range in 1995 (Bonilla 1996: 12). Given the
low level of bilateral trade, the losses associated with closing the common
border were not significant relative to overall trade flows. Ecuador achieved
an increase of US$0.64 million in its overall trade in 1995 compared to the
previous year.
A study by Simmons measured border effects on trade using a gravity
model. The study had an institutional focus the premise being that institu-
tions are responsible for reducing transactions and uncertainty at the border.
It also focused on the negative externalities associated with reactive insti-
tutional measures. The final assessment confirmed that bilateral trade was
negatively affected by border disputes. The model ‘estimated an average loss
of about $35 million in bilateral trade for every year the two countries con-
tinued to dispute their borders’ (Simmons 2005: 25). Although low, there
were costs associated with maintaining the dispute. Overall, the study esti-
mated a cumulative loss of over a billion dollars for both countries. The list
at the foot of this page summarises the study’s findings with regard to the
estimated effects of territorial disputes on trade, 1967–2000 (Simmons 2005).
Trade agreements
Prior to joining the CAN in 1969, Peru and Ecuador had no formal trade
agreements between them. Pending a border settlement, there was no serious
political will to move forward with a bilateral agenda, which also affected
the CAN’s effort to achieve full integration. Specifically, the ambiguity
surrounding cross-border transactions impaired this integration. Related
gains from this integration, including ‘involvement with the trading group,
MERCOSUR, as well as some $1.5 billion in international loans for future
development of the two countries’, finally served as an incentive to settle
disputes (Henrikson 2005: 366). Once conflict was resolved trade grew.
Estimated average yearly trade:
• with dispute US$59.21 million;
• with no dispute US$92.86 million.
Estimated cumulative impact of disputing:
• US$1043.15 million.
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Actual average yearly trade:
• with dispute US$74.94 million;
• with no dispute US$182.67 million.
Figure 8.3 records the flow of bilateral trade. It is evident that trade ebbed
when the two countries were at war, particularly in 1981. That year, as well as
1994 and 1995, marked the few instances when Peru’s exports to Ecuador
were lower than its exports to Bolivia (CAN).31 Trade took off once the two
countries resolved their differences and it has increased continuously since
then. Peru is now the primary destination for Ecuadorian exports, constitut-
ing 59 per cent of its CAN exports in 2005 and 8.7 per cent of its global
exports (CNN 2006). Historically, Colombia was Ecuador’s most important
CAN market, until 1999.
Figure 8.3 Bilateral trade trends.
Source: Andean Community (2006).
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For Peru, Ecuador is now its second most important CAN market, after
Colombia, displacing Venezuela in 2002 (CNN 2006). Peru’s exports to
Ecuador comprise 27 per cent of its intra-community trade and 1.8 per cent
of its global trade. While this seems very small in comparison to Ecuador’s
exports to Peru, signalling an actual trade deficit, it is important to take into
account that Peru is a larger market relative to Ecuador’s.32 Overall, the above
numbers indicate an upward trend in commercial exchange. What is not so
clear is whether Peru can reduce its trade deficit.
Current trade between Peru and Ecuador
A 2004 report by the Economist Intelligence Unit states:
Since the demarcation of the border was completed in May 1999, both
governments have worked towards strengthening the treaty by deepening
trade links. The peace accord includes projects for investment and trade
liberalization, such as the planned interconnection of the oil pipelines
between the two countries, the improvement of facilities for the cross
border transit of tourists from Lambayeque department in Peru to
Azuay province in Ecuador, and improved transport links between the
Ecuadorian south and the Peruvian north to facilitate cross border
transit.
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2004)
The citation confirms Simmons’ assertion that ‘borders as institutions for
organizing understandings about jurisdiction over territory are increasingly
important as the potential for economic interdependence increases’ (Simmons
2005: 5). To stimulate inter-state trade, the border integration agreement con-
sidered suspending the existing tariff barriers and instituting a free trade zone
by 2003. The agreement also envisaged the movement of people and vehicles.
Towards this end both countries have jointly planned to construct cross-
border roads (La Oferta 2005).
The trade and navigation treaty signed by both countries, has enabled
Ecuadorian vessels to navigate the Amazon River; they receive the same
treatment as Peruvian vessels.33 Ecuador is allowed to set up trading centres
along the river to store, transform and commercialise merchandise in tran-
sit.34 Most important, the treaty signals the signatories’ commitment to grant
each other most favoured nation (MFN) treatment.35
These measures yielded concrete results. In the early 1990s, trade between
Ecuador and Peru did not exceed US$165 million. In 1999, it stood at
US$310 million dollars, increasing to US$873 million in 2004 (La Oferta
2005). Table 8.2 indicates the level of commercial exchange in relation to
that with other partner countries. The numbers attest the increasing import-
ance of bilateral trade between the two countries. Table 8.3 illustrates the
significance of this trade in a global context.
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Relation to regional integration schemes
I have already discussed the CAN’s contribution towards promoting eco-
nomic and political cooperation between Peru and Ecuador. Figure 8.4 tracks
their commercial flows to the CAN. Clearly, the resolution of the conflict has
led to enhanced trade flows to the region. Figure 8.5 tracks their trade with
the world.
Free trade agreements (FTAs) with the United States, if approved, would
constitute another important trade milestone. The US is the top destination
for exports originating from both Peru and Ecuador. Securing permanent
access to that market would ensure that, at the very least, trade flows
remain intact in the aftermath of the Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA),
which expired in December 2006.36 Otherwise, a loss of market access would
affect the countries’ economic stability and, as explained below, elicit illegal
trader.
Table 8.2 Bilateral trade
Reporter country: Ecuador Reporter country: Peru




Value of exports to
Ecuador, in US$ thousands
Year, partner
ranking
238,584 1997, 5 101,716 1998, 19
199,127 1998, 4 50,554 1999, 21
180,146 1999, 7 96,730 2000, 18
293, 822 2000, 4 124,553 2001, 15
253, 033 2001, 2
373,698 2002, 2
Source: Inter-American Development Bank (2003).
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EU 17.9 EU 11.5
EU candidates 0.5 ASEAN 2.2











Source: European Union (2006a, 2006b).
Note: * Excepting Turkey, these include the following: Algeria, Cisjordanie, Egypt, Israel,
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Syria and Tunisia.
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The FTA negotiations with the US have not gone smoothly. These negoti-
ations began in May 2004 and have yet to be approved. The US tried to
get its Andean counterparts, except Bolivia, to sign an agreement before the
2006 presidential elections in those countries (anticipating fears of popu-
list takeovers).37 Peru and Ecuador hoped to negotiate a deal before the
ATPA’s expiration in December 2006. This Act allowed participating coun-
tries to export nearly 6,300 products to the US without having to pay tariffs
(US International Trade Commission 2005). Losing this edge could be disas-
trous since Ecuador and Peru, along with other countries in the region, are
lagging behind in terms of competitiveness and investment attraction (Bussey
2006).
Peru managed to secure a bilateral deal (Trade Promotion Agreement) with
the US in December 2005. Amid popular protests, the Peruvian congress
ratified the trade deal in June 2006, by 79–14 votes with six abstentions (CNN
2006). President Alan Garcia, who was sworn in on 28 July 2006, wanted
to ‘propose an accord for the impoverished majority and not in its elitist
conception’ (Bloomberg 2006). To do so, he appointed Hernando de Soto,
Figure 8.4 Regional trade.
Source: CAN General Secretariat (2006).
Figure 8.5 Global trade.
Source: CAN General Secretariat (2006).
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the renowned Peruvian economist, as chief negotiator. Long, drawn-out
negotiations ended with the US Congress’ approval on 4 December 200738
and President Bush’s signature on 14 December. While the resulting agree-
ment might not be wholly socialist or favourable to the impoverished major-
ity in Peru, it is the first one requiring compliance with environmental and
labour standards.
Ecuador’s situation differed greatly. The US pulled out of negotiations in
May 2006, after Ecuador annulled a contract with Occidental Petroleum, a
US-based oil firm. The discovery of unapproved transfer of assets to a Cana-
dian oil company and excessive oil extraction by Occidental Petroleum
motivated the action (Hidalgo 2006). The US labelled it a breach of the
US–Ecuador bilateral investment agreement. Prior to this incident, the US
had criticised Ecuador’s new hydrocarbons law, which had already jeopard-
ised the negotiations.39 In response to criticism from the business community,
particularly the US negotiators, Ecuador’s president said that accepting an
imposition from an oil company in order to secure an FTA was unacceptable
(Hidalgo 2006).
Be that as it may, Ecuador would be at a serious disadvantage if the US
manages to negotiate bilateral trade deals with Colombia and Peru. Trade
exclusion from the US, given Ecuador’s higher production costs, would
encourage illicit trade to and from its better-off neighbours. Ecuador’s exports
to the US constitute 2 per cent of its GDP. As an alternative to the agreement,
President Rafael Correa expects to obtain an extension of benefits under the
ATPA. In his view, these benefits ‘should last as long as the anti-drug fights
lasts’ (Josephs 2006).
Although the FTAs with the US have inherent benefits, they also have
drawbacks. As is the case with other FTAs, eliminating tariffs means fore-
going government revenue. Tariffs also provide industry protection, without
which there are market losses in the short term, possibly long term as well if
the affected industries are not able to become more competitive. The most
serious threat is the potential of the FTAs to break down the Andean Pact
(Hidalgo 2006). To illustrate, the CAN currently outlaw the patenting of
plants, as required under the US FTA stipulations (Montenegro 2006).
In general, the FTAs negotiated by the US tend to be more stringent than
the WTO law. For this reason, Hugo Chavez decided to pull Venezuela out
of the CAN; claiming that ‘North American imperialism killed the CAN’
(Lucas 2006).
So, recapping, trade with the US is a double-edged sword. It has sparked
deep political rifts and it is threatening the integrity of the CAN. But neither
Peru nor Ecuador is prepared to terminate trade relations with the US;
it would be a devastating blow to their economies and to regional stability,
particularly if trade is diverted to neighbouring countries. Next to the mas-
sive discontent the situation would breed, an illegal exodus of goods and
people appears a minor complication.
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Future trends
Trade trends, along with the recent declarations by the ministers of foreign
relations, suggest that both countries will continue to work together to
expand their bilateral trade. They are currently negotiating a deal that will
allow Peru to directly import crude oil from Ecuador, the fifth largest oil
producer40 in South America (Palomino 2007). Improved bilateral relations
facilitate such exchanges, which could not be expected ten years earlier. On
the downside, the flow of illegal Peruvian immigrants to Ecuador could mar
trade relations, putting pressure on an already fragile economy. The con-
sequent cessation of border development and integration programmes would
constitute a serious economic drawback for both countries. More critically,
failing to consolidate the Andean integration process, as a knee-jerk reac-
tion to the potentially disruptive effects of implementing FTAs with the US,
will likely cause the greatest harm.
Conclusion: potential implications for future relations
Diplomatic and trade relations between Peru and Ecuador have normalised
since the dispute ended in 1998. Indeed, trade grew rapidly in subsequent
years, despite internal economic and political problems. The deposition of
Ecuador’s President Jamil Mahuad in January 2000 was triggered by the
country’s worst economic crisis in 70 years.41 Two specific events brought on
the crisis: the banking collapse and El Niño, which devastated crops. Further,
since President Bucaram’s ousting in 1997, Ecuador has gone through seven
presidents (four over the course of the peace negotiations).42 Overcoming this
political instability is necessary for needed reforms to take place.
Defence concerns for Ecuador now lie at the border it shares with Colom-
bia, primarily due to guerrilla incursions. US assistance through Plan Colom-
bia has induced a hike in Ecuador’s defence spending. This year’s budget
allocation alone was almost US$800 million. Eighty per cent of this amount
was funnelled into salaries for approximately 55,000 defence personnel.43
Peru, on the other hand, fared better in the aftermath of the conflict due
to strict fiscal policies put in place to control high inflation rates and other
symptoms of economic instability. President Fujimori’s austere economic
reforms aimed to make Peru an active player in the global economy and
succeeded in leading Peru out of its debt crisis.
However, in spite of his economic successes, Fujimori was not immune to
public criticism provoked by his authoritarian regime. The public also accused
him of human rights abuses.44 Evidence of corruption among high-ranking
officials in his administration triggered his downfall in his third term of
office; a salient case was that of the director of Peru’s National Intelligence
Service, Vladimiro Montesinos. Renewed economic difficulties also fuelled
public discontent. ‘After the collapse of the Fujimori regime, the government
removed army officers accused of involvement with Mr. Montesinos, and
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scaled down expenditure on the armed forces’ (Economist Intelligence Unit
2004). A recent government initiative seeks to revamp Peru’s armed forces
so that they can be better prepared to address non-traditional security
threats.
In terms of future prospects, the evidence presented in this chapter leads us
to believe that diplomatic and trade relations between Ecuador and Peru will
follow a steady course. Regional integration was key to peace, and consider-
ing the absence of conflicts and the upward trend in commercial exchange,
including trade with the world as a whole (as seen in Figure 8.5), it is fair to
say that trade has supported peace. However, this does not immediately trans-
late into enhanced governance to prevent or mitigate conflicts. While efforts
to foster border integration and economic development appear to stabilise
political relations, I was unable to identify concrete action plans aimed at
improving the crisis-management capacity of related institutions.
External actors have had a significant influence on peace-building efforts.
Without their participation, the conflict would have continued. However,
future interventions are not guaranteed as the mediators have been relieved
of their obligations under the Rio Protocol. This begs the question whether
Peru and Ecuador would pursue bilateral negotiations, or would they revert
to the CAN for assistance in resolving disputes. Perhaps the CAN should
consider establishing independent mediators with obligations similar to those
stipulated in the Rio Protocol. In view of the Protocol’s success, a similar
mechanism would constitute a powerful confidence-building mechanism.
Be that as it may, if the level of interdependency continues to increase, then
a swift resolution through diplomatic engagement will tend to be the response
to a dispute. This is because putting an immediate end to the conflict or
disagreement is clearly a win–win solution. In the case of Ecuador and Peru,
if conflict were to arise now or in the future, the outcome would depend on
several factors, including the level of interdependency and external actors’
involvement. At present, Peru has better prospects at stabilising its economy
and internal political climate than Ecuador. Since internal conditions do, to a
certain extent, affect the level of engagement and consequently interdepend-
ency, Ecuador seems to be in a more vulnerable position. Yet, the fact that it
was Ecuador’s reluctance to settle the border that perpetuated the dispute
allows observers to rest easy knowing that economic interests, along with
diplomatic controls and safeguards, will be enough to protect the peace
for now.
Notes
1 Venezuela’s president, Hugo Chavez, has expressed sympathy towards Colombian
guerrillas and his country is known to harbour them. This frustrates Colombia’s
efforts to eradicate guerrilla activity, to the point that it has actually been accused
of violating Venezuela’s territorial sovereignty by going after them across the
Venezuelan side of the border.
2 An administrative appendage set up by the Spanish Crown in 1563.
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3 The area’s high attitude and jungle climate made it difficult to settle homesteads.
See US Department of State (1980), as well as Band (2000) and Parodi (2002).
4 At the time, Ecuador was part of Gran Colombia, a federation of newly
independent countries led by Simon Bolivar, leader of the independence move-
ment of South America. The federation was comprised primarily by Venezuela,
Colombia, Panama and Ecuador. Plagued by factional disagreement, the feder-
ation was dissolved in 1830. Although a map outlining the border between
Gran Colombia and Peru was drawn after the 1829 war (won by Gran Colombia),
Peru never accepted it and used the federation’s dissolution as a reason for its
invalidation.
5 The Buenos Aires Conference for the Maintenance of Peace, held on 1–23
December 1936. See boundary report by the US Department of State.
6 The 1936 Lima Accord defined this line according to disputants’ actual occupa-
tion of boundary territory; Ecuadorian groups were settled in the upper jungle,
whereas Peruvians occupied larger tracts of land in the lower jungle. For more, see
Leonard (2006) and Yepes (1998).
7 Estimates vary among consulted sources. Some, like Cooper, put the number at
15,000 for Peru’s troops and 3,000 for Ecuador’s. A detailed account of the mobil-
isation effort can be found in Mundo Andino’s website (www.mundoandino.com/
Peru/Ecuadorian-Peruvian-war, accessed 11 June 2008), under Territorial Dispute,
as well as Mares’ (2001) book.
8 See point B-1 of Rio Protocol (1946).
9 By then, the boundary commission had completed 95 per cent of the demarcation.
10 For an overview of the causes and consequences of the demise of the right to
conquest in the twentieth century see Korman (1996).
11 According to Homza, only one of Ecuador’s A37 was slightly harmed. Cooper
offers a different account: two A37Bs and – possibly – a Kfir were damaged.
12 Ecuador actually asked for the guarantor’s assistance in resolving the dispute on
24 January 2005.
13 Given the area’s land mine infestation and the still latent conflict, most patrolling
was done by air.
14 As a precondition to MOMEP operations, the conflicting parties were required
to accept a four-phase programme that ended with the establishment of a
DMZ. Homza (2004), Marcella (1995) and, in particular, Weidner (1996) discuss
MOMEP’s peacekeeping efforts.
15 The road to settlement was marred with disagreements over Ecuador’s right
to retain hold of a minor logistics base, Banderas. Ecuador argued that the base
was located in an undisputed area on its side of the border and its inclusion in the
DMZ would endanger its efforts to aid indigenous people living there. In the end,
Ecuador was granted this concession.
16 In spite of the peace negotiations, both countries engaged in an arms race, most
likely fuelled by Peru’s irritation at having lost the war. At the height of the
negotiations, Peru’s navy and army were on call. See Homza’s (2004) overview and
Mundo Andino (n.d.).
17 President Duran Ballen’s successor, Bucaram took office on 10 August 1996. He
was impeached on corruption charges.
18 Territorial entity comprised of the former colonial territories of the Viceroyalty of
New Granada and the General Captaincy of Venezuela.
19 Peru’s military had almost half of the population living under a state of emer-
gency, ostensibly in an effort to combat the terrorism that had infested the country.
It was also Fujimori’s main source of support; the military supported his coup in
1992 by closing the Congress and the courts. On the other side, Ecuador’s military
has continually intervened in government affairs due to the weakness of the latter’s
institutions. The socialist policies implemented during the military-led government
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in the 1970s earned it high marks among the civilian populace. By 1995, it had
control of 60–70 per cent of the Ecuadorian economy. For further details, see Ruiz
(2006).
20 At the onset of the 1995 war, some Peruvians speculated that the Ecuadorian
military, whose control of the economy was apparently slipping, struck a deal
with President Sixto Duran Ballen; the military was to strike against Peru’s forces
to detract the public’s attention from the increasingly unpopular president in
exchange for restored rights to royalties in oil production. See Ryser (1995).
21 One commission was assigned the task of preparing a treaty of commerce and
navigation to facilitate Ecuador’s access to the Amazon River, another was to
come up with a comprehensive agreement on border integration to stimulate the
disputed area’s development, a third was in charge of demarcating the border, and
the remaining one was to develop mutual confidence measures aimed at preventing
future conflicts.
22 Mainly by obstructing access to strategic areas and preventing military buildup.
Homza (2004) evaluates MOMEP’s role as a CBM.
23 See Albright (1998).
24 All guarantor contingents had coequal status; their efforts were coordinated by a
Brazilian general.
25 Each guarantor was allowed to provide up to ten observers, with the exception the
US, which also provided support personnel and equipment.
26 Phase I took place between 2001 and 2004. It focused on community development
and, particularly, the consolidation of peace. Phase II began in 2005 and is
expected to end in 2009. Its goal is to achieve economic development in the border
region. See USAID brief (2005) for further programme details.
27 Originally set to last until 2009, but was recently extended to 2014.
28 For further details see Plan Binacional (1999).
29 At the time, Venezuela was one of the five member countries comprising the CAN
(the other four are Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru). It withdrew from the
CAN in June 2006.
30 Some of this money is derived from the assistance received from the government
of the United States through Plan Colombia (a plan to combat drug trafficking
originating from Colombia). After Colombia, Ecuador is the country that receives
the most support under this plan. See La Hora (2006) for more details.
31 Bolivia ranked third in terms of intra-community market orientation for exports
from both Ecuador and Peru.
32 The population of Peru and Ecuador is, respectively, 28.4 million and 13.2 million.
33 See Article 6 of the treaty.
34 See Article 22 of the treaty.
35 See Article 35 of the treaty.
36 The purpose of this Act, effective since 1991, is to combat drug production and
trafficking in four Andean countries (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru) by
offering trade benefits to help these countries develop and strengthen alternative,
legitimate industries.
37 The US started simultaneous negotiations with Colombia, Ecuador and Peru,
with different results to date.
38 Strong anti-trade sentiment delayed the negotiations. The fact that two-way trade
between Peru and US is not significant (at US$8.8 billion, it accounts for less than
half a per cent of the US’s total world trade) assuaged these; the deal is merely a
symbolic gesture. The Senate’s 77–18 approval was preceded by the House of
Representatives’ 285–135 vote in November 2007. See related articles by Weisman
(2007) and Associated Press (2007).
39 Approved on April 2006, the law aims to distribute benefits equally between the
state and oil companies.
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40 Interestingly, Ecuador’s rich oil fields are adjacent to Peru’s border.
41 The economy registered a growth of −7.5 per cent and an inflation rate of over
60 per cent. This dire situation led Ecuador to default on half of its foreign debt of
US$13 billion. See Rohter (2000).
42 Officially, a presidential term in Ecuador lasts four years.
43 La Hora (2006) details Ecuador’s current defence spending behaviour and deems
it excessive.
44 Some observers note that the state of emergency and the anti-terrorist legislation
were maintained longer than was necessary, thus encouraging human rights viola-
tions on the part of the armed forces and the police, which enjoyed significant
leeway during the struggle to eradicate leftist rebel violence.
References
Albright, M. (1998) ‘Ecuador and Peru’, op-ed, Diario Las Americas, 31 October.
Available from http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/1998/981031.html.
Accessed 22 October 2007.
Associated Press (2007) ‘Bush signs US-Peru free trade pact’, 19 December. Available
from http://www.usatoday.com. Accessed 19 December 2007.
Baud, M. (2000) ‘State-building and borderlands’, in P. van Dijck, A. Ouweneel and
A. Zoomers (eds) Fronteras: Towards a Borderless Latin America, Amsterdam:
Centre for Latin American Research and Documentation (CEDLA), pp. 41–82.
Bloomberg (2006) ‘Peru seeks to renegotiate free-trade pact with US’. Available from
http://www.bilaterals.org. Accessed 13 September 2006.
Bonilla, A. (1996) ‘Proceso político e intereses nacionales en el conflicto Ecuador–
Perú’, Nueva Sociedad, 143. Available from http://www.nuso.org/upload/articulos/
2499_1.pdf. Accessed 15 June 2006.
Brousek, D. (2006) ‘Perú recarga baterías para una guerra distinta: Hombre prevenido
vale por dos’, Tiempos del Mundo.
Bussey, J. (2006) ‘Nations rush to make trade pacts’, Miami Herald. Available from
http://www.bilaterals.org. Accessed 13 September 2006.
CAN General Secretariat (2006) ‘37 Años de integración comercial, 1969–2005’, stat-
istical document, SG de 144. Available from http://www.comunidadandina.org/
estadisticas/SGde144.pdf. Accessed 2 August 2006.
Carreras, M. (2007) ‘La paz trae progreso – La résolution du conflit entre l’equateur
et le pérou des négociations “forward-looking” réussies (1995–1998)’, Centro
Argentino de Estudios Internacionales (CAEI), working paper, 14. Available from
http://www.caei.com.ar/es/programas/latam/working.htm. Accessed 22 October
2007.
CNN (2006) ‘Peru approves free-trade pact with U.S’, June. Available from http://
www.bilaterals.org. Accessed 13 September 2006.
Cooper, T. (2003) ‘Peru vs. Ecuador; Alto-Cenepa war: 1995’, Central and Latin
American Database. Available from http://www.acig.org/artman/publish/
article_164.shtml. Accessed 13 March 2006.
COHA (Council on Hemispheric Affairs) (1998) ‘Peru–Ecuador peace agreement:
Hemisphere’s last armed territorial dispute finally settled’, memorandum to the
president 98.29. Available from http://www.coha.org. Accessed 9 July 2006.
Dominguez, J.I. et al. (2003) ‘Boundary disputes in Latin America’, United States
Institute of Peace, Available from http://www.usip.org. Accessed on 20 November
2005.
Peru and Ecuador 203
Economist (1995) ‘A warning from the Andes’, 334:7949, 42. Available from http://
proquest.umi.com/. Accessed 12 September 2006.
Economist (1996) ‘National pride and national frontiers’, 338:7949, 42. Available
from http://proquest.umi.com/. Accessed 12 September 2006.
Economist Intelligence Unit (2004) ‘Peru: international relations and defense’, EIU
Views Wire, London: Economist Intelligence Unit.
El Universo (2006) ‘Perú y Ecuador analizan migración y limites marítimos’, El
Universo, 6 September. Available from http://www.eluniverso.com. Accessed 10
September 2006.
El Vigía (2006) ‘Ecuador y Perú estrechan relaciones’, El Vigía. Available from http://
www.elvigia.net. Accessed 10 September 2006.
European Union (2006a) ‘Ecuador: trade statistics-economic fiche’. Available from
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113378.pdf.
Accessed 9 October 2006.
European Union (2006b) ‘Peru: trade statistics-economic fiche’. Available from http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2006/september/tradoc_113435.pdf. Accessed 9
October 2006.
Gowa, J. (1989) ‘Bipolarity, multipolarity, and free trade’, American Political Science
Review, 83:4, 1245–1256.
Henrikson, A.H. (2005) ‘Good neighbor diplomacy revisited’, in I.T. Gault and
H. Nicol (eds) Holding the Line: Borders in a Global World, Vancouver: UBC Press,
pp. 348–378.
Hidalgo, F. (2006) ‘Por qué estados unidos abortó el TLC con Ecuador?’ Avail-
able from http://www.alasru.org/textos/hidalgotlc.htm. Accessed 12 September
2006.
Homza, J.L. (2004) ‘Special operators: a key ingredient for successful peacekeeping
operations management’, Landpower Essay – Institute of Land Warfare, 04–6W.
Inter-American Development Bank (2003) Hemispheric Trade and Tariff Database.
Available from http://alca-ftaa.iadb.org/eng/ngmadb_e.htm. Accessed 21
June 2008.
Josephs, L. (2006) ‘New Ecuador leader nixes U.S. trade pact’, The Associated Press.
Available from http://www.washingtonpost.com. Accessed 22 October 2007.
Korman, S. (1996) The Right of Conquest: The Acquisition of Territory by force in
International Law and Practice, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
La Hora (2006) ‘Ecuador: Abusivo gasto militar’, 6 September. Available from http://
www.iidh.ed.cr/comunidades/segurida/noticia_despliegue.aspx?Codigo=2644.
Accessed 13 September 2006.
La Oferta (2005) ‘Ecuador y Perú impulsan proyectos fronterizos comunes’. Available
from http://www.laoferta.com. Accessed 15 June 2006.
Leonard, T.M. (2006) Encyclopedia of the Developing World, London: Taylor &
Francis.
Lima Commitment: Andean Charter for Peace and Security and for the Limita-
tion and Control of Foreign Defence Spending. Adopted on 17 June 2002.
Available from http://projects.sipri.se/cbw/docs/cbw-hist-andean.pdf. Accessed on
20 January 2006.
López, M. (2004) ‘Desarrollo en integración fronteriza Perú–Ecuador’. Available
from http://planbinancional.rree.gob.pe. Accessed 6 July 2006.
Lucas, K. (2006) ‘Community: grasping at unity straws’, Inter Press Service News
Agency. Available from http://www.bilaterals.org. Accessed 12 September 2006.
204 Alejandra Ruiz-Dana
Marcella, G. (1995) ‘Guerra y paz en el Amazonas: implicancias politicias del conflicto
Ecuador–Peru para los estados unidos y America Latina’, Revista Ser en el 2000, 8.
Available from http://www.ser2000.org.ar/articulos-revista-ser/revista-8/marcella.
htm. Accessed 11 October 2007.
Mares, D.R. (2001) Violent Peace: Militarized Interstate Bargaining in Latin America,
New York: Columbia University Press.
Montenegro, I. (2006) ‘FTA means deeper poverty in Peru: GMOs arrive. Democracy
doesn’t’, Available from http://www.bilaterals.org. Accessed 12 September 2006.
Mundo Andino (n.d.) ‘History of the Ecuadorian–Peruvian territorial dispute’.
Available from www.mundoandino.com/Peru/History-of-the-Ecuadorian-
Peruvian-territorial-dispute. Accessed 10 October 2007.
Palmer, D.S. (1997) ‘Peru–Ecuador border conflict: missed opportunities, misplaced
nationalism, and multilateral peacekeeping’, Journal of Inter-American Studies
and World Affairs, 39, Fall. Available from http://www.findarticles.com. Accessed
1 August 2006.
Plan Binacional de Desarrollo de la Región Fronteriza Ecuador–Perú (1999) Available
from http://www.planbinacional.gov.ec and http://www.planbinacional.org.pe.
Accessed 22 September 2006.
Palomino, M.L. (2007) ‘Peru, Ecuador say they are now best of friends’, 1 June,
Reuters. Available from www.reuters.com. Accessed 12 October 2007.
Rio Protocol (1946) Adopted 26 February. Available from http://www.usip.org/pubs/
peaceworks/pwks27/appndx1_27.html. Accessed 10 October 2007.
Rohter, L. (2000) ‘Ecuador coup shifts control to no. 2 man’, New York Times,
23 January. Available from http://www.nytimes.com. Accessed 22 October 2007.
Ruiz, J.C. (2006) ‘Seguridad y defensa de Ecuador: Espejismos y arenas movedizas’,
Available from http://www.ndu.edu/chds/Journal/PDF/2006/Vasquez-article-
edited.pdf. Accessed 5 July 2006.
Ryser, J. (1995) ‘The Ecuador thorn’, Global Finance, May, 95.
St John, Ronald B. et al. (1999) The Ecuador–Peru Boundary Dispute: The Road to
Settlement, Durham: Durham University – International Boundaries Research
Unit (IBRU).
Sethi, M. (2000) ‘Novel ways of settling border disputes: the Peru–Ecuador
case’, IDSA Strategic Analysis Journal, XXIII:10. Available from http://
www.ciaonet.org/olj/sa(sa_00sem01.html. Accessed 5 July 2006.
Simmons, B.A. (1999) ‘Territorial disputes and their resolution: the case of Ecuador
and Peru’, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace. Available from http://
www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks27/pwks27.html. Accessed 23 July 2006.
Simmons, B.A. (2005) ‘Trade and territorial conflict: international borders as institu-
tions’. Available from http://iicas.ucsd.edu/papers/GTCconf/Simmons_
Territory_and_Trade_UCS.pdf. Accessed 23 July 2006.
Sims, C. (1996) ‘Peru protests Israeli jets sale to Ecuador’, New York Times, 7 January.
Available from http://www.nytimes.com. Accessed 22 October 2007.
USAID (United States Agency for International Development) (2005) ‘Peru–Ecuador
Border Region Development’, data sheet. Available from http://www.usaid.gov/
budget/cbj2005/lac/pdf/527-008.pdf. Accessed 28 July 2006.
US Department of State, Office of the Geographer (1980) ‘Ecuador–Peru boundary’,
International Boundary Study, 172, 19 May.
US International Trade Commission (2005) ‘The impact of the Andean Trade
Preferences Act’, twelfth report, publication no. 3888.
Peru and Ecuador 205
Weidner, G.R. (1996) ‘Operation safe border: the Ecuador–Peru crisis’, JFQ Forum,
52–58.
Weisman, S.R. (2007) ‘House panel approves a trade pact with Peru’, New York
Times, 26 September. Available from http://www.nytimes.com. Accessed 11 October
2007.
Yepes, E. (1998) Perú–Ecuador, 1941–1942: Tres Dias de Guerra, Ciento Ochenta Dias
de Negociaciones, Lima: Universidad Nacional Agraria La Molina and Universidad
del Pacifico.
206 Alejandra Ruiz-Dana
9 Trading across the Straits
Will a free trade agreement




The relationship of China and Taiwan is a complicated one. It is necessary
to provide some context to the current state of affairs since both sides increas-
ingly appeal to different aspects of history to argue their case. It can also be
quite daunting at times to understand why either side sometimes gets upset or
provoked by the slightest change of terms.
The tension is seen by the government in Beijing as a legacy of an unfinished
civil war. The fall of the Qing dynasty saw the declaration of the Republic of
China (ROC) on 1 January 1912. However, for the next two decades, China
fell into a period of internal chaos and disorder. The country was divided into
provinces ruled by warlords by virtue of their command over private armies.
By 1927, the Kuomintang (KMT) under Chiang Kai-Shek had more or less
unified China and a capital was established in Nanjing from 1927 to 1937.2
However the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) led by Mao Zedong continued
to provide some resistance to the Nanjing government. Both sides continued
their civil war, although the Nanjing government was recognised officially as
representing the ROC.
In 1937, the Japanese launched a full-scale invasion of China that led to a
temporary – if uneasy and often not observed – truce between the CCP led by
Mao Zedong and the KMT. With the defeat of the Japanese in 1945, open
civil war broke out between the KMT and the CCP.
In 1949, the KMT fled mainland China for Taiwan after it lost the civil war
against the CCP. On 1 October 1949, Mao formally declared the establish-
ment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Both sides continued to claim
that they represented ‘China’. The importance of this claim is seen in the
representation at the United Nations (UN). The ROC held the seat at the UN
until 1971, when it was replaced by the PRC.
Many Taiwanese have challenged this version of the story as incomplete
and being too ‘mainland-centric’. For instance, the Taiwan Yearbook 2005
published by the Taiwan Government Information Office (GIO) pointed out
that Taiwan had ‘been a neglected island before the 17th century’.3 They
argued that Taiwan had always been independent of China. In 1662, Jheng
Cheng-gong defeated the Dutch and established a government in opposition
to the Qing dynasty. Taiwan only came under the Qing control in 1683. In
1895, it was ceded ‘in perpetuity’ to the Japanese under the terms of the Treaty
of Shimonoseki in April 1895. This treaty was the peace treaty concluded
between the Qing and Japanese after the former lost the first Sino-Japanese
war in 1894–1895. Some of these Taiwanese historians argue that since
Taiwan only came under the brief control of the Qing, it should not be seen
as part of mainland China.
The terms of the return of Taiwan to the ROC is another point of contest-
ation, with some Taiwanese arguing that General MacArthur only ‘gifted’
Taiwan to ROC after the Second World War with the legal status of Taiwan
kept ambiguous.4 An unfortunate episode in 1947 further tested the uneasy
relationship between the ‘mainlanders’ and the ‘Taiwanese’, when the KMT
governor of Taiwan, Chen Yi, put down unrest in Taiwan, killing thousands
of people in the process. This episode has since been a symbol of the tension
between the two protagonists.5
Since martial law was lifted in 1987, some forms of contact between China
and Taiwan were allowed. However, the tension between the two remains
palpable.
For the purposes of this chapter, the terms ‘ROC’ and Taiwan are used
interchangeably. This is a simplifying definition since it is possible to imagine,
though probably not politically feasible at the moment, a Taiwan not being
the ROC but a new political entity. The term ‘China’ refers primarily to
mainland China governed by the PRC. However, it could also be used to
refer to the territory that both the PRC and ROC leaders, specifically
Mao Zedong and Chiang Kai-Shek, had in mind when they talked about
‘reunification’.6
A free trade agreement as a means to promote peace
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the extent to which a formalised
agreement, specifically a free trade agreement (FTA), would help to mitigate
tensions between the two entities. The term ‘free trade agreement’ was con-
ventionally understood to refer to a preferential trade agreement (PTA) ‘with
tariffs eliminated entirely on goods produced in member countries’.7 How-
ever, in the popular media, the term FTA is increasingly used to simply refer
to the assortments of economic agreements such as ‘closer economic partner-
ship agreements’ or ‘comprehensive economic partnership agreements’
or ‘economic partnerships’. Although this chapter uses the term FTA to
describe these economic agreements for simplicity, it is important to keep
in mind that the coverage, length of implementation and details of these
agreements differ widely.
The example of the European Union (EU) has often been cited as an
exemplar of how closer economic cooperation and subsequently a security
community could be formed through the formation of a customs union. This
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chapter examines the extent to which an FTA could play a part in mitigating
tensions and promoting stability.
Promoting interdependence
That FTAs might be used to increase interdependence should not be taken
for granted. By itself, an FTA simply describes a kind of economic agree-
ment. The actual efficacy of the agreement will depend on other factors such
as the trade links between the two partners and complexity of the rules of
origin (RO).8
The general conception that the likelihood of violent conflict decreases
with greater interdependence (which raises the opportunity cost of conflict) is
a popular notion. However, this conception depends on other factors. It is
entirely plausible that there will be a greater likelihood of war, especially if
one state is dependent on another for vital resources such as supply of fuel
or raw materials. This dependence could also be in the form of relying on
a particular trade partner for national development. One of the immediate
causes of the war between Japan and the United States in 1941 was the
imposition of an oil embargo on Japan by the US.
A refinement of the theory is the ‘trade-expectation argument’ by Copeland
(1996). Copeland argues that peace will only be promoted when a state has
a positive expectation of future trade. Hence, for a state that is dependent
on another state, the possibility of war will increase if the state expects
disruption to this trading relation.
FTAs also signal the importance of the political relationship between two
states, representing a commitment to engage each other.9 Such integration
can be either economic or political. The EU is often cited as an example of
how regional integration could take place through economic integration or a
gradual ‘spill over’ of issues to finally encompass some form of political
integration.10
Limitations of FTAs
Every FTA is different
Ultimately, every FTA differs and is unique in its own right. These differences
could relate to:
• the coverage of the trade in goods and services (i.e. how many goods and
services actually receive a reduction of tariffs);
• the duration over which concessions are phased in;
• the RO (what conditions are needed for the goods to qualify for the
preferential arrangement);
• the dispute settlement mechanism (DSM);
• differences between what has been agreed upon at the multilateral forum
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and the bilateral agreement and the reality of what is taking place within
the market (often the FTAs that are signed do not promise much more
than whatever has been agreed under World Trade Organization (WTO)
or other international agreement’s obligations);
• the extent of trade facilitation and technical barriers to trade;
• the extent of inclusion determined by ‘behind-borders’ agreement such
as competition policy and mutually recognised standards;
• the scope of coverage as well as exclusion of sensitive products.
Political will to use institutions in the FTA
Ultimately, even after an FTA is signed, it does not necessarily mean that the
partners will use the institutional tools available under the FTA. Given the
proliferation of forums and organisations (both regional and international),
states could choose between resolution by political negotiation or by the
WTO DSM or through the institutions agreed upon in the bilateral
agreement. In the same line, many trade and investment agreements have
been signed by the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)
governments but many of them were not implemented.
One should not overstate the importance of formal economic agreements
or even admission to the WTO (or its predecessor, General Agreements on
Tariffs and Trade (GATT)).11 Both China and Taiwan have developed rap-
idly without membership in GATT and the WTO (until 2001). Nor do
FTAs guarantee increased economic interactions among partners. For
instance, a number of the FTAs recently concluded among trading partners
with small volumes of trade, such as Singapore and Bahrain or Singapore
and Jordan, are unlikely to generate significant economic integration. Ultim-
ately, an FTA should be seen as a step towards possible closer cooperation
but not a panacea. It is possible that countries that are more open and
globally integrated are more likely to promote bilateral or regional
integration.
China’s policy towards Taiwan
Political relations
Both sides set up quasi-official organisations to deal with some of the
bilateral issues. In 1991, Taiwan established the Strait Exchange Foundation
(SEF) while China set up the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan
Strait (ARATS). In 1992, officials from both organisations held informal
talks in Hong Kong that resulted in the ‘1992 consensus’. The consensus was
an informal agreement reached orally between ARATS and SEF stipulating
that both sides of the Straits adhere to the one-China principle but with
different interpretations.12
In 1993, Wang Daohan, the president of ARATS, and the late Koo Chen-Fu,
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chairman of SEF, held formal talks in Singapore. The talks left difficult eco-
nomic issues unresolved. In particular, Beijing wanted to institute direct air
and sea links, which Taiwan refused. In retaliation, China rejected Taiwan’s
request for protection of its mainland investments. However, both sides
agreed on ways to verify and compensate for lost mail, establish a framework
for authenticating legal documents and facilitate follow-up meetings between
the two organisations.
The second round of Wang–Koo talks was scheduled for May 1995 but it
was postponed indefinitely after Taiwan’s then president, Lee Teng Hui,
made a visit to Cornell University (in the United States) in June. The relations
between both sides also deteriorated with the Chinese conducting missile tests
near Taiwan in July and August 1995 and in March in 1996.
In 1998, another round of talks was held in Shanghai. Significantly, the
PRC had quietly dropped some conditions it had earlier demanded after
the 1995–1996 cross-Straits missile crisis.13 While the outcome was not
substantial, it represented a return to the negotiating table by both sides.
There have been a number of shifts in China’s strategy in handling the
Taiwan issue. One of the first proposals was by Chinese Deng Xiaoping who
introduced the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ in his 1984 ‘Guidelines
on actions towards Taiwan’. While the terms have changed over the years, the
idea that two different political systems could co-exist in a country has
not intrinsically been accepted by the PRC. Its objective remains to reunify
Taiwan. However, China’s leaders seem to have gradually relaxed on the
timeframe of the unification. It seems that Beijing is increasingly satisfied as
long as Taiwan does not declare independence because China considers that
time is more likely on its side.
Economic relations
The evolution of the political relationship between the two should also be
seen in the context of the deepening economic relationship between the two.
There are two caveats to some of the figures used in this article. First, it is
important to note that the trade and investment figures between China and
Taiwan are complicated by the role of Hong Kong as a transit between the
two countries. Many Taiwanese companies set up shell companies elsewhere
in Asia, usually Hong Kong before investing in China. Hong Kong also plays
a transshipment role in re-exporting some of the imports to other countries.
Second, the investment figures for China are complicated by the presence
of ‘round-tripping’ in Hong Kong, whereby some of the Chinese firms set up
shell companies in Hong Kong to invest in China. This is usually done in
order for the Chinese firms to gain more favourable investment terms espe-
cially in terms of taxation. China also provides favourable land use rights and
better administrative support for foreign investors than local ones.14
For most of the statistical information, we have used the figures from the
Mainland Affairs Council (MAC), which is based in Taiwan. The reason for
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using the MAC figures is that they have provided estimates on both PRC and
ROC figures.
Trade patterns
Since indirect trade was allowed between the two countries in 1987, trade
between the two has increased dramatically.15 In 1987, it was estimated by
the MAC that the value of the total trade between China and Taiwan was
US$1.5 billion. By 2004, this figure had gone up to US$6.6 billion. This is a
306 per cent increase. Trade between the two grew 33 per cent in 2004 from
US$4.6 billion in 2003.
Taiwan was China’s fifth largest trading partner in 2004. Taiwan was
China’s sixth largest exporter but second largest importer (after Japan) in
2004. This also shows the role played by China as the final stop of assembly
for many of the East Asian states (see Table 9.1)
Based on the MAC estimate,16 the share of Taiwanese imports as a portion
of China’s total imports has increased from 2.8 per cent in 1987 to 8 percent
in 2004. The share of Chinese exports to Taiwan as a percentage of Chinese
total exports has increased from 0.7 per cent in 1987 to 2.8 per cent in 2004.
The percentage of Chinese trade with Taiwan, as a portion of total Chinese
trade has increased from 2.1 per cent in 1987 to 5.3 per cent in 2004. From
China’s perspective, Taiwan is an important but not significant trading
partner. It is difficult to get accurate statistics of China’s trade with Taiwan
because quite a lot of bilateral trade relations went through Hong Kong.
Generally, Taiwan exports capital goods and higher end machinery and
electronic products to China.
Table 9.1 Mainland China foreign trade by country (area) (US$ hundred millions)
Period 2002 2003 2004 January–October 2005
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
Japan 484.4 534.7 594.2 741.5 735.1 943.7 686.9 811.8
USA 699.5 272.3 924.7 338.6 1,249.5 446.8 1,325.3 397.8
Hong
Kong
584.7 107.4 762.9 111.2 1,008.8 118.0 969.9 101.1
South
Korea
155.0 285.7 29.7 51.0 38.4 44.3 31.0 23.0
Taiwan 65.9 380.6 90.0 493.6 135.5 647.8 133.5 597.7
Germany 113.7 164.3 175.4 243.4 237.6 303.7 259.9 252.1
Singapore 69.7 70.5 88.7 104.8 126.9 140.0 132.0 133.7
UK 80.6 33.4 108.2 35.7 149.7 47.6 154.0 44.4
France 40.7 42.5 72.9 61.0 99.2 76.6 94.6 71.9
Australia 45.9 58.5 62.6 73.0 88.4 115.5 89.5 131.6
Russia 35.2 84.1 60.3 97.3 91.0 121.3 105.3 131.3
Source: China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook and China’s Customs Statistics compiled
by MAC. Available from http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/156/27.pdf.
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Investment
Again, we should bear the caveat in mind when looking at the figures for
investments to China. In particular, it is difficult to determine how much of
the high amount of investment of Hong Kong actually originates from Hong
Kong due to the phenomenon of ‘round-tripping’. It is also difficult to know
how much of the investment from Hong Kong is from Taiwanese companies
based there.17
From Table 9.2, we can see that 11.1 per cent of the total realised foreign
direct investment (FDI) in China came from the British Virgin Islands in
2004. The source of investments is difficult to trace since the Virgin Islands is
a tax haven and many companies operate investment holding companies or
shell companies in order to qualify for preferential tax benefits.
Taiwan was China’s sixth largest source of FDI in 2004, accounting for
5.1 per cent for the total realised Chinese investment. This is a slight decline
of 7.7 per cent over the figures in 2003. Nevertheless, it is difficult to conclude
that there is actually a decline in Taiwanese investment in China since we are
uncertain as to the extent to which Taiwanese investment in China has been
funnelled through Hong Kong or the British Virgin Islands.
Nevertheless, what is evident from the figures is that Taiwanese investment
is an important source of capital for the Chinese economy. It is uncertain
whether there is dependence of China on Taiwanese capital or vice versa.
However, as the Taiwanese commercial stake in China increases, the PRC
government has gained a stronger bargaining position vis-à-vis the ROC.
The PRC can use the Taiwanese businesses to exert pressure on the ROC
government. (Examples are discussed below.)
Table 9.2 Sources of realised FDI in China (US$ millions)
2002 2003 2004
Country/Area Amount % Amount % Amount %
Hong Kong,
Macao
18,329.31 34.75 18,116.70 33.86 19,546.60 32.24
British Virgin
Islands
6,117.39 11.60 5,776.96 10.80 6,730.30 11.10
Korea 2,720.73 5.16 4,488.54 8.39 6,247.86 10.31
Japan 4,190.09 7.94 5,054.19 9.45 5,451.57 8.99
US 5,423.92 10.28 4,198.51 7.85 3,940.95 6.50
Taiwan 3,970.64 7.53 3,377.24 6.31 3,117.49 5.14
Singapore 2,337.20 4.43 2,058.40 3.85 2,008.14 3.31
Germany 927.96 1.76 856.97 1.60 1,058.48 1.75
Others 8,725.62 16.55 9,577.16 17.90 12,526.26 20.66
Total 52,742.86 100.00 53,504.67 100.00 60,627.65 100.00
Source: China Statistical Yearbook, China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook and Intertrade,
published on MAC website, http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/156/31.pdf.
Note: Any slight discrepancies in numbers are due to rounding.
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Tourism
There has been a steady increase in the number of Taiwanese tourists to
China since the two established some links in 1987, despite the absence of
direct transport links between the two countries – except during the lunar
New Year period. About 3.7 million Taiwanese tourists visited the mainland
in 2004, which was a 35 per cent increase over 2003 (see Table 9.3). While the
rate of increase was exaggerated by the low base in 2003 (it was low because
of the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in the region),
it represented a 311 per cent increase over the figures in 1990. This represents
an average annual growth rate of approximately 10.7 per cent over 14 years.
Taiwanese tourists constitute the third largest source of tourists after Hong
Kong (66.6 million) and Macao (21.9 million).18
The increase in visits also shows a trend towards broadening of the eco-
nomic relationship between the two territories. Tourism did not seem to be
affected by the ups and downs of the political relationship. Nevertheless, the
increase in exchanges or more accurately interactions of the people on both
sides do not seem to have diluted the Taiwanese sense of a separate identity.
On the other hand, visitors from China are far fewer because of bureaucratic
controls imposed by Taiwan’s authorities.
Table 9.3 Number of Taiwanese visitors to mainland China

















January–October 2005 3,513,900 13.82
Source: China Monthly Statistics and China Travel Yearbook produced by MAC, http://
www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/156/19.pdf.
Note: Taiwanese residents have been allowed to visit mainland China since November 1987.
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Use of FTAs by China
China seems to have started to use FTA or the ‘closer economic partnership
agreement’ (CEPA) to integrate Hong Kong and Macao with the mainland
economy. In January 2004, the CEPA between China and Hong Kong came
into effect. It was signed on 29 June 2003 and was notified to the WTO on
12 January 2004.19 However, since then, there have been two other ‘updates’
or additions to the original agreement to expand the coverage and refine the
rules.
Under the agreement, China agreed to eliminate all tariffs for a list of
goods specified in Annex 1 of the agreement. The RO for the CEPA were also
quite liberal with goods only needing 30 per cent value-added in Hong Kong
to qualify for the preferential treatment.
The CEPA between China and Macao is almost identical to the Hong
Kong CEPA. The only minor differences are the difference in agencies and
regulations applicable in Hong Kong and Macao as well as the coverage of
goods. However, other major components for instance, the main text, RO and
requirements for entities operating in the Mainland are the same.20
Lessons from these FTAs for Taiwan
It is important to note that China is concerned that reunification be seen as
beneficial for Hong Kong and Macao. Even though the gains from these
CEPAs are limited and will not slow down the deindustrialisation of Hong
Kong,21 the terms are reasonably generous and liberal. It is likely that these
CEPAs served as a signal to Taiwan that reunification would be rewarded
economically. These CEPAs are also a means through which China could
encourage greater dependence by Hong Kong and Macao on the Chinese
economy. The CEPA with Hong Kong also acts as a signal to Hong Kong
that China is determined to help revive the territory’s economy after the
SARS outbreak in 2003.22
Taiwan’s policy towards the mainland
Political relations
In 1949, the KMT lost the Chinese civil war in mainland China and fled to
Taiwan. Members of the National Assembly moved to Taiwan and, in effect,
the ROC continued to govern.23 In all, about two million mainland Chinese
fled to Taiwan. These mainlanders occupied key positions of authority.
Martial law was declared in 1949, which was only lifted in 1987.
The unfortunate ‘228 Incident’ occurred in 1947, when several thousands
people were killed after the KMT governor Chen Yi put down unrest in
Taiwan. This incident is controversial and was only allowed to be discussed
after 1987. It has now become a common example used by many Taiwan
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nationalists as an example of how the mainlanders have oppressed the
Taiwanese.24 Such negative historical antecedents have helped to strengthen
independent movement in Taiwan, especially in southern Taiwan.
After the death of Chiang Kai-Shek in 1975, Yen Chia-Kan briefly became
the president. Chiang Kai-Shek’s son, Chiang Ching-Kuo, then became the
president of the ROC in 1978. Chiang Ching-Kuo introduced the policy of
the ‘three nos’ in 1978, which signified ‘no official contact, no official talks
and no compromise’.
When Chiang Ching-Kuo passed away in 1988, Lee Teng Hui became
the first Taiwanese-born leader of the KMT and correspondingly, for that
time, president of Taiwan. Lee established the National Unification Council
(NUC) in 1990 to convince the mainland government that Taiwan was com-
mitted to reunification.25 However, the ‘three nos’ policy had gradually been
put aside.26 The meeting in Singapore between the heads of ARATS and SEF
provided one of the most visible breaks in this policy.
The NUC established the National Unification Guidelines which consisted
of four principles towards the goal of eventual unification. They included
acceptance that the mainland and Taiwan are both Chinese territory and that
unification was the ‘common responsibility of all Chinese people’.
It was, however, Lee Teng Hui’s visit to his Alma Mater, Cornell University,
in June 1995 that caused possibly the most serious setback in the cross-Strait
relations. The PRC saw it as a betrayal of the US’ previous agreement of ‘one
China’, as well as a broken promise by Secretary of State Warren Christopher
not to grant a visa to Lee.27 The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) conducted
military exercises in the Taiwan Strait between July and November 1995,
including two rounds of missile testing.28 By March 1996, with the PLA
carrying out more military exercises, the US President Bill Clinton sent two
aircraft carriers to the Straits as a show of US commitment to Taiwan.29
Another diplomatic tension in the Straits, though not as serious as in
1995–1996, occurred when President Lee publicly declared in an interview in
July 1999 that the relations between Taiwan and the mainland was one of
‘state-to-state relations’, or at least ‘special state-to-state relations’.30 Lee’s
statement was seen as a clear desire to seek relations with the PRC on possibly
an equal basis.31 This time, the PRC did not adopt as strong a response as
in 1996.32 In fact, the Clinton administration also responded very differently
from 1996. It criticised Lee for being a troublemaker and supported the
PRC’s view.33 All along, at an official level, the US maintained a ‘one
China policy’.
Economic relations
Lee Teng Hui’s ‘no haste, be patient’ (NHBP) policy
The 1996 cross-Strait tension made Lee Teng-Hui realise the importance
of not being overly dependent on China. In October 1996, President Lee
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addressed the eleventh meeting of the National Reunification Committee
saying:
To ensure the security and welfare of the 21 million fellowmen in Taiwan
area is the bottom line of our survival and development. Therefore the
starting point of our mainland policy must be to keep out roots in Taiwan,
enhance construction, and strengthen our national power. We must show
no haste, be patient, move steadily, and then go far.34
This NHBP policy was effectively a call for a review of Taiwan’s then strategy
of ‘Taiwan–China development nexus’.35 Under this, Taiwanese companies
were barred from investing in infrastructure building and some high-tech
industries in the mainland. They were not allowed to invest in any project
exceeding US$50 million and were not allowed to put more than 20 per cent
of their total assets into the mainland projects. Taiwanese investment in
the mainland fell by 43 per cent and some companies such as the Formosa
Plastic Group and President Enterprises postponed or cancelled some of
their projects in the mainland.36
Even when the Taiwanese government allowed ‘mini-three-links’ (MTL)
(transportation, postal and trade links) between China and Taiwan, begin-
ning 1 January 2001, it only allowed these links to apply to the offshore
islands of Kinmen and Matsu, rather than the entire Taiwan. Two of the
main aims for the establishment of the MTL were to decriminalise activities
such as smuggling and trespassing. The Taiwanese government hoped to
boost the economy especially in terms of tourism in Kinmen and Matsu.
Nevertheless, even such a small move was criticised by some Taiwanese as
detrimental to Taiwan’s security.37
Proactive Liberalisation with Effective Management (PLEM)
With the slowdown in the global economy (due to 9/11 attacks on the US), as
well as deteriorating domestic economic conditions, President Chen relaxed
some of the restrictions on Taiwanese investment in the mainland. On
7 November 2001, the Taiwanese Executive Yuan changed its policy of
NHBP to the ‘proactive liberalisation with effective management (PLEM)’.38
The new policy would allow Taiwanese investors to invest in the mainland
in more than 7,000 product categories. However, investment in 195 produc-
tion categories, including upstream petrochemical industries and 12-inch
silicon chip foundries, remained banned. The investment ceiling was also
raised. For instance, only investment over US$20 million in the mainland
needed to be screened on a case-by-case basis whereas investment below that
amount would be approved after a ‘simple screening process’.39
Nevertheless, Chen Shui-Bian has remained wary of being overly depend-
ent on the Chinese economy.40 In January 2006, he reiterated the need to
tighten regulations on Taiwanese firms investing in mainland China, possibly
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in response to Chinese President Hu Jintao’s call for direct transport links
between the two countries.
Existing trade relations
Regardless of the hesitation from the government, the figures show that the
economic relations between Taiwan and China are deepening rapidly. If we
use estimated figures from the MAC (or ‘Mainland 2’ in Table 9.4), we can see
that China was Taiwan’s largest trading partner in 2004, accounting for a
total of US$61.6 billion, followed by Japan at US$56.9 billion and the US at
US$50.5 billion.
In terms of exports, China is Taiwan’s largest export market, absorbing an
estimated US$45.0 billion in 2004. Hong Kong is Taiwan’s second largest
export market at US$29.9 billion.41 The US is Taiwan’s third largest export
market at US$28.1 billion.
In terms of imports, Taiwan imported US$43.6 billion worth of products
from Japan, its largest import partner in 2004. The second largest import
partner is the US with about US$22.4 billion, followed by mainland China at
US$16.7 billion.
Based on the estimates from MAC, Taiwan’s trade dependence on China
was 18.0 per cent in 2004.42 If the composition of trade is broken down,
China accounted for 9.9 per cent of Taiwan’s imports and 25.8 per cent of
its exports. This dependence seems to be increasing – in 1990, Taiwan’s
trade dependence on China was only 4.2 per cent. This increase in depend-
ence on trade with China has been noted with alarm by the Taiwanese
government.43
Table 9.4 Taiwan’s major trade partners (US$ hundred millions)
2002 2003 2004 January–October 2005
Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports Exports Imports
US 267.6 180.9 259.5 168.2 281.3 223.9 234.8 176.8
Japan 119.7 272.8 119.4 326.4 132.3 436.5 119.1 388.9
Hong Kong 308.5 17.4 283.7 17.3 298.8 20.9 251.4 15.8
South Korea 38.7 77.1 45.7 86.9 53.5 116.3 45.3 108.0
Germany 38.4 44.2 42.1 49.7 45.1 58.3 35.4 51.6
Singapore 43.8 35.4 49.8 38.7 63.4 42.9 61.7 40.2
Malaysia 31.3 41.5 30.5 47.5 40.7 54.1 34.8 42.9
Holland 37.7 14.4 41.3 12.9 54.2 21.8 35.6 17.2
UK 29.1 13.6 28.8 14.2 33.8 17.3 26.5 14.2
Mainland (1) 103.1 17.1 117.9 21.6 147.6 24.9 140.3 21.6
Mainland (2) 294.7 79.5 353.6 109.6 449.6 166.8 422.9 162.8
Source: MAC website, http://www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/156/35.pdf.
Notes: Data for all countries except for the mainland figures are from the Monthly Statistics of
Exports and Imports Taiwan Area, ROC; Mainland China (1) data comes from Hong Kong
Customs Statistics; Mainland China (2) data are based on estimation from ROC MAC.
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Existing investment relations
This dependence on China can also be seen in the investment figures. In
Table 9.5, we can see that there is a divergence in figures between the
approved figures by the ROC and the realised figures (based on the mainland
Chinese government data). The amount of realised Taiwanese investment
(based on mainland China data) has remained fairly constant since 1993 at
around US$2.6 billion–US$4.0 billion. From the ROC perspective, it has also
gradually increased the approved amount.
It seems that the Yangtze River Delta region is one of Taiwanese investors’
favourite destinations in China. The Yangtze River Delta consists of the
Jiangsu, Zhejiang provinces and the Shanghai municipality. It has been esti-
mated that the region attracted 55 per cent of the total Taiwanese investment
in China in 2004 (in 1993, the figure was only about 26 per cent). In contrast,
both the share of Taiwanese investment in China received by Guangdong and
Fujian provinces in the Pearl River fell from 48 per cent in 1993 to 28 per cent
in 2004.44 Regardless of the locality of the investments, there is recognition
of a move of Taiwanese business interests towards the mainland.45 Appar-
ently, the Yangtze River Delta has more cultural affinity to most non-native
Taiwanese businessmen as many of them came from this region. In addition,
the Yangtze River Delta has better investment opportunities for Taiwan
Table 9.5 Taiwan’s investment in mainland China (US$ millions)
Year Approved by Ministry of
Economic Affairs, ROC
Official data from mainland
China




1991 237 174.16 3,815 3,310.30 861.64
1992 264 246.99 6,430 5,543.35 1,050.50
1993 1,262 1,140.37 10,948 9,964.87 3,138.59
1994 934 962.21 6,247 5,394.88 3,391.04
1995 490 1,092.71 4,847 5,849.07 3,161.55
1996 383 1,229.24 3,184 5,141.00 3,474.84
1997 728 1,614.54 3,014 2,814.49 3,289.39
1998 641 1,519.21 2,970 2,981.68 2,915.21
1999 488 1,252.78 2,499 3,374.44 2,598.70
2000 840 2,607.14 3,108 4,041.89 2,96.28
2001 1,186 2,784.15 4,214 6,914.19 2,979.94
2002 1,490 3,858.76 4,853 6,740.84 3,970.64
2003 1,837 4,594.99 4,495 8,557.87 3,377.24
2004 2,004 6,940.66 4,002 9,305.94 3,117.49
January–September
2005
965 4,193.47 2,850 7,013.41 1,576.89
Source: ‘Table 10: Taiwan Investment in Mainland China’, MAC website, http://
www.mac.gov.tw/big5/statistic/em/155/10.pdf.
Note: Includes the number of registration of previously unregistered investment.
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businessmen compared to the Pearl River Delta in the south as it is more
dominated by Hong Kong businessmen.
Taiwan has been wary of high-tech investments in mainland China by
Taiwanese companies. In particular, the Taiwanese government is concerned
about the semiconductor sector; Taiwan has among the largest computer
maker industries globally, with about 73 per cent of their output coming from
Taiwanese-owned factories in China in 2004.46 Taiwan Semiconductor Manu-
facturing (TSM) is the only Taiwanese semiconductor firm to have received a
formal approval to open a semiconductor plant in the mainland. However,
this could be due to the fact that TSM is using an older technology, ‘trailing
edge technology’, and is thus not seen as posing too much of a threat to the
Taiwanese economy.47
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that the Taiwanese government has been suc-
cessful in its opposition. It is not easy for the Taiwanese government to
regulate Taiwanese companies especially since they could register overseas
first before investing in China. For instance, Semiconductor Manufactur-
ing International Corporation (SMIC or Zhongxin), which is based in
Shanghai, is registered as an American company but it is led by a Taiwanese
businessman.48
This does not mean that the Taiwanese government has given up trying
to restrict the flow of capital.49 For instance, in 2005 after China passed
the Anti-Secession Law, the Taiwanese government began to strengthen
regulations on Taiwanese companies such as Powerchip Semiconductor and
ProMOS Technologies. Powerchip Semiconductor filed for government
approval to set up an 8-inch wafer plant in China in 2004 but the approval
was delayed. ProMOS Technologies is also facing a similar situation.50
The Taiwanese government has also charged a Taiwanese businessman
Robert Tsao, a former chairman of United Microelectronics Corporation
(UMC) with criminal ‘breach of trust’ over his involvement in setting up a
Chinese company, Hejin Technologies, in 2001 despite a ban on Taiwanese
semiconductor investment in China.51
Taiwan companies previously opened shell companies in Hong Kong but
now are diverting through investment companies in tax havens e.g. Virgin
Islands and Cayman Islands.52 For instance, investments from Xunda Com-
puter and Dafeng Computer are both registered as originating from British
Virgin Islands but they are also subsidiaries of Mitac Computer and Quanta
Computer in Taiwan.
Nevertheless, businesses with interests in cross-Strait economic ties have
probably exerted some restraint on the Taiwanese leaders who might prefer
independence.53 The various commercial associations in Taiwan have also
generally called for stability in February 2006 when Chen ceased the oper-
ations of the NUC.54 It is uncertain as to the extent to which their call for
restraint is heeded by either government on both sides of the Straits.
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Taiwan policy under Chen Shui-Bian
Chen Shui-Bian seems to be adopting a gradual but obvious move towards
independence. First, he added the word ‘Taiwan’ to the ROC passports – a
sign seen by the Chinese as a step moving towards a separate entity – in his
first term of office. Second, he has continued to ask for entry to the UN but as
Taiwan, rather than the ‘Republic of China’.
In his inaugural speech after winning his first presidential elections in
2000, he said:
I fully understand that, as the popularly elected 10th-term president of
the Republic of China, I must abide by the Constitution, maintain the
sovereignty, dignity and security of our country, and ensure the well-
being of all citizens. Therefore, as long as the CCP regime has no inten-
tion to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in
office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title,
I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called ‘state-to-state’ descrip-
tion in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change
the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification.
Furthermore, there is no question of abolishing the Guidelines for
National Unification and the National Unification Council.55
The results of the 11 December 2004 elections were widely regarded as a
setback for Chen Shui-Bian and his provocative policies against China.56 The
pro-independence parties (also known as the pan-blue parties) won the elec-
tions with a slim majority of 114 seats in the 225 member Legislative Yuan.
The pan-green forces won 101 seats with the remaining 10 seats going to
independent candidates.
However, in 2006, Chen raised the possibility of abolishing the NUC.
The NUC had not met since April 1999. Its budget had also been cut
drastically.57 Chen pointed out that the guidelines and the council were
‘absurd products of an absurd era’. The US, subsequently, condemned this
provocative act.
Separate Taiwanese identity
Since the political liberalisation of Taiwan in the 1980s, the sense of a
Taiwanese identity has been growing stronger.58 This has been one of the
reasons for the wariness many Taiwanese feel about Chinese moves towards
greater economic integration. For instance, if we were to look at the results of
polls carried out by the MAC, the percentage of Taiwanese wanting unifica-
tion as soon as possible has generally been less than 3.5%, with the latest poll
conducted on November 2005 showing 2.1% of the people wanting unifica-
tion immediately. The percentage of respondents wanting independence as
soon as possible was 10.3 per cent. Most (37.7 per cent) favoured the status
Trading across the Straits 221
quo now and a decision later.59 Having said that, most polls seem to show that
most Taiwanese favour neither immediate unification nor independence. In a
way, this means that there is still some room for manoeuvre by both Taiwanese
and Chinese governments.60
Aside from polls, other Taiwanese have used other arguments to provide
justification for Taiwanese independence, including re-examination of the
terms of the various declarations in the late nineteenth and twentieth century
such as the Shimonoseki Treaty, Cairo Declaration, San Francisco Treaty and
the Mutual Defence Treaty (between the US and Taiwan).61
There have been missed opportunities by the PRC to win support from the
Taiwanese. For instance, in September 1999, Taiwan suffered the strongest
earthquake of the century (ranking 7.6 on the Richter scale). About 2,000
people were killed and over 8,000 injured. Many more were left homeless.
However, the PRC insisted that any foreign emergency humanitarian agency
obtain Beijing’s approval before providing aid to Taiwan. The PRC’s image
in Taiwan was further damaged when it did not allow a Russian relief plane
to fly over the mainland to Taiwan, causing a 12-hour delay.62 Its initial offer
of assistance was also relatively insignificant – US$100,000 in disaster aid
and US$60,000 worth of relief supplies.63 These and other diplomatic errors
ended up alienating the Taiwanese people.64
Breaking out of diplomatic isolation
Taiwan has been trying to break out of its international isolation by ‘buying’
allies especially in the smaller developing countries.65 Where possible, it has
tried to join regional and international organisations. For instance, it is a
member of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Asian Develop-
ment Bank (ADB) and the WTO. The strategy in gaining membership,
or at least legitimacy for its bid for membership, includes arguing for
the right for representation by the Taiwanese people (and that Taiwan or
China cannot speak for the other), contrasting the democratic credibility of
Taiwan against the communist regime,66 or simply as an economic or ‘health
entity’.
Although China objects to Taiwan participating in international organisa-
tions, it tolerates Taiwanese participation if ‘statehood’ is not a criterion.
For instance, Taiwan’s twelfth successive bid of joining the UN General
Assembly was rejected in 2004. While Taiwan has slightly more success in
joining some organisations, namely APEC and WTO, it has been unsuccess-
ful, for the eighth time, in its attempt to join the World Health Organization
(WHO) in 2004 as a ‘health entity’.67 This failure also gives an indication of




Is an FTA the best way forward?
One proposal of mitigating the conflict is to promote greater cross-Strait
relations. An FTA is a possibility, or something akin to the CEPA between
China and Hong Kong, or China and Macao.
The Taiwan government has recognised that closer economic integration is
part of the mainland Chinese’s strategy to reintegrate Taiwan. Hence Taiwan
has generally been reluctant to liberalise its economic relations with China.
For instance, the two countries do not yet have direct transportation links
except for festive seasons and in localised areas. There are also restrictions on
high-tech investments in mainland. Taiwan is wary of economic integration
with mainland China. Instead, it has sought FTAs with other partners, such
as the US, Japan and Singapore partially to break out of the diplomatic
isolation.
What are the other considerations for an FTA?
There is also a case of legal ambiguity even if an FTA is signed. That is, if
there were to be a commercial dispute between the two, would the dispute be
settled at the WTO or at the bilateral level or in Chinese courts? Given that
mainland China sees Taiwan as part of China, it is not unthinkable that the
Chinese would insist that it is a domestic issue and ought to be handled by the
Chinese courts rather than at the international level.
One should have realistic expectations of what the FTA can accomplish.
That both China and Taiwan are members in various regional and inter-
national organisations such as ADB, APEC and WTO and yet serious ten-
sions remain suggests that there can be occasions when political exigencies
override common memberships.69
Despite the common membership in the WTO, Taiwan has still maintained
several restrictions on trade with China. For instance, it was reported
in the Taiwanese media that Taiwan would not provide China’s agricul-
tural and service products the same reciprocal treatment. It has invoked
Article 13 of the WTO Agreement, arguing that its national security would be
jeopardised.70
Cooperation between the two in the WTO is at a minimum. For instance, in
a letter to the periodical Business Week, the director of the Information
Division, Yih de Jung-Tzung of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office was
adamant in insisting that Taiwan was not a part of mainland China. He
added ‘it is a mischaracterization to count Taiwan among China’s three
votes’ in the WTO. Indeed, Taiwan’s representatives are there to advocate
only the interests of Taiwan. They have and will exercise the right to vote
differently from China’s representatives in WTO decisions.71
China too has invoked WTO clauses against Taiwan.72 Taiwan maintains a
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large trade surplus with China, which puts it in a vulnerable position.73 For
instance, in March 2001, China initiated an anti-dumping investigation
against cold-rolled steel imported from Taiwan. Given that Taiwan exported
45 per cent of its total 2.6 million tons of cold-rolled steel to China, this
investigation had serious economic implications for Taiwanese commercial
interests. Less than a week later, China announced another anti-dumping
investigation on PVC imports from Taiwan; in this case, China absorbs 80 per
cent of Taiwan’s total PVC exports.
China was also able to pressurise the Taiwan Plastic Industries Association
to be the lead contact agency.74 In fact, in both cases, China did not go
through the Taiwanese government but consulted directly with the various
commercial associations. By reaching directly to these commercial associ-
ations with direct interests, China has managed to marginalise the Taiwanese
government and to force the Taiwanese government to open its market to
Chinese markets.75
While APEC is a much looser economic forum, its annual leaders’ summit
provides a useful forum politically for the leaders of the members to meet.
China has been insistent in preventing high-level Taiwanese representatives
from attending these annual summits. If Taiwan President Chen had thought
of increasing the level of political visibility through such forums, he would
have to try harder.76 For instance, only economic ministers from Taiwan are
allowed at these APEC summits. Things turned quite unpleasant at the 2001
APEC summit held in Shanghai when the Taiwanese delegation withdrew
from the summit after China rejected the Taiwanese choice of sending former
Vice-President Li Yuan-zu for the annual summit. (China viewed Li as too
political.)77
Perhaps, ironically, it might be easier to secure an FTA between the two if
Taiwan were able to declare independence and negotiate as a sovereign state.
This would allow the Taiwanese people’s aspirations for international recog-
nition to be fulfilled and reduce their fears of being subsumed into the
Chinese polity. However, this scenario is likely to result in a war between
the two since independence for Taiwan is likely to significantly reduce the
legitimacy of the CCP leadership.
Conclusion
It is difficult to see how an FTA would happen between China and Taiwan
at least under the current Taiwanese leadership. While the implicit assump-
tion of the research agenda is to find the best way to improve the political
relationships between China and Taiwan via economic integration, such
economic integration is seen as a threat by Taiwan. A formal FTA would
require the political will of both governments. At the moment, this will is
missing.
The bilateral relation between China and Taiwan must be seen not just at
the domestic level but also at the larger geopolitical conditions of the region.
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This relationship is complicated by the dynamics of other bilateral relations,
particularly Sino-Japanese and more importantly, Sino-US relations.
Unless the Sino-Japanese relations improve, Taiwan would be able to count
on Japanese support to keep its distance from China. Japan has a historical
relationship with Taiwan as it was Taiwan’s colonial master for about five
decades. Japan wrested Taiwan from the then Qing dynasty after winning the
Sino-Japanese war in 1894–1895. However, unlike the other Asian countries
such as South Korea, China and some of the Southeast Asian states, the
people in Taiwan do not seem to bear as much of a grudge against Japan for
its imperial behaviour in the late nineteenth century to the end of the Second
World War.78
The Sino-Japanese relationship itself is too complicated to be sufficiently
reviewed here. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, the successor of Koizumi, has
demonstrated his interest to patch up relations with China by visiting China
first after he became the new prime minister. The regular visit to the Japanese
shrine by Koizumi, despite the protests of its Asian neighbours, has been one
of the main reasons for the deterioration of ties between China and Japan.
Ultimately, however, it is the quality of the Sino-US relations that is the
most consequential for Sino-Taiwanese relations. Taiwan needs the political
support of the US in order to keep its distance from China. It is with the
supply of advanced military technology as well as the presence of the US
Seventh Pacific Fleet that has allowed Taiwan to maintain an independent
political existence. When the Sino-Taiwanese relations deteriorated dramat-
ically in 1996 with the Chinese conducting war games off the coast of
Taiwan, the then US President Bill Clinton sent two carrier groups to the
region. In June 1998, Clinton articulated his administration’s Taiwan policy
in what was known as the ‘three nos policy’. Under this policy, the US agreed
that there would be:
• no US support for independence for Taiwan;
• no support for a two-China or ‘one China, one Taiwan’ policy;
• no support for Taiwan’s admittance into any international organisation
that requires statehood for membership.
The Sino-US relations deteriorated in the early period of George W. Bush’s
presidency when the US State Department spokesman Richard Boucher
announced that the Bush administration intended to drop Clinton’s ‘three
nos’ policy on Taiwan. However, after 9/11, Sino-US relations turned much
warmer as the Chinese supported Bush in his ‘war against terror’. With the
six-party talks in limbo, it is likely that the US will continue to maintain a
somewhat close relation with China to exert pressure on the North Koreans.
Ultimately, even if Taiwan declares independence, it is uncertain as to
which major country would dare to recognise it given that China is likely to
impose high political and economic costs on offending countries. It is very
unlikely that any of the Southeast Asian states would do so. If China can
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maintain a close relationship with the US, it is unlikely that there will be a
major incident over Straits.
Despite no visible prospects of a formal FTA between China and Taiwan,
closer economic cooperation driven by market consideration is proceeding
without much official interruptions from both sides of the Straits of Taiwan.
Without doubt closer economic links between the contending parties and
increasing economic stakeholders in the region has contributed to stability
and the present ‘status quo’ equilibrium.
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The role of regional trade
integration in conflict prevention
Oli Brown, Mzukisi Qobo and
Alejandra Ruiz-Dana
Trading enemies for partners
Our world is being reshaped by the competing forces of globalisation and
regionalism. As new economic and political powers emerge, the centre of
gravity of the world’s economy is shifting away from the old pact of economic
strength that straddled the north Atlantic. Trade is one of the principal
drivers of that change.
Since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was signed in
January 1948, the international community has launched successive rounds
of negotiations to reduce the barriers to the trade in goods and services and
to harmonise the numerous regulations that govern international trade. As
the easily negotiated ‘low-hanging fruit’ was picked off, the negotiations
became more protracted and complex. Meanwhile, the sense (and plentiful
evidence) that international trade liberalisation has not benefited all countries
equally has made those negotiations more acrimonious.
The latest round of trade talks was dubbed the ‘Doha development agenda’
when launched by the members of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in
November 2001. It has since foundered on the intransigent negotiating posi-
tions of both sides, and is likely to stutter on for a few more years before
completion. However, pro-liberalisation countries are not kicking their heels
waiting for the Doha round to finish. The difficulty of reaching multilateral
agreement, and the intense media spotlight that shines on each ministerial
meeting of the WTO, means that the trade liberalisation agenda is increas-
ingly being pursued behind closed doors in bilateral and regional agreements
rather than under the uncomfortable glare of multilateral negotiation. In
other words, the WTO is no longer the only game in town – if, indeed, it ever
was. There is a fundamental tension between multilateralism and unilateralism
to which regionalism offers a ‘third way’.
Received wisdom suggests that trade fosters interdependence between
countries, that trade agreements can help to manage disagreements between
countries and that trade integration can bind countries’ divergent national
interests to a common future. The European Union (EU) was an explicit
experiment in trying to ‘design’ conflict out of a system. Regardless of its
political effectiveness, as a form of internal conflict prevention it has been
wildly successful. Nearly 60 years after the creation of the European Coal
and Steel Community, European trade integration has transformed a contin-
ent that had previously started many of the world’s bloodiest wars into a
stable, democratic grouping of 27 nations – with more queuing to join.
But as the studies within this volume underline, peace is by no means an
automatic outcome of trade integration. The EU experiment is not universally
applicable; the driving forces of regionalism will vary from region to region.
Integration is a political as well as an economic process. It is almost always
about more than just functional trade complementarities and there are always
more political and strategic interests at work. However, the political economy
of trade integration is still poorly understood.
This book is the culmination of an 18-month multi-continent comparative
research project, which has tried to assess the impact of regional trade inte-
gration on conflict prevention and management. Throughout the project two
core questions have guided the research. The first is of the ‘chicken and egg’
variety: is peace a product of trade or does trade flow from peace? More
specifically, what are some of the conditions under which trade can help (or
hinder) political rapprochement? The second is more institutional and func-
tional: namely what sort of institutions and mechanisms need to be in place
for trade integration to be supportive of conflict prevention and dispute reso-
lution? The rest of this concluding chapter tackles each of these questions in
turn.
Finding sequential meaning in the trade conflict relationship
The trade–conflict linkage
The idea that trade promotes peace is attributed to several classical liberal
thinkers. In his monumental work, The Spirit of the Laws, French political
philosopher Charles de Secondat, the Baron of Montesquieu (1689–1755),
declared that ‘the natural effect of commerce is to bring about peace. Two
nations which trade together render them reciprocally dependent: if one has
an interest in buying the other has an interest in selling; and all unions are
based upon mutual needs’ (Cohler et al. 1989).
Later, the concept of trade diplomacy came to be known as Cobdenism. It
was named after Richard Cobden, the British politician who, together with
John Bright, led the Anti-Corn Law movement1 and formed the Manchester
School.2 Cobden defined trade as a moral issue, as it upholds the right of
people to exchange the fruits of their labour and, consequently, draws ‘men
together, thrusting aside the antagonism of race, and creeds and language,
and uniting us in the bonds of eternal peace’ (Cohler et al. 1989).
Similarly, French economist Frédéric Bastiat (1801–1850) emphasised the
political benefits of trade. He observed that when borders impede the flow of
goods, armies will cross borders. Later, Ludwig von Mises, an influential
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Austro-Hungarian economist and one of the staunchest defenders of capital-
ism (1881–1973), argued that government interference was the main culprit
in the incidence of conflict amongst nations. Interference ‘creates conflicts for
which no peaceful solution can be found’ (Von Mises 1996) by setting up trade
and migration barriers or, more specifically, by engaging in mercantilism.3 In
this sense, he agreed with Adam Smith’s (1723–1790) invisible hand concept;
the market would work itself out without the need for government to inter-
vene. People, as rational actors, will choose to exchange goods to improve
their lot since no one is fit to produce everything.
Along with Adam Smith, David Ricardo (1772–1823) provided much of
the material upon which liberal economic and political theories are based.
According to him, trade is a positive-sum game for all interested actors as
it allows them to focus on their comparative advantages. By opening up to
trade, nations improve their well-being as they are able to purchase goods
whose production is cheaper elsewhere, while expanding the market for their
own products. Protectionism, on the other hand, only benefits a minority at
the expense of the majority.
Recently, classical liberal thinking has sparked empirical studies to deter-
mine whether there is a positive connection between trade and conflict. Oneal
and Russet (1997) have found that bilateral trade flows reduce the risk of
war, particularly if the level of these trade flows is high, as this augments the
opportunity cost of conflict. Mansfield and Pevehouse (2000) argue that the
institutional context (trade agreements, regional integration schemes, etc.)
influences the effect trade has on bilateral relations. Countries that belong to
the same trading bloc (or preferential trade agreement (PTA)) are less likely
to engage in disputes than non-trading countries.
Other studies have found that trade constitutes a stronger disincentive to
engage in conflict when it occurs between contiguous states, which are usually
more conflict-prone (Gartzke 2000). More recently, Gartzke and Li (2005)
have estimated that capitalism’s contribution to international peace far out-
weighs that of politics or democracy. They argue that nations with very low
levels of economic freedom are 14 times more likely to experience conflict
than the freest states.4 Polachek and Seiglie (2006) find that any unfavourable
gains from trade reduce the marginal cost of conflict, and that, ‘only through
mutual dependence can an equilibrium come about where peace remains solid
and secure, so that neither party is motivated to change the status quo’.
Other variables have been (and have to be) taken into account. Democracy
is considered a necessary ingredient by some; together with trade, it consti-
tutes much of the liberal peace theory.5 In particular, democracy allows those
interest groups that have much to lose from a potential conflict to influence
foreign policy with their vote (Russett and Oneal 2001). Others argue that
democracy might come after trade; that is, trade promotes economic devel-
opment, which ultimately results in democracy.
Criticisms include that of Barbieri (1996, 2002) who argues that trade can
actually cause conflict. Yet, according to Oneal et al. (2003), this conclusion
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does not take diverging military capabilities into account; less capable states
are unlikely to attack those with superior capacity to engage in warfare.
Seiglie (2002) points out that trade-generated wealth allows countries to
purchase military equipment, which can provoke tensions between partners.
Polachek and Seiglie (2006) find that this connection between increased mili-
tary spending and conflict is unclear; military equipment is more likely to be
used against non-trading partners to protect gains from trade.
These studies principally focused on the likelihood of conflict erupting
between trading partners. Quite apart from significant selection bias (coun-
tries that trade already are likely to have solved many of their disputes
already), they do not specifically address the difficulty or likelihood of coun-
tries resolving disputes in order to trade. They might consider the potential
gains from trade, but often these are not enough when the political and/or
ideological views are too divergent, as in the case of India and Pakistan, for
example. Thus, the peace-building potential of trade remains unproven.
The capacity of trade to foster prosperity remains unquestioned. In doing
so, trade reduces the need for countries to utilise force to achieve desired ends
(such as getting new supplies of resources). But trade and conflict are not
necessarily incompatible. Wars can encourage certain types of trade – in
arms, for example. Trade can also underpin conflict as a source of funds;
both for rebel groups or the state, and can perpetuate violence should the
profits to be made from war by the belligerents exceed those available to them
in times in peace. Conflict diamonds are one recent, headline-grabbing
example, though many others exist.
Trade can also provoke conflicts of interest at the intra-state level. WTO
negotiations and bilateral trade discussions, such as the ones between the
United States and the former beneficiaries of the Andean Trade Preference
Act (ATPA),6 have caused public uproar. Protesters believe that the gains
from free trade only benefit those countries with the greatest negotiation
leverage (i.e. the wealthy nations) and the small minority in the developing
countries that accept their terms. In some cases, this discontent has resulted
in armed rebellion such as the Zapatista movement in Mexico.7
The relationship between trade and conflict remains a complicated one.
Still, attempting to understand it is worthwhile in order to understand
whether trade can be a viable form of conflict prevention.
Lessons drawn from the case studies
Trade alone is not sufficient to hinder conflict. The case studies in this book
indicate that there are other variables that contribute to creating an atmos-
phere of peace and stability. These include internal stability, strong institu-
tions, like-minded governments, compatible market economies, well-defined
borders and mutual interdependence. While a variable’s importance might
change according to the case under discussion, they are all necessary for true
trade integration to take place.
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In South Asia, country leaders hoped that by achieving economic inte-
gration through the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) the groundwork for achieving peace would be laid (see Chapter 4).
But internal strife and inter-state tensions have continued to block such
peace. Furthermore, intra and inter-state conflicts prevent SAARC mem-
bers from pursuing the internal reforms needed to complete the integration
process; they need political stability to do so.
The ongoing conflict over Kashmir8 between India and Pakistan illustrates
how trade flows are effectively hostage to conflict. This unresolved dispute
prevents both regional integration and cooperation; profound nationalistic
sentiment has made bilateral reconciliation difficult, and the dispute has
thus far resulted in two armed conflicts and three crises. The severity of the
dispute makes it ‘the single largest constraint’ for regional aspirations (see
Chapter 4).
Despite their ongoing disagreements, India and Pakistan do still trade with
each other, albeit at sub-optimal levels. But various impediments remain. For
instance, Pakistan has not granted most favoured nation (MFN)9 status to
India, while India maintains, on average, higher tariff levels than Pakistan.
Were these two countries to normalise their diplomatic relations and establish
a free trade agreement (FTA), some analysts estimate that bilateral trade
flows would, in ten years, increase ninefold (Burki 2004: 24). This potential
was first observed between 1948 and 1949, when India received 56 per cent
of Pakistan’s exports and Indian goods made up 32 per cent of Pakistan’s
imports. In contrast, today Pakistan’s exports to India hover between 0.4 and
2.5 per cent of total exports, and India’s exports to Pakistan are less than
0.5 per cent (see Chapter 6).
Given the trade restrictions and shared border between Pakistan and
India, informal trade has flourished. Indeed, ‘informal trade exceeds for-
mal trade by over US$150 million. The combined value of trade is close to
US$1.0 billion’ (see Chapter 6). The elimination of trade barriers would
eliminate the need to resort to informal trade channels and could result in
annual trade flows of at least US$2.62 billion. Given that the average annual
trade between 1999 and 2005 did not exceed US$250 million, the potential
gains from free trade become evident (see Chapter 6).
Another case of neighbourly hostilities occurred between Peru and Ecua-
dor. Like India and Pakistan, these countries continued to trade with each
other (at reduced levels) despite an ongoing territorial dispute. The scale of
this trade varied with diplomatic relations; in times of conflict, trade was at
its lowest. A study by Simmons found that actual average yearly trade during
the dispute was US$74.94 million and actual average yearly trade in times of
peace amounted to US$182.67 million (Simmons 1999: 14). However, the
level of economic interdependence between the countries was so low that, at
one point, they closed the border between them for eight months with no
significant economic repercussions (Ruiz-Dana et al. 2007: ch. 2).
Ecuador and Peru eventually resolved their dispute to promote the benefits
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of the Andean Community (CAN). A ‘clearly defined jurisdiction over
borders’ was necessary to avoid the curtailment of commercial transactions;
without it, the integration process could not move forward (Ruiz-Dana et al.
2007: ch. 8). Therefore Andean integration required a peaceful agreement
between the two countries. As noted, Ecuador and Peru were both experi-
encing significant yearly losses in bilateral trade; by resolving their differ-
ences, both could achieve greater gains from bilateral and regional trade.
Indeed, it was followed by an upsurge in exports from both countries to the
CAN.10 Similarly, bilateral trade jumped to US$310 million in 1999 (La
Oferta 2005).
There seems to be a clearer trade–conflict link in Latin America with regard
to intra-state, rather than inter-state, conflict. To begin with, most inter-state
conflicts have been caused by territorial disputes. These have largely been
resolved. Intra-state conflicts, on the other hand, continue to haunt countries
such as Colombia and Bolivia. In the former’s case, trade liberalisation has
been accompanied by the illegal trade in arms and narcotics. In Bolivia, a
fight over resources, especially natural gas, has pitted an elite minority against
a majority of indigenous peasants. Some of these peasants believe that gas
exports undermine Bolivia’s sovereignty; estimates indicate that these exports
would fetch up to US$500 million in annual earnings (International Crisis
Group 2004: 32).
These situations occur in the presence of a weak state apparatus. In both
countries, the state has been unable to put an end to the internal conflicts, a
failure that has indirectly jeopardised potential gains from trade. In addition,
the CAN has not come up with a regional approach to the conflicts. This has
been particularly harmful to Colombia, as its neighbours (Ecuador, Peru and
Venezuela) have not fully cooperated to halt the flow of illicit goods and rebel
groups.
Despite their weaknesses, South America’s two trading blocs (Southern
Common Market (MERCOSUR) and the CAN) have evolved from security
concerns to commercially viable arrangements. It remains limited, however:
while the level of intra-regional trade has grown since the inception of both
blocs, regional trade does not exceed that of individual members’ trade with
their traditional partners (i.e. the US and the EU). Yet, in the absence of
adequate substitutes in the region, this is not necessarily a bad thing. Com-
mon economic interests have already been forged, and future improvements
in competitiveness among the members are likely to benefit the blocs by
tightening this trade gap. These shared interests also make the potential for
future conflicts unlikely.
The study by the South African Institute of International Affairs (SAIIA)
suggests that weak institutions, both at the domestic and regional level,
obstruct economic integration in Southern Africa. Instead, they ‘create fertile
conditions for conflict’, for this is a context where ‘the pursuit of power lies
at the core of defining relations between states’ (see Chapter 3). The Great
Lakes conflict is cited as an example of this. Zimbabwe took advantage of its
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presiding role over the Organ for Politics, Security and Defence (OPSD) to
intervene in the conflict. In doing so, it sought to tip the balance of power in
its favour vis-à-vis South Africa’s predominant role in the Southern African
Development Community (SADC).
Whereas formal trade has not met expectations,11 informal trade rises
and falls with the security situation. In Zimbabwe, a country that has been
immersed in internal turmoil since its independence in 1980, the economy
subsists on this informal trade (see Chapter 7). The ongoing conflict has
eroded formal market mechanisms and institutions, particularly due to
corruption. The informal economy has become the preferred exchange
medium; at least 80 per cent of households currently participate in it (see
Chapter 7). Since informal trade greatly affects the entire region, the SAIIA
argues that it is eroding the potential for formal trade. The SADC has not
come up with a direct response to this. Institutional overhaul is a necessary
first step to ensure that it plays a meaningful role in conflict prevention and
trade integration.
Economics proved to be the main driver behind Southeast Asia’s integra-
tion, which became more formalised with the creation of the Association
of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) in 1967.12 The 1992 establishment of
the ASEAN free trade area (AFTA) resulted in lowered tariffs that have, in
turn, boosted intra-regional trade and fostered interdependence. Total intra-
ASEAN trade increased from US$44.2 billion in 1993 to US$174.39 billion
in 2003. This result has raised the cost of regional or inter-state conflict,
particularly as the region grew more competitive vis-à-vis the EU and the
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) (see Chapter 5).
The Singapore Institute of International Affairs (SIIA) argues that the
Southeast Asian picture is not entirely rosy. AFTA’s non-binding and non-
punitive nature has sometimes resulted in entrenched interests and economic
nationalism that encourage exceptions that go unpunished, as neighbours
with similar resource inputs and export products compete with each other. To
date, no ASEAN member has invoked the dispute settlement mechanism
(DSM) for fear of jeopardising intra-regional relations. However should dis-
parities continue this acquiescence could be shaken up and result in height-
ened tension amongst ASEAN members. In the face of the aforementioned
threat, as well as existing intra-state conflicts and non-traditional security
threats, cooperation within ASEAN will have to move beyond commercial
interests in order to set up the institutions and mechanisms needed to forge
stronger political and cultural ties in the region (see Chapter 5).
The institutional angle: regional trade agreements (RTAs) and
conflict prevention
The case studies demonstrate that political stability and compatible views are
a prerequisite to solid and formal trade relations. At the same time, potential
gains from trade can encourage the resolution of a dispute, as in the case of
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Peru and Ecuador. Once trade flows have been established, they are likely to
deter future conflict.
Nevertheless, economic gains are not always an incentive. India and
Pakistan are unwilling to put their differences aside to achieve full trade bene-
fits. In southern Africa, there are too many vested interests in maintaining
informal trade flows. Also, similarities or common bonds do not necessarily
foment harmonious relations. Shared boundaries, particularly if undefined,
can be a source of conflict (e.g., India and Pakistan, Peru and Ecuador). The
Southeast Asian case demonstrates that similar product bases and resource
inputs can result in cut-throat competition. The link between trade and con-
flict is, therefore, not always obvious; there are other dynamics that play out
in distinct disputes. Hence the importance of weighing differing contexts
individually. Each necessitates a unique approach and, where conflict exists, a
unique solution.
The causality of the trade–conflict relationship is not unidirectional. There
are a number of intervening variables, including: the history of conflict in
an integrating area, the role of formal and informal rules in integration, the
domestic political setting and the role played by political economy forces
in the regional integration process. One of the conclusions drawn from this
study is that the design of institutions shapes the nature of regional relations
and the economic and political success of trade integration.
But as to exactly how such institutions should be structured to support
stability more is hardly an obvious matter. Since conflicts stem from disagree-
ments between two or more states or within states, institutions designed
to limit such conflicts should be properly designed and managed (World Bank
2005: 57). Faulty design and implementation seems to plague most regional
integration schemes in the developing world. Yet regional institutions are an
important part of governance alongside domestic and global governance
institutions. They have the potential to manage conflicts and buffer risks asso-
ciated with instability, promote trade and investment, contribute to better
political governance and enhance economic development.
Creating a positive association between trade and peace
While there is evidence of deeper integration in parts of the developing
world, especially Southeast Asia, it is still hard to find examples of integra-
tion that have reached a high level of institutionalisation. Europe, which has
one of the most successful integration mechanisms in the world, prides itself
on having achieved a high degree of internal integration and high level of
institutionalisation.
Europe’s relative success has been achieved largely through fostering inter-
dependence and healthy resource competition within the integrating area.
From this example, there is no doubt that both formal and informal con-
straints are important in governing the behaviour of actors. Formal con-
straints are those that are codified in rules and institutions, whereas informal
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constraints are tacitly understood. The latter are difficult to define in concrete
terms since by their very nature are soft, and hard to measure.
One of the most common features of regional integration initiatives in
the developing world is the pre-eminence given to narrowly defined political
objectives, without clear linkages to important aspects such as trade and
development. For Africa, this was recently made evident in the efforts led
by Libya’s Muammar al-Gaddafi and Abdoulay Wade of Senegal to create a
‘United States of Africa’, to be made up of federated states under a central
government. This was blocked by a group of countries led by South Africa
who preferred an option based on gradually strengthening regional economic
communities (RECs) and their associated institutions. The regional institu-
tions that can better facilitate peace and stability are those that are carefully
designed and make an explicit linkage between the peace and security agenda
with issues of trade and development cooperation.
But an unwieldy continental government that is not constituted by strong
regional or sub-regional building blocks founded on common values and
objectives will not have much success in creating conditions for sustainable
peace. Most regions in the developing world have not as yet reached the
maturity to expand as Europe for example has, through various phases, over
the last five decades. Neither are they established with a similarly strong
institutional framework. Since the regions that we examined are developing
regions this should not come as a surprise, but especially for three reasons.
First, the state has not achieved a level of confidence that is characteristic of
modern Western states; consolidating the state and defending its sovereignty
thus becomes a preoccupation for most developing regions. This is strongly
the case in most parts of sub-Saharan Africa and, to some degree, for South-
east Asia. The fundamental difference with the relatively developed regions
that have attained high levels of institutionalisation lies in deeper internal
integration that has encouraged healthy resource cooperation between states.
Weak sovereignty in the countries constituting regional communities partly
explains the reluctance of these organisations to interfere in the internal
affairs of their member countries, even when human rights abuses are ram-
pant. Weak internal institutions and underdevelopment lend these states a
weak form of sovereignty. This also means that successful regional integra-
tion hinges on the availability of strong institutions and convergence around
democratic norms.
The second reason has to do with the recent history of inter and intra-state
conflict in these regions. In most of these cases militarised conflicts were
present as recently as the 1980s, with some regions witnessing a series of
military rulers. This history has created a social milieu of economic national-
ism and military–industrial complexes. Perceptions of insecurity and the need
to increase the aggregate power of the state remains a problem for deepening
integration. Yet it is only when intra-regional integration is deepened and the
region pursues external integration that the risk of militarised conflict can be
significantly reduced.
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Consider the case of southern Africa. In this area, regionalism began in the
late 1970s as a political project aimed at reducing dependence on apartheid
South Africa, and structuring relations that would thwart South Africa’s
efforts to encroach upon the region north of its border. There was very little
in common between the countries that began what was then called the
Southern African Development Coordinating Conference (SADCC) and
now called the Southern African Development Community (SADC), other
than the common enemy of apartheid South Africa. This area has a long and
deep history of conflict, including the civil wars in Angola and Mozambique,
beginning in 1975 and lasting until the early 1990s.
The insurgent movements in these countries received support from South
Africa as part of its war effort against the liberation movement. Cross-border
attacks by South Africa in its neighbouring countries were a common feature
in the 1970s, ostensibly to drive out ‘terrorist’ elements. There were weak
trade ties in this area. The establishment of the formal regional organisation
in the form of SADC, with trade as one of the prominent agendas, was not
preceded by increased commercial relations between countries.
Other conflicts in the area include the more recent Great Lakes con-
flict between 1998 and 2002, which also involved four SADC countries –
Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC).
The DRC had joined SADC in 1997 driven largely by security considerations
rather than any strong economic ties with other SADC countries.
Whereas in the case of Southeast Asia there are no militarised inter-state
conflicts, intra-state tensions abound, and these are linked to income inequal-
ities and poverty or marginalisation. In essence these are socio-economic
grievance-based tensions. Even the historical tensions between China and
Taiwan have gradually de-escalated with little sign that this could become an
actualised conflict. The dense commercial networks and economic integra-
tion between the two make it unlikely, though not impossible, that conflict
could break out in the future. Other conflicts in this region include those in
Aceh in Indonesia, southern Thailand and southern Philippines.
Trade integration that inhibits conflict is, to a degree, evident in South Asia.
There is a sense that to some degree integration within the context of the
South Asian Preferential Trade Agreement (SAPTA) has contributed to the
thawing of tensions between India and Pakistan. This is the case where grow-
ing trade relations have a potential to create a zone of peace in this area in the
future. In the past, the persistence of conflict – especially between India and
Pakistan – in this region hindered meaningful trade integration. In a general
sense, the complex nature that conflict has assumed – with intra and inter-
state tensions feeding each other – has made it difficult to develop confidence
building measures (CBMs) that could guarantee long-term stability.
The tensions here include the long-standing India–Pakistan tensions; the
Kashmir insurgency, which is believed by India to be supported by Pakistan;
the India–Sri Lanka tensions, which articulate with the internal conflict
involving Tamil Tigers within Sri Lanka; as well as territorial disputes
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between India and Bangladesh. Trade alone cannot be sufficient in address-
ing these tensions, some of which can be traced to history and touch deep on
issues of identity. However, as a CBM and as a platform to foster commercial
linkages and cooperation, trade integration could in the long run ensure
convergence of the interests of various actors and limit further escalation of
tensions.
Limiting the escalation of tensions depends not only on what happens at
the regional level but also on the domestic political setting. Regional relations
on issues of trade and security cannot be understood in isolation from
domestic level forces, including the nature of institutions, the political culture,
and the character of relationships between various societal actors. Willingness
of various states to cooperate both at the political and economic level is an
important success factor.
Third, most of these regions have the highest incidence of poverty. Sub-
Saharan Africa, for example lags far behind with respect to economic devel-
opment. Even in the promising region of Latin America, the incidents of
poverty are very high. While Southeast Asia has significantly reduced overall
poverty levels, Cambodia and Laos are performing poorly (World Bank 2005:
22). As the case study of Southeast Asia highlights, some of the intra-state
conflicts are linked to poverty and economic marginalisation.
The role of formal and informal constraints in creating
positive associations
Both formal and informal constraints help to inhibit conflict and force
actors to take integration seriously and commit themselves to agreed object-
ives. Informal constraints, as Douglas North observes, encapsulate acceptable
norms that are not necessarily codified, which provide solutions to coordin-
ation problems (North 1997). In this respect, it is not only the formal rules
that matter, but also softer variables such as culture, tradition and beliefs that
play a significant role in shaping economic performance.
This can also be expressed in growing cross-border commercial linkages
that are not mediated by formal institutions. For example, in Southeast Asia,
regionalism in a formal institutional sense played no role in fostering trade
between 1985 and 2000, and the role of AFTA – after it was established in
1992 – was minimal. It did however help as a CBM and a formal institutional
mechanism to strengthen commercial linkages.
Across all the case studies that we have looked at, shared understanding,
inter-subjective norms, common values and political orientation play a criti-
cal part in regional relations. Where these are lacking, tensions abound,
especially of the inter-state nature. This is evident in sub-Saharan Africa and
South Asia. It is clear that a shared political culture is a major CBM, without
which coordination among the actors would be difficult.
Consider, for example, the case of South Asia, where the actors exhibit
fundamental differences along cultural, religious, political system and ethnic
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lines. In this region the index of political stability is low, and tensions have
hindered the development of a progressive regional integration mechanism.
Moreover, inter and intra-state conflicts intersect considerably, and throw the
region into a perpetual state of hostility. This contrasts markedly with South-
east Asia, where the incidents of inter-state conflict are rare, though certain
parts of the region are marred by intra-state conflict.
The limited occurrence of inter-state conflicts in Southeast Asia can be
explained by the existence of informal constraints by state elites, which in
turn limits the propensity towards inter-state conflict. In this region, the long
tradition of informal relationships dating back to the establishment of
ASEAN in the wake of the Vietnam War seems to have had a constraining
effect on actor behaviour. It is the more formal institutions such as ASEAN
that are weak (especially for their lack of restraining capacity), and it is here
that more buttressing is needed.
From informal to formal constraints: developing strong institutions
Informal constraints are not, on their own, sufficient to create sustainability.
As noted earlier, informal constraints include, but are not limited to, inter-
subjective and tacit norms that are not necessarily codified, as well as com-
mercial relationships that are not mediated by formal structures. The latter,
for example, includes trade flows that take effect even in the absence of for-
mal structures governing trade. Over and above informal constraints, a set
of formal rules governing the conduct of actors with respect to both trade
and security issues is required, especially to lend credibility to regional inte-
gration efforts. Regional integration has to have explicit declarations on what
is expected from various member countries.
An instructive example can be seen in the ‘Declaration on Security’ made
by the Organization of American States (OAS) in 2003.13 This Declaration
highlights a commitment to cooperating on the combat of: transnational
organised crime; corruption; asset laundering; illicit trafficking in weapons;
extreme poverty and social exclusion; health issues; and environmental
degradation.
MERCOSUR put in place ‘club rules’ (explicit rules of political conduct
for member states) when the commander of Paraguay’s armed forces was
suspected of harbouring intentions of a coup in 1996. This resulted in the
four presidents of the MERCOSUR member states signing a declaration on
democratic commitment in Argentina in June of that year, making dem-
ocracy a precondition for membership. This was later extended to the FTAs
between MERCOSUR and Bolivia and Chile in the Protocol of Ushaia in
June 1998 (Schiff and Winters 2003: 199). This is a good, although by no
means perfect, accountability mechanism.
Indeed, as Maurice Schiff and Alan Winters (2003: 188) observe, integration
schemes are most effective when they impose ‘club rules’ such as democracy
and human rights. The dilemma often faced by regional integration schemes
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is that members cannot possibly impose strictures or conditions at the
regional level that are non-existent in their own countries. Hence infra-
structure of democratic governance, adherence to the rule of law and
protection of human rights are essential in various member states if the
regional project is to be a success. Formal rules exist, in part, to encourage
member states in regional organisations to develop democratic norms at the
national level.
In the case of SADC the formal rules aimed at dealing with conflict are
captured in what is known as the OPSD, established in Windhoek in July
1996 (Cilliers 1996). Although this sought to accord importance to security
coordination, conflict mediation and military cooperation, the manner in
which the OPSD has functioned has not been optimal. There has been lack of
policy coherence or clear linkage between this structure and those dealing
with economic or trade relations. For better functionality, it is important to
establish strong linkages between issues of regional security and trade and
development.
For many years, the OPSD has been weakened by lack of leadership, par-
ticularly tensions between Nelson Mandela and Robert Mugabe (the former
chairing the SADC summit and the latter chairing the OPSD in 1996). The
absence of commonly agreed values at the regional level compounded the
difficulties experienced by this body. Recently this has been restructured to
give it a better focus, but coordination problems persist. Nonetheless, it is an
important CBM in the sub-region and, with the very significant exception of
the Great Lakes conflict of the late 1990s, there have not been other inter-state
conflicts.
In its recent restructuring, with the adoption of the Strategic Indicative Plan
for the Organ for Politics, Security and Defence (SIPO) in 2001, the OPSD
sought to shift its emphasis from narrow military/security issues towards
emphasising democratisation, institution-building, human rights, political
pluralism and inclusion of civil society. At its core it has two important
articles: a protocol on politics, defence and security; and a mutual defence
pact.
In Southeast Asia, CBM such as the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation set
out to promote mutual respect for the independence, sovereignty, equality,
territorial integrity and national identity of all nations. Significantly, this
Treaty also establishes a code of conduct for peaceful settlement of dispute:
the High Council arbitrates and determines the best course of dispute settle-
ment. This formal framework encourages mediation before the more formal
and legalistic arbitration route.
There is also the ASEAN Troika, which exists at a higher level and is made
up of the past president, the outgoing president and the incoming president
of the Troika. This is another instrument that is used to mediate conflict, and
can be activated by ASEAN ministers of foreign affairs. The Troika, however,
lacks any decision-making capacity and cannot encroach into the internal
affairs of member countries. Because of this, some ASEAN members tend to
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rely on external security provision, and this helps to keep stability. As such,
both ASEAN and SADC need to strengthen the capacity of their security
institutions.
The SAARC is an overarching RTA with both an economic and political
mandate. While SAARC’s charter promotes active collaboration and mutual
assistance in the economic, social, cultural, technical and scientific fields,
the main thrust of regional efforts has been directed towards economic inte-
gration. All activities to be undertaken within the SAARC framework are
governed by the overarching principles of ‘sovereign equality, territorial
integrity, political independence and non-interference in the internal affairs
of other states’. On the one hand, mutual benefit is a primary consideration;
the sovereign equality condition weighs in against powerful countries lever-
aging their power against weaker countries. On the other hand, member states
can not involve themselves in bilateral conflicts within the region. For the
moment, the clauses on territorial integrity and non-interference in member
countries’ internal affairs rules out SAARC’s role as a peacekeeper.
However, the absence of recourse to deliberate upon bilateral political rela-
tions has become a major concern for member states. Realising the negative
impact of political tensions on trade arrangements in the region, some ana-
lysts have called for a regional institutional mechanism to contain conflict
among members. Others have even suggested the need to amend the SAARC
charter to allow it to deliberate upon bilateral issues. As early as 1990,
Sri Lankan analyst Ravinatha Ariyasinghe had proposed a ‘strategic regional
security framework’ designed to ensure regional security in South Asia
(Ariyasinghe 1990). No progress has been made on this front, and realistically
such a development is not on the cards any time soon. Member states, particu-
larly Pakistan and India, must find means outside the SAARC arrangement
to resolve their differences.
While none of these cases are necessarily models to be replicated, they
provide useful examples from which important lessons can be drawn. One such
lesson is that there may not be a need to design new institutions or to impose
a one-size-fits-all approach. However there are necessary processes that
regional institutions need to set in motion. The existing institutions need to
evolve organically to deeper levels of institutionalisation as trade integration
deepens. Hence, even in the ongoing discussions about establishing the pan-
African government there was simply no support for imposing institutions
that did not organically evolve. In some instances existing institutions may
need to be restructured and better capacitated in order to function optimally.
Creating strong regional–global linkages
Global linkages can enhance the conflict-inhibiting potential of RTAs.
Inward-looking and shallow integration schemes can easily generate tensions
between the integrating countries. In this respect, RTAs may need to exhibit
depth in the percentage coverage of traded goods as well as in the scope of
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products that are traded. Some integration schemes – such as MERCOSUR –
are customs unions in a shallow sense but have sectors that are excluded on
the basis of them being designated sensitive.
Other regional integration schemes, as the case of SADC shows, are char-
acterised by slow implementation or their benefits are eroded by bureaucratic
impediments, such as the occasionally complex provisions to meet rules of
origin (RO) requirements (which demonstrate that a good is produced within
a particular region and so qualifies for lower tariffs). In a sense, countries
would have to engage in deeper integration that promotes open regionalism
or that is WTO-consistent. This lays at the heart of what Richard Baldwin
(Baldwin and Krugman 2002) calls the ‘juggernaut effect’ of regional
integration.
In the ongoing WTO negotiations an emphasis is laid on having both a
quantitative and qualitative benchmark for RTAs. A qualitative benchmark
would ensure that in future no sector would be excluded in the tariff liberal-
isation schedule, except those that are deemed security sensitive – especially
agriculture and textiles, which are often deemed sensitive sectors. Quantita-
tive benchmarks set acceptable percentage thresholds for tariff liberalisation
for products in the tariff schedule.
This may not necessarily address issues of conflict or establish the neces-
sary confidence to overcome tensions, but it may help to build a critical mass
of trade between two or more countries in a way that increases the cost of
conflict. Dynamics such as the ‘agglomeration effect’ inherently generate
tensions. Agglomeration happens when, as a result of regional integration,
firms gravitate towards central (as opposed to peripheral) locations that offer
attractive features such as trade cost advantages and proximity to other
industrial activities and suppliers. This problem could be mitigated by
increased developmental cooperation through the establishment of regional
value chains in certain sectors, or through developmental funds to improve
the competitiveness of peripheral countries. Such measures could go some
way in mitigating the tensions that arise from an asymmetric distribution of
economic benefits.
Creating the right climate for trade to reinforce stability: the necessary
conditions for success
Rather than describing the types of institutions that may help to facilitate
peace, we will highlight some of the conditions that are necessary for the
emergence of better regional institutions of trade and security. There are five
key dimensions that we would like to highlight.
The first dimension has to do with the relationship between the domestic
and regional level processes. There is little doubt that the two have to be
mutually reinforcing if regional integration is to create stability. Furthermore,
if the relationship between regional trade and security is to be a positively
reinforcing one it would need to be supported by normative values that
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capture a commitment to democratisation, upholding of the rule of law and
respect for human rights. More than anything else this would require far-
reaching political and economic reforms at the domestic level. This, along
with greater integration with developed countries in the North, will help
create the necessary agency of restraint that will guard against reversal or
slips into instability.
Second, the design of regional integration schemes have to be sensitive
to latent historical tensions or perceptions that trade agreements could be
skewed in favour of dominant countries. While in most instances trade inte-
gration schemes were created with a view to ensuring political cooperation
and stability, these could also create the opposite effect. As Maurice Schiff
and Alan Winters observe, this could be the case where ‘tariff preferences
created to induce regional trade can create powerful income transfers within
the region and can lead to the concentration of industry in a single loca-
tion’ (Schiff and Winters 2003: 194). A strong focus on ‘developmental
regionalism’ could considerably reduce the scope for tensions.
Developmental regionalism emphasises the removal of supply-side con-
straints and infrastructure development and views trade in a more integrated
manner, linked to domestic developmental challenges. Some of the exam-
ples of developmental oriented regionalism include infrastructure-related
or project-based regional cooperation to manage regional public goods such
as forestry, shared water resources, energy and transport infrastructure.
In South Asia, where there are pre-existing political tensions, the design of
RTAs should take into consideration these sensitivities, especially the anti-
pathies of smaller countries towards more powerful ones. One way of over-
coming this is to put in place a mechanism – in the form of a developmental
fund – to compensate for any possible losses. This development fund would act
as a mechanism to compensate for any loss of revenue and mitigate any pos-
sible risk to integration. In the MERCOSUR, this US$100 million develop-
ment fund is known as the Fund for Structural Convergence of MERCOSUR
(FOCEM), and is hardly sufficient in an area with 95 million people – the
majority of whom are poor.
FOCEM is aimed at structural convergence, developing competitiveness,
encouraging social cohesion and strengthening the integration effort. Ideally,
in such a developmental mechanism, member countries should make contri-
butions that reflect their level of economic development and the extent of
their benefit from regional integration. Larger countries would thus contribute
more.
This asymmetrical contribution will help limit the tensions that are likely
to arise between the core and peripheral countries in an RTA. The develop-
mental fund could also be further explored in the context of the economic
partnership agreements (EPAs) between the EU and various African sub-
regions, where the EU makes developmental allocations as part of enhancing
competitiveness of smaller economies and encouraging them to deepen
integration.
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Recently, African ministers launched the Pan-African Infrastructure
Development Fund, which currently stands at US$625 million with the goal
of raising US$1.2 billion, to provide long-term financing for developmental
projects in the areas of cross-border energy, transport, telecoms, water and
sanitation.14 This is one example of strengthening regional integration to
become more development-focused and to reduce economic imbalances that
could be fertile ground for tensions within the region.
The third dimension is the need to broaden the capacity of regional inte-
gration mechanisms. For example, structures such as the SAARC and the
South Asian Free Trade Agreement (SAFTA) need to be institutionally
equipped so that they can address trade disputes when they arise. They
should also do so proactively, so that in regions with sensitive security
situations (i.e. South Asia), disputes are resolved before they escalate. With-
out an appropriate mechanism for addressing trade-related disputes, trade
integration could exacerbate existing political tensions in a given region.
The architecture of such a conflict-resolution mechanism should include a
standardisation of conflict indicators; developing early warning systems in
member countries; enhancing the capacity for conflict prevention, manage-
ment and resolution; and a regular assessment of factors that have a potential
to lead to conflict, including imbalances in welfare and poverty.
Fourth, regions need to fully exploit or develop product complementarities
across all sectors, including services, as this could help to deepen regional
trade integration and lessen the propensity towards competition – and con-
flict. As with the instruments that deal with security issues, similar DSMs in
the trade arena could help deal with disputes that might arise.
RTAs that are of the open regionalism type, aimed at harmonisation and
the deepening liberalisation of trade and investment regimes, have better
chances for success than those that are inward-looking. It is here that har-
monisation with multilateral trade liberalisation becomes important. At a
broader level, integration should be aimed at tariff reduction rather than
creating a gridlock of import-substitution policies overlaid with complex RO,
as is the case with SADC.
RO should be kept simple, and should not be used for protectionist reasons
under the guise of curtailing transhipment. In addition, particular attention
needs to be paid to non-tariff barriers, including those issues that have a
bearing on trade facilitation, such as customs procedures and standards. In
comparison to other regional efforts, ASEAN seems to have been most suc-
cessful in this respect; it has pursued external openness in tandem with the
expansion of intra-regional trade (World Bank 2005: 60).
Fifth, regional infrastructural cooperation, especially over scarce and
shared resources such as water, could help prevent potential conflicts. In
Latin America a resource-based conflict erupted when Peru and Ecuador
clashed over a section of the Amazon River basin. Cooperation in this area
could be governed in the form of protocols that are built into the regional
integration scheme. Some of the other areas where cooperation could be
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facilitated include energy, transport, environment and health. A focus on
infrastructure cooperation and development-oriented regionalism can help
build confidence, since many conflicts are linked to real or perceived economic
marginalisation.
Finally, porous borders present a challenge, as incidents of drug traffick-
ing, the illegal arms trade and the movement of criminals between countries
remain prevalent. In southern Africa, the political and economic situation in
Zimbabwe, which has arisen largely from political mismanagement and the
recession of democracy, has accentuated these border leaks, with security
implications for South Africa and other neighbouring countries. In Latin
America, internal strife in Colombia has had a spill-over effect, including a
narcotics problem in Colombia that affects its neighbouring countries. This
again points to the importance of fostering cooperation beyond simple trade
integration. Such expanded cooperation could lead to protocols on cross-
border movements of people, illegal arms trafficking and trade in illicit goods
and so on. SADC has various protocols dealing with these and other areas.
However, it is one thing to have such protocols on paper, and quite another
for member states to ratify them and to ensure that implementation and
surveillance mechanisms are in place.
Concluding remarks: implications for policy-makers
The fundamental conclusion of this research is not revolutionary. It is that
the nature of the economic connections between countries affects the evolu-
tion of their political relationship, and vice versa. RTAs are as much political
as economic agreements. As such, they can play an important role in develop-
ing informal constraints on conflict (both inter and intra-state), such as inter-
dependence and ‘constituencies for peace’, as well as institutionalising formal
constraints on conflict, such as channels for political dialogue and dispute
resolution.
The relative fall in inter-state conflict in recent years has been mirrored by
a growth in RTAs. These trends seem inter-linked – but which is ‘cause’ and
which is ‘effect’ is unclear. Evidently, countries experiencing latent or overt
conflict will be unwilling to sit down over a trade negotiating table. To even
consider trade integration, countries have to have reached a certain level
of institutional maturity and stability. As such, universally ascribing a ‘peace
dividend’ to regional trade integration risks a serious selection bias. Never-
theless, it is clear that regional trade integration can be a very important
aspect of regional governance mechanisms, economic welfare and conflict
avoidance.
The question for policy-makers is whether there is enough of a rationale
for promoting regional trade integration as a mechanism for conflict preven-
tion in the absence of clear trade complementarities. In other words, is there
enough of a peace dividend from trade integration to justify externally
encouraging trade integration on fragile states (as the EU has been keen to
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do)? Or is the momentum for trade integration something that has to develop
endogenously?
Our research underlines the fact that trade links alone are not sufficient to
hinder conflict. Many other variables contribute to creating an atmosphere of
peace and stability. Economic gains are not enough of an incentive to avoid
conflict – but they can help. India and Pakistan, for example, are unwilling to
put their differences aside to achieve the full benefits of trade. In Africa, there
are too many vested interests in perpetuating informal trade. Similarities
or common bonds do not necessarily result in harmonious relations. The
Southeast Asian case demonstrates that similar product bases and resource
inputs can result in cut-throat competition.
Trade agreements are typically concluded between asymmetric powers.
Trade integration inherently involves ceding a portion of sovereignty to
regional institutions, something which many developing countries, still in a
process of state building, are unwilling to do. RTAs are likely to be more
successful where the larger power recognises its enlightened self-interest in
not pushing an unbalanced agreement. However, in southern Africa at least,
it seems that a neo-mercantilist approach to RTA negotiation is prevalent.
In Latin America inherent asymmetries highlight the fact that the integration
process has yet to be completed. And members’ unwillingness to subject
themselves to strong legal mechanisms and instead resolve problems through
diplomatic engagement hinders progress.
The case studies demonstrate that political stability and compatible views
are a prerequisite to stable, formal trade relations. However, as a CBM and a
platform to foster commercial linkages and cooperation, trade integration
can, in the long run, ensure convergence of the interests of various actors and
limit the further escalation of tensions.
Notes
1 A movement to abolish tariffs on corn, which were equivalent to taxes on bread.
2 Term used to refer to the free trade movement and laissez-faire thinking in England
during the nineteenth century.
3 Government’s actions to block free trade.
4 Economic freedom indicates how much economic liberalisation a given country
has experienced. See Gartzke (2005: 34).
5 Based on Immanuel Kant’s ideas, as expressed in his work, Perpetual Peace, the
theory suggests that democracies are, in principle, less conflict prone and trade
reinforces their mutual dependence. Thus, it is in their best interest to maintain
the peace.
6 The beneficiaries are Peru, Ecuador, Colombia and Bolivia. The Act expired in
December 2006 and it granted unilateral trade advantages to these countries; they
were allowed to export over 5,000 products without paying duties. The Act was
part of the fight against drug production and trafficking in the Andean region.
7 The armed movement came into existence in 1994, on the very same day that
NAFTA, Mexico’s free trade agreement with the US and Canada, became effect-
ive. It is based in Chiapas, one of Mexico’s poorest states, and its members
are mostly indigenous peasants. The Zapatistas have declared themselves against
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neo-liberalism and globalisation. Although the movement started off with an
armed uprising, the Zapatistas have, in recent times, resorted to more diplomatic
means for presenting their demands to the Mexican government.
8 The Kashmir conflict dates from 1948, the year after both countries’ independence.
9 MFN status indicates that one nation is accorded the same treatment as other
nations trading under the WTO, thus benefitting from lower tariffs and trade
barriers; it signals open trade with that particular nation.
10 Negotiations concluded in 1998 and the definition of the boundary was finalised
in May 1999.
11 South Africa’s regional partners hoped that trade with South Africa, given its
dominant economy, would result in complementarities and, consequently, prosper-
ity. Thus far, the outcome of such trade indicates that South Africa has benefited
the most from the trading arrangement; the rest of the region has not benefited
from similar export–import complementarities.
12 ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967 in Bangkok by the five original mem-
ber countries: Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Thailand. Brunei
Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos People’s
Democratic Republic and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April
1999, http://www.aseansec.org/64.htm (accessed 5 June 2008).
13 The original document can be found at, http://www.oas.org/documents/eng/
DeclaracionSecurity_102803.asp (accessed 5 June 2008).
14 ‘Africa Fund backs unity drive with cash’, Engineering News, 2 July 2007.
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